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
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GEORGE I

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THE NORTHERN WAR

A STUDY OF BRITISH-HANOVERIAN POLICY
IN THE NORTH OF EUROPE IN THE
YEARS 1709 TO 1721

BY

JAMES FREDERICK CHANCE

M.A., F.R.HIST.S.

LONDON
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PREFACE

THE present work is recast[1] from articles which have appeared in the "English Historical Review," with the addition of chapters on the events of the years 1720 and 1721 and with consultation of further authorities, in particular the "Kurakin Archives," the publications of the Russian Historical Society ("Sbornik"), Solov'ev's Russian history, and Schartau's essay on the relations between Hanover and Sweden in the years prior to 1715. The author's design is to trace the progress of northern warfare and diplomacy from the battle of Poltava to the peace of Nystad, with special reference to the part played therein by Great Britain and Hanover.

These northern affairs have not received from English or German historians the attention which they deserve, considering the importance of their influence on the general politics of Europe. To cite examples from English history, the leading phenomenon of the reign of George I was the substitution of alliance with France for the accustomed hostility, and the determining cause thereof was the sudden resolve of Peter the Great to abandon the invasion of Sweden. When in 1718 Cardinal Alberoni turned the arms of Spain against Great Britain and France, he placed his chief hopes of success upon the co-operation of the northern powers, and the belief that he had secured it was a chief reason for the consent of parliament to a declaration of war. And in the last years of our period the aggrandisement of Prussia, which George's northern policy entailed, and the disposal of German provinces without reference to the imperial authority, weighed hardly less than the enforced settlement with Spain and the war of religion in Germany in alienating Great Britain from her old ally Austria. Sufficient notice has not been taken of this influence of the north upon the south; good modern histories contain statements which are contrary to the facts; and only the most scanty notice has been taken of the importance of the trade to the

[1] By the kind permission of Messrs. Longmans, Green, & Co.

eastern Baltic ports, on the protection of which British naval action in that sea was first based.

The bulk of material has been drawn from the archives of the Public Record Office and the British Museum, with aid from those of Paris, Hanover and Stockholm, from published correspondence and papers, and from special works included in the list of authorities given. In the quotations the original spelling is preserved, but punctuation and the use of capitals have been varied and French accentuation has been modernized. Dates, unless otherwise specified, are in the new style.

J. F. CHANCE.

London, *October* 1909.

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GEORGE I

AND

THE NORTHERN WAR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY. THE BALTIC COMMERCE

The accession of the house of Brunswick to the throne of Great Britain brought that country into relations with the north and east of Europe, such as had not previously existed. Up to the end of the seventeenth century the continental powers, whose politics were of moment to her, were France, Spain, and the United Provinces, and political relations with further Europe were subsidiary to them. The affairs of North Germany, of Sweden or Denmark, Poland or Turkey, interested Great Britain of themselves but little, while Russia was as yet only the distant and half-barbarous tsardom of Muscovy. And although the outbreak of the great northern war in 1700 broadened the horizon, the efforts of queen Anne's governments in regard to it were limited to preventing it from entering the empire, and so imperilling the success of the Grand Alliance against France. But anxiety on this score lapsed with the peace of Utrecht, and under Bolingbroke's guidance Great Britain was severed from the continent. Had Anne lived, the northern war might have ended without concerning the island kingdom further than in regard to the Baltic commerce. But George I, as elector of Hanover, at the time of his accession was about to take part in it; his interests centred in North Germany; and that Great Britain should become involved in them was a necessary consequence.

Hanover, to use the common name for Brunswick-Lüneburg, was no petty German state, but ranked high among the secondary powers of Europe, the equal of Prussia and but little the inferior of Denmark. If the dominions united under the rule of George Louis in 1705 were of less extent than those of Prussia, or Saxony, or

Bavaria, their wealth had long been husbanded with an economy which verged on parsimony instead of being wasted on vain display or foreign ambition. Revenues from demesne lands and excise amounted in 1705 to a million and a half of crowns, and in addition there were rich royalties and profits from the mines of the Hartz.[1] Agriculture and manufactures flourished in the hands of an industrious people; flax was exported in large quantities, or made into linen at home; the cloth industry gained such proportions, as to create a serious trouble with England. The rivers Elbe and Weser gave easy communication with the sea. The elector could put into the field a well-equipped army of from twenty-five to thirty thousand men. He was himself a soldier of repute, commanding in the years 1707 to 1709 the army of the empire, and spoken of in 1710 as a possible successor to Marlborough. The Dutch republic had guaranteed his rights to the British throne, and was prepared to support them in arms. Faithful service to the emperor secured to him the favour of Vienna. The Palatine elector, so influential there, was his confidential friend. Hesse and Saxony courted his goodwill, and Denmark and Prussia must always reckon with him. As elector of Hanover he was a leading personage in Europe, and as king of England he became more powerful than the emperor himself.

A thing of portent, indeed, to Europe was the accession of this great prince to the throne of the leading maritime power. If his new subjects were jealous of the imposition of German obligations upon England, continental states equally feared the intrusion of England into Germany. To what heights might not Hanoverian ambition now attain? The power and influence of the Lüneburgers had been rising steadily, the duke of Hanover had gained an electorate, the elector was now a king, and the king, if the house of Habsburg failed, might rise yet higher. That George I might succeed Charles VI on the imperial throne was in 1714 a possibility not disregarded.

In European history the reign of George I is a period of transition from the old to the new. Its principal phenomenon was the creation of the empire of Russia by Peter the Great, whereby the centre of European gravity was shifted eastwards. Sweden, Holland and Turkey receded to the second rank among the powers, Spain rose to new life, the foundation was laid of the future military greatness of Prussia. The characters of the time are Peter the Great and Charles XII; Charles VI, Frederick William I of Prussia, Augustus the Strong, and George himself; Elizabeth of Spain; Eugene,

[1] Edmund Poley, *Account of the Elector and Princes of the House of Brunsvic*, 1705, R. O. Germany (States) 161.

Dubois, Goertz and Alberoni. In England we have the great names of Townshend, Stanhope, and Robert Walpole, while none were more able, or of greater authority in Europe, than George's German minister Bernstorff.

Great Britain in king George's time was mistress of the sea, her trade flourished, and the state of her finances contrasted strongly with the bankrupt condition of most other powers. But if he accomplished great things, if he forced the emperor to accept the Quadruple Alliance, destroyed the armaments of Alberoni, and dictated peace in the north to all except the tsar, it was not by the power of his kingdom alone that he did so, but by the co-operation of France under the regent Orleans and by the influence of Hanover in Germany. As Ranke observes, the united might of Great Britain and France, now for the first time actively presented, acquired by degrees so great authority, that all important European issues were decided by it.[1]

The influence of Hanover upon British foreign policy is a subject of long-standing controversy. Pamphleteers of the opposition in the reigns of George I and George II would have us believe that it was the connexion with Hanover that obliged Great Britain to entangle herself again in the affairs of the continent, and that in their time her interests were consistently subordinated to those of their electorate. But Townshend's government, in seeking in 1714–16 to reconstitute the Grand Alliance, only resumed the policy of its Whig predecessors, discarded by Bolingbroke, and Townshend, Stanhope and Walpole alike based their foreign policy on what they considered to be the interests of Great Britain. Briefly it may be said that George I and his son, though not autocrats in England, unable to dispose of British armaments at will and closely watched by jealous parliaments, were yet able, and not infrequently, to make British interests serve their German aims. Examples of this are seen in the first years of George I in regard to northern affairs, in which Hanover was so immediately concerned. British squadrons were sent to the Baltic first to protect the trade against the prohibitory edicts of Charles XII, afterwards also to prevent the invasion, which it was believed that he was preparing; but George used them in the service of his electoral war with Sweden. And, after the death of Charles, the action of Great Britain against Peter the Great was undertaken with the view of preventing him from becoming master of the Baltic; but it supported George in his feud with that monarch. On the other hand, the treaties of 1719 with Prussia were carried through by the ministers of Great Britain and France against

[1] *Preussische Geschichte*, Book V.

the determined opposition of Bernstorff and his colleagues, always jealous of Prussia and strong in their loyalty to the emperor.

The political relations of Great Britain with Sweden previously to the year 1700 were amicable enough, but only occasionally of importance. William III did his best to bring Charles XI into line against France, but that monarch, after the early experiences of his reign, kept aloof from foreign entanglements, devoting himself to the internal recuperation of his kingdom. But immediately after his death defensive treaties were made with various powers. And when it became known that the kings of Denmark and Poland and the tsar were preparing their unprovoked attack upon his young son, whom they thought to be unable to defend himself, these were extended. On 6 January o.s. 1700 a treaty of mutual defence was concluded with Great Britain for eighteen years, and to this Charles XII constantly appealed in the time of his distress. Another of the same month was with Great Britain and the United Provinces, confirming and extending a previous one of 1698. Its expressed object was the maintenance of the peace of Europe, and its fourth secret article obliged the parties to do their best to preserve peace in the north and to give guarantees of the treaty of Altona of 1689, if necessary. In consequence of these treaties, when Frederick IV of Denmark, soon after their conclusion, made his attack on Holstein, an Anglo-Dutch fleet entered the Sound to aid the counter-attack of Charles XII, while Dutch troops marched to reinforce the army of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. As the result, Frederick was forced to accept the treaty of Travendal and to keep the peace for nine years, during which time the further interference of Great Britain in northern affairs, after it had proved impossible to persuade Charles XII to join the allies against France, was limited to efforts to prevent his arms from disturbing the peace of the empire.

In the hostilities of 1700 the princes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, one of them the future king of England, took part on the side of Holstein and of Sweden. The alliance of Celle and Hanover with the latter power dated from 1683, it had been proved in the field against Denmark in 1689, and it was renewed in 1698 and again in 1704. Charles XII was then fighting his other enemies, Peter the Great and Augustus of Poland, and George Louis of Hanover was regarded as his principal friend, the one man in Europe who had influence with him. "I cannot finde," wrote Robert Harley to the British envoys at Hanover, "that any State or Prince has credit in that Court, but your Electorall House." "There is no Prince that hath credit with the King of Sweden as his Electorall Highnesse." "You know no person has interest with the K.

of Sweden, but the Elector of Hanover." [1] He was consulted, when it was decided to send Marlborough to Alt-Ranstädt in 1707 to divert Charles XII from raising further war within the empire. And, in spite of differences, and of negotiations with Denmark in 1708, he continued to be the ally of Charles at least till 1711. After Poltava, the Swedish minister, Baron Frisendorff, appealed to him as " le meilleur amy du Roy." [2] And at the beginning of 1711 the Holstein minister, Frederick Ernest de Fabrice, wrote from Bender that Charles still regarded him as " son meilleur ami parmi les princes Chrétiens." [3]

Nevertheless, within four years George Louis, now George I, was found conspiring with Frederick William I of Prussia and Frederick IV of Denmark to rob Sweden of her provinces in Germany. How this came about we shall see from what follows. But first it is necessary to say something of the Baltic commerce, whose interests played so great a part in enabling George to utilize for his electoral war with Sweden the resources of Great Britain.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Baltic Sea was practically a Swedish lake. The dominions inherited by Charles XII included the coast-provinces west and east from the Sound to the frontier of Courland, and on the southern shore Pomerania from the Oder to the Recknitz, and Wismar and its dependencies in Mecklenburg. Russia had no outlet to the Baltic, excepting through the Swedish port of Narva, until Peter the Great, early in the century, took that place and built St. Petersburg.

For commercial purposes five divisions of the north of Europe were recognized in England: Sweden and Finland, Denmark and Norway, then under one crown, Germany, Russia, and the " East Country." Germany, as thus understood, only touched the Baltic in Mecklenburg, Lübeck and Sleswick-Holstein, and its trade passed almost entirely through Hamburg. That with Russia had been since 1554 the monopoly of the Muscovia or Russia Company, trading to Archangel or through Narva. The " East Country " comprised the provinces between the Oder and the Gulf of Finland and was served by another chartered company, the Eastland, restricted in its operations to those countries since 1672.

The official returns of English trade with other countries for a series of years from 1697 were published in 1776 by Sir Charles Whitworth. It appears from them that in the years 1697 to 1714 the annual value of imports from Sweden (including Finland)

[1] 18 and 28 July o.s. 1704, 20 Sept. o.s. 1706, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 48.
[2] B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 223, f. 274.
[3] *Anecdotes du séjour*, 24 Dec. o.s. 1710.

varied, in round numbers, from £143,000 to £246,000, with a mean of £182,000, while the exports thither only in one year exceeded £70,000, and fell in another as low as £22,000. For Denmark and Norway the figures show an average of £76,000 for imports, and, omitting 1697, of £43,000 for exports. The trade with Russia varied greatly. The imports had a value of £223,000 in 1704, of £29,000 in 1706, and an annual average of £124,000. The exports, nil in 1697, rose in 1710 to £212,000, with an average, excluding again the former year, of £107,000. For the last three years of the period they were respectively £49,000, £58,000, and £94,000. The figures include, of course, the trade to Archangel, but after the founding of St. Petersburg as much of this as possible was diverted by the tsar's orders thither. The Eastland Company, lastly, imported in these years goods to the average annual value of £146,000 (the maximum £224,000, the minimum £64,000), exporting up to 1708 to the average value of £137,000, but afterwards, in consequence, presumably, of the commercial blockade established by Charles XII, very much less, the amount for 1710 being only £29,634.

The chief exports from England to the north were woollen cloth and other textile fabrics; hardware and earthenware; metals, as wrought iron, lead, and tin; tobacco, sugar, rice, and other foreign produce. The woollen manufactures reached the average annual value of £157,000, of which three-fourths went to Russia and the East Country.[1] The imports were the produce of the northern pine-forests, pitch and tar, masts and deals; of the mines, iron in large quantities, and copper; of the fields, hemp and flax, wheat and rye; besides furs, tallow, and other articles. The hemp and flax came almost entirely from Russia[2] and the East Country, the iron and copper from Sweden, the pitch and tar from Sweden, Norway, and Russia, and most of the timber from Norway. Denmark exported little but cattle to the Netherlands.

Considerable as this Baltic trade was, the economic maxims of the time condemned it as injurious. Two centuries ago the national value of a commerce was measured not by its volume, by the capital it engaged or the labour it employed, but by the preponderance of exports over imports. Money, the measure of wealth, was identified with wealth itself, and the object of commercial legislation was to increase the country's store of coin and bullion. If the imports of a trade exceeded in value the exports, the nation was held to be poorer by the resulting outflow of the precious metals. To preserve the "balance of trade" the reverse

[1] R. O. Board of Trade, Trade Papers 23.
[2] For particulars for 1703–04 see B. M. Add. MSS. 15898, f. 141.

must be the case. Thus we find the Commissioners of Trade reporting in 1697 : [1]

" Finding that we have imported from some countries goods to a much greater original value than we have exported thither ; and it being certain that some private persons may enrich themselves by trading in comodities, which may at the same time diminish the wealth and treasure of the nation, to which no addition can be made by trade but what is gained from foreigners and foreign countries ; and that such an overballance has not been made by any circulation in trade or exchange, so as to make such trades advantageous for this nation, as they have of late been carried on ; we have in our enquiries particularly distinguished the same from others that have a better foundation, conceiving that such trades have occasioned the exportation of coin or bullion, or hind'red the importation thereof."

In the fore-front of such injurious commerce the Commissioners placed that with Sweden, the East Country, and Denmark and Norway. Their report continues :

" The Iron, Hemp, Pitch, Tar, Wyer, Masts, and Deals imported from Sweden and South side of the Baltick Sea we find hath much increased upon us, and that the first cost of late years amounts to above £200,000 per ann. Viz[t]. :

Iron	£70,000
Hemp	90,000
Wire	10,000
Pitch and Tar	15,000
Copper, Masts, Deals, Furs, and other goods	20,000
	£205,000

and that the ships employed of late in that trade are not above one half English bottoms, and that the King of Sweden did about the year 1680 lay a duty of above 50 p. Cent upon our woollen goods imported there, and encouraged woollen manufactures in his own Dominions carried on by the help of wool from England (as we are informed), but exported thither by way of Scotland,[2] and encouraged the expence of such by the example of the Court ; and also having anno 1696 laid such difficulties on the English Merchants, as have constrained them to leave the country, did by these means so discourage the importation of English goods that we have not exported thither the value of £40,000 pr. annum since the laying of those Dutys, by which we are overballanced about £200,000 pr. ann. in goods and freight.

" From Norway and other parts belonging to the King of Denmark, we find the importation of Timber and Deals much augmented since the Fire of London and increase of buildings, and so much thereof in foreign bottoms,

[1] *A Report concerning the General Trade of England made by the Board of Trade Dec. the 23rd*, 1697. R. O. *loc. cit.*

[2] There being strong enactments against the exportation of wool from England.

that from Michaelmas 1691 to Mich'as 1696, there were enter'd in the Custom house at London 1070 foreign ships from those parts, and but 39 English, our ships being charged there with some dutys more than the Danes, and our exportation of goods thither not £10,000 pr. ann. (those people supplying themselves with that they want chiefly from Holland and Hamburgh), and therefore we are overballanced in that Trade by goods and freight at least £150,000 per ann."

From Russia, said the Commissioners, "our importations computed upon the first cost there have not exceeded our exportations," and they only recommended that the Russia Company, reduced to thirteen persons, should be thrown open to all the king's subjects upon the payment of a small fine, a suggestion carried out in 1699.[1]

The measures recommended to place the Swedish and East Country trade upon a better footing were, firstly, that the growth of hemp and flax should be encouraged in Ireland and the production of pitch, tar and copper in New England, in both of which cases there would be the additional advantage of employing only English ships; secondly, that the use of English and Spanish iron should be promoted; and thirdly, that every endeavour should be made to obtain the removal of the burdens and disabilities, under which the English merchants laboured. In pursuance of the first of these recommendations an act to encourage importation from the North American plantations was passed in 1703 and was supplemented by later legislation of the reign. Bounties were allowed for pitch and tar, resin and turpentine, hemp, masts, yards, and bowsprits imported of proper quality. Regulations were made for the preservation of the pine-forests. Among other measures may be noted the planting of a colony of Palatine refugees on the Hudson river in 1710, with the express purpose of manufacturing pitch and tar from the forests of New York.[2] The Irish linen industry had already been founded by the well-known act of 1696.

If, then, the Baltic trade was regarded as financially injurious to Great Britain, how came it that the restrictions placed upon it by Charles XI and Charles XII seriously imperilled, as they did, the good relations between two powers whose political and religious interests were allied? We find the answer in the nature of the commodities imported. They were the materials for building ships, and at the beginning of the eighteenth century they could only be obtained in sufficient quantity from the north. The

[1] The fine was fixed at £5. The Eastland Company had been similarly thrown open in 1672 for a fine of £2 (Macpherson, II. 706, 563).

[2] For the beneficial results of this legislation, and also for particulars of the heavy disabilities placed upon British merchants in Sweden and the East Country, I may refer to the *English Historical Review*, XVI. 680–83.

prosperity of Great Britain and other sea-faring nations depended then upon the produce of the Baltic regions. Hulls might be built of British oak, but pine-timber for the masts and yards, hemp for the ropes, flax for the sails, pitch and tar for their various uses must come for the present thence, and a stoppage of the supply meant that men-of-war and merchantmen could not put to sea. If the Baltic convoy miscarried, Townshend wrote in 1715, "such a scarcity of naval stores must ensue, as would disable His Majesty from fitting out a fleet next spring upon any event." [1] And again, "it is our misfortune at this juncture, by the knavery of the Muscovites in imposing on our merchants last year, to have our navall magazines so ill provided with stores, particularly with hemp, that if the fleet of merchant men, now lading in the Baltick, should by any accident miscarry, it will be impossible for His Majesty to fitt out any ships of war for the next year, by which means the whole navy of England will be rendered perfectly useless." [2] Such were the considerations which enabled George I in the first instance to bring British squadrons to the Baltic.

[1] 2 Aug. o.s. 1715, B. M. Add. MSS. 28154, f. 248.
[2] 22 Sept. o.s. 1716, Coxe, II. 86.

CHAPTER II

THE NEUTRALITY CONVENTION OF 1710

THE treaty of Travendal, or rather that article of it which prohibited Frederick IV from ever aiding again the enemies of Sweden, was guaranteed, among other powers, by Great Britain, the United Provinces and Brunswick-Lüneburg. For the treaty of Alt-Ranstädt of September 1706, which temporarily deprived Augustus II of the Polish crown, that king engaged to solicit the guarantees of the emperor and the sea-powers, and though these were never given, that of Great Britain was regarded as promised.[1] Prussia and Hanover gave their guarantees, and all the powers, including France, recognized Stanislaus Leszczinski as king of Poland. When therefore Charles XII in the autumn of 1707 led his army out of Saxony to attack Peter the Great in the heart of Muscovy, he appeared to leave his position in Poland and North Germany secure. Not that either Frederick IV or Augustus, the latter the man least to be trusted of his time, could be expected to observe the engagements forced upon them, if opportunity offered to repudiate them, but Charles relied on the guarantees of the powers his allies. Resolute himself to sacrifice everything rather than to break his word, he refused to take into reckoning that they might find themselves unable to perform their undertakings.

When the news of the catastrophe of Poltava came in August 1709, Augustus at once issued a manifesto [2] repudiating his treaty, and re-entered Poland. He had already in June come to an understanding with Frederick IV to renew the war, and the two had done their best to draw the king of Prussia into it; but willing as the last-named was to join them, in spite of his guarantee and of his own treaty concluded with Charles XII at Alt-Ranstädt in August 1707, his minister Ilgen was able to hold him back. He concluded, however, a defensive alliance with them on

[1] Cf. p. 28. The Swedish envoy Leyoncrona's account of the council at which the guarantee was definitely promised was made use of later by Count Gyllenborg; R. O. Foreign Ministers 61.

[2] 8 Aug. 1709; the German text, Beskow, *Karl den Tolfte*, pp. 83–86; a French translation, said to be from the Latin original, Dumont, VIII. i. 237.

28 June.[1] The two kings renewed their league with Peter the Great in October, and Frederick of Denmark then declared war. The 15,000 Swedish troops left in Poland under General Krassau retired into Pomerania, pursued by a Russian force to the frontier of Brandenburg.

The powers, who should have interfered, were engaged to the utmost of their resources in the war with France and naturally placed their own interests before those of Sweden. Those interests required, in the first place, that the German and Danish troops serving in the Netherlands and elsewhere should not be withdrawn for the defence of their own countries. Marlborough stated in 1709 that, if what was feared happened, 40,000 Danes, Saxons and Prussians, and perhaps also 20,000 Holsteiners and Brunswickers, might be lost from the Netherlands alone.[2] Accordingly we find queen Anne's government taking no thought for the interests of Charles, but only that his troops might be prevented from breaking again into Poland or the empire.

In December 1709 the earl of Stair and a Dutch envoy were sent to the king of Poland, in order, Stair was instructed, " that you may make together the proper instances for keeping that Prince steddy to the Interests of the Allys, whose friendship and concurrence with Our measures at this conjuncture is of the highest importance to Our service, and to the good of the Common Cause." Having acquainted himself with the views held at the Hague, he was to proceed to Hanover " particularly to acquaint the Elector in Our name with these Our instructions to you, and receive from him what further directions he shall think fit to add for your guidance in this your negotiation." To the king of Poland he was to give " expressions of Our particular satisfaction at his being happily settled in his Kingdom of Poland, with assurances of Our firm friendship for him, and Our constant inclination towards advancing his interests." (Queen Anne had already warmly congratulated the tsar on his victory at Poltava.) What was especially demanded of Augustus now, Stair was told, was for him to concur " to preserve the tranquility of the Empire, and keep the war out of Germany." All efforts, he was to say, were being made to keep the Swedes quiet, so that they should neither re-enter Poland, nor attack Denmark in Germany nor in Sleswick or Jutland, nor molest Saxony. If they should make any such attempt, the queen would combine with the emperor, the States-General, and the king of Poland to

[1] See Droysen, IV. i. 333–36; Lundberg, pp. 4–6. Peter the Great also sought to gain the king of Prussia, meeting him at Marienwerder.

[2] Coxe, *Memoirs of John Duke of Marlborough*, III. 123, citing his despatch to Godolphin.

prevent it. It was hoped further that the last-named would use his influence with the kings of Denmark and Prussia and with the tsar to the end desired.[1] How strongly Stair advocated the interests of Augustus may be seen in his despatches.[2] Secretary Boyle wrote to him on 27 January o.s. 1710 that he was to find out " what measures would be most acceptable to his Majesty for securing the Neutrality of Germany and dissipating the apprehensions the Poles may have of the return of Crassau's Troops into their country," and on 14 April o.s., " there is no doubt but that the Neutrality will be punctually complyed with, and the dominions of his Polish Majesty, as well as the other princes concerned, secured from all hostilitys." [3]

The " Neutrality " referred to was a scheme devised to maintain peace within the empire. It was proposed that the Swedish provinces should be declared neutral territory, that is to say, that neither should they be invaded nor the Swedes use them as a base for counter-attack. This expedient commended itself alike to the friends and to the enemies of Sweden ; to the former, because their object would be secured, to the latter, because they would be protected on the side of Germany while prosecuting their war elsewhere. Protracted negotiations during the winter resulted in a convention embodying the scheme being signed by the representatives of the emperor, Great Britain and the United Provinces at the Hague on 31 March 1710.[4] It provided for preservation of the neutrality by force of arms, if necessary. It was accepted by the other powers concerned, and, in spite of the crushing defeat inflicted upon the Danes at Helsingborg, by the senate of Sweden ; such was the exhaustion of the country, that there was no alternative.[5]

The elector of Hanover supported the convention strongly, for two reasons : firstly in the interests of the war with France, in which he was so zealous, and secondly because he, like the king of Prussia, who proposed the scheme,[6] was a neighbour of Sweden in Germany. If the war should be carried across the Elbe into Bremen and Verden, he might become involved in it. The princes of Brunswick-Lüneburg had always looked with a jealous eye upon

[1] From Stair's instructions, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 209.
[2] R. O. Poland 116.
[3] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 121.
[4] Dumont, VIII. i. 249.
[5] The miserable state to which Sweden was reduced was set forth in the memorials of Count Gyllenborg, the Swedish minister in London ; see especially that of 20 April o.s. 1710, R. O. Foreign Ministers 61. Robert Jackson, the British minister resident at Stockholm, came home specially to represent the same to the British and Dutch governments. The letters he brought from the Swedish regency, dated 18 Feb. o.s. 1710, are printed by Lamberty (VI. 271–73) ; the original of that to queen Anne is at the Record Office, Royal Letters 56.
[6] So Droysen, IV. i. 342.

those duchies, as they were commonly called, which divided their dominions from the sea and commanded the estuaries of both Elbe and Weser. Their possession by Sweden had long been a prime reason with them for keeping on friendly terms with so powerful a neighbour. They would rather, no doubt, have had them themselves, and if Sweden were to lose them, could not consent that any other power should possess them. But at this time George Louis seems only to have been anxious to prevent disturbance arising. He, as well as Frederick I of Prussia, had been approached by the kings of Denmark and Poland in the previous summer, the former suggesting that he should have a good part of the duchy of Bremen and promising to seek no acquisitions in Germany himself; while both undertook not to recall their troops from the Netherlands.[1] But the elector put them off, desiring only to maintain the tranquillity of Germany. And he pursued the same course in regard to overtures from Peter the Great.

Peter sent to Hanover in November 1709 Prince Boris Kurakin, whose diplomatic career was to be so distinguished. He was instructed to discover first, acting incognito, the sentiments of the ministers, reports indicating that Bernstorff was strongly disinclined to the cause of Sweden, and then, if it appeared proper, to inform Bernstorff that he brought an autograph letter from the tsar and to desire a private audience. If he found what he should say well received, he might then produce his full powers to negotiate a treaty of alliance, whose conditions would be that the parties should mutually support each other's pretensions, that no peace should be made with Sweden until those pretensions were satisfied, and that the tsar should do his best to obtain the assent of his allies and the elector endeavour to enlist the aid of England. He reached Hanover on 23 November. At the audience granted him he expressed himself exactly in the terms of his instructions. He pointed out that the elector, so far from receiving thanks from Charles XII for his faithful services, had experienced from him nothing but vexation and opposition, and that, if the Swedish king had not fortunately been humbled, he would have been disposed to burst again into the empire, to the no small injury of all his neighbours. Although allied with Sweden, the elector was entitled to look after his own interests, and should consider the insecurity of his dominions while Bremen and Verden remained in Swedish hands. The tsar did not desire to ruin any crown entirely, as the king of Sweden desired to ruin Russia, but only to keep him within bounds. In reply to these representations

[1] Schartau, pp. 16 foll.

George expressed the hope that the tsar did not intend to trouble the empire, occupied with the war with France, and would make peace with Sweden in the present winter; and Kurakin gave him all assurances. But the suggestion that the elector should join the league against Sweden was put off on the ground that thereby the flames of war would be lighted within the empire, to the prejudice of the war with France. Bernstorff, however, stated that Krassau could not be allowed to attack the king of Denmark, for the same reason. At a future time, he thought, the proposed alliance might be entered into, but not now. Kurakin then went on to propose a treaty of friendship and good correspondence, with the object of maintaining the quiet of Germany, or at least that the elector should promise to stand neutral. Such a defensive treaty commended itself, and after repeated exchange of drafts and counter-drafts was concluded under date 3 July 1710. Its fourth and fifth articles provided for the neutrality of the Swedish provinces, while a separate article allowed the elector, in spite of his undertaking not to furnish the enemy with money, to acquire from the crown of Sweden by purchase or mortgage lands, subjects, rights or revenues.[1] A similar treaty was concluded on 14 July with Denmark, which included mutual guarantees of territories held.[2] Before he left Hanover (7 August) Kurakin wrote that though the elector could not take immediate action against Krassau's corps, the Hanoverians expected to procure for themselves in the end the provinces they had in view by purchase.[3]

In the meantime the belief, that the immunity of Germany from war was secured, had been rudely upset. The allies, in formulating their scheme of neutrality, had reckoned without Charles XII. Escaped from Poltava to Bender in Bessarabia he had been extremely well received there by the Turkish authorities, had received promise of assistance, and was expecting very soon to reappear in Poland at the head of an irresistible array of Turks and Tartars.[4] That Krassau's force should be prevented from marching to meet him there was the last thing in his thoughts. As soon as he heard of the neutrality negotiations he sent home orders that no terms should be made without his consent, and, before long, withdrew from his senate the direction of foreign

[1] *Kurakin Archives*, II. 22–26, 185–313, 321 foll., instructions and correspondence; Solov'ev, Book XVI. chap. i.; Schartau, pp. 35, 36.

[2] Schartau, pp. 34, 35.

[3] To Shafirov, 6 Aug. 1710, *Kurakin Archives*, II. 337.

[4] Sir Robert Sutton, the British ambassador at Constantinople, wrote a year later that besides the remnants of Charles's Swedes, Cossacks, Wallachs, and Poles, 10,000 Turks and a great body of Tartars would follow him into Poland (16 Nov. o.s. 1710, R. O. Turkey 22). Later, these forces were magnified in the public report.

affairs, directing his envoys and officers to obey orders from himself alone. And he demanded of the guarantors of the treaty of Travendal, and especially of Great Britain as their chief, that they should carry out their engagements against the king of Denmark.[1] Owing to the remoteness of his place of refuge—the journey from Bender to Vienna usually took a month, and then the courier had only accomplished half the distance to the Hague—his letters, dated 21 March o.s. 1710, were not received till June. Those to the elector of Hanover were three in number. The first required military aid against Denmark, the second set forth the treason of the king of Poland, the third concerned the directorate of Lower Saxony.[2] George Louis explained in reply the reasons why he could not interfere actively on Charles's behalf, namely, that he could not do so alone, that his guarantees only obliged him to act in concert with the other powers, that the emperor, Great Britain, and the Dutch republic denied having guaranteed the treaty of Alt-Ranstädt, and that the king of Prussia, who had done so, had already recognized Augustus as king of Poland.[3] In doing this he distinguished himself from his fellow-guarantors, who did not take the trouble to reply to Charles at all. And he arranged to advance to Sweden the sum of 240,000 crowns on the security of two bailiwicks near Rothenburg,[4] and this, in spite of the objections of other powers, including England.[5] True, that the bailiwicks would have been a valuable acquisition, but the loan would have enabled the fortresses of Bremen and Verden to be put in a proper state of defence. The money was already provided, when there came from Charles XII peremptory orders to break the negotiation off.

Charles's repudiation of their work, and the knowledge that Krassau might undertake the offensive, disquieted the allies against France wofully. It is remarkable to read in the despatches what fear Krassau's troops inspired, and what greater importance was attached to keeping him quiet than to saving him from attack. It was Charles, indeed, who was dreaded, and not his opponents. Really Krassau's force, plague-stricken

[1] The original of his letter to queen Anne, R. O. Royal Letters 56.

[2] *Kurakin Archives*, II. 272.

[3] Copies of the elector's two letters of 28 June 1710, sent by Jefferyes from Hanover in February 1711, R.O. Sweden 17.

[4] D'Alais from Hanover, 3 Feb. 1711, R. O. Germany (States) 164. Particulars of this negotiation, Schartau, pp. 45–48.

[5] Townshend from the Hague, 24 Feb. 1711, R.O. Holland 236. St. John wrote to D'Alais, 16 Feb. o.s. : " I am glad to hear your Court has not yet paid any of the purchase-money for the Baillages which they have lately bought of Sweden. The furnishing of money for the Swedes at this juncture by any means, gives great ground of complaint." R. O. Foreign Entry Book 48, and similarly 9 and 30 March o.s.

and half-starved, was hardly fit to defend itself in Pomerania; but the reputation of the Swedish soldiers magnified its strength, and Stenbock's victory at Helsingborg had opened the prospect of reinforcements to be sent from home. Proposals to hire the troops, or a part of them, for service against France failed, for Charles sent word that he required them for his own purposes. In these circumstances it was deemed necessary to give effect to the provision in the convention for the use of force. Prussia and Hanover particularly urged this, as also did the ministers of the tsar and his allies at the Hague. A supplementary convention was signed there on 4 August [1] prescribing the contingents to be furnished by the different states concerned. As the weeks went on, indeed, and Charles's affairs seemed not to prosper at the Porte, the necessity for assembling this "neutrality corps" appeared less urgent,[2] and that the trouble and expense of assembling it might be saved was particularly the view of the new Tory government in England. Henry St. John, secretary of state for the Northern Province, rebellious from the first against interference in continental affairs, gave expression to the opinion: "they will not find it easy to persuade us to comply in this affair, who have so much on our hands already." [3] It was not, he said, for the interest of England that Sweden should be ruined for the benefit of "the Muscovite and the Pole," but that a proper balance of power should be maintained in the north.[4]

But at the end of the year came the startling news that Charles had been successful in persuading the sultan to declare war upon the tsar. Alarming reports reached the emperor from his minister at Constantinople and infected the Hague and London. It was believed that Charles meant to attack the empire in concert with France; "the scheme," St. John wrote, "which there is no room to doubt has been concerted between them." [5] The northern confederates renewed their instances for the assembly of the neutrality corps [6] and all set themselves in earnest to collect it.

The sentiments of Charles are explained to us by Frederick Ernest de Fabrice, who was accredited to him at Bender by the administrator of Holstein-Gottorp, and was further charged with

[1] Dumont, VIII. i. 254.

[2] Cf. Townshend from the Hague, 7 and 31 Oct. 1710, R. O. Holland 236.

[3] To Lord Raby at Berlin, 24 Oct. o.s. 1710, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 52.

[4] Cf. to Marlborough, 10 Nov. o.s., ibid. 78, a despatch of great length on the affairs of the north.

[5] To Peterborough at Vienna, 13 Feb. o.s. 1711, ibid. 40, and similarly elsewhere.

[6] Cf. memorials to the States-General by the tsar's minister Matvyéev, and the replies, B. M. Add. MSS. 33005 (abstracts).

instructions from the elector of Hanover.[1] As the envoy of a closely allied state, and in constant communication with Charles both in public and in private, he had exceptional opportunity of observing him. The king, he says, piqued himself upon his promise not to interfere in the affairs of others. But he would not brook the slightest menace; menaces and danger but whetted his desire to brave them.[2] In his past conduct he had never given any sign of a desire to aid France; the contrary was the case. But the guarantors of the treaties of Travendal and Alt-Ranstädt had limited their efforts in his behalf to remonstrance. Charles had reminded them of their duties, but only the elector of Hanover had thought fit to explain in return the reasons of his inability to perform them. The allies had recognized Augustus as king of Poland. They had set on foot a scheme of neutrality, of which the first end was their own interest and only the second, or perhaps one of several, to preserve the German provinces of Sweden. So far from aiding Charles, they had moved heaven and earth to foil his efforts to rouse the Porte to action. When these had been successful, they asked for assurance that he would not disturb the empire. But they had given no assurances in his favour in return, and he demanded as much consideration at Bender as in Saxony. The Turkish war was not directed in any way against the empire, nor even against the republic of Poland. It was only desired to reduce the power of the tsar, daily becoming more redoubtable. Indeed the mere suspicion that Charles meditated injury to the emperor or his allies was offensive to him. If they desired further assurance, they must send to him able ministers to convince him of their good intentions. The most essential token that they could give thereof would be to force a peace upon Denmark; in regard to Augustus, they might offer their mediation. If they sent a force to prevent Krassau from entering Poland, within a year, Fabrice thought, they would see Germany in flames. The offer of a loan by the elector of Hanover was taken as a mark of friendship, but, to avoid misunderstanding, Charles had ordered

[1] Fabrice was the second son of one of George's most trusted ministers, Weipart Louis de Fabrice. His despatches to the administrator and to his minister Goertz have been printed as *Anecdotes du séjour du Roi de Suède à Bender*, Hamburg, 1760. I use here an unpublished despatch to Bernstorff of 25 March o.s. 1711, a copy of which was furnished to the British government (R. O. Sweden 131). Despatches of the end of December 1710 to Bernstorff and to Goertz are of similar effect; an extract from the former by Robethon is at the British Museum, *Stowe MSS.* 223, f. 440.

[2] "Vous connoisés le Roi, et vous savés, que vouloir empêcher une chose, ou la lui défendre, est lui en donner l'envie et l'y obliger" (Fabrice to Goertz, 24 Dec. o.s. 1710). "He thinks he has been neglected by the Allys, who instead of assisting him in his misfortunes have taken occasion to prescribe him laws; this is what he can't bear" (Jefferyes, 15 June o.s. 1711, R. O. Sweden 17).

the regency of Bremen to accept money only from private persons, and for the same reason had declined a similar offer of 200,000 crowns from the administrator of Holstein-Gottorp. Alliance with Hanover would always be preferred to alliance with Prussia.

The peace with Denmark, says Fabrice, was " le grand Article,"[1] and Charles was willing to grant it. He had, indeed, instructed his senate in this sense, as soon as he heard of the victory at Helsingborg.[2] Its advantages were obvious, though Charles might not consider that. The fleet might be reduced, commerce would be relieved, the German provinces be assailable only from Poland, and the forces employed in guarding the south coast of Sweden and the Norway frontier might be sent to reinforce Krassau. The Danes themselves were not unwilling to come to terms, and, had the issue of Peter the Great's Turkish campaign of 1711 been different, would probably have done so.

Here then was a defeated exile, not crushed or despondent, but confident of his powers and resources, demanding, not praying, dictating rather than accepting terms.[3] What to reply to his demands, or what to do at all, the allies frankly did not know. The British government tardily sent to Bender Captain James Jefferyes, who had attended Charles in his last campaign and had been taken prisoner at Poltava.[4] He was instructed on three points: to obtain Charles's consent to the neutrality convention, to discover whether mediation by the queen and her allies would be accepted, and to obtain the revocation of the edict lately issued against trade to the eastern Baltic ports. For the summer of 1710 had been employed by Peter the Great in completing the conquest of the Swedish provinces south of Finland, and he had reduced in turn Viborg, Riga, Pernau, Arensburg, Reval, and Keksholm. Charles had thereupon prohibited trade to those coasts and commissioned privateers to prey upon the merchantmen venturing thither, and their depredations had begun. But Jefferyes could not be heard from for months; leaving in January 1711, and staying on his way at the Hague, Hanover and Vienna, he did not reach Bender till the end of April. And in the meantime, at the beginning of March, Charles's formal protest against the neutrality convention was presented at the Hague. It stated that, when the king heard

[1] And so Sir Robert Sutton, 12 Feb. o.s. 1711, *loc. cit.*

[2] *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 365. For the negotiations, see Carlson, pp. 15–18.

[3] Very instructive as to Charles's defiant confidence is his despatch to the senate of 3 Feb. o.s. 1711, absolutely refusing any accommodation with Russia, and insisting upon uncompromising resistance (*Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 369).

[4] He was a son of Col. Sir James Jefferyes, who had been in the service of Charles XI. Becoming secretary to Dr. John Robinson, British envoy to Sweden, he accompanied him to Alt-Ranstädt in 1707, and was allowed to attend the Swedish army on its departure for Russia.

of the convention, he did not doubt but that its sole aim was to make his kingdom and provinces safe, as he might not only expect from the friendship of his allies, established by treaties, but even demand as a right. But when he perceived that his enemies' cause was equally protected and favoured by it, and that his dominions were abandoned to their attack, when opportunity served, without any succour from his friends, he had ordered his ministers to declare openly that he would in no wise be bound by it. And he now made it formally known that, relying on the Divine help and the justice of his cause, he would reserve to himself the unrestricted power of employing against his enemies the means and strength which God had given him, wherever and whenever the usage of war should demand. And if, contrary to all hope and expectation, anyone should cast aside his friendly sentiments and put impediment in his way, then, when the time came for him to attack the enemy leagued against him, he could not look upon such an one otherwise than as an aggressor.[1]

The delivery of this document caused great alarm, and it was thought that the neutrality corps ought to march at once. But it was hard enough to find troops for service against France; now some 20,000 men were to be found for an independent object. For all his efforts, Marlborough remained short of three or four battalions to complete the 8,400 infantry to be provided by the sea-powers. Equal difficulty was experienced in providing the other quotas. The place of rendezvous could not be fixed; some were for the frontier of Holland or Holstein, some for the Pomeranian, others for Saxony or Silesia. The command of the force was in dispute between George Louis of Hanover and his son-in-law, the prince royal of Prussia. One much discussed expedient was to employ for the purpose the Saxon troops in the service of the allies under the command of Augustus himself, but the various forms of this were rejected as inconsistent with the scheme of the neutrality.[2] St. John, hopelessly embarrassed, could only fulminate against the mismanagement of the neutrality scheme by the authorities at the Hague, to whom, he insisted, its conduct had been left. "Every

[1] Dated Bender, 30 Nov. o.s. 1710. The Latin text, Dumont, VIII. i. 258. It agrees with a copy sent from the Hague by Townshend (R. O. Holland 236). Lamberty's version is inaccurate and in parts unintelligible.

[2] See Townshend's despatches from the Hague of January and February 1711, and those of St. John to him, R. O. Holland 236, Foreign Entry Book 79. If Augustus, St. John wrote, recalled his troops from the service of the allies, then they would be able to allege this as a cause for not marching their contingents, and "to keep out of the Fray, . . . and to preserve the Character of Neuters with great exactness." But Augustus, he said, judged better than to take that measure, as he wished to engage the allies in hostilities with Charles, "and I find we are like more or less to have our share in this Broil" (30 Jan. o.s.).

measure that occurs to one's thoughts," he wrote, " is immediately attended by a crowd of objections, and yet the necessity of resolving on something presses us very hard." To force a peace upon Denmark would be to quarrel " with those Northern Powers who are at present our certain friends, and whose troops are employed in our service against the common enemy, and that in favour of a prince, who is a very uncertain friend to us, and from whose troops we have many just apprehensions of disturbance, without the expectation of any assistance." Augustus, " a good ally," and Peter, could not be abandoned to Charles's fury.[1] A " trimming dilatory game " was the only one that could be played. A truce in regard to the empire had been proposed, and if that were accepted, " whether the Peace succeed or not, we shall have consumed the summer, and shall be got over the crisis of our present distemper."[2]

But of a truce Charles would not hear. The Danes, said his minister Count Gyllenborg, had been beaten, Augustus was not to be feared, the Muscovites had conquered all they could. A cessation of arms would oblige Charles to keep his army starving in his own devastated provinces.[3] It would deprive him of the fruits of his efforts at the Porte, and be of advantage only to his enemies.[4]

Peter the Great meanwhile was making every effort at the Hague through his ambassador Matvyeev to deter the allies from undertaking action against Denmark. Assurance was given that nothing would be done to disturb Germany or interfere with the French war. And Prince Kurakin was acting similarly in England, where he had arrived, after tarrying at Hamburg and in Holland, at the beginning of November. He was instructed to protest that, in spite of slanderous reports, the tsar intended nothing to the prejudice of the queen and her allies and would remain entirely neutral in regard to the war with France. The king of Sweden on the other hand, he was to say, had engaged in negotiation with Louis XIV. With regard to the tsar's own designs of conquest, it was entirely false that he proposed to keep Riga and Livonia for himself, his campaign had only been undertaken to obtain Ingria and to aid the king of Denmark ; he was under treaty with the

[1] It was not likely, St. John banteringly remarked, that Charles would admit Peter to a peace on any terms, " since in that case he would have no Enemy left at all ; and to have always one seems to be an article very essential to his happiness."

[2] See to his Amsterdam confidant, John Drummond, 27 April o.s. (Gilbert Parke), and to Marlborough, Lord Raby and Whitworth, April and May, R. O. Foreign Entry Books 78, 79, 52. Whitworth, accredited to the tsar, wrote on 14 May from Hanover, " if time can be gained till next winter the Allies will certainly then have a better prospect of turning the whole affair " (R. O. Russia 7).

[3] " Il y crevera faute des vivres, lesquels sans cela il seroit allé querir dans les Pays ennemis."

[4] Memorial of 5 June o.s. 1711, R. O. Foreign Ministers 61.

king of Poland to deliver up Livonia to him. If mediation were proposed, Kurakin was to express the tsar's willingness to accept it, as he had been willing to do at the beginning of the war when the Swedes would not hear of it; but first he must have the king of Sweden's conditions in writing; nor must Kurakin request the mediation, but on the contrary avoid, if possible, all mention of it. Expressions of jealousy of the tsar's naval power should be met by the assertion that he intended to keep a strong fleet in the Baltic only for his own security, and would place no hindrance in the way of trade to the ports which he had occupied. Proposals for a treaty of commerce must be taken *ad referendum*.[1]

Nothing substantive, then, was to be proposed in England, as had been done at Hanover, and the details of Kurakin's negotiation are not of importance. He stayed in England till the end of June 1711, and then left for Holland. Peter the Great wrote to Anne after the receipt of Charles's protest and received a formal letter of assurance in return.[2]

The protest, and confirmatory letters received from Fabrice, had a powerful effect at Hanover, silencing the friends of Sweden.[3] To assist Baron Bothmer in a last effort to obtain the assembly of the neutrality corps the elector sent to the Hague his trusted secretary of embassies John de Robethon. But he had no success and was constrained, after some months of negotiation, to advise that the whole scheme must be given up.[4] It was found necessary to acquiesce in the repression of the Swedes in Pomerania by force. Bernstorff told D'Alais that no cognizance would be taken of the intended march of the Danes through Mecklenburg, and that the king of Poland and his allies could not leave the Swedish army in their rear, when exposed to the attack of Charles's Turks and Tartars from the south. The king of Sweden, he said, had so expressly declared that he would fall upon his enemies everywhere, that they could not be hindered from taking measures of defence.[5] The Danish campaign was actually rendered feasible by a loan from Hanover, not of the 240,000 crowns which Charles had refused, but of a whole million, half of which sum was actually paid before the campaign began. This loan also was strongly objected

[1] *Kurakin Archives*, II. 26–29.

[2] 29 April and 21 June 1711 o.s. respectively, ibid. 39–44.

[3] "La protestation du Roy," D'Alais wrote, "a changai entièrement les sentiments que quelques uns avoient ici en sa faveur." 10 March 1711, R. O. Germany (States) 164.

[4] An account of this mission of Robethon, compiled from the original papers, in Spittler's *Göttingisches historisches Magazin*, I. 553 foll. For the difficulties which prevented the assembly of the neutrality corps see, besides the despatches, Lamberty, VI. 470–71.

[5] D'Alais, 3 July, *loc. cit.*

to in England, not only on account of the injury to Sweden but because it was feared that the king of Denmark would by it be enabled to take back into his own pay his troops hired to the allies. He was actually making great difficulties about the renewal of his treaty for this purpose. The elector assured the British government that it had been stipulated that the money should not be used in this way.[1] And indeed he sought to impose terms on the confederates as the price of the powers' consent to their invasion of Pomerania, namely, that they should in no way hinder the operations against France, that the Danish and Saxon troops should not be recalled from the Netherlands, that the places conquered should be handed over to the custody of the sea-powers till the conclusion of the war, that Mecklenburg and Lauenburg should suffer as little injury as possible and above all not be used for winter-quarters, that the Danes should not cross the Elbe, and that his own lands and interests, and those of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, should not be compromised in any way. These conditions were embodied in a treaty proposed to the Russian and Saxon ministers at Hanover, and to press them John Louis de Fabrice, the elder brother of him who was at Bender, was sent to Dresden. But he had no success ; the tsar and the king of Poland felt themselves sufficiently secure and the king of Denmark was not to be put off from his present designs upon Bremen and Verden. He proposed that the elector should rather join with him for their mutual advantage.[2]

Jefferyes's first despatches reached London on 8 July o.s. The neutrality convention, he reported Charles to say, had been made without his knowledge and was of advantage to his enemies rather than himself : he could not accept it. The mediation offered by the queen was out of place ; she was bound by treaty to compel the kings of Denmark and Poland to make peace ; as for the tsar, negotiation with him was the business of the Porte. The blockade of the Baltic ports must and should be maintained so long as they remained in Peter's power.[3] This plain uncompromising refusal dispelled any remaining hopes of accommodation. Charles would not accede to the proposals of the British government ; they could not give effect to his demands. St. John branded his conduct in reference to the blockade as "groundless and intolerable," talked of force, and vented his spleen by denouncing

[1] See D'Alais' and St. John's despatches of July and August 1711, R. O. Germany (States) 164 and Foreign Entry Book 48.

[2] Schartau, pp. 65–67.

[3] Charles's formal answer to Jefferyes, 2 May o.s. 1711, with the latter's further memorial on commerce in November and the reply, Lamberty, VI. 453, 465–68.

in scathing terms the whole northern policy of the allies since the treaty of Alt-Ranstädt.[1]

And now the proposal that, as there was no possibility of setting the neutrality corps on foot, the confederates should be allowed to attack the Swedes in Pomerania was being seriously discussed. It was approved, as we have seen, at Hanover, and was gaining the assent of the British and Dutch governments, much as they disliked it. St. John opened his mind on the subject to Marlborough as follows : [2]

" I would speak to Your Grace concerning the situation of the Northern affairs, but they are now come to such a pitch of distraction, the demands made upon us by both sides are so high, and so peremptory, every expedient which can be thought of is lyable to so many objections, in short it is so dangerous to the common cause to do anything, and so impossible to do nothing, that her Majesty and all those, who have the honour to serve her, are at a loss what measure to take upon the Resolution which the States-Generall are come to, and have transmitted hither. The only Ouverture they seem to have thought of, through which to extricate themselves and us from the present difficulty, is a proposition that the Saxon Recruits should continue where they are, and that these Forces with the Corps of Neutrality should stand by, whilst the Confederates of the North do by a very gross connivance on our part, march into Pomerania, and attack the army of Sweden, in which case the States hope that these Princes will go no further than barely to deliver themselves from the apprehension which they are under of that Body. Your Grace sees how little likely it is that King Augustus and his allyes will exert much moderation in their success, and how destructive it may prove of the Ballance of Power in the North, and of the Protestant interest in Germany, if those provinces of Sweden should be subdued and parcelled out. . . . The Dutch have had the whole conduct of this affair, if they get as well out of it, I shall have a great opinion of their ability or of their luck."

And to James Scott, lately sent to Dresden, he wrote :

" You will be pleased to begin with giving King Augustus's Ministers to understand that we are extreamly surpriz'd at the unfriendly conduct of their Court in relation to the Act of Neutrality, since the chief aim seems to be an entire inversion of the design with which we enter'd into it. Our only view was preserving the Peace of the Empire, and preventing by the Act of Neutrality any disturbance which might happen to us in the prosecution of our warr against France, but instead of that, two measures are now insisted upon, either of which would be extremely prejudicial to the Common Cause. For if we consent that the Forces, which we have provided for the preservation

[1] See his despatches to Whitworth, Marlborough and Drummond, 12 and 10 July and 3 Aug. o.s., published by Gilbert Parke, and those to Dayrolle and Orrery, 10 to 24 July o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Books 74, 79.

[2] 20 July o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 78.

of Peace, should be the beginners of Hostility, and that the troops which we intended only as a security for the Empire, should be permitted to attack the Swedes, we should be necessarily engaged as principals in the Northern warr, and it is too obvious what a diversion of our strength that must prove, and how much it must weaken our efforts against France." [1]

However, in spite of such expression of the views of the British government, to allow the confederates to invade Pomerania seemed to be the only course to pursue, and a final resolution was adopted at the Hague on 14 August authorizing Augustus to employ for it a portion of his Saxons engaged for service in the Netherlands, and to do his best to reduce the Swedish garrisons; for the rest, the act of neutrality to continue in force.[2] St. John wrote of the "expedient":

"How satisfactory it may be to the Czar, I can't say, but according to our Logick in this part of the world, it is a pretty considerable stretch for Neuters to take, and nothing but the King of Sweden's obstinacy, which made it necessary, could render it tolerable. The Queen, you know, has left the direction of these matters entirely to the States, and has in general declared that she will concurr in such measures as should be concerted at the Hague in relation to them." [3]

The action agreed upon was undertaken immediately. Before the end of August 24,000 Russian, Polish and Saxon cavalry passed through Brandenburg and Mecklenburg to Demmin, while a Danish force attacked the northern fortress of Dammgarten. The neutrality convention was a dead letter. And there came at the same time from Turkey the news of Peter the Great's marvellous escape from his desperate situation on the Pruth, of the treaty which the Grand Vizier had granted him, and of the ruin, not indeed of Charles's hopes, but of any immediate prospect of their fulfilment.

[1] 17 July o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 121.

[2] The articles, Lamberty, VI. 468.

[3] To Whitworth, then at Vienna, 28 Aug. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 40. To Scott St. John wrote, 21 Aug. o.s.: "We must do what we can to save him (Charles XII) from that ruin which he seems so earnestly to seek, and not suffer the balance of the North to be destroyed, nor the Protestant Interest in the Empire to lose so great a security as that of the Swedish Provinces."

CHAPTER III

THE OCCUPATION OF THE SWEDISH PROVINCES IN GERMANY, 1712–14

THE campaign in Pomerania had little result; in December the confederate forces retired from before Stralsund, the Danes taking up winter-quarters in Holstein. For the next year, 1712, operations were designed on a larger scale; a greatly increased Russian force was sent to act with the Saxons against Stralsund, Stettin, and Wismar, while Frederick of Denmark turned his arms against Bremen and Verden. St. John's prophecy proved correct; "we are apt to fear that if Pomerania is once invaded with success, it will not be in the power of the Elector of Hanover nor perhaps of all the Allies, to say to the princes engaged in that war, thus far shall you go and no further." [1]

Further negotiations had taken place between Hanover and Denmark in the autumn,[2] but no agreement was arrived at. At the end of the year the elector took advantage of the dissension produced among the confederates by the failure of the campaign to offer his mediation, but this, again, proved useless, for while both Frederick IV and Augustus were disposed to peace, and the latter might have been satisfied merely to retain the Polish crown, Charles XII would still consent to nothing less than a full restoration of the conditions of Travendal and Alt-Ranstädt and demanded that the two kings should be declared enemies of the empire. The elector was prepared to advance further money to the king of Denmark, upon condition that he should no longer molest Mecklenburg in any way nor on any pretext send troops into Bremen, but the latter, on the contrary, offered again to put him in possession of part of that duchy in return for a sum of money, a proposal which was declined.[3]

Peter the Great, absent during the summer of 1711 on his

[1] To D'Alais, 17 July o.s. 1711, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 48.

[2] See Schartau, pp. 75 foll.

[3] D'Alais, 11 Dec. 1711, R. O. Germany (States) 164. But, he says, "malgré mes représentations, je vois qu'ils ont pris leur parti, et sont résolus d'accorder un au tre emprunt."

Moldavian campaign, was now home again. The allies against France watched his actions with anxiety and were doing their utmost to conciliate him. He was known to be incensed on various counts with the court of Vienna, and it was reported that he had concluded a definite treaty with France. Whitworth, long accredited to him as ambassador from Great Britain, met him at Carlsbad in October, and thither repaired Bernstorff and others also.

Peter's language to the western powers was now altered. He instructed Matvyeev and Kurakin at the Hague (17 October) to enquire, in reference to the requests made to him not to prejudice the war with France, whether the allies would promise reciprocally not to interfere with his own war or attempt to deprive him of his conquests. If so, then he on his part, supposing that his peace with Sweden were made before theirs with France, would not only undertake not to assist France in any way, but, if necessary, would enter into alliance with them and even promise military aid. An answer was requested within two months.[1]

Whitworth followed Peter to St. Petersburg and remained in attendance during the winter. He was able to send home reassuring reports as to his relations with Vienna and Paris, but that was the limit of his success. He could not obtain for the allies against France more than assurances of goodwill, even when in May 1712 the news arrived that the efforts of the British and Dutch ambassadors at Constantinople to obtain for him a peace with the sultan, who had declared war again in November, had been crowned with success.[2] Peter steadily prepared his armaments, built ships, impressed men, levied contributions, and refused to redress the hardships of which the merchants in his dominions complained, or to complete a treaty of commerce. It was clear that he would follow his own ambitions, without regard to the interests of others.[3]

The consideration shown to him was not extended to his allies. St. John declaimed against the " flagrant injustice " of Frederick IV in seizing as Swedish ships vessels bought by Englishmen in Sweden, and against Augustus for his slackness in supplying the troops contracted for and his threats of recalling those that had arrived in the Netherlands. And when, in spite of the withdrawal of Great

[1] *Kurakin Archives*, II. 46.

[2] The British and Dutch mediation is recited in the preamble to the Russo-Turkish treaty of 5 April o.s. 1712 : Dumont, VIII. i. 297.

[3] On all these matters, see Whitworth's despatches, R. O. Russia 7. He followed the tsar to Pomerania, and, after spending the autumn at Berlin, returned home. A detailed list of the merchants' grievances will be found in a memorial by his successor George Mackenzie, 10 March o.s. 1715, ibid. 8.

Britain from the war, the bulk of the German troops in the queen's pay refused to obey her orders and continued fighting under Prince Eugene, he not only notified that no further sums would be forthcoming on their account, but threatened confiscation of the arrears due.

With Charles XII the efforts of the British government had no more success than with Peter the Great. The representations of Jefferyes, that the conduct of the queen and her allies was the consequence of Charles's own behaviour and the result of necessity rather than of inclination, made no impression. Charles told him that he had reason to look upon the queen's offer of mediation as "words of course and compliment rather than anything in reality." Nor had Jefferyes the least success in urging afresh the removal of the Baltic blockade.[1] Charles's anger reached its height, when Sir Robert Sutton and Count Colyer in the spring of 1712 succeeded, as has been said, in persuading the sultan to make peace. Sir Robert himself believed his action to have the queen's approval, being convinced that Charles and those with him were entirely in the interest of France and that their return to Poland would be disastrous to the cause of the allies;[2] views which were shared and confirmed by Jefferyes. But his belief was mistaken; it would have been preferred in England that the Turkish war should continue. St. John wrote:

"I can't help being of opinion from severall accounts which I see my Lord Dartmouth receives from Sr. Robert Sutton, that both he and Monsr. Collyar have been too busy in acting the part of Mediators at the Port. Since if that matter were intirely ended, we should have much more reason to apprehend the Czar, thô we have enough to be jealous of him at present. And, till we have finished our great work with France, it is without doubt our interest to keep the fire alive in those Parts."

And again,

"Sir Robert Sutton has undoubtedly acted in many things without order, in some against order; and in the whole he has erred in laying aside the merchant, and affecting to act the Politician."

It was not without reason that the king of Sweden was provoked, and Sutton was to be recalled.[3]

During the whole of 1712, in fact, the British government derived from the affairs of the north nothing but embarrassment. St. John,

[1] Jefferyes, 10 Nov. o.s. 1711, received 23 Jan. o.s. 1712, R. O. Sweden 17.

[2] Sutton, Dec. 1711 to April 1712, R. O. Turkey 22.

[3] To Whitworth, 8 April and 8 July o.s. 1712, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 122. In August Count Gyllenborg claimed to be officially informed that government disapproved of the ambassador's proceedings, R. O. Foreign Ministers 61.

who became in July Viscount Bolingbroke, harped always in his despatches upon the theme that no action could be taken in regard to them until the peace in prospect with France was concluded. One at the end of the year to General Breton at Berlin will serve as an example for them all. The government, Bolingbroke wrote, was "extreamly perplexed, and the Queen has her hands tyed up from medling in them more perhaps than any other power, in regard to her former engagements." The treaty of Travendal obliged her not to favour the king of Denmark, and that of Alt-Ranstädt, the promised guarantee of which was "in justice as obligatory as if it had been actually given," not to espouse the interest of Augustus, while the king of Sweden would have no accommodation except upon the footing of those treaties.

"Nobody but his Swedish Majesty would imagine, that in the present posture of affairs any scheme of Peace can be enter'd upon, wherein greater regard will not be had to King Augustus and the King of Denmark than is stipulated by those Treatys. One advantage we have however resulting from this misfortune, that we are furnished with a good excuse for keeping ourselves at present from medling at all." [1]

The end of the year, indeed, saw the temper of Charles towards Great Britain improved. Jefferyes having been instructed to inform him that the queen had no intention of withdrawing from her guarantees and treaties, that she would have sent a squadron to the Baltic but for the lateness of the season and would certainly do so in the following year, and that she had the welfare of Sweden seriously at heart, Charles replied that he was now confirmed in his confidence in her good intentions and that it would be his constant resolution to maintain with her a sincere friendship.[2] Jefferyes advised that the principal service, which the queen could do for him, would be to procure him a peace with Denmark.[3] But these professions on either side had little influence on the course of events.

Frederick IV had begun his operations in March by seizing merchantmen in the Elbe estuary. The sea-powers and the elector of Hanover protested strongly, and on the initiative of the last-named conferences were opened with Frederick's ministers at Hamburg with the object of persuading him to refrain from hostilities in the river or beyond it. But though the former were stopped, nothing further resulted. The elector also sought to restore quiet in Mecklenburg. He informed Count Vellingk, the

[1] 5 Dec. o.s. 1712, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 52.

[2] Extract from a letter of Charles of 5 Nov. o.s. 1712, enclosed in Gyllenborg's memorial of 7 Sept. o.s. 1713, R. O. Foreign Ministers 61.

[3] 10 Nov. o.s., R. O. Sweden 17.

Governor-General of Bremen, that it would be hard to obtain the neutrality of the Elbe and of Bremen and Verden, unless he on his part would agree that Mecklenburg should not be molested. But Vellingk said that, before such an undertaking could be given, the Danes must evacuate Rostock and Malchin, which they had occupied. When news came of the Turkish peace Frederick IV threw off all restraint and began to assemble his army for the invasion of Bremen at Itzehoe.[1] He knew that neither the sea-powers nor anyone else would oppose it.

George Louis was in a difficult position. He neither wished to go to war with Denmark, for that would strengthen the Swedes in Pomerania, whom he desired to be deprived of the power of offence, nor could he while the bulk of his troops were still fighting in the Netherlands and without prospect of other support than that of Wolfenbüttel. He exerted himself vigorously to dissuade Frederick IV from his enterprise and refused to grant certain facilities requested for it. When in the first days of August the Danish army was carried across the Elbe from Glückstadt, George ventured so far as to occupy the strong places of Verden and a small portion of Bremen with his own troops, on the pretext of preventing the plague, with which the Danish army was supposed to be infected, from being carried into his dominions. The duchy of Bremen was soon conquered; Vellingk's power to resist, small as it was, was weakened by revolts among the peasantry; a few troops sent by the king of Prussia and the duke of Wolfenbüttel in the name of the circle of Lower Saxony only looked on while Stade was invested. The fortress fell on 7 September.

From his occupation of Verden may be dated the definite change in George's policy towards Sweden. True, that his action was taken in agreement with Count Vellingk, but he certainly expected to retain the principality for himself, if Sweden were to lose it. On the other hand, if Charles were victorious in the end, he would have the credit of having done him service. He stated his intention of holding Verden for so long as the Danes remained in Bremen. His policy for the time was to remain neutral, and to keep on terms with either side.[2]

Frederick IV was loud in his resentment, but could not take action against Hanover, firstly because he might then come into collision with the emperor and the sea-powers, and secondly on account of what had occurred in Pomerania. There the siege of

[1] Particulars, Schartau, pp. 92–98.

[2] See on the above Schartau, chap. VII. He states positively (p. 105) that the elector occupied Verden with the intention of keeping it, and that he was duping Vellingk in the matter.

Stralsund, undertaken by 40,000 Russians and 20,000 Poles and Saxons, had again failed, principally for want of siege-guns, those promised from Denmark not arriving, while terms for a supply of them by the king of Prussia could not be arranged. When Marshal Stenbock, the victor of Helsingborg, arrived with strong reinforcements in September, the besiegers were forced to retire. On receipt of the news the Danish forces were brought back from Bremen and advanced through Mecklenburg to their assistance. In November Stenbock took up the offensive, drove the Danes back, occupied Rostock, and raised the blockade of Wismar. Thereupon the rival kings of Poland, Stanislaus and Augustus, the former of whom was with the Swedish army, entered into negotiations for peace, and a truce was agreed upon. Stanislaus offered to resign his crown and set off for Bender to obtain the consent of Charles XII thereto.

The truce was neither to the taste of the tsar, who had lately arrived in Mecklenburg, nor of the king of Denmark, nor of the elector of Hanover, who feared what Stenbock might attempt not less than they did.[1] He was already in negotiation for the return of a good portion of his troops from the Netherlands. He sent a special envoy to Frederick IV to discover his sentiments and whether the confederates intended to make peace, in common or separately, and to offer his mediation, if it should be of use. His envoy, George Ernest von Werpup, Bernstorff's son-in-law, was instructed to advise that the confederates should hold together and bring the war to a successful issue, and that no occasion should be offered to Augustus to raise dissension. These instructions to Werpup show that George desired, at any rate, the reduction of the Swedish arms in Germany. Frederick's answer was that he was not averse from a good peace and was willing to accept the elector's mediation, but thought that quiet would best be restored in Germany by a successful prosecution of the war.[2]

The truce, concluded only for a fortnight, was not prolonged. Immediately on its expiration Stenbock marched to attack the Danes and smote them once more at Gadebusch (20 December), before the Russians and Saxons could effect a junction with them. And soon afterwards came the news of a third declaration of war on the part of the sultan, news which George professed to welcome but designated privately as ill tidings.[3]

The coming of Stenbock had determined the emperor to make a fresh effort to enforce neutrality in Germany. He summoned a congress of the neutral German powers, which met at Brunswick

[1] So Robethon to Grote in London, 26 Nov. 1712, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 224, f. 317.
[2] Schartau, pp. 110–11. Werpup's instructions were dated 10 Dec. 1712.
[3] Ibid. p. 112.

about the middle of December under the presidency of Count Damian Schönborn, and was attended by representatives of Prussia, Hanover, Wolfenbüttel, Hesse-Cassel and Münster. A " résultat " of its deliberations was quickly arrived at and made known.[1] It recommended that the powers named, and the elector Palatine, should set on foot together a force of 20,000 men to enforce peace within the empire, and that, if the belligerents refused to withdraw their troops, they should be declared enemies thereof. Those of them who were members of the empire, and especially the Swedes, were to be addressed in strong terms, but the tsar, as a foreign potentate, " avec ménagement," and the Swedish forces, excepting those required for their garrisons, were not to be permitted to re-enter Poland, but to retire across the sea. Bremen and the part of Pomerania already occupied were to be placed in sequestration in the hands of the emperor till the conclusion of the war. In the case of the defeat of either side, the neutral force was to be used against the victors. But these were words only ; the resolution was to be referred to and closely considered by the powers concerned, and their fears and jealousies prevented any effect from being given to it. The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the marriage of whose eldest son to the princess of Sweden was already in prospect, was particularly set against it, while the duke of Wolfenbüttel shared his views and the king of Prussia and his son, who in February succeeded him, though strongly supporting the scheme in principle, dissented on points of detail.[2] The congress was prorogued in March 1713 with nothing done.

The elector of Hanover strongly supported the resolution of the congress, as appears from his instructions to his minister Heusch at Berlin and the utterances of Bothmer at the Hague and Thomas Grote in London. And when, after Gadebusch, Stenbock elected to advance into Holstein and the tsar was undecided whether to pursue him thither or to turn his arms against the sultan, the appeals of Frederick IV to him for succour were supported by John Louis de Fabrice, instructed privately by Bernstorff, if not officially.[3] Publicly, on the other hand, the elector gave out that he only desired to secure the safety of his own dominions,[4] and the language

[1] Printed by Lamberty in summary, VIII. 295, and in full, VIII. 324, but under date 20 Dec. 1713. He is confused, attributing the former to a conference at Hamburg. The congress, Robethon wrote to Grote on 16 Dec. 1712, was to open the next day (B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 224, f. 323).

[2] Robethon to Grote, 3 to 20 Jan. and 10 March 1713, *loc. cit.* 224 and 225.

[3] Schartau, pp. 115–17.

[4] Cf. D'Alais from Hanover : " On pouroit concourir a l'exécution de ce project, si cela se pouvoit faire sans frais et sans exposer ses propres frontiers, dont on cherche seulement à assurer la préservation, comme on l'a souvent declaré, et il n'y

which he used to Vellingk convinced the count of his sincerity.[1] To Stenbock he sent General Hammerstein to discover how far he and Vellingk had authority to treat for peace, and to tender his good offices. But they could only say that the conditions of Travendal and Alt-Ranstädt must be insisted upon.[2]

Pursued by an overwhelming force Stenbock was forced back under the walls of Tönning, and his army was only saved by its admission to that fortress by the orders of the administrator of Holstein-Gottorp, a concession which he could hardly avoid, but which furnished Frederick IV with an excuse for occupying the whole of the young duke's dominions and in later years for claiming them for himself as spoils of war. Peter the Great now left the conduct of the campaign to the king of Denmark and Prince Menshikov and travelled by way of Hanover to Berlin, but did not succeed in gaining over either George or the new king Frederick William I to his side. The former, he wrote to Menshikov, showed great inclination and gave much advice, but would not act, while the latter had no money, feared the Swedes, and felt his inexperience in politics. The tsar's offer of Elbing and adjacent territory was declined.[3] Stenbock's fate was but delayed, for no succour was forthcoming to him. In order that Tönning itself might not fall into the hands of Denmark, he consented to evacuate the town and to surrender. He stood out long for guarantees on the part of Hanover and Prussia that himself and the remains of his army should be transported back to Sweden, but these were not obtainable, and all remained prisoners of war.[4]

Such was the situation of affairs, when the peace of Utrecht broke up the Grand Alliance and freed the sea-powers from the burden of the war with France. The principal excuse advanced by Bolingbroke for not interfering in northern affairs now no longer availed. But still the British government did not act. The

a pas apparence qu'on entreprenne rien au delà," 21 Feb. 1713, R. O. Germany (States) 164.

[1] Schartau cites Vellingk as follows (4 Feb. 1713): "Ce prince a plus temoigné son affection pour les interests de Sa Majesté que les autres n'ont fait qui se sont trouvés en obligation de le faire. Ne soutient-il pas encore à l'heure qu'il est avec hauteur et prudence le duché de Verde et une partie du duché de Bremen contre l'usurpation du Roy de Danemark. A-t-il envoyé un seul homme à l'armée de Neutralité assemblée en Silésie lorsque nos ennemis entrèrent la première fois en Pommeranie. Il a envoyé à la solicitation des complottans à Bronswik son debuté pour voir de quoi il estoit question; mais quand il a reconnu qu'on y concertoit des incongruités et des choses très préjudiciables au Roy il s'en est excusé et il ne s'en est voulu mesler en manière quelconque. De plus il a eu la bonté de m'envoyer nouvellement son major général monsieur Hammerstein. . . . Les faits sont démonstratifs; j'en réponds sur mon honneur."

[2] Schartau, p. 118; Robethon to Grote, *loc. cit.* 225, f. 16, 20 Jan. 1713.

[3] Solov'ev, Book XVII. chap. i.

[4] The capitulation of Oldensworth, 16 May 1713, Dumont, VIII. i. 388.

squadron promised for the relief of Stenbock in Tönning did not sail, in spite of the earnest appeals of the Swedes and of an assurance transmitted to the Swedish minister in Paris that "a very strong squadron was being got ready." [1] Had there been only the Danes to reckon with, the relief might have been sent, but to quarrel with the tsar was quite another matter. He had declared his intention of seizing, in such a case, the effects of the merchants at Archangel and Moscow,[2] and he controlled now the commerce to the eastern Baltic ports, which, if the British traders were cut off from it, would become the monopoly of their Dutch rivals. Had the United Provinces, or France,—the power, to use Bolingbroke's words, "which can best be played off against the Muscovite," [3]—been willing to co-operate, the risk might have been undertaken, but Louis XIV was in no condition to help, except by words, and the Dutch were not only estranged by the peace of Utrecht but financially were almost ruined, and were hard pressed besides by the claims of Prussia to the Orange inheritance.[4] The emperor, left to fight France with only such aid as the empire could afford,—and indeed the persistent pursuit of her private ends by Austria during the war deserved no better fate,—would have nothing further to do with the sea-powers. The elector of Hanover, on the worst terms with the Tory ministry in England and as determined an enemy of France as the emperor himself, continued to support him in the war and to assert his inability to interfere, while still engaged therein.

Great Britain, in fact, in casting off continental responsibilities, had deprived herself of allies and had sacrificed that leadership in Europe which William III had conferred upon her and Marlborough by his victories had established. The help given by queen Anne's ministers to Sweden was confined to exhortations which were ineffectual and to threats which were disregarded. They took refuge in denying the force of guarantees to treaties, whose provisions had not been observed by the parties to them. The defensive treaty of 1700, now the special subject of Gyllenborg's appeals, could not, they said, oblige the queen to engage in an offensive war, or make her "a partner in all the new designs grafted upon the original quarrel." The queen would not indeed sit by to see Sweden subdued and the balance of power in the north

[1] Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury at Paris, 3 March o.s. 1713, Gilbert Parke.

[2] Robethon desired Grote to circulate the report of this among the London merchants (*loc. cit.* 225, f. 53).

[3] To Shrewsbury, 29 May o.s., Gilbert Parke.

[4] See Droysen, IV. ii. 28–31, 62–63. Memorials by Bonet setting forth at length the king of Prussia's claim to Mörs, 29 Nov. 1712 and 7 Jan. 1713, R. O. Foreign Ministers 45.

destroyed, but, if she were to interfere, the Swedes must definitely declare their willingness to treat for peace. On the other hand the ministers of Denmark, Russia and Poland were informed of the importunate demands made upon the queen to fulfil the guarantees and the obligations of the defensive treaty, and were admonished that neither she nor the French king nor the States-General would allow the ultimate catastrophe to be accomplished. Let their masters take heed in time, and not refuse to meet Sweden in the negotiation into which she was being urged to enter.[1]

A special effort was made at the Hague in July. At a meeting of the ministers of the powers interested Strafford advised that the good offices of the sea-powers should be offered to procure a peace and a plan be submitted to the combatants, the part of those who accepted it to be taken against those who declined it. The ministers were requested to state the pretensions of their various courts as a basis for the plan. And on 7 August he presented a memorial about Tönning. The town, he protested, having been evacuated by Stenbock, and the Russian and Saxon troops withdrawn, there was no further reason for prosecuting war in those parts. The action of the Danes in no way helped them in the war with Sweden, since Tönning was not Swedish. But the careful and evasive reply of the States-General amounted to a refusal, and Strafford's exertions remained fruitless.[2] The queen, Bolingbroke wrote to Daniel Pulteney at Copenhagen, would do nothing, waiting " for such incidents as either chance or management may create in order to dispose the parties concerned to a reasonable composition." [3]

Desirous then to save Sweden, but thwarted by Charles, incensed on various grounds with Denmark, but fearful of a breach with Russia, and, while resolved against single intervention, unable to procure help, the British government viewed with satisfaction a new development in northern affairs, which formed indeed an incident such as Bolingbroke had hoped for. This was the intervention of Prussia, which took place not so much because she was included in the peace of Utrecht, as because the accession of a new king made her mistress of her own resources.

Frederick, the first king of Prussia, always paid earnest heed to the doings of his Swedish and Polish neighbours. More than once he was on the point of joining either Charles or Augustus, to

[1] Bolingbroke's despatches, *passim*, March to June 1713.

[2] Documents in Lamberty, VIII. 307–12. One reason, which the Danes alleged for the necessity for ousting the young duke of Holstein-Gottorp, was that he, as son of Charles's elder sister, was heir to the throne of Sweden, and that the possession of his dominions by that crown would be too dangerous for themselves to endure.

[3] 12 Aug. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5.

have his share of any spoils that might result. The old Hansa town of Elbing was the special object of his cupidity; after that Stettin and as much of Swedish Pomerania as might be attached thereto. But there were yet greater attractions in the west, Juliers and Berg, Neuchatel and Vallengin, the Orange inheritance; prizes which could only be obtained by adherence to the Grand Alliance. Now Frederick was drawn in one direction, now in another, lowering more and more by his vacillation the credit of his state.[1] The ultimate cause that confined his action to the west, and kept his splendid troops employed year after year in Italy or in the Netherlands, was an empty treasury. An incompetent, not to say corrupt administration, unsound finance, and extravagant expenditure on vain display, made the successor to the Great Elector as dependent as any other German prince upon the gold of the sea-powers.

The first act of Frederick William, his son, was to dismiss hordes of court functionaries, to cut with ruthless hand salaries and pensions, to save money by every possible economy. The able Ilgen headed a triumvirate for the conduct of public policy; every department of state was subjected to searching reform; the money saved was devoted to the army.[2] Master thus of his own troops, Frederick William could look the confederates in the face and bring them to an understanding.

Had Charles XII been of another temper, Frederick William might perhaps have been his ally, instead of, as he became, an annexor of his provinces under guise of neutrality. His father, when refusing the proposals of Peter the Great,[3] had imagined a confederacy in opposition. The main condition was that Charles should allow Stanislaus to resign, as he desired, the Polish crown. That done, and Augustus recognized, an army of 60,000 Prussians, Swedes, Poles and Saxons would recover for Charles his lost provinces and drive Peter back behind his old frontiers. Prussia was to

[1] "Während der grosse Doppelkrieg im Norden und um die spanische Succession dem preussischen Staat immer neue Gelegenheit bot, seine Bedeutung in Deutschland und in Europa zu entwickeln, liess Friedrich I unter dem rastlosen Doppelspiel höfischer und fremder Einflüsse sich mehr und mehr zur Seite schieben, sich schon auch von Kursachsen, von Hannover überholen, sich schon auch in seinem Recht auf die oranische Erbschaft verkürzen. Die anderen Mächte, die grossen wie kleinen, gewöhnten sich daran, dass man Preussen nicht zu fürchten und nicht zu schonen brauche, dass man es missachten und missbrauchen dürfe" (Droysen, IV. ii. 4). Under Frederick I, writes Waliszewski, "La Prusse a suivi un système que l'on pourrait résumer ainsi; ne rien faire, mais tâcher d'obtenir quand même quelque chose; laisser les autres se battre et profiter de la bagarre pour s'adjuger une part du butin" (*Pierre le Grand*, p. 370).

[2] See Droysen, IV. ii. 7 foll.

[3] In 1711 Count Alexis Golovkin, the Russian ambassador at Berlin, gave two reasons for this, firstly that Prussia had no sufficient army and the risk of war with Sweden could not be faced, secondly that the tsar's offers did not match his claims (Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*).

have Elbing and anything else that might offer without prejudice to her allies. That Charles himself should return home was an indispensable condition.[1]

But Charles had declined. That his proposed allies could hardly have been depended upon to carry out the scheme was not the ground of his refusal. Partly his sense of honour again objected; he had made Stanislaus king, and Stanislaus must remain so; partly he chose still to rely upon the sultan. The news of Stenbock's landing in Pomerania steeled his resolution. That Prussia should fight for him was well enough, but to restore his rights, not for her own profit. The chance was lost, Frederick died, and Frederick William was free to pursue with regard to Sweden his own course. The friendly letter desiring his alliance and support, which Charles wrote to him from Demirtasch in May,[2] could not reach him until the policy now to be described was decided upon.

Frederick William entered the arena on the invitation of the administrator of Holstein-Gottorp. A treaty of 22 June 1713, devised by that master of resource, the Holstein minister George Henry von Goertz, in concert with Vellingk, provided that Stettin and Wismar should be occupied jointly by Prussian and Holstein troops until the conclusion of the war, when they were to be restored to Sweden, while the king of Prussia was to concert with Great Britain, the United Provinces and Hanover measures to save Tönning and rescue the other dominions of the duke from the clutch of Denmark. In case, it was said, the help of the powers named should be delayed, the king of Prussia would join with the queen of England alone to use all serviceable means not only to raise immediately the siege of Tönning, but also to obtain restitution to the house of Holstein-Gottorp.[3] The parties agreed to endeavour to protect Stralsund and Rügen from attack, while by secret articles Prussia guaranteed the succession of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in Sweden, in return for the cession to her of Stettin and its district up to the Peene.[4]

British approval of this treaty is shown by despatches of

[1] See Carlson, pp. 32 foll.; Droysen, IV. i. 419 foll.

[2] 18 May o.s. 1713, *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 223. The letter is very instructive as to Charles's views. All the right was on his side, and his enemies were persecuting him "gegen treu und glauben."

[3] General Breton, forwarding a ciphered abstract of the treaty (R. O. Prussia 6), rendered this clause: "En cas qu'on ne pût pas disposer les dites puissances ensemble d'entrer dans un tel concert, le Roy de Prusse prendra la chose sur luy, moyennant la seule concurrence de la Reine de la G. Bretagne." In the treaty as printed by Dumont, VIII. i. 392, and in the *Theatrum Europaeum*, XX. i. 612, the word *nicht*, in "nicht allein mit der Zuthuung (or Zuziehung) der Königin in Gross-Britannien," spoils the sense, and would seem to be wrongly inserted.

[4] Lundberg, p. 93. Dumont and the *Theatrum Europaeum* do not give the secret articles.

Bolingbroke and of William Bromley, who in August replaced him as secretary of state for the northern province. The former wrote: "We are of opinion that the Treaty made by the Administrator of Holstein with the King of Prussia might prove some skreen to Sweden, might give them some breathing time, and afford to their friends a foundation whereon to raise somewhat of advantage to them."[1] And the latter: "As to the Dutchy of Holstein, it is agreed on all sides that the only method now left to preserve it will be that of a Sequestration into the hands of the King of Prussia, which the Queen will press his Maj^ty^ to take upon him."[2] And again, as neither the States-General nor the elector of Hanover would send troops to succour Tönning, "nothing remains to save that place and country, but the King of Prussia's taking upon him the sequestration of Holstein."[3]

As regarded Wismar and Stettin, the scheme was foiled by the refusal of their commandants to surrender them. As the result, the latter fortress underwent a siege by the Russians and Saxons, and at the end of September Count Meyerfeld, unable longer to hold out, offered to accept the arrangement proposed. Prince Menshikov consented, and on 6 October he, and Count Flemming on the part of the king of Poland, concluded with Frederick William the treaty of Schwedt. Stettin and the part of Swedish Pomerania between the Oder and the Peene were handed over to Prussia and Holstein-Gottorp in sequestration till the conclusion of the war, the king of Prussia undertaking not to restore them to Sweden before peace was made. And it was agreed that a like disposition should be made of Wismar and Stralsund, when they surrendered or were taken, after which the tsar and the king of Poland would withdraw all their troops from Pomerania, the king of Prussia promising to prevent the Swedes from attempting any hostilities thence against Poland or Saxony or Sleswick-Holstein. If the king of Sweden should attack him, the other parties promised to come to his assistance.[4] Thus Frederick William obtained this territory not from the Swedes, but from their enemies, and as he had to pay 400,000 crowns to the tsar and the king of Poland towards the costs of the siege, he acquired a definite lien upon it, until that sum should be repaid. As Charles XII absolutely refused to recognize the treaty or ever to refund the money, he was able to retain his hold until the cession of the territory to him was forced upon Sweden by George I in 1719. The treaty of Schwedt,

[1] To Jackson at Stockholm, 16 Aug. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 154.
[2] To the same, 15 Sept. o.s., ibid.
[3] To Breton at Berlin, same date, ibid. 53.
[4] The treaty, Dumont, VIII. i. 407. The reasons for his action were set forth fully by Frederick William in his manifesto of August 1715, ibid. p. 452.

says Droysen, was one of the most important ever concluded by Prussia, not only because it laid the foundation of subsequent developments in her northern policy, but because after long retrogression it was the first step forwards, it may be said, the decisive step.[1]

The treaty roused the greatest jealousy at Copenhagen and Hanover, principally on account of its provisions in regard to Wismar. The king of Denmark and the elector could not willingly see Prussia obtain, by the occupation of that fortress, a footing in Mecklenburg, and the latter went so far as to propose to Frederick IV action in common to prevent it.[2] As, however, the commandant of Wismar, as has been said, refused to give the place up, and could hold it, the case for such action did not arise.

The scheme for saving Holstein from the Danes failed, because Frederick William could find none to help him. Neither the elector of Hanover nor the sea-powers would take part in measures of compulsion. The king of Denmark, indeed, was urged to agree to the sequestration,[3] and when Rosenkrantz, the Danish minister in London, complained of a letter from the queen exciting the king of Prussia to action against Denmark, answer was made to him that, who ever first broke the neutrality of Holstein, it should be restored, the Swedes having evacuated the province.[4] But at the same time General Breton was particularly instructed " not to engage Her Majesty in any part of the expence necessary for those expeditions." As to the final possession of Stettin by Prussia he was to " give room to hope," but cautiously, and without engaging the queen to anything particular, " lest her Majesty should be hereafter brought under difficulties to perform it, from his Swedish Majesty's intractable temper." [5] Frederick William wrote himself to queen Anne three times [6] earnestly protesting that he fully shared her sentiments in regard to Holstein-Gottorp and enquiring what measures she proposed to take, in order that he might further them. He fully intended, he said, strenuously to exert himself, " enixa virium nostrarum

[1] Droysen, IV. ii. 59.

[2] Schartau, p. 134.

[3] Bromley to Pulteney, 14 Oct. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5.

[4] The same, 13 Nov. o.s.

[5] Bromley to Breton, 26 Oct. and 13 and 17 Nov. o.s., ibid. 53. To Bonet Bromley wrote, 25 Nov. o.s., " La Reine fera tout ce qu'on peut raisonnablement espérer d'Elle, pour que Sa Majesté Prussienne recueille quelque fruit des soins et des dépenses dont Elle s'est chargée pour l'avantage de la Suède, mais la Reine ne se croyant pas en droit de disposer des Places d'autrui, Elle ne sauroit pas s'engager que Stetin ni aucune autre Place nommément lui soit cedée par cette Couronne " (ibid.).

[6] 15 Aug. and 4 Nov. 1713, and 23 Jan. 1714, R. O. Royal Letters 46, the two latter the Latin originals.

contentione," in the duke's cause, but the king of Denmark would be much more easily controlled, if the queen would join her arguments to his own. Bonet in London, Ilgen at Berlin, emphasized these expressions, asked for help in men, ships, and money, and added the hope, that the British government would favour their master's aspiration to have in the end Stettin and the neighbouring country for himself.[1] But all in vain ; active aid was refused, and Frederick William was unsupported. He advanced indeed a force to Lenzen, with the result that Frederick IV promised to provision Tönning regularly and to refer his differences with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to the Brunswick congress, but his final action was decided by Peter the Great. Frederick William must have regard to him, in spite of Ilgen's advice that he should ally himself with Sweden to procure a peace which should restore the balance of the north and repress the tsar's power.[2] He had already been admonished by Peter against entering upon hostilities with Denmark and against the sequestration,[3] and when it was threatened that, if the hostilities were prosecuted, the treaty of Schwedt should not be ratified and the Russian troops return to Pomerania,[4] they had to be abandoned. Frederick IV disregarded his promises, and on 7 February 1714 Tönning fell.

The terms on which Peter the Great would make peace with Sweden were laid before the sea-powers by Prince Kurakin, appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to treat.[5] He was ordered to accept from them only good offices. The basis of a peace would be the restoration of Carelia and Ingria, ceded by the peace of Stolbovo in 1617, to Russia, and the return of Livonia to Poland ; if Sweden kept that province its fortresses must be razed. If Dantzig were not acceptable as a place of congress, then Breslau might be proposed, or, failing that, Brunswick, but not the Hague or other distant places. An armistice could be agreed to for twenty, or at the least for fifteen years, though the shorter term would only mean repose from hostilities. If peace between France and Austria appeared probable, the negotiation must be hastened on, if not, be protracted, if possible, till the opening of the coming campaign. If the sea-powers were inclined to support Sweden strongly, then Kurakin should repeat

[1] Bonet, Nov. and Dec. 1713, R. O. Foreign Ministers 45 ; Breton, 5 Aug., 31 Oct., 11 Nov. 1713, 17 Jan. and 14 April 1714, Prussia 6. Breton's despatches include copies of the elector of Hanover's correspondence with the king of Prussia.

[2] Brückner, p. 430.

[3] 20 Sept. and 16 Nov. o.s., *Kurakin Archives*, II. 68, 82–87.

[4] Breton, 23 Dec. 1713, 20 Jan. 1714, R. O. Prussia 6, the latter a long and important despatch.

[5] Appointment, dated 3 July o.s. 1713, *Kurakin Archives*, II. 64.

the tsar's threat to reduce to ashes all the places he had conquered, rather than restore them as fortresses to be used by the enemy.[1]

Charles XII in the meanwhile remained intractable, in spite of the events of February 1713, the capture of his person and his removal to Demotika. His prospects, hopeful for a time,[2] went from bad, when a third peace between Turkey and Russia was probable, to worse, after it was concluded and ratified, so that Sir Robert Sutton could write in September, " whatever is now desired by the King of Sweden, his Ministers or Officers, is certainly refused." [3] Yet he still demanded the execution of the guarantees, and declined to have peace imposed upon him against his will or to accept mediation, whether by the sea-powers or by the emperor.[4] And he sent instructions to enforce in its full rigour the Baltic blockade, which the senate for some time past had relaxed.[5] Gyllenborg delivered a formal declaration to the effect that his master, entirely depending upon the queen of England's friendship and counting upon the accomplishment of the promises made to him, solely desired a solid and honourable peace through her good offices. To effect this, it would be most proper for her to announce publicly her intention of not withdrawing from her treaties, which was the more necessary, seeing that malicious reports spread to the contrary had done him infinite harm both at the Porte and at the other courts of Europe. He had felt the effect of this in the coldness of the Turks and of his former friends to such an extent that, remembering the ill conduct of Sir Robert Sutton, it might have affected, were that possible, the trust he had always held and continued to hold in the inviolable friendship and the justice of the queen. A declaration, such as he proposed, would restore his confidence.[6]

No assistance, then, to those who sympathized with Sweden

[1] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.* In regard to Kurakin's report of proposals by his Danish and Saxon colleagues to gain Strafford to their side by bribery, he was authorized to promise him, if he would really support the tsar's interest, a present of 20,000 crowns, and to Whitworth, formerly entrusted with peace-negotiations at the tsar's court and at heart opposed to the present Tory ministry, one of 50,000. Further, for the person who should act as intermediary with Strafford, 2,000 ducats, and in all, to persons who should help, 100,000 crowns.

[2] Fabrice to Goertz, 17 and 29 March o.s. 1713 ; Jefferyes, 26 March o.s.

[3] 15 Sept. o.s., R. O. Turkey 23. From May to December Charles was confined at Timurtash or Demirtash, a seraglio of the sultan half-an-hour from Adrianople. (Jefferyes, 13 May and 12 June o.s. ; Fabrice, 14 April o.s.)

[4] Carlson, pp. 51, 58 ; cf. *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 396.

[5] Jackson, 5 Sept. o.s. 1713, R. O. Sweden 20.

[6] 1 Sept. o.s., R. O. Foreign Ministers 61. See also Charles's letter to queen Anne, 15 May o.s., " à Demirtache auprez d'Adrianople," R. O. Royal Letters 56, the answer to which, of 1 Oct. o.s., is printed by Lamberty, VIII. 326.

was to be obtained from her monarch. Many members of the Swedish senate, we learn, would have been glad to have had a peace forced upon them, but act contrary to his instructions they dared not, fearing for their heads, and were compelled to declare so.[1] But now Sweden was on the verge of revolution. Taxes had long been intolerable and impossible. The loss of Finland, the granary of Stockholm, was ascribed to treachery. In the autumn of 1713 the senate was compelled to place the princess Ulrica at the head of the government, and to summon the estates. Vellingk was authorized to conduct negotiations for peace in its name. When, towards the end of January 1714, there came letters from Charles absolutely refusing peace and expressly ordering the dissolution of the estates, if they had been convoked, consternation reigned, and an outbreak was only averted by the firmness of Chancellor Horn. The senate declared that the king must be obeyed, and that it only remained to fight desperately to the end, and so perish.[2]

The emperor in the meanwhile had summoned another congress to meet at Brunswick, extending his invitation to the powers at war with Sweden, but not to Great Britain and the Dutch republic. This rebuff was not the less disagreeable to the British government, because it might have been expected. Dr. John Robinson, now bishop of London, who with the earl of Strafford had negotiated the peace of Utrecht, being still in Holland, Bromley instructed him to consult with the Dutch ministers upon "what measures should be taken upon such an unaccountable treatment of the States as well as of her Majesty, who, thô she is not fond of being a Mediator, yet sees no reason why she should be in such a manner excluded after the Guaranties she has given."[3] The congress was attended by Russian, Danish and Saxon ministers, but Charles XII refused to take part in it or recognize it in any way. It opened its deliberations, after long delay, in April 1714, but again they were futile of result. And though it continued in being

[1] Jackson, July foll. 1713, R. O. Sweden 20.

[2] Jackson, Oct. 1713 to Jan. 1714. A good account of the state of the country and of the proceedings of this Riksdag in Bain's *Charles XII*, pp. 254 foll. Here may be noted a striking memorandum of Vellingk to Sparre at Paris of date 23 April 1714 (*Handlingar*, VI. 266). The writer urged that it was of the last necessity that Charles should consent to the negotiation of a general peace. A reconciliation with Augustus was indispensable, seeing that the king of Prussia would engage himself to nothing without that. Charles ought not to persist in being the only one to refuse the emperor the title of king of Spain. He should rather send a minister of importance to Vienna. The old friendship too with Hanover should be restored, especially in view of the high credit the elector now enjoyed and the respect held for him by the tsar.

[3] Nov. 1713, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 80, cf. to Pulteney at Copenhagen, 11 Dec. o.s., ibid. 5, and Pulteney to Strafford, 25 June 1714, Denmark 34.

for several years and the emperor was always insistent that questions affecting the empire should be referred to it, nothing was ever done, and in the end the pacification of the north was effected without reference to the imperial authority.

In the spring of 1714 the prospect for Sweden looked black indeed. All her dominions oversea were occupied by her enemies, excepting only Wismar and Stralsund and Rügen. A Danish army was expected to cross the Sound ; a Russian fleet to capture Stockholm. The elector of Hanover, the French war being now ended, openly threw in his lot against her, conducting negotiations with Denmark and Prussia for the partition of her German provinces.

Frederick IV first proposed that the elector should have Verden and himself Bremen, the elector paying him 200,000 crowns, and next a treaty of alliance on the basis of the complete expulsion of the Swedes from Germany and the recovery of the provinces formerly held by Denmark in Sweden. Bremen, under this proposal, was to be divided between himself, the elector, and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the last named giving up his share of the duchy of Sleswick and northern Ditmarsch to Denmark, while that power was further to have the northern half of Swedish Pomerania with the isle of Rügen. But George Louis insisted upon having the whole of Bremen and Verden for himself, and that the compensation to Holstein-Gottorp must be in Danish territory, Oldenburg, to wit, if not also Delmenhorst. And so, after further proposals had been made, the negotiations, for the time, dropped. The Prussian proposals were that all the strong places of Sweden in Germany should be occupied by Prussia and Hanover jointly, in the name of the emperor, until the conclusion of the war. But to this the emperor would not assent, and when George Louis offered to guarantee Stettin and its district to Prussia, in return for cessions of territory on her part, his demands were too exorbitant to be allowed. So that these negotiations also failed for the time.[1]

Others took place with the tsar. George had sent to St. Petersburg in January Frederick Christian Weber,[2] while Prussia was represented there by " Oberschenk " von Schlippenbach.[3] Prince Kurakin came to Hanover in April. Bernstorff informed him that the elector consented to Sweden being deprived of her German provinces, but advised that Prussia, disappointed of fulfilment of the promises made by England and France, should be brought in,

[1] Particulars of the above, Schartau, pp. 143–47, 150–51.
[2] His instructions, dated 10 Jan. 1714, Schartau, p. 141.
[3] Droysen, IV. ii. 78.

and the emperor be persuaded to consent. The scheme proposed was that Hanover should have Bremen and Verden, Prussia Stettin, Denmark ducal Sleswick; the duke of Holstein-Gottorp being compensated by lands producing 100,000 crowns in revenue. The Danes and Prussians were to set themselves against Stralsund, the elector against Wismar; that town, its fortifications razed, to be handed over to the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. These proposals were well regarded at St. Petersburg; Chancellor Golovkin instructed the Russian ministers abroad to further them; and he at Hanover, Schleinitz, sent word that, in case Denmark proved recalcitrant, the elector was ready to act against her in concert with Russia and Prussia.[1] This, however, was not to the tsar's taste; Weber was informed that, while he was willing that Hanover should have Bremen and Verden, nothing could be done except in concert with Denmark; the tsar could only use his good offices to induce that power to yield up Bremen. To Copenhagen, to help Prince Basil Dolgoruky in arranging measures for the coming campaign, Peter the Great sent a man of whom we shall hear more in 1720, Paul Ivanovich Yaguzhinsky. He reported (January 1714) an ill reception. The rottenness of the Danish government he expressed himself unable to describe; a fleet could not be equipped for want of money. He went on to report proposals for guarantees of Stettin to Prussia and of Bremen and Verden to Denmark, with satisfaction to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp by Prussia. For this, and for money, the king of Denmark would undertake an invasion of Scania. After the fall of Tönning a definite demand was made to him for 400,000 (later abated to 200,000) crowns, with 150,000 for arrears, Frederick promising in return to place his fleet under the tsar's command for action against Carlskrona. His land-forces, he now said, he must keep in Sleswick-Holstein for protection against Prussia. With this answer Yaguzhinsky returned to Russia. Soon afterwards there came to Riga Henning Frederick von Bassewitz to plead the cause of his master, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. But on Kurakin's report of his real designs he was ordered to depart, which he did at the end of April. Immediately thereafter Peter offered the king of Denmark 150,000 roubles to equip his fleet and provisions for it, upon condition that he would act with all his strength on the Swedish frontier in order to prevent the whole force of Sweden being turned against Russia. He advised Frederick IV to beware of Prussia, he himself not being satisfied with Frederick William's promises. He ended with the threat that, if the Danes would not make a diversion against

[1] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.* Schleinitz had not long before been transferred to the tsar's service from that of Wolfenbüttel, on Kurakin's recommendation.

Sweden, he would do nothing to restrain the king of Prussia from acting against them. Dolgoruky, however, was told that the 150,000 roubles were not sufficient, and that the season was too far advanced. The British and French ministers at Copenhagen, in the meantime, did all they could to persuade the Danish court of the danger of Russian mastery of the Baltic.[1]

And now Louis XIV interfered, in response to the king of Prussia's request that he should support the scheme of sequestration. He sent back to Berlin in March Count Conrad Alexander de Rottembourg, a general in his service of Brandenburg descent, fitted for the mission by his connexions and possessions in and knowledge of that country. Louis's main object, as we see from Rottembourg's instructions, was to bring Prussia over to his side as against Austria and Hanover. But this obliged him to support the pretensions of Prussia to Stettin. He was ready, Rottembourg was told, to do his best to persuade Charles XII to make the cession, and, if he were successful, would guarantee it. But it would be very difficult to obtain, on account of the value of Stettin to Sweden as covering Pomerania; besides, the emperor and empire would oppose such aggrandisement of Prussia strongly. Charles was known to be making instances at Vienna, and if the cession were to be obtained, it could only be by the king of Prussia prevailing with the tsar, as he could do, to restore his conquests. This was to his interest, in order to prevent the tsar from becoming too powerful, politically and commercially. In fact, all other Swedish territory must be recovered, including St. Petersburg and Livonia and Bremen. It was added in a "mémoire secret" that, even if the king of Prussia failed to persuade the tsar as desired, nevertheless the alliance projected between France and Prussia must not be lost sight of, though the other negotiation must take precedence. To procure success, Rottembourg might offer to Grumbkow, if he found fit opportunity, a pension of 15,000 livres, and annual "gratifications" to Ilgen and Printz of 12,000; but this must be done very cautiously.[2] Besides this, Louis XIV urged upon Baron Eric Sparre, as representing Sweden at Paris, acceptance of the sequestration scheme, and sent him also to Berlin to persuade the king of Prussia to act. Nominally still in the French military service, he was relieved of his commission, in order that Charles XII might not suspect him of working in the interest of France.

[1] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[2] *Recueil des instructions*, XVI. 292 foll., 11 March 1714. The instructions ended: "Surtout il faut savoir ce qu'il a dessein de faire si la reine d'Angleterre vient à mourir, et s'il souffrira que le Duc d'Hannovre monte tranquillement sur le trône d'Angleterre."

But it was too late; Frederick William had been forced to adopt another policy. Schlippenbach had been met with caresses at St. Petersburg, and Peter the Great had proposed mutual guarantees of the territories acquired.[1] A treaty resulted, 12 June 1714, which guaranteed to the tsar Ingria, Carelia and Esthonia with the ports of Viborg, Narva and Reval, and to Prussia Stettin and the country up to the Peene. All the efforts of Sparre and Goertz and of the British, French and Swedish ministers at Berlin proved unavailing.[2] Goertz was expelled from the Prussian court with contumely,[3] and all hopes of Prussian intervention in the cause of Holstein-Gottorp ended.

Queen Anne's government continued its useless expostulations in favour of Sweden. The king of Prussia was assured of support against attack by the tsar or other powers if, by threatening to invade Holstein, he would deter the king of Denmark from invading Scania.[4] Strafford at the Hague, Matthew Prior at Paris, were instructed to make every possible endeavour to procure concerted action with the United Provinces and France.[5] Further threats were launched at Copenhagen. The queen, it was declared, would reluctantly resume the arms laid down rather than suffer Sweden to be totally destroyed. Although the parties in the war were all her friends, although Frederick IV was her near relation, she must interpose. The growing power of the tsar in the Baltic was as dangerous to Denmark as to others.[6] To Russia was despatched George Mackenzie, transferred from Dresden. His instructions[7] included a strongly worded paragraph in favour of Sweden, described as a nation with whom the queen had important alliances, and in

[1] Brückner, pp. 430–31.

[2] "Nous avons fait un complot magnifique composé du Baron Görits Mr. Bretton Envoyé de l'Angle Mr. de Rottenburg Mr. de Friesendorff et moy pour attaquer unanimément de vive force et tous à la fois cette cour" (Sparre to Vellingk, 16 June, *Handlingar*, VIII. 154). There is much interesting detail in this correspondence about the negotiations. To quote from Sparre's of 8 May: "J'ai remarqué dans la conférence en général que l'on a beaucoup d'envie de posséder Stettin, que l'on veut peu ou rien faire pour le mériter, que l'on aime respecte et craint le Czar, qu'on compte peu ou point sur le Roy Auguste, qu'on est remply de ménagement pour l'Empereur et d'ombrage pour la cour d'Hannovre. Ve Excce conviendra que voilà un villain cannevas." Sparre left Berlin early in July for Vienna, where Goertz joined him.

[3] See Droysen, IV. ii. 94. Goertz's letter to Gyllenborg announcing his ill-treatment, R. O. Foreign Ministers 62, original. (Its presence here, with others, appears to be due to their having been among Gyllenborg's correspondence seized in February 1717.)

[4] Bromley to Breton, 4 May o.s. 1714 (cf. 13 April o.s.), R. O. Foreign Entry Book 53.

[5] Bromley to Strafford in this month, ibid. 81. Bolingbroke to Prior, 6 May o.s., ibid. 28; he sets forth the situation at length.

[6] Bromley to Pulteney, 4 May o.s., ibid. 5.

[7] 23 May o.s., R. O. Russia 8.

whose preservation the interest of her people was deeply concerned. The tsar was to be induced to assent to a peace, reaping thereby glory and the fruits of his successes. On the other hand the Swedes had been exhorted to make the king of Prussia their friend by ceding to him Stettin, rather than let him owe its acquisition to their enemies.[1]

But none of these representations had success. The States-General only replied to the queen's letter of 25 March that they would be glad to help in procuring a good peace, but were overcome by embarrassments resulting from the late war. Deputies told Strafford that they had little inclination to aid a power which had done their commerce so much harm. He notified that the Dutch would do nothing that might be disagreeable to any of the confederate princes, or to the emperor; that their chief interest was in the completion of their Barrier treaty; and that, if they took action in regard to the Baltic trade, it would be on their own account and not conjointly with the queen.[2] Foreign nations in fact declined to place any dependence upon a ministry accused of betraying its allies and known to be shattered by internal dissension. Its declarations and its threats alike were laughed at. Goertz could write from Berlin, "Je vous dis à regret que tout ce que l'on sauroit prêcher à la Cour icy de la vigueur de la Cour Britannique n'est regardé que comme des chansons."[3] A Danish statesman "se mocquoit des menaces de l'Angleterre, étant convaincu qu'Elle n'oseroit rien faire par la crainte qu'Elle a pour le Czar, qui ne manqueroit pas de faire massacrer les Marchands Anglois, et de se saisir de leurs effets."[4] Prince Kurakin told Strafford that his master had ships of war as well as the English and Dutch, and did not see what right they had to sent fleets into the Baltic.[5]

What action the British government did take was of a half-hearted kind against Sweden. The depredations of the privateers in the Baltic had become unbearable. The clamours of the merchants, and the increasing scarcity of naval stores, forced the queen's hands. It was determined to send a small squadron to convoy the traders. The first instructions given by the admiralty to its commander, Captain Archibald Hamilton, 9 July o.s., directed him to accompany the merchantmen all the way to St. Petersburg.

[1] Bromley to Strafford, 26 March and 27 April o.s., R.O. Foreign Entry Book 80; cf. Bolingbroke to him on the latter date, Gilbert Parke.

[2] Strafford, March to August 1714, R. O. Holland 249, 250.

[3] 26 June 1714, R. O. Foreign Ministers 62. Cf. extracts from letters of Sparre, Vellingk, and others to Gyllenborg in May and June, ibid.

[4] Pulteney to Strafford, 23 June, R. O. Denmark 34.

[5] Strafford, 6 March, R. O. Holland 249.

But on 4 August o.s. he sent in news of twenty-four Swedish men-of-war of from 30 to 70 guns lying on the look-out, with orders to "sink by their sides" rather than allow English or any other ships to reach the forbidden ports. Fresh instructions, therefore, were issued to him to the effect that on his arrival at Elsinore he was to take every possible means to inform himself whether the above intelligence were true, and, if he found it to be so, to return to the Nore with as many of the merchantmen as would accompany him.

Six days before these instructions were issued to Hamilton queen Anne died, 1 August o.s. The reasons for the preparation of the expedition were submitted by Bromley to his new master in the following despatch:[1]

"Sir,

"By direction of the Lord Justices I have the honour to represent to your Majesty the unfortunate condition of your subjects of Great Britain trading to the Baltic Seas, where ships and effects are daily seized by the Swedish Men-of-War and Privateers.

"When these violences were first begun, it was given out on the part of Sweden, that nothing farther was intended than barely to prevent our supplying her enemies with ships, ammunition, and provisions, but notwithstanding these specious pretences, many vessels were confiscated without any proof of their being designed for the service of the Czar, or their having any contraband goods on board, and it was afterwards declared, his Swedish Majesty had sent positive orders, not to suffer any nation whatsoever to trade to or from any port that had been taken from him in the course of this war. I beg leave with all submission to acquaint your Majesty, that by Treaties conducted in the years 1661 and 1700 between the Crowns of Great Britain and Sweden (extracts whereof are hereunto annexed), it was agreed that neither Party should furnish the enemies of the other with any of the goods therein specified.

"Accordingly all care has been taken, as far as the nature of the case would admit, to enforce a due observation of those Treaties, but we know of no Law or Treaty which debars your Majesty's subjects from trading to or from any port taken from Sweden, and in the quiet possession of another prince, when such port is not besieged or blocked up by land or by sea.

"There are four Men-of-War appointed to convoy the ships of your Majesty's subjects to the Baltic Sea, and the Earl of Strafford, your Majesty's Ambassador at the Hague, is instructed to press the States that their convoy may join your Majesty's for their mutual security. He writes me the States have answered, their convoy is not ready, but the season of the year for this trade being far advanced, your Majesty's ships are commanded to proceed, though Captain Hamilton the Commodore of your Majesty's ships is under orders to stop at Elsinore, and inform himself of the strength and designs

[1] 7 Aug. o.s. 1714, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 217.

of the Swedes, since Mr. Jackson, your Majesty's Resident at Stockholm, has given his opinion that the Swedish squadron will attack that of your Majesty if they happen to meet, and in case Mr. Hamilton finds there is any danger, he is to return to the river of Thames, with as many of the Merchant Men as are willing to accompany him.

"The Lords Justices have directed me to acquaint your Majesty that the interruption of your subjects' trade to the Baltic will be particularly prejudicial to your Majesty's service, and to all other the trade of Great Britain at this time, in regard of the want there will be of Naval Stores, and it is with all duty and humility submitted to your Majesty's great wisdom, what instances you shall think fit to make to the Princess and Senate of Sweden on this occasion. I am, etc.

"W. Bromley."

"Whitehall 7th August 1714."

Although the experiences of this expedition belong to the history of king George's reign, it will be convenient to append an account of them to the present chapter. Its importance lies not in what it did, or failed to do, but in the fact that it was fitted out by the Tory ministry of queen Anne, and quite independently of any inspiration on the part of Hanover. It sailed from Yarmouth roads about 9 August o.s., and consisted of his Majesty's ships *Woolwich*, *Dolphin* and *Flamborough* with some eighteen sail of merchantmen, mostly of the Russia Company and bound for St. Petersburg. On arrival at Elsinore Hamilton learnt that two powerful Swedish squadrons were on the look-out for him, prepared for attack, and decided in accordance with his instructions not to proceed further, but to return home. He left Elsinore at the second attempt with his three men-of-war and seven of the merchant ships on 10 September o.s. Next day the *Dolphin* sprang a bad leak, and the weather being stormy, he put into the Swedish harbour of Marstrand, near Gothenburg, for repairs. He sent word of his arrival to General Hugo Hamilton, in command at Gothenburg, who at once came over with Admiral Leyonhaupt in a cruiser of 44 guns. Another cruiser of equal strength was in the harbour. Civilities ensued, the Swedes being entertained on board the *Woolwich* and the English captains in Marstrand castle. But when the time for departure approached, Leyonhaupt declined to allow pilots to go on board. The Swedish men-of-war laid themselves athwart the Englishmen, and the two latter available, the *Dolphin* being lashed to the wharf with her powder and guns on shore, prepared for action. The merchantmen, which had put into Gothenburg, were seized there on the pretext of their being bound to the forbidden ports, their papers being confiscated and their masters thrown into prison.

However the affair being referred to Stockholm, the senate proved more accommodating than in the general case. The embargo was removed, and, leaving the *Dolphin* to follow, Hamilton sailed on 26 September and arrived in Sole (Southwold) Bay on 4 October.[1]

[1] Authorities for Hamilton's expedition: R. O. Admiralty, In-Letters 1879, etc.; Jackson from Stockholm, 25 Sept. o.s. 1714, Sweden 21. A list of twenty ships provided with passes, with other instructions to Hamilton of 22 July o.s. from the secretary of state, King's Letters 72.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND

NEVER was there a more complete reversal of national policy, seldom a more sudden turn in the fortune of an individual, than that which occurred in England in August 1714. On 27 July o.s. Bolingbroke achieved that supremacy in the state for which he had laboured and intrigued; the government of the country was in his hands, and he could look to shape its future after his own views. But the accomplishment of his plans brought with it their ruin; in crushing Oxford he killed the queen, on whose life all depended. The agitation of the crisis brought on an attack, from which in five days she died. The prompt action of the friends of the protestant succession secured it in accordance with the Act of Settlement. The elector of Hanover was declared and accepted king. The Lords Justices, named beforehand to form a regency, took over the papers of the secretaries of state. Bolingbroke found himself a servant, where he had been master. On 31 August he was dismissed in ignominious fashion from his employments.

The business of re-organizing the government was begun immediately upon the queen's death. The ministry which came into office in September was necessarily Whig. The majority of the Lords Justices were of that party. Sunderland and his friends by their persistent outcry, the succession in danger, had forced themselves to be considered the sole repositories of its safety. Baron Bothmer, the elector's plenipotentiary, who more than anyone advised the new appointments, believed the assertion. The peace policy of Oxford and Bolingbroke had been bitterly resented at Hanover. The multitude of Whig claimants was great, and the minor appointments offered to loyal Tories were declined. The earl of Nottingham, so influential with the Church party, who accepted the post of President of the Council, could hardly now be called a Tory.

Cabinet and premiership, as we know them, were not yet established in England; they were developments of the new reign

produced in great measure by the circumstance that George, ignorant of the English language, could not personally preside over the deliberations of his ministers. The great office of Lord Treasurer had during the reign of Anne carried with it the leadership, but Shrewsbury was the last to hold it. To head the government George chose not Cowper, the new Lord Chancellor, not Halifax or Sunderland, but a Whig of secondary importance, Charles Viscount Townshend. He received the office of secretary of state for the northern province. It has been said that Townshend owed his elevation to the fact that he had gained the favour of Bothmer, or Robethon, when envoy at the Hague.[1] This statement can only be accepted in a sense. Bothmer, long resident at the Hague, and three times accredited to the Court of St. James's, was intimately acquainted with the characters of all the English statesmen, and so was Robethon. Knowing them, they recommended Townshend as the most suitable. To have at the head of George's first government a man of controlling influence, or an extreme party politician, was not, in the opinion of the Hanoverians, desirable. Townshend was a sound Whig of moderate views, and his position in the political world and in society was sufficient without being preponderant. Further, his reputation for uprightness recommended him to a master, who required from his servants fidelity and trustworthiness. These seem to have been the main considerations, which determined his appointment.

But if an honest statesman, he was not an able one. He was cautious and slow in deliberation, without arriving thereby at correct conclusions. Yet, once he had formed his judgment, he held to it strongly, and his misplaced self-reliance cost him now and again a fall. Moreover he was proud, impatient of contradiction, wanting in complaisance; faults of a just man. He would quarrel with his friends, and neglect to be on good terms with persons of influence at court. His actions were consequently maligned and the king lost confidence in him, Sunderland intrigued against him, and after two and a half years he lost his office.

His colleague for the southern province was General James Stanhope, the soldier who had gathered honour at Port Mahon, at Almenara, and at Saragossa, and had not lost it at Brihuega. Since his return from Spain he had occupied himself with politics, importing into them the energy and dash which had marked his conduct in the field. He was no insular politician, but had a fine conception of a foreign policy proper to Great Britain. He was a man of education and a linguist, who could undertake

[1] Lady Mary Wortley-Montagu's account to this effect (*Letters and Works*, ed. 1861, II. 124) is purely silly.

embassies to foreign courts in person. In uprightness of character he matched Townshend. The enquiry into his management of the military funds at his disposal, intended to damage him, only brought him credit.[1]

The vehement earl of Sunderland, Marlborough's son-in-law, the loudest and most forward of the Whig lords and of higher standing than either of the secretaries of state, had to be content for the present with the lord lieutenancy of Ireland. It was not till the autumn of 1716 that he gained, by means not the most creditable, George's favour. On Townshend's fall he succeeded for a time to his office.

The only other of George's English ministers, who need be mentioned, was Robert Walpole. Holding at first the subordinate office of paymaster-general, his powers of debate and skill in finance speedily made him the rival of Stanhope in the lower house. Brother-in-law to Townshend, he was of a different character and a very different destiny. The later opportunities of the reign he so utilized, that his power in the next was almost absolute, and his name remains among the first in English history.

George I landed at Greenwich on 18 September o.s., and two days later made his public entry into London amid great rejoicing. With him came his son George Augustus and a great suite of Hanoverian ministers and officials, who crowded the precincts of St. James's. Baron von Goertz, grand marshal and president of the Chamber of Finance, Baron von Bernstorff, first minister, and secretary of embassies de Robethon, were the most important of them. Bothmer had come to London a month before the queen's death to watch the development of the ministerial crisis.

Two of these Hanoverians, far different in birth and station, were in politics practically one. Andreas Gottlieb von Bernstorff was a wealthy landed proprietor and a baron of the empire; John de Robethon was the son of a French advocate, an exile, and one who owed his fortune solely to his own industry and talents. Yet the minister would hardly have achieved his great reputation without the clever prompting of the secretary.

What the two secretaries of state were in England, that and more was Bernstorff at Hanover. A Mecklenburger, he had entered as a young man the service of George William, duke of Celle, becoming in 1689 his first minister. On the duke's death in 1705 he was transferred with other of the Celle ministers to Hanover, and on the death of old Count Platen in 1709 became first minister there. He was a man of immense industry,

[1] Michael (I. 437) has an enthusiastic appreciation of Stanhope's conduct of foreign affairs.

conducting personally an enormous correspondence not only on public affairs but on the management of his great estates as well. In matters of state he was held to be one of the most experienced ministers in Germany. "À tout prendre," says a perhaps too laudatory biographer,[1] "c'estoit un des plus grands ministres de son siècle, mais grand en tout, qui ne s'amusoit pas aux petitesses et qui fut honneur a l'Allemagne." The Prince of Wales, on meeting Heinsius at the Hague, discovered a likeness between Bernstorff's character and his.[2]

Bernstorff concentrated his aims in public policy on the aggrandisement of Hanover, and insisted to that end on the maintenance of loyal allegiance to the emperor, while opposing all advancement on the part of Prussia. This jealousy of Prussia brought him later into collision with British and French views, as when he successfully opposed the admission of Prussia to the Quadruple Alliance and vehemently combated the concessions which it was necessary for Hanover to make to that power, in order to carry through the treaties of 1719. And in other ways he threw British interests on one side, when they conflicted with those of Hanover. Besides thus prejudicing British foreign policy, he would have his say in every detail of the domestic affairs of the three kingdoms. Such opposition and interference became extremely irksome, and though Bernstorff was able to withstand his opponents Townshend and Walpole, he had to yield later to Stanhope and Sunderland. He retired then to Hanover, crushed by the loss of favour of the master whom he had served so well.[3]

John de Robethon was a French Huguenot refugee. He seems to have first obtained a post in the household of the princess of Orange. Afterwards he was secretary for some years to the Lüneburg envoy in England, Baron Schütz, then to the earl of Portland at Paris in 1698 and then to William III. A little busy prying person, he made the best use of the opportunities of a private secretary and obtained an intimate acquaintance with all affairs of state. On William's death he passed into the service of the duke of Celle. Speedily obtaining the favour and confidence of Bernstorff, he became there an important person, and was

[1] Thomas Eberhard von Ilten, son of Bernstorff's contemporary, the Hanoverian minister at Berlin; printed by Bodemann in the *Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen*, 1879.

[2] "Le Pensionnaire lui paroissoit tout à fait un ministre par ses manières, sa vie et son discours comme M. de Bernstorff" (Neuburg to Robethon, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 227, f. 457).

[3] See on Bernstorff: A. W. Ward, *Great Britain and Hanover*, pp. 71–76; "Biographische Fragmente," in Spiel's *Vaterlandisches Archiv des Königreiches Hannover*, V. iii. (1821); character by Ilten, *loc. cit.*; Michael, I. 445; Heinemann, III. 384.

ennobled. In 1705 he migrated with Bernstorff to Hanover. The elector gave him further advancement, admitted him to his privy council, appointed him to a special post in the department of foreign affairs,[1] and employed him as his confidential secretary. He was therefore a party to all state secrets and foreign negotiation, and he was believed to rule Bernstorff entirely. The position he held is shown by the fact that personages such as Marlborough and Prince Eugene corresponded with him directly, and that he sent instructions to the elector's envoy in London personally. He was particularly skilled in obtaining intelligence by the methods of the time, the deciphering of despatches intercepted in the post and the employment of spies and secret agents. But withal he was an ideal secretary, clever with hand and brain, punctual and methodical, of a wide experience of the world and faithful to his masters. Of special value in the elector's case was his knowledge of English men, manners and language obtained by his long residence in the country. In the new reign he busied himself, like Bernstorff, with every detail of the administration; but what was disagreeable in the case of the minister was odious in that of the secretary. Almost every English notice that we have of Robethon is abusive. But his influence was not to be shaken, nor the interference complained of to be prevented. While his patron remained in favour, so did Robethon, when the former was disgraced, he shared his fall. Retaining his appointment at court he lost his power, and did not long survive the humiliation.[2]

Baron Frederick William von Goertz, second at Hanover after Count Platen before the coming of Bernstorff, was the latter's rival there and at first in England. Always in opposition to him, he did his best to confirm George in his indifference to the English succession, and both before and after its accomplishment associated himself with the Tories rather than the Whigs. Thus Lord Clarendon, reporting from Hanover, could call him "a very good man" at the same time that he declared, "Mr. Bernsdorf is governed by Robethon, who is as bad as bad can be."[3] But, with the views he held, Goertz could not remain long in England; after a few months he was sent home, and his later career was confined to the

[1] "Privy Councellour of Ambassy," D'Alais entitles him, adding that the post brought no increase of salary, but the rank of a colonel, and precedence of the Gentlemen of the Chamber, R. O. Germany (States) 163, 17 May 1709.

[2] Robethon is described in his will as the Right Hon. John Robethon, "Privy Councillor of Ambassage of H.B.M. lodging in his palace of St. James's." He died in March or April 1722. For particulars about him, and authorities, see the author's article in the *English Historical Review*, XIII. p. 55. Also Michael, I. 446.

[3] Coxe, II. 44. The originals of these papers relating to Clarendon's mission (1714) are at the British Museum, *Stowe MSS.* 242.

electorate. He was the principal advocate of the cause of Sweden at Hanover, against Bernstorff; and it was to him and his son that their famous Gottorp cousin, when he visited Hanover in August 1714 to ascertain what were the views then held there on northern questions, recommended Count Gyllenborg to attach himself.[1]

Closely allied on the other hand with Bernstorff was Baron Hans Caspar von Bothmer, the eldest son of a Celle judge, but of the privy council at Hanover before George William's death.[2] His work was diplomatic. He was, for instance, at Vienna for Lüneburg in 1696 and 1699, at Ryswyk in 1697, at Paris in 1698. During queen Anne's reign he was stationed at the great centre of European diplomacy, the Hague, and in her last years paid visits of some length to London, where the Whigs—to his embarrassment, seeing that he was instructed to show no party predilection—besieged him, and he earned in consequence the enmity and abuse of Bolingbroke.[3] He was in London when the queen died, and became therefore the immediate representative of the new king. As the man, in whose hands lay practically the distribution of places, he was courted and referred to by all. He showed great tact in the position, greatly contributed to the peaceful accomplishment of the succession, and gave in the sum as little offence as he could expect. Afterwards he remained in London and, like his two colleagues, had his say in all public affairs. As in Robethon's case, his knowledge of England and the English was invaluable to George. But as a man of rank and of public status he was less the mark of hatred than the secretary, and his greater adaptability enabled him to escape the fate of Bernstorff. When the latter opposed the views of the second ministry of the reign Bothmer declined to follow, and remained in favour. At a later date he was sent to be first minister at Hanover, but died in London in 1732.[4]

George himself was alien to the English. He was to them only

[1] Goertz to Gyllenborg, 30 Aug. 1714, R. O. Foreign Ministers 62.

[2] Schaumann in the *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie* states that Bothmer also went from Celle to Hanover in 1705. But Edmund Poley in his *Account* distinctly says that Bothmer was already of the council at Hanover before that time. Michael (I. 335 note) has remarked on the inaccuracy of Schaumann's writings.

[3] For instance, to D'Alais, 28 Nov. o.s. 1712: "to say no worse of him, notwithstanding that air of coldness and of caution which he wore, he was the most inveterate Party-man that I ever saw, and the most capable of giving *tête baissée* into the most extravagant measures that Faction could propose" (R. O. Foreign Entry Book 49, also 18 Jan. and 11 March o.s. 1712, ibid.). "Faction," of course, with Bolingbroke meant opposition.

[4] *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie;* Michael, I. 301, 448–49; Heinemann, III. 384; *Vaterländisches Archiv*, II. (1836) 287; character by Ilten, *loc. cit.* Generally for the "Hanoverian Junta," see Ward, *loc. cit.*

the nearest protestant heir, and James Edward had certainly been preferred, could he have been induced to declare himself of that religion. Cold and unemotional by nature, reserved by habit, his presence was wanting in dignity, and his tastes homely, not to say coarse. He had good qualities enough, no great talent, but plenty of solid common sense ; he was prudent and safe in politics, in business careful and methodic, strong-willed, of proved personal courage, and a man of his word.[1] But these virtues could not of themselves engage the affections of a people that had hated a William III and adored a Charles II. George's dull German solidity disgusted the English, and his ignorance of their language hindered a better acquaintance, the exhibition of some sympathy on his part for insular feelings and prejudices, or a just appreciation on theirs of his real worth. They found fault with his coldness, his coarseness, his love for Hanover, his Lutheranism, his German confidants, his taste in mistresses. They required one to fulfil the functions of royalty, they were obliged to accept a stranger, and they unreasonably expected him to become an Englishman. George had only to express a wish to encounter from his new subjects not accord, but opposition.

The change of monarch and of ministry brought with it changes of the first importance in the relations of Great Britain with other European powers. Not indeed immediately with Austria, for the resentment of the emperor required time and diplomacy for its abatement. But the friendliness cultivated by Bolingbroke with France was immediately destroyed ; mutual suspicion took its place, and the year which remained to Louis XIV was marked by little veiled hostility. On the other hand the Dutch laid aside their anger and ill will, openly expressed their joy at George's accession, and were ready to give him practical support. It was not only that the statesmen of the Hague were pleased to see their old friends in office in London. They were delighted to be relieved of the apprehension of an alliance between France and Great Britain to their prejudice. And, being engaged in stubborn dispute with Austria about the provisions of their new Barrier Treaty, they expected to find in George, as king of England, a powerful advocate of their cause. The British government on its part viewed the renewal of the old alliance with the greatest possible satisfaction. Yet, though the accord was real, and Dutch troops came to England in 1715 and 1719 to fight for king George against the Pretender, the support given beyond that to Great Britain was but moral.

[1] Frederick William of Prussia, for instance, wrote, " Der König von England . . . ist ein braver, rechtschaffener, redlicher König, und der Parole hält " (Droysen, IV. ii. 102, note).

Although a Dutch squadron joined the British in the Baltic in 1715, its admiral was prohibited from engaging in hostilities that were not forced upon him, and thereafter money for equipping men-of-war was not forthcoming. The Dutch had spent themselves in the war with France, and had gained nothing by the peace. Their treasury was empty, and they could only seek to safeguard their commerce, the life-blood of the nation, by abstention from action which might endanger it. Hence their unwillingness to accede to the Quadruple Alliance, to which they were a party nominally, lest their Spanish and West Indian trade should suffer. And indeed after a few years the Dutch republic ceased to be of much account among the powers of Europe.

CHAPTER V

THE NEW CONFEDERACY AGAINST SWEDEN

King George immediately upon his accession, conveniently furnished with excuse by Bromley's despatch, entered a protest at Stockholm against the prohibition of the Baltic commerce and threatened action on the part of his electorate to redress the grievances of his new subjects. But the Swedish senators could only reply to the Hanoverian secretary Schreiber, as previously to Jackson, that they must obey their sovereign's express orders.[1]

The issue of Hamilton's expedition could not but increase the ill feeling between England and Sweden. The seizures of British merchantmen were more frequent in this year than ever before, being reported by almost every post. In January 1715 Jackson made a formal claim for over £65,000 in respect of some 24 ships or their cargoes seized.[2] Small wonder that Townshend took a strong tone in his replies to Gyllenborg's appeals for help and protests against the supply of ships and men which the tsar was obtaining from England.[3] He recapitulated the efforts made by the queen and the elector to keep intact the Swedish provinces in Germany, to procure a reasonable peace, and to save Sweden from the sorry situation to which she was reduced. It was of no use, he said, to appeal to treaties, when the king of Sweden utterly refused to accept the good offices proffered in accordance with their stipulations. He had himself defied their true sense by continually disturbing British subjects in their commerce in the Baltic and confiscating on no sufficient pretext their ships and goods. Care had been taken that those ships carried no contraband of war. In view of such " unexampled and outrageous severities " it could not be expected that troops should be sent to assist Sweden

[1] Jackson, 25 Sept. o.s. 1714, R. O. Sweden 21.

[2] 15 and 22 Jan. o.s. 1715, ibid., printed by Lamberty, IX. 250. Full particulars of the claims also with Townshend's despatch of 10 Dec. o.s. 1714, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155. The Russia Company claimed £45,156 9*s.* 9*d.*

[3] Oct. and Nov. 1714, R. O. Sweden 62. Orders, however, were sent to the Lords of the Admiralty to make strict enquiry into the justice of this complaint (5 Nov. o.s. 1714, R. O. Admiralty, Secretary's Dept., In-Letters 4099).

and Great Britain be engaged in the war. Nevertheless, of the goodwill and friendship preserved by the one country towards the other, all reasonable steps would be taken for the benefit of the latter in concert with the States-General.[1]

In North Germany the situation was sufficiently alarming. It was known that Charles was about to return home from his long exile, and soldiers freed from service by the conclusion of the French war were flocking to his standards in Pomerania.[2] The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was openly leagued with him, had interviews in his favour with the kings of Prussia and Poland, and was ready to send troops. Those in Zweibrücken, Charles's patrimony, would march northwards with the Hessians. Charles Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and other German princes were showing sympathy. The last resources of Sweden were being strained to supply reinforcements. Suddenly, towards the end of November, Charles appeared. He had left Demotika on 1 October, crossed the Danube at Giurgevo, and arrived on the 19th at Pitesti in Wallachia, a few hours' ride from Bucharest and near the frontier of Transylvania. Here he stayed over a fortnight, partly, as was reported, to give time for his troops from Bender to join him, mainly, awaiting an answer to his enquiry at Vienna, whether he would be allowed to pass the emperor's dominions in security and incognito.[3] A sufficiently satisfactory answer received, immediately, and without waiting for the nobles sent by the emperor against his desire to receive him, he began on 8 November[4] his famous secret ride to Stralsund.

The route to the north lay then, as now, through Vienna, and Charles's arrival there was eagerly expected both by the curious and by persons, as Goertz, who desired an interview. On 14 November a small party of Swedish officers passed through the city on their way homewards. They hurried northwards through Bavaria, Hesse, and Brunswick-Lüneburg, avoiding the dominions

[1] Nov. 1714, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 256. A paragraph of similar import was inserted in the instructions for the earl of Stair, envoy extraordinary to Paris, 22 Nov. o.s. 1714, R. O. King's Letters 14. "The King of Sweden could never be brought to hearken to any practicable proposals that were made to him, and, persisted always to act in a manner so contrary to the advice of his best Friends, as rendered it impossible to save his Dominions from that Ruin and Desolation which has since fallen upon several of them. However, if that Prince on his return changes his former methods of acting, and gives way to measures which may with reason be put in practice for his Preservation, We have so great a desire to contribute thereto, that We shall on all occasions shew our readiness to do him the best service We can."

[2] Droysen, IV. ii. 98.

[3] Carlson, p. 76. Rescript to secretary Stiernhoek at Vienna, *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 401.

[4] So Jefferyes: some authorities give 6 Nov.

of the king of Poland. On the 19th Whitworth, as well informed as anyone, reported home from Ratisbon the general belief that Charles had not yet left Transylvania. But he was one of the party, and before the rumours of that fact began to be credited he was in Stralsund. An ordinary courier would have taken from four to five weeks to cover the distance, 1,000 to 1,200 miles : Charles accomplished it in a fortnight. Accompanied only by an officer [1] and two valets,—the others of his company had failed from exhaustion, —he knocked at the gates of Stralsund on the night of 21–22 November.[2] The officer of the guard did not know him, and he only obtained entrance on the plea of despatches for General Dücker. Admitted and recognized, his presence roused a frenzy of enthusiasm. But he was in a sad state ; his body covered with bruises, the wound in his foot re-opened, his legs so swollen that the boots had to be cut off.[3]

His arrival had been heralded at Stockholm a month before by despatches which brought consternation to the city, containing, as they did, a wholesale re-arrangement of offices and orders for the imposition of new taxes and the raising of fresh regiments. The senate decided to send Count Meyerfeld, governor-general of Pomerania, to represent the impossibility of carrying out these latter commands, the kingdom being denuded both of men and money. But they were baffled by an order from Charles at Stralsund, that no one should go to him without permission. Nevertheless, in the extremity of the case, Meyerfeld risked the penalty of disobedience. He travelled thither early in December, bearing as a peace-offering 100,000 rix-dollars squeezed with extreme difficulty from the pockets of the Stockholm burghers.[4]

George had intended to receive Charles in his dominions with all possible honour and hospitality, deputing Major-General von Bothmer, brother of the baron, to meet and conduct him with a Hanoverian escort, Bothmer being ordered at the same time to limit the king's attendance to 500 and to prevent the passage of Hessian or other foreign troops.[5] But the intention was foiled by the rapidity of Charles's passage, and indeed the preparations

[1] Otho Frederick Düring.

[2] Letters from Charles to his grandmother and sister, written immediately upon his arrival, are dated 11 Nov. o.s. (*Egenhändiga Bref*, pp. 7, 136). Jefferyes says the night of the 11th (o.s.) ; Wich that Charles surprised General Dücker at table ; while Dangeau in his Journal (5 Dec. 1714) gives 3 a.m. on 22 Nov. as the time.

[3] Jefferyes from Stralsund, 4 Dec. o.s., R. O. Sweden 17, and to Robethon, same date and 3 Nov. o.s., B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 227, ff. 528, 497, 501; Wich, 27 Nov., R. O. Hamburg 31 ; Whitworth, 1 to 26 Nov., Germany (States) 169 ; George Fury from Vienna, 31 Oct., Germany (Empire) 225.

[4] Jackson's despatches, autumn of 1714.

[5] Schartau, pp. 156–57. The orders to Bothmer were dated 21 Nov.

were but ceremonial and precautionary, for George had already come to an agreement with the king of Prussia for mutual defence against him. Frederick William had paid a visit to Hanover in July, and subsequent negotiations resulted in the mission of Baron Eltz to Berlin at the end of October. There followed on 11 November the signature [1] of a "punctation for a convention," a specification, that is to say, of the points of a treaty to be concluded later. Under this agreement the "Compaciscenten" undertook to use every effort to deprive Sweden of her possessions in Germany, on account of the danger which her presence there threatened to the empire and particularly to their own dominions; a danger, it was said, not a little increased by the prospective marriage of the heir of Hesse-Cassel to the princess of Sweden, which would give France and Sweden an opportunity to unite.[2] In view, especially, of the return of the king of Sweden the parties agreed immediately upon the signature of the compact to set to work to effect the object stated, the establishment of a definite concert. As the king of England was already in possession of Verden and the king of Prussia of Stettin and its district, the two would defend each other against any who should endeavour to expel them, and would maintain each other in possession. King George further promised, as soon as the duchies of Bremen and Verden were handed over to him by Denmark with all their appurtenances, to help to secure to the king of Prussia Stettin and Pomerania up to the Peene with Demmin, Anclam, Wolgast, and the isles of Wollin and Usedom in perpetuity and as Sweden held them under the treaties of Westphalia. Frederick William, on his part, promised the same in regard to Bremen and Verden, and further, so soon as he was in possession of the territory named, to cede to the king of England all the feudal rights possessed by Brandenburg in Brunswick-Lüneburg, whether such were dependent upon Minden or Halberstadt or otherwise, his "superioritas territorialis" over the three villages of Holtorf, Capern, and Gummern belonging to Bernstorff's estate of Gartow,[3] and all his church patronage in Brunswick-Lüneburg. The auxiliary force to be furnished by either side in case of need was fixed at 10,000 men for the king of England and 16,000 for the king of Prussia, one-third in each case to be cavalry, particulars on this head being left for a future extension of the present "punctation." [4]

[1] At "Alten-Landsburg," presumably Alt-Landsberg, near Potsdam.

[2] The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel being, it was believed, in close understanding with Louis XIV.

[3] Situated in the extreme eastern corner of Brunswick-Lüneburg, between the rivers Elbe and Aland.

[4] From the Staatsarchiv at Hanover; signed by Eltz and the Prussian triumvirate Christopher von Dohna, Printz and Ilgen, 11 Nov. 1714.

There was considerable delay before the ratifications of this compact could be exchanged. George refused to join in an occupation of Rostock in the name of the circle of Lower Saxony, of which he and the king of Prussia were directors, or to specify what help he would give, if Prussia were obliged to declare war upon Sweden; he insisted, on the one hand, that he must be in possession of the duchy of Bremen before declaring war, and on the other that the cessions by Prussia to himself must not be postponed till she was confirmed in her own acquisitions. Not till the end of the year were the ratifications exchanged, after it had been agreed that the Prussian cessions were to be made as soon as Stralsund and the isle of Rügen were taken, and to be cancelled, if Stettin and its district had in the end to be restored.

At the same time negotiations were being carried on with Russia and with Denmark. The Danes had not at first been willing to pay any more respect to George as king of England than as elector of Hanover. They expected, Pulteney tells us, that he would have trouble in his new kingdom, that there might be a Tory majority in the new parliament, or perhaps a fresh war with France. Frederick IV declined to make amends for the damages inflicted upon British commerce in the Elbe and elsewhere so long complained of, or to evacuate Holstein, in spite of the emperor's remonstrances against that as against other his encroachments, or to give up Bremen. Yet, wrote Pulteney, "however their affections may turn, as they find their expectations more or less answered, we have at present the advantage that they respect and fear us more than they did some months ago, and the surest tye we can hold them by is that of fear." [1] Which statement was true, for when the Danes saw George settled on his throne and knew that Charles XII was about to return from Turkey they became more tractable, consenting now to receive Pomerania north of the Peene with Stralsund and the isle of Rügen in lieu of Bremen. A definite proposal was made by Frederick IV after negotiations had taken place between Rosenkrantz and John Louis de Fabrice, the Danish and Hanoverian representatives at the Brunswick congress (October 1714). He offered to hand over the duchy of Bremen, with Stade, to king George, as soon as he was in possession of the Pomeranian territory, reserving to himself half the revenues of Bremen and maintaining half the garrison of Stade till peace was concluded. Then he would give his guarantee for the full possession of both Bremen and Verden by Hanover, provided that king George would guarantee to him similarly Sleswick and

[1] 16 Oct. 1714, R. O. Denmark 34.

his share of Pomerania, would pay part of the cost of the Danish naval operations against Stralsund and Wismar, and would aid Denmark to recover her provinces in Sweden ; the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to be compensated for Sleswick by a yearly payment of 100,000 crowns from the revenues of Bremen. But these terms were not acceptable to George ; he stood fast in his resolve, not to involve himself in war with Sweden before Bremen and Stade were delivered up to him, and not to take part in the operations against Stralsund and Wismar beyond preventing Hessian or other troops from coming to their relief. Nor would he agree to the proposed compensation to the duke, nor to exert himself further in the cause of Denmark than by good offices. Fabrice was ordered to say that to negotiate upon other terms than these was but loss of time, and that his master, if the king of Denmark thought to do without his help, would take his own measures. And though in December General Dewitz came to Hanover with modified proposals, he received the answer that no treaty would be made before the article for the evacuation of Bremen was rightly settled. Nor had Dewitz better success at Berlin, the Prussian ministers saying that Denmark must first come to terms with Hanover.[1]

The Russian overtures were made through Prince Kurakin, who was sent again to England. Peter instructed him that he waited to propose a plan for peace with Sweden until he knew whether the king of England would enter into the negotiation ; the king of Prussia had guaranteed to him everything excepting Livonia and Finland, and these he did not pretend to keep ; only a proper line of frontier from Viborg and some necessary islands.[2] Kurakin's work bore fruit in the treaty of Greifswald, of which below.

The consent of Frederick William to ratify the compact of Alt-Landsberg was partly due to the failure of overtures which he made to Charles XII.[3] The terms he proposed might well have been accepted, to restore Stettin in return for the immediate repayment of the 400,000 crowns expended and an undertaking from Charles not to attack Saxony or Poland, and to guarantee

[1] Particulars of the above, Schartau, pp. 162–68. Also for the winter's negotiations, Droysen, IV. ii. 101 foll. But his account is certainly partial. Prussia coveted Stettin just as much as Hanover or Denmark other portions of Swedish territory. But they are accused of greed, while Frederick William is credited with the patriotic desire of driving the Swedes out of Germany and of preserving the quiet of the empire. No doubt he had the former purpose, as had his father and grandfather before him (Ranke, *Preussische Geschichte*, IV. 485), but it was by no means unselfish. Could he have taken Stralsund without the aid of the Danish fleet, he would probably have done so.

[2] Kurakin's credentials, 2 Oct. o.s., instructions, 9 Oct. o.s. 1714, further credentials and full powers, Feb. 1715, *Kurakin Archives*, II. 101 foll.

[3] Droysen, p. 106.

Swedish Pomerania against attack thence. He offered further to advance 800,000 crowns for the hereditary possession of the country up to the Peene, or for its administration until repayment. The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and Count Rottembourg on the part of France, tried hard to bring about an accommodation on these terms. But Charles refused them, and thus, to use the words of Jefferyes, who had followed him to Stralsund, "the one party insisting on his right, and t' other on his pretention, the negociations which had been continued here for 2 or 3 weeks were broak off."[1] Frederick William began to prepare for a campaign. A definite scheme of defence was adopted, a third regiment put into Stettin. In vain the landgrave spent the latter half of January in Stralsund, and proceeded thence to conferences at Oranienburg.[2] Modified proposals of his[3] had no better success than those already rejected.

Thus Charles a second time rejected an alliance, which would at the least have preserved for him a great part of his German provinces and have reduced the number of his adversaries. He was perhaps right. In the first place, as Droysen points out, his most valuable asset was his personal prestige. If he were precluded from attacking king Augustus in Poland or Saxony or the Danes in Holstein, if he seemed to yield to Prussian force, that prestige would be gravely impaired. In the second place, a blow suddenly and successfully delivered might dispose his enemies to peace upon his own terms. Wismar and Stralsund were inexpugnable while he held the sea, and he had good prospect of maintaining his superiority on that element. It was not till the Danes in August 1715 forced his fleet to retire to its own harbours that his land position in Germany became hopeless. He was proved to be wrong by the event, but there was sufficient to justify so bold a nature in making the venture. He showed of what mind he was by summarily ejecting on 23 February a handful of Prussians from Wolgast.

Frederick William strengthened his position by arrangements with the tsar and the king of Poland, concluding with the latter a definite treaty for military aid on 3 February, while Golovkin on Peter's part promised the help of 30,000 to 40,000 men.[4] But during the coming year the full energies of the one monarch, and all that the latter could spare from his operations in Finland, were to be absorbed by the civil war in Poland. King George also concluded a defensive treaty with Augustus on 1 January 1715, a separate article of which stated that it should be a "casus foederis"

[1] 25 Dec. o.s., R. O. Sweden 17.

[2] Jefferyes, 8 and 18 Jan. o.s. 1715, ibid.; Wich, 8 and 12 Feb., R. O. Hamburg 31.

[3] For these and the king of Prussia's reply, see Lamberty, IX. 268.

[4] Droysen, p. 113.

if the German dominions of either party were attacked by any power in consequence of the northern war.[1]

In the meantime Count Gyllenborg, in spite of the cold reception of his arguments by Townshend in the autumn and of the disabilities entailed upon him by lack of money and credentials, continued to urge the justice of his master's cause, the obligations of the treaties, and the interest of Great Britain in saving from ruin a country so long her friend. In particular he called attention to the dangerous expansion of Muscovy. He was seconded in his efforts by the Holsteiner Hermann Petkum, who came to London in January. They had interviews with Townshend and with Bernstorff, but made little impression.[2] To Petkum, pleading the cause of his own country, the former replied that the king was full of pity for its condition, but that, as some of the parties interested declared that the house of Gottorp had drawn its present misfortunes upon itself,—an allusion to the convention with Stenbock as to Tönning, recently discovered and published,—he desired, before taking action, to be enlightened as to the truth of those allegations and thought, besides, that Brunswick was the proper place for the discussion of these matters.[3] To Gyllenborg was objected, as before, the interference of the king of Sweden with British commercial interests. If, it was said, he would consent to remove the restrictions imposed and would give satisfaction for damages done, he might expect to see Great Britain exert herself to procure him a good peace.

But so far removed was Charles from any such course of action that he played into the hands of Hanover by the issue of an edict, which Jackson declared to violate in almost every clause his treaties with Great Britain and the United Provinces; "not a British ship," he said, "can come into the East Sea, but she will be made prize."[4] The principal provisions of this "Privateer Ordinance" of date 8 February o.s. 1715, were as follows[5]:

Privateering commissions were to be issued to any, whether subjects of the king of Sweden or foreigners, who should desire them. A ship encountered was to be boarded and her papers examined. If all were correct, she should go free, and no violence or plundering should be committed. But if anything suspicious

[1] Schartau, pp. 168–69; he points out errors on the part of Droysen.

[2] Gyllenborg's correspondence, *Handlingar*, X. 121 foll., Feb. 1715.

[3] Petkum, 31 Jan. o.s. 1715, R. O. Foreign Ministers 1; Townshend's reply, 8 Feb. o.s., Foreign Entry Book 248. Petkum remained in England till 1719.

[4] 5 and 19 March o.s., R. O. Sweden 21.

[5] Abstracted from Jackson's English translation, ibid. The Swedish original in G. Floder's *Handlingar hörande till konung Carl XII's historia*, IV. 224 (Carlson, p. 81 note). A French version in Lamberty, IX. 228.

were observed, hatches were to be sealed and the ship brought into port.

If after being signalled a ship attempted to escape, satisfaction was to be made to the privateer. Any resistance entailed forfeiture.

Judgment of the prize court was to be summary, nor, in the case of insufficient papers, was time to be allowed to procure others fuller or more authentic. Only such papers were to be admitted as were found in the ship at the time of capture. If the case were dark and intricate, bulk was to be broken and the cargo examined. If the ship were given free, the privateer was to be responsible for all damage which might have been done to her while in charge.

Lawful prize were all ships of the enemy, whatever their cargoes; all neutral ships going to or coming from the prohibited ports; and all built or bought in the enemy's territory, taken before they had touched free ground.

The following papers were required for the ships: the builder's attestation of the place of building; a bill of sale, showing how the ship came into the hands of the owner, if he were not the builder; a bill of burthen, showing the size of the ship, consonant with the two former; and a passport giving the names of owner and master, to show that the owner was not an enemy and to what port the ship was bound. This was to be sworn by master and owner, or joint owners, and to specify the whole lading, to be renewed for every voyage, and to be subscribed by the magistrates of the place of origin according to ancient custom. The papers must be strictly in order and in agreement with each other. Ships not provided with them, or having double and contradictory ones, were to be made prize.

Cargoes were confiscable if belonging to or sent for the account of the enemy, if carried in enemy's ships or to or from the prohibited ports, or if not covered by proper documents. On their account were required: an affidavit of the freighters, certified by the magistrates of the place of lading, specifying as well the nature of the cargo as its owners and destination; a bill of lading, showing what the cargo was and for whose account; a separate certificated bill of lading for such part of the cargo as might belong to the master; and a list of the goods carried, with their marks; these all to be mutually conformable. Bills of lading not filled up were expressly prohibited. Other papers, as invoices, letters of advice, custom house rolls, etc. might be asked for, for comparison with those specified. Goods about which the papers were contradictory might be confiscated.

Contraband of war, including soldiers' clothing, was of course forbidden.

Ships laden from one enemy's port to another, or coming too near a prohibited port or one not specified in their papers, unless driven thither by stress of weather or other good cause, were confiscable with their cargoes.

Every ship must have a roll of its company duly certificated, showing amongst other things the birth-place of each of the crew. If there were no such roll, or if it appeared that more than one-fourth of the men were natives of an enemy's country, the ship and cargo were to be confiscated. If a part only of a ship were lawful prize, the whole must be condemned.

Lastly the prize, when so adjudged, was to be the sole property of the commissioned privateer or his owners, and neither the king nor the public were to have any share in it.

The execution of the ordinance was immediate. By the end of March some thirty "capers" had sailed or were sailing from Stockholm, some twenty from Gothenburg, others from Wismar and Stralsund. Two Dutch and five British merchantmen had already then been brought into Gothenburg or Marstrand.[1] Others were detained at different ports for want of proper papers, to their great loss. This was especially unjustifiable, as the edict had not been issued when they left home. But Charles refused to grant them passes and insisted upon their obtaining the documents prescribed.[2] No redress was to be had from the Swedish senate, for the officers in Gothenburg and the other ports rejected its authority, referring themselves directly to Charles's orders. In May Wich reported from Hamburg that the Baltic swarmed with Swedish privateers and that thirty-two English and Dutch vessels had been taken quite lately.[3]

The ordinance both aided the enemies of Sweden and was condemned by her friends. The marquis de Torcy, for instance, wrote on 18 April to Campredon, the French resident at Stockholm: "Ce Prince avoit assez d'ennemis sans chercher encore de nouveaux moyens d'attirer contre luy toutes les nations qui trafiquent dans le Nord, et je crains qu'il n'ait lieu de se repentir d'avoir donné un prétexte aux Anglois et aux Hollandois d'envoyer des escadres dans la mer Baltique. Car elles n'y agiront pas vraysemblablement pour les intérêts de la Suède." [4] The sailing of an Anglo-Dutch fleet was indeed the result. Previously there had been considerable opposition to the merchants' demands for protection, but now it

[1] Jackson, 19 and 26 March o.s., *loc. cit.*

[2] Jefferyes, 5 and 12 April o.s., R. O. Sweden 17. In June we find a petition to Admiral Norris from the masters of 13 English ships detained at Dantzig for want of the prescribed papers (B. M., Add. MSS. 28154, f. 111).

[3] 24 May, R. O. Hamburg 32.

[4] M. A. E., Suède 131, 18 April 1715.

could not avail. Gyllenborg saw this, and pleaded for a relaxation of the edict in certain points, in view of the embittered state of public feeling.[1] But his memorials and his pamphlets were of no use.[2] Townshend wrote to Jefferyes: "This late edict contains several innovations that no treaty law or reason can justify. We can look upon such proceedings as piratical only, and commissions founded upon such orders can be calculated for no other purpose, but to set the neutral powers at defiance, who are concerned in the commerce of the Baltick." [3]

The negotiations for a league of Prussia, Denmark and Hanover against Sweden were resumed in January 1715, when George sent his last word to Copenhagen by the hands of the Russian minister Schack, who was returning that way from London. He required that Frederick should evacuate Bremen and Stade within fourteen days after request, promising to declare war on Sweden himself as soon as he was in possession, to pay 30,000 crowns quarterly towards the cost of the war, to prevent troops from coming to the help of Sweden from the south, and to send 6,000 men to the aid of Denmark, if her German provinces were attacked. He refused, however, to take part in the operations against Stralsund. But Frederick insisted that the declaration of war must precede the evacuation, that the subsidy must be 50,000 crowns quarterly, and that George must take part in the operations; the provision for auxiliary aid, he said, was more proper to be embodied in a defensive treaty.[4]

Dolgoruky at Copenhagen and Alexis Golovkin at Berlin exerted themselves to the utmost to bring those courts into agreement with that of Hanover,[5] and Baron Eltz was sent again to Berlin towards the end of March. But terms could not be agreed upon; the Prussians were loth to undertake the risk of war. Although George declared both through Eltz and to Bonet in London

[1] To Müllern, 29 April o.s., *Handlingar*, X. 165.

[2] The *Seconde lettre d'un ami à Dantzig à un ami à Amsterdam*, ostensibly of December 1714, upholding the prohibition of commerce to the lost ports, would seem to have been issued by Gyllenborg. It is printed by Lamberty, IX. 230. Gyllenborg wrote of it, 31 May o.s. 1715, "Jag haſver nu låtit trycka och utdehla det andra Dantziska brefvet" (*Handlingar*, X. 171). Sparre replied approvingly, and said that he had no difficulty in divining the author. Another pamphlet printed by Lamberty (IV. 219) is the *Lettre d'une personne de distinction de Rotterdam à un ami de Amsterdam, Rotterdam*, 10 *May* 1715. Of the first Dantzig letter there is a translation at the British Museum (8245 b. 69), entitled *Reasons for the present conduct of Sweden, in relation to the Trade in the Baltick*, an apology for Charles's conduct and a violent attack upon the commercial policy of Peter the Great.

[3] 8 March o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

[4] Schartau, pp. 172–73.

[5] See fully Solov'ev, *loc. cit.* Peter the Great to Frederick William, 1 April o.s. 1715, urging him to war, *Kurakin Archives*, II. 115.

that the British squadron under orders for the Baltic should help to reduce Stralsund and Rügen, that was not sufficient for Frederick William. He made additional demands, in particular that George should protect his dominions in Guelders and Cleves against a possible French attack. Hence, although Frederick IV now agreed to George's stipulations in regard to Bremen, the negotiations once more were broken off. Too much was asked, and too little offered in return.[1]

But now Charles XII stepped in once more to ruin his own cause. After his occupation of Wolgast, and when he refused to restore the place, more Prussian troops were sent into Usedom. On 21 April Charles invaded that island and speedily made himself master of it. Thereafter the non-Prussian portion of the garrison of Stettin was disarmed, and the dismissal of Frisendorff from Berlin on 26 April marked the formal commencement of war between Sweden and Prussia. Meanwhile Frederick William had desisted from the more difficult of his conditions for a treaty with Hanover, while George withdrew his demand that Prussia should contribute to the compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp.[2] And in regard to the action of the British squadron in the Baltic he declared as follows :

" We can promise the King of Prussia on Our royal word and honour that the squadron shall act in support of the operations in Pomerania against Sweden, and We would hope that His Majesty would believe Our word, seeing that the result would shew that there should be nothing lacking to the fulfilment of it. We could not enter into a written engagement with His Majesty on this point, because the provision of the said squadron belongs to Us as King, and in drawing up anything thereon in writing We could not employ Our German Ministry, but the matter must pass through the hands of Our British Ministers." [3]

These mutual concessions, and this declaration, enabled a treaty to be signed by Heusch and Ilgen on 27 April,[4] and it was ratified by Frederick William in his camp at Stettin on 30 May.[5] About the same time was ratified a treaty between Prussia and Denmark concluded on 17 May.[6] But the third treaty, between Hanover and Denmark, was delayed. King George had signed it in London on

[1] Schartau, pp. 174–76.
[2] Ibid. p. 178.
[3] To Heusch, 16 April 1715, translated from Michael, I. 717.
[4] Schartau, p. 179.
[5] Staatsarchiv, Hanover.
[6] See Schartau, p. 181 ; Droysen, pp. 122, 130 : Holm, p. 150. The last named gives an abstract of the treaty

21 April o.s.,[1] but Frederick IV did not till 26 June,[2] and he still declared that he would not exchange the ratifications, nor hand over Bremen, until George had signed an undertaking to contribute to the compensation, if any, to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp equally with himself. A declaration to this effect having been signed by Baron Eltz on 16 July and by George in London twelve days later,[3] the ratifications were at length exchanged.

The preambles of these treaties threw the whole blame for the declaration of war by the three powers against Sweden upon Charles XII. He had, it was said, rejected with contempt and threats ("mit Verachtung Indignation und Bedrohung") the proposals of friendly powers for neutrality and peace, had thereby brought the northern war into Germany and particularly into the circles of Upper and Lower Saxony, and had inflicted the utmost injury upon states of the empire having no concern in that war, while he still showed by his refusal to send ministers to the Brunswick congress that he persisted in his aversion from peace and had in fact openly declared that he would recover sword in hand what he had lost and revenge himself upon his enemies and so-called false friends, thereby making probable the outbreak of a widespread war. And since he had entered into engagements and correspondence with other powers both within and without the empire, namely with other states thereof for troops and even with France and her adherents, prudence and care were required on the part of all, and particularly of the states neighbouring on his dominions, to avert the fatal consequences which old and recent experience showed must result. All hope being extinguished that the king of Sweden would dispose himself to arrangement by treaties and would leave the empire and in particular the two circles undisturbed, but on the contrary he being resolved to attack "via armorum" anyone in the empire, whosoever he might be, no power that had at heart the well-being and quiet of the empire could be suspected of ill in taking measures to meet the danger as circumstances required. The principle of "extremi mali extrema remedia" must be applied.

The contracting parties agreed therefore (art. 1) to use jointly the whole strength which God had given them to avert from the empire and in particular from the two circles the dangers threatened by the king of Sweden's violence. Even if he, it was stated in the Danish-Hanoverian treaty, perceiving the earnestness of their

[1] Staatsarchiv, Hanover.

[2] Ibid.; an abstract, Holm, p. 145; translations made in 1728, and wrongly dated 26 July, R. O. Treaty Papers 4, and B. M., Add. MSS. 32755, f. 563.

[3] R. O. ibid.; Schartau, pp. 186–87.

intentions should incline himself to peace, nevertheless the treaty should continue in full force and his German provinces be dealt with as provided. That is to say, perpetual hereditary possession of the duchy of Bremen and principality of Verden was guaranteed to Hanover, of Stettin and the country to the Peene, including Demmin, Loitz, Anclam, Wolgast and the isles of Usedom and Wollin to Prussia, and the northern half of Swedish Pomerania with the isle of Rügen to Denmark. Wismar, its fortifications razed, was to be a free imperial city, and the isle of Poel to go with it, subject to the rights of Lübeck; but the "Amt" of Neukloster to pass to the princely house of Mecklenburg, provided that that house remained neutral in the war and gave satisfaction to the estates of Mecklenburg for forage already supplied to the Danish army. The Warnemünde tolls were to be abolished. Further, in compensation for the injury done to Denmark by the admission of Stenbock's army to Tönning, that power should be maintained and guaranteed in possession of the princely portion of the duchy of Sleswick, the compensation therefore to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, if any, to be settled at the Brunswick congress. If a prince of Holstein succeeded to the throne of Sweden he must resign his German dominions to the next agnate, nor should a king of Sweden ever possess anything in Holstein. The duchy of Bremen, including Stade, was to be evacuated by Denmark fourteen days after requisition by Hanover, and thereupon the latter was to pay to Denmark the sum of 300,000 thalers with all arrears of contributions due up to the date of surrender. If the war with Sweden were still on foot on 1 May 1716, and the king of Denmark were not yet in possession of Stralsund and Rügen, then, unless Hanover were separately engaged in military operations against Sweden or her allies, a further payment of 50,000 thalers was to be made to Denmark quarterly for one year, if the war lasted so long, or, if peace were made earlier, proportionately till that time.[1] As soon as the duchies were handed over, Hanover was to declare war with Sweden.

King George undertook to do his best to obtain from parliament in the present session payment to Denmark of the remaining claims for subsidies under the treaty of 1701, and of the arrears for the Danish troops employed in the war with France.

[1] The money was to be paid in two-mark pieces (two-thirds of a thaler) of the Leipzig standard of 1690. As to the amount actually paid over, authorities differ. Horatio Walpole says 600,000 rix-dollars, Koch and Schoell (XIII. 256) six "tonnes d'or" and 277,000 rix-dollars for arrears of contributions, Stenzel (III. 270) 600,000 thalers and 271,000 arrears, Heinemann (III. 218) 695,000 thalers, Coxe and Mahon £150,000, a sum roughly equivalent to 650,000 thalers. Schartau (p. 196) says that the arrears were estimated at the time of the surrender of Stade at 413,000 thalers.

Prussia promised to cede to Hanover absolutely, as soon as Stralsund and Rügen were conquered, all her feudal holdings and church patronage in Brunswick-Lüneburg, and her sovereignty over the three Gartow villages, as had been stipulated in the "punctation"; provided that, if at the peace Prussia were unable to keep Stettin and its dependencies, the above should be restored to her.

Military contingents of from 6,000 to 8,000 men respectively were to be furnished by each party to the others to maintain them in possession of the lands allotted, or to help to defend their existing territories, if these should be invaded. If Saxony were attacked whether by Sweden or by another party in her favour, the three kings were to combine their forces in her defence; the king of Poland to give a corresponding undertaking in return.

Prussia undertook, pending the extirpation of the Swedish forces in Pomerania, to restrain them, with the help, it was hoped, of the northern allies, from offensive action thence. But the danger of succour coming to them from Hesse or elsewhere, particularly from France, was to be warded off by king George, who should concentrate his army for the purpose in Calenberg and Hildesheim and desire help from the bishops of Münster and Paderborn, with whom he had defensive treaties. For further aid in this quarter, if necessary, the Prussian troops in Westphalia should be kept ready for action at short notice. Unless all were absolutely and certainly secure on the side of Hesse and the Rhine Hanoverian troops were not to be required to undertake offensive operations beyond the Elbe. And those sent for defence were to be kept as near the frontier as possible.

The siege of Stralsund was to begin immediately, Denmark supplying twenty battalions of infantry and a flotilla and transports at her own cost; the former to march at once, the ships to sail as soon as the British fleet appeared in the Baltic. There were provisions for determining the plan of operations, the command, and other details. The remaining clauses provided for the inclusion of other powers in the treaties, for obtaining the assent and assistance of the emperor, for communicating them to the tsar and procuring his concurrence and eventual help, and against the conclusion of a separate peace by any party.

The separate article of the Danish-Hanoverian treaty agreed to at the last moment, as above said, bound the parties to share equally in any compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, if such, contrary to expectation, had to be made. In later years George and his son, pleading the unwarrantable delay on the part of Denmark in evacuating Stade, the enormity of the sum exacted

for arrears of contributions, and the fact that after all Hanover had to purchase the duchies from Sweden, alike refused to share in the compensation.[1]

Such then, was the outcome of Charles XII's heroic determination to make head against his enemies at all costs and his refusal to accept any kind of compromise. To bring about an alliance of three powers so jealous of each other as were Denmark, Hanover and Prussia was a feat of which he might have been proud, had not the alliance been directed against himself. Had he in the first instance accepted the neutrality convention, or in the second come to terms with Prussia and refrained from threats against Hanover, he might have preserved at least his German provinces. But he made it more profitable for those powers to join with his hereditary enemy Denmark for their own gain, and the share of the spoils which they obtained they never relinquished.

[1] See B. M., Add. MSS. 32755, f. 571. It may be remarked, as to the Prusso-Hanoverian treaty, that Frederick William also sought to renew the defensive alliance of 1690 with Great Britain; see an original letter of Bonet of 17 May o.s. R. O. Foreign Ministers 46.

CHAPTER VI

THE RELATIONS OF CHARLES XII WITH FRANCE AND WITH THE EMPEROR

We have seen that Charles XII, when he was at Bender, was believed to be intriguing with Louis XIV against the interests of the members of the Grand Alliance, the enemies of France and, as he termed them, his own false friends. The belief excited the more disquietude, and especially at Vienna, in that the minatory attitude of Charles, when in Saxony in 1707, was remembered, and that the Turks, his allies, were still dreaded there. Really the fears entertained had no foundation. In the first place, Charles denied himself the intention imputed to him, and one of his peculiarities was that he always spoke the truth. In the second place, while he instructed his envoy at Constantinople to cultivate good relations with the French ambassador and to intimate to him that he was displeased with the sea-powers and might be led to take measures against them, he informed him also that, as a member of the empire, he would not help France against the emperor.[1] And thirdly we have the evidence of the French king. Louis XIV was accustomed to explain fully in his instructions to his envoys his previous relations with the courts to which they were accredited. In a document of this kind he complained that throughout the war Charles had declined to respond to his advances, or to give him the aid he had reason to expect. Although he had shown his goodwill by offering to bring Charles back from Turkey by sea, by sending money and corn to Stenbock, and by letting his ambassador at Constantinople stir up war between Turkey and Russia, yet he had never been able to procure any undertaking in response.[2]

Louis XIV had indeed, on the representations of Eric Sparre, sent 200,000 crowns and corn for the relief of Stenbock in Tönning.[3] And he sought to serve the cause of Sweden at Berlin, as we have

[1] *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 389, 19 Nov. o.s. 1711.
[2] Instructions to the Count de Croissi, 1715, *Recueil des instructions*, Vol. II.
[3] Carlson, p. 42.

seen, if only as the secondary object of his policy. Further, he intimated to Prince Kurakin at the Hague through his ambassador the marquis de Châteauneuf that Charles XII was disposed to make a separate peace with Russia and had approached him on the subject. Kurakin replied that the kings of Denmark and Poland could not be excluded, and Peter the Great, having received his report, instructed him that it would be dangerous to accept the propositions of Louis XIV, because of the support given to Sweden by the French ministers at Constantinople and Berlin. He was disposed to make peace with Sweden, but his allies must be included.[1]

Not till it was too late did Charles XII turn his eyes towards France. On 2 September o.s. 1714, shortly before he left Demotika on his journey homewards, he wrote to his sister that that power was more likely than any other to render him aid, because her interests were more than anyone else's at one with his own.[2] But Louis could only help him now by subsidies, and most valuable this form of assistance was. Charles's most pressing want was that of money.[3] He had not enough to pay the most ordinary expenses. We read of mutiny, even in Stralsund, for want of pay. With money troops could be obtained from Germany. He tried various expedients. He ordered three-fourths of all salaries on the civil list to be paid in interest-bearing paper, redeemable when cash should be available. He reimposed the old charges on "unfree" ships, discontinued during the war, and commanded all customs to be paid in rix-dollars, "whereas," says Jackson, "there is scarce now such a kind of species to be found in the kingdom."[4] He proposed to sell,—to the permanent injury, it was observed, of Swedish shipping,—great quantities of Pomeranian timber to a Paris banker.[5] But none of these expedients, nor further extraordinary exactions from the long-suffering Swedish people, were in any way sufficient. The restrictions on commerce, in particular the ordinance of privateers, deprived the burghers of the means of refilling their empty pockets. Trade in Sweden came almost to a standstill, the merchants' commodities lay on their hands, and

[1] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[2] *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 132.

[3] "Si le Roy n'est pas assisté bien tost de quelque somme d'argent, toute la boutique d'icy sautera en fort peut de tems" (Goertz to Sparre, Stralsund, 26 March 1715, *Handlingar*, VIII. 239).

[4] 19 March and 23 April o.s. 1715, R. O. Sweden 21.

[5] Hogguer by name. Jefferyes frequently refers to this, and forwarded on 30 April o.s. the conditions of purchase of 15,000 oak and 33,000 pine-trees. Prior reported the affair from Paris on 8 Jan. (R. O. France 159), and the earl of Stair, his successor, mentions it more than once. The British government was apprehensive that the timber would be used to build French war-ships in aid of the Pretender.

mineral and other products of the country sold for half their former value.

Money therefore must be got from abroad, and abroad meant France. Fortunate it was for Charles that Eric Sparre, who returned to Paris at the beginning of 1715, found sympathy and success. In the first place he asked for a loan of 2,000,000 crowns on the security of Zweibrücken and the county of Veldenz, France to become owner of the same if the money were not repaid in ten years' time. It was asked in reply, would Charles continue the war with Russia, or consent to a truce; would he send a minister to Brunswick; on what footing would he treat with king Augustus, most suitably, it was suggested, through the interposition of the landgrave; and what measures would he adopt with the king of Prussia in regard to Stettin. Sparre answered (2 February) that his master would only consent to a truce with the tsar on condition that the latter restored all his conquests with the exception of a small portion which he might keep for himself for his own time, and undertook not to assist the other enemies of Sweden; that a minister could only be sent to Brunswick on the understanding that all the German provinces of Sweden were to be restored; that Charles was willing to come to an agreement with Augustus, but the want of sincerity of that prince prevented anything being done; and that his sentiments in regard to Prussia he (Sparre) would explain by word of mouth. The envoy further mooted a project for the entry of a French army into Germany, in concert with the emperor and certain German princes, to put an end to the war, enumerating a possible contingent of 32,000 men to be furnished by the latter.[1] This suggestion fell on very stony ground, but a subsidy treaty was successfully negotiated, and signed on 3 April. The essential part of it was that Sweden should receive from France a quarterly payment of 150,000 crowns, the first two quarters in advance. There were reciprocal guarantees of territories under the provisions of the various treaties since 1648. Louis was to use his good offices to recover for Charles the possessions in Germany of which he had been despoiled, and to support as well the interests of Holstein-Gottorp. In return, in case he were attacked, Charles was to make a diversion in his favour, or to give the direct aid either of 5,000 infantry and 2,700 horse or of eight ships of war.[2] Events

[1] The above from Sparre's correspondence, *Handlingar*, VIII. 178 foll., and from the records of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. In July Sparre actually proposed that the joint army of his conception should be commanded by the Chevalier de St. Georges.

[2] M. A. E. Suedè 131. The treaty, with omission of the 12th clause, promising a commercial treaty, and of the 14th providing for ratification, is printed in

rendered this last provision nugatory. To use the expression of Marshal D'Huxelles, the obstinacy of the king of Sweden drew upon him fresh enemies and fresh misfortunes, and took from him the means of succouring France, had there been need. But Louis performed his obligations. He paid the subsidies, and he sent to Berlin to exercise good offices the count de Croissi, brother of the marquis de Torcy, the head of the ministry of foreign affairs.

Croissi was instructed to exert his best endeavours to arrange terms for Charles XII with the kings of Prussia and Poland, in order to recover for him the losses suffered at the hands of Denmark. He was ordered to visit on his journey Cassel, to learn the views and take the advice of the landgrave, and Wolfenbüttel, to try to discover the intentions of the king of England through that related court. To attempt an arrangement with Denmark, he was told, was not worth while. That king was in arms against Sweden without a shadow of justice, and solely to profit by her unfortunate condition. He was a feeble, irresolute creature, ready to encroach where there was no prospect of resistance, but prompt to retreat in face of opposition. Bremen and Holstein must at all costs be restored, the more so because to expel the Danes from the former duchy was the only way to save it from the king of England. As to Russia, there was no hope of inducing the half-barbarian tsar to resign his conquests. But freed from her other enemies Sweden would be able to account for Russia and Denmark by herself. And it would be good for a war-loving prince like Charles to be so occupied, otherwise he might, for instance, resume his mischievous interference in the cause of the protestant religion in the empire. The king of Prussia was to be warned of the danger to his marches of Brandenburg in case of a success by Charles, and of the overpowering increase of the might of Russia, and pressed to give up Stettin on the terms advocated by the landgrave. The essence of the negotiation was to be peace between Sweden and Prussia.[1]

The mission never had any chance of success. Croissi learnt as much from the landgrave, who laid the blame rather upon Prussian prevarication than on Swedish obstinacy. He found the king of Prussia at Stettin (or Wollin) on 9 May, and was at Stralsund on the 14th, just missing Vellingk, to whom, as well inclined to France, he had been particularly recommended to address himself. Staying on during the siege he became an

Tessé's *Memoirs*, II. 321 foll., forming part of a "*Mémoire secret*" given to Tessé by D'Huxelles for the purposes of the negotiation with Peter the Great entrusted to him, when Peter was in Paris in 1717. Flassan's version (2nd ed., IV. 306-08) is inaccurate.

[1] Instructions cited.

enthusiastic worshipper of Charles, was extremely intimate with him and constantly in his company both on his tremendous rides and at home, and conversed with him confidentially on all subjects. Instead of persuading him to peace he became fired with his zeal and set himself to devise schemes for his benefit.

In the first place he urged Charles to fall in with the proposals which reached him from the Jacobites, who offered to find money in return for military aid.[1] To foment trouble in England, he said, would be proper, since king George was now Sweden's most cruel enemy. Charles admitted the advantage to himself, but refused his consent on the ground that the king of England had not declared war upon him, so that his sense of honour was again to his disadvantage ; but Müllern strongly supported the refusal upon other grounds, namely, that the king had enough enemies to fight already, without adding to them Great Britain, that he had no troops to spare, and that grave mistrust would be excited by such action among all protestant princes. In the second place, Croissi went so far as to advise his government to assemble near Metz an army of 25,000 men, " que les gazettes ou les nouvelles publiques feront aisément passer pour estre de cinquante mille." The Dutch and several German princes, he said, would approve of this. The emperor, threatened by the Turks, could not interfere ; the king of Prussia would be terrorized. The force could easily reach the latter's frontiers, if desired, through the friendly lands of Hesse and Wolfenbüttel.

The answer that he received was a crushing reproof, showing clearly that Louis XIV had no intention of doing anything which might draw upon himself a fresh war. Croissi had been informed in his instructions that the British malcontents certainly looked to the king of Sweden for help, but that Louis would keep his promise not to assist the Chevalier directly or indirectly, and he must only try to gather the opinion of Charles and of other foreign princes on the subject. Now he was told that his action was strongly disapproved. The king of Sweden must on no account make new enemies. He had not the means of beginning a war with England, even if he wished it. Louis, while peace with England lasted, would adhere to his promise, and not attempt to disturb that country. Again, any force assembled near the German frontier might draw upon France a fresh war. " Réglez vôtre conduite

[1] What these proposals were we know from Berwick's *Memoirs*, and from Bolingbroke's *Letter to Sir William Windham*. A force of 7,000 or 8,000 men at Gothenburg, instead of being transported to Stralsund, was to be landed in Scotland. Berwick actually handed over to Sparre at Paris the sum of 50,000 crowns, but Charles would not accept the money. The matter was also opened to Gyllenborg in London. Cf. Carlson, pp. 95–97 ; Westrin, pp. 94, 95.

sur le principe que je veux observer la paix et pour satisfaire à ma parole et pour le bien général de mon Royaume et ne proposez rien qui puisse tendre au renouvellement d'une guerre qui seroit également contraire à l'un et à l'autre." The king of Sweden must be brought to write to the emperor and to send a minister to Brunswick.[1] Accordingly we find Croissi, after June, giving no more hot-headed advice, but confining himself to the relation of passing events, of the progress of the siege, and of ineffectual negotiations with Prussia. After the death of Louis XIV in September Sparre and Cronström, the Swedish ministers at Paris, lost no time in submitting to the new council of regency memorials recalling obligations and appealing for help.[2] But as early as 21 September Lord Stair could write, " Le nouveau gouvernment nous veut du bien, et leur nouveau système a besoin de nous." [3] The regent Orleans indeed had no intention whatever of attempting interference and embroiling himself with England. The instructions sent to Croissi in November ran as follows :

The king had duly learnt from the count's despatch of 4 September that the king of Sweden, in spite of the absolute necessity of making peace, refused persistently to take any steps to procure it. It could be wished that his resources matched his courage. There were times when it was proper for princes to dissimulate their resentment, to yield to necessity, and to seek to diminish the number of their enemies, when they could not resist them. The king of Sweden must send ministers to Vienna and to Brunswick to treat for peace. The French envoy at Vienna had long striven to bring the emperor to attempt mediation in conjunction with France, but the answer was that such was not possible, so long as Charles refused to do what was desired of him. Rottembourg at Berlin, Besenval at Dresden, had been similarly foiled by his impracticable attitude. The late king of France, who had learnt by long experience how to reign, had often found the plan of submitting to conditions, in order to divide his enemies, successful, and the king of Sweden might well follow his example.

Croissi, who had now quitted Stralsund, replied to this that he had done all he could to influence the king of Sweden in the way

[1] In the *Handlingar*, Vol. X, we have Gyllenborg's complaints to Müllern of the coldness of the French court and Sparre's replies thereto from Paris pointing out the age of the king and the exhaustion of the country. " En un mot on est entièrement résolu de conserver la paix avec tout le monde." And again, " En un mot, et quoi qu'on dise, je puis vous assurer, Monsieur, qu'ici on ne songe pas à faire le moindre démarche en faveur du Prétendant " (Sparre, 1 July and 16 August).

[2] 15 Oct. 1715.

[3] To Robethon, B. M., *Stowe MSS.* 228, f. 105.

desired, but to no purpose. "Moins il s'est trouvé en état de résister, plus il s'est levé et roidy contre ses malheurs." [1]

Although it had not been possible for Louis XIV to come to the aid of Charles XII in arms, the belief that he might do so had prevailed, and the possibility had been guarded against in the treaties of 1715, as we have seen. All the more was it necessary that the allies against Sweden should obtain the assent of the emperor to their proceedings. But he, though he might consent that Hanover should have Bremen and Verden, viewed with a jealous eye any extension of the dominions of Prussia and was entirely opposed to the contemplated aggrandisement of Denmark. Here then was Charles's opportunity. Though Louis could not help him to regain his lost dominions, the emperor might. Yet, with his usual perversity, he refused to submit his cause to him or to send plenipotentiaries to Brunswick. Formally invited to do so for the third time in March 1715, he failed to reply till 17 June. Then he still declined to include in the emperor's titles that of king of Spain. To yield this cherished prejudice was, in his opinion, to show unworthy weakness. He had always been willing, he said, to accept a proper peace, would send ministers to Brunswick, given a guarantee that his German provinces should be restored, or would enter into negotiation for a general peace under the emperor's mediation at Breslau or Dantzig.[2] Such a reply was equivalent to a refusal.

Very different was the conduct of Frederick William of Prussia. He might decline, and not too politely, the overtures of France, but he could not treat in like manner the head of the empire, whose consent to a permanent change of ownership of German provinces would be required. We hear much from a French source of the dread of imperial interference entertained at Berlin.[3] Knowing that Charles was being earnestly pressed by all his friends to send ministers to Brunswick, Frederick William took care to be beforehand with him, professing every regard for his constitutional lord. When Charles in May and June set his case before the emperor and Europe generally in the form of despatches from Müllern to secretary Stiernhoek, Prussian manifestos at once were issued in reply.[4]

[1] The above from M. A. E., Suède 135. Croissi's despatch last quoted was from Rostock, 28 Dec.

[2] Charles demanded of the emperor, "ut Nobis contra jus fasque laesis certam spen faciat, Eandem non permissuram restitutionem Nostram in Provincias Germanicas ad Pacis Westphalicae normam a nemine in dubium vocatum iri." The letter is included in the printed supplement to the decree of the imperial commission on northern affairs of 17 Jan. 1716, a copy of which was forwarded to England by Whitworth from Ratisbon on 17 Feb., R. O. Germany (States) 172.

[3] Torcy's *Memoirs, passim*, cf. note, p. 222.

[4] The Swedish papers, 27 April and 4 June, Lamberty, IX. 270, 273. The substance of the Prussian answer to the former in Whitworth's of 13 May, R. O.

The Prussian ministers at Vienna were active, and their master's flattering professions of submission, backed by the powerful advocacy of Hanover, had their due effect.[1]

Not till late in July did Charles consent to address the emperor by the required titles.[2] He then sent him four letters. The first congratulated him upon his accession, the second upon his coronation in Hungary, acknowledging him also the sole legitimate heir to the Spanish throne, the third thanked him for allowing the Swedes to return through his dominions from Turkey, while the fourth recognized him as sole arbiter in the troubles in North Germany, offered submission to his decision (though without an undertaking to send a minister to Brunswick), and disclaimed any arrangement with the Porte to his disadvantage.[3] But it was now too late, the emperor had been gained over, and the siege of Stralsund could proceed without interference from Vienna.

Germany (States) 170; that to the latter was printed, and a copy sent to Vienna (or Ratisbon) on 27 June (ibid. 8 July). This is perhaps the "*Motifs qui ont engagé Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse à se charger du Sequestre de la Poméranie Suédoise, et qui l'obligent à en maintenir les conditions*" (Lamberty, IX. 285, *Lettres Historiques* for August 1715, Dumont, VIII. i. 352).

[1] Cf. Droysen, pp. 118–19, 126–28.

[2] "Enfin," wrote a Swedish minister, "la glace est rompue entre Nôtre Cour et celle de Vienne. Le Roy s'est determiné de donner a l'Empereur les titres d'Espagne dans toute leur étendue, et j'ay receu quatre lettres de Sa Mté à ce Prince à la fois" (20 July 1715, M. A. E., *loc. cit.*). Goertz says that word had come from the emperor that Charles might write to him without giving him the titles, but that, if he gave them, it would be taken as a friendly act; whereupon Charles decided to concede them and to send a minister to signify his amity and gratitude (to Sparre, 18 June, *Handlingar*, X. 245). Sparre, writing to Gyllenborg on 5 Aug., said that everything depended on the sending of these letters (ibid. p. 345).

[3] Schaub from Vienna, 24 July, R. O. Germany (Empire) 32.

CHAPTER VII

THE BALTIC EXPEDITION OF 1715

In nothing did Charles XII differ more from George I than in his hatred of diplomacy, whose methods filled him with disgust. George and his ministers, on the other hand, were well acquainted with its byways ; their secret service was the most highly organized in Europe ; and they thoroughly understood the art of turning the interests of others to their own advantage. Of this the treaties of 1715 afford a good example. George was to have Bremen and Verden, but the only part which Hanover was to take in the military operations against Sweden was to ward off the danger of relief coming to Stralsund from Hesse or other German states or from France ; a danger which was chimerical. His real service to the confederate cause was expected, in accordance with his promise, from the action of the British squadron proceeding to the Baltic.

The despatch of this squadron was the result of the outcry of the merchants and of the scarcity, which was beginning to prevail, of naval stores. It sailed at the end of May under the command of Admiral Sir John Norris, a seaman of tried experience, who had risen to be commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean but since 1711, being out of favour with the Tory government, had been unemployed. It consisted of eighteen of the line and two smaller vessels, and included the *Cumberland* and *Norfolk*, the flagships of Norris and of Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Hardy, of 80 guns, the *Essex* and *Burford* of 70, the *Plymouth*, *Ripon*, and *Dreadnought* of 64, and eleven 54's. Two of these, the *Chatham* and *Bonaventure*, in charge of merchantmen from east-coast ports, awaited the admiral's coming at Flekker island in the mouth of Christiansand fjord. The whole fleet, 106 sail, reached the Sound on 10 June, and three days later joined at Elsinore the Dutch fleet of twelve men-of-war and upwards of two hundred merchantmen, commanded by Admiral Lucas de Veth.[1] It may be noted that the proportion in number of the

[1] Authorities for Norris's expedition ; at the British Museum, his journal, Add. MSS. 28128, his letter-books, with his original instructions, 28143–44, and original

British and Dutch men-of-war, five to three, was that observed during the French war and still maintained, in spite of the great preponderance of the Dutch merchantmen. In strength, too, the Dutch ships were greatly inferior to the British, the only two of more than 52 guns being the *Gelderland*, 72, and the *Boetselaar*, 64.

Before the fleet sailed the British government delivered through Jefferyes at Stralsund a strongly-worded protest against the ordinance of privateers, with a demand for payment of the damages claimed and for the regulation of all matters relating to trade upon the basis of existing treaties. But Jefferyes, on presenting a memorial to this effect, was answered that nothing more was being done than had formerly been done by Great Britain herself in time of war. Though no reparation had been made for the damages formerly inflicted upon Swedish trade, the claims on that account were by no means abandoned.[1] When after much delay the memorial was presented to Charles, the reply (31 May) was quite brief, referring Jefferyes to the answer given him at Bender in 1711. The ordinance, he was informed, was only intended to meet the artifices contrived to gain access to the forbidden ports. Müllern had shortly before told him that the Swedes considered none so hostile to them as the king of England, " because he had not only by letter disswaded the king of Prussia from entering into a treaty of accommodation with Sweden, but likewise had encourag'd him to proceed in his designs, and had promis'd to lend him supplys and powerful assistances." [2] Jefferyes took occasion to remark that he would certainly not yield to force, who had defied the whole Ottoman empire with some thirty of his subjects.[3] Townshend informed him that the king was not surprised

" that the Swedes, who have so long and so unjustly insulted the British subjects, and have done them such great damages, should upon the sailing of the fleet be apprehensive of extraordinary designs against them. It is very natural that those who have given such severe provocations should frame to themselves strange schemes, such as their fears may suggest. However our proceedings are upon a fair and honest foot."

letters to him, 28154; at the Record Office, principally, his despatches to Townshend, S. P. Dom. Naval 81 and Admiralty, In-Letters 2, letters from the secretaries of state, do. 4099, Captain Hopson's despatches, do. 1879. See also Michael, pp. 716–32, but his otherwise excellent account is marred by inaccuracies, chiefly in consequence of a confusion of dates; see the *English Historical Review*, XVII. 447 note.

[1] Jefferyes, 29 March o.s., R. O. Sweden 17.

[2] The same, 21 May o.s. Similarly the Swedes at Vienna later attributed the ill success of their negotiations there to king George's machinations: Schaub, 28 Aug., R. O. Germany (Empire) 32.

[3] 31 May o.s.

If the king of Sweden would let British commerce go free and undisturbed, and would pay compensation, he would soon find that the fleet had no such designs as, for instance, the aid to Sweden's adversaries supposed by Müllern.[1]

Norris was instructed to proceed with his convoy to the Baltic, to escort the traders safely to their different destinations, and to bring them back. He was to oppose with force any attempt to interfere with them by men-of-war or privateers. If the Dutch fleet did not arrive in the Sound within three or four days of his coming, he was to proceed without it. Special reference was made to " the great and insupportable loss " suffered by British subjects of late years by the seizure of their ships, and to the privateer edict with its " unheard of innovations that are directly contrary to all law and reason and to the treaties subsisting." Despatches were to be forwarded to Jackson and Jefferyes, desiring them to make yet further representations at Stockholm and Stralsund insisting upon freedom of trade in the Baltic in accordance with existing treaties. But without waiting for the answers Norris was to take such steps for intercepting any Swedish ships that he might meet with as should be consistent with the safety of the convoy, to detain them until a satisfactory answer was obtained, and in case of refusal of his demands to bring them home to England. A supplementary instruction ordered him " to treat the subjects of the Czar of Muscovy in the most civil and friendly manner, his Majesty not doubting that his subjects will receive the same treatment in all respects at the hands of the Czar and his officers."

Norris's written instructions then only extended to the protection of trade and the making of reprisals. But he was fully apprised by Bernstorff of the king's wishes in regard to Stralsund.[2] Thus, in answer to his question, where he should stay while waiting to conduct the traders back from their destinations, he was informed, " the best station for hindering the transport of Swedish forces into Germany is about the isle of Bornholm, or before the harbour of Carleskroon." [3] And, when the siege of Stralsund was begun, he was constantly pressed by the kings of Denmark and Prussia, as we shall see, to come to their aid, they understanding that he had definite orders to do so.

How far Townshend and his colleagues were privy to this is not clear. Some members of the government, Lord Orford, first lord of the admiralty, in particular, strongly objected to offensive action being taken against Sweden. He particularly enjoined

[1] Same date, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.
[2] See Michael, p. 720.
[3] Queries by Norris, and answers thereto, B. M., Add. MSS. 28154, f. 56.

Norris on no account to join the Danes in such action, and the ammunition supplied to the fleet and the hospital accommodation were limited to peace requirements.[1] If more were wanted, Norris was privately informed, the king would arrange with the Danes for a supply.[2] But the British ministers knew that the siege of Stralsund was to be undertaken, and must have perceived the use to which the instructions to make reprisals could be put in that connexion. Townshend makes no reference indeed thereto in his despatches. The admiral's " first and chief point of view," he says, must be the safety of the convoy ; after that he was to apply himself " with all the diligence and earnestness " he could to make reprisals. He advised him, indeed, to blockade Carlskrona, but gave as the reason that the Swedes certainly intended to attack him, and he could thus prevent their squadron there from joining that at Stockholm.[3]

But this silence was equally preserved, even after it had been decided in August to leave a certain number of English ships in the Baltic during the winter months, to act in conjunction with the Danes. If Townshend was not from the first aware of the manner in which Norris was being urged to make the furtherance of the confederate cause the main object of his cruise, he knew it later, if not in the course of his official work, then privately, and in particular through Norris's father-in-law, Admiral Aylmer, who was much at court, and from whom Sir John in his letters concealed nothing. We cannot but conclude that Townshend purposely omitted from his despatches all reference to the confederate plans in order that, in case of a parliamentary enquiry, the necessities of British commerce should appear to have been the sole ground for the government's action.

Of the pressure put upon Norris by the confederates we have full knowledge from the letters he received and his replies thereto. His most frequent correspondent was Püchler, the Hanoverian resident at Copenhagen, who was specially entrusted with the transmission of the English despatches to him and who took up the cause of Denmark as though it were his own. He advised Norris (1 June) on the best positions from which he might blockade Carlskrona, he expressed (20 June) the king of Denmark's displeasure that instead of doing this the fleet had gone directly from Copenhagen to Dantzig, and he forwarded a series of later appeals for its return from eastern waters to save the Danish flotilla attacking Rügen. Robethon also advised upon the blockade of Carlskrona

[1] See Norris's of 30 July o.s. quoted below.
[2] Queries and answers, as above.
[3] 14 June o.s.

(20 May o.s.) and expressed (21 June o.s.) Bernstorff's hope, that Norris would soon return and post himself off Bornholm, suggesting that the ships detached to protect the traders at different ports should be recalled, so that the fleet might be strong enough to meet the Swedes, even should the Dutch contingent hold aloof. The king of Prussia himself sent in appeals,[1] such as the following :— " Ne manquez pas, je vous en prie, de nous délivrer de cet embaras, et faites en sorte que la flotte de Suède, que vous pouvez combattre sans rien risquer, soit du moins obligée de rentrer incessament dans ses ports." And he made strong representations in London in support of his entreaties. The result of these we shall see as we follow Norris on his voyage.

Immediately upon the junction of the fleets at Elsinore a council of war was held, at which it was decided to proceed at once to carry out the main part of the admirals' instructions, to see the traders safely to their different destinations. De Veth, it appeared, had only orders to act on the defensive, in case his merchantmen were attacked. The whole fleet, 338 sail,[2] quitted Danish waters on 17 June. Bornholm was cleared two days later, and on the 24th Dantzig bay was reached and the trade dropped for that city and for Königsberg. No despatches being to hand, sail was again made, and on arrival off Lyser Ort on the 27th 116 merchantmen under escort of four men-of-war separated for Riga. The next point was Reval, whence five men-of-war sailed on 1 July with fifty-four traders for St. Petersburg. The first portion of the admirals' task was thus completed. They had quite expected to be attacked, but, as we now know, Charles had ordered that if the squadrons were combined no attempt should be made against them, but that all intention thereof should be concealed and the object of assault be the Danes and Russians.[3]

In the meantime Jackson and Jefferyes had received the fresh instructions sent to them by Norris from Copenhagen before he left. The British secretary Hanneken himself carried the former across to Helsingborg ; the latter went to Stralsund by the hands of Captain Fynboe, a Holsteiner in the English army, whose services

[1] 27 July and 8 Aug., see below. His first letter, of 17 July, only asked protection for his ships carrying corn from Königsberg to Pomerania, which protection Norris was able to give.

[2] This figure allows for 306 merchantmen, but a list in Add. MSS. 28154, f. 97, gives only 87 English and 199 Dutch, total 286. Of these 107 Dutch and 16 English were bound for Riga, 9 and 36 respectively for St. Petersburg, 15 and 9 for Königsberg ; 27 Dutch were for Reval, 15 for the " East Sea," and 13 English for Dantzig. None are mentioned as bound for Narva, formerly so important a trade resort, but now ruined by St. Petersburg (cf. George Mackenzie, 5 Nov. o.s. 1714, R. O. Russia 8).

[3] *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 409.

Norris had annexed on account of his acquaintance with the languages of northern Germany. He travelled by way of Gottorp, where Püchler then was, to consult him and entrust to him the admiral's despatches for England.[1]

The two ministers were instructed to demand a fresh payment for the damages done to British shipping, revocation of the privateer edict, and freedom of commerce in the Baltic. They were to announce that, if the king of Sweden refused compliance, the British admiral would seize all Swedish vessels that he should meet with and detain them and their cargoes until satisfaction was obtained. Each of them accordingly delivered a memorial in which the claim for damages was placed at £69,024 2*s*. 9*d*., exclusive of the reckoning for certain ships lately taken into Gothenburg. The senate answered Jackson that they could only consult the king, and forwarded the document to Stralsund. Müllern told Jefferyes that his memorial amounted almost to a declaration of war.[2] To which Townshend, on being informed, replied that, if Müllern looked upon the remonstrance in that light, certainly " that unreasonable and unjustifiable edict " relating to privateers must be similarly regarded. If the king of Sweden would give the satisfaction justly demanded, he would see the fleet return quietly home.[3]

Charles's reply did not reach the British government till September, by which time the fate of Stralsund was practically sealed. It was dated 4 July o.s., but delivered through Gyllenborg in London, as Charles professed to believe that Jefferyes had exceeded his instructions and would be disavowed. Its tenour is given below.

Leaving Reval on 6 July the admirals spent some days in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, looking out for Swedes and taking soundings, and then sailed southwards, arriving in Dantzig roads on the 21st. Here they learnt that Stralsund was definitely invested, that the Swedes had sailed out of Carlskrona, and that, the Danish men-of-war having retired in consequence to their own waters, the flotilla in Rügen bay was in great danger. Now was the time for Norris to put his secret instructions into force, but he could not. In those days the transmission of despatches to commanders abroad took time, and their punctual delivery was uncertain. Norris hoped to find awaiting his colleague at Dantzig

[1] Journal, 1 and 2 June o.s. ; to Townshend on the latter date, R. O., S. P. Dom. Naval 81.

[2] Jackson, 17 and 18 June o.s. Jefferyes, 14 June o.s. Jackson's memorial is printed by Lamberty (IX. 256).

[3] To Jefferyes, 1 July o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

orders which would enable him to join in an attack upon the Swedish fleet. He could not venture it alone, for he had only fourteen of his own ships with him, and join the Danish fleet he might not. But it was found that the desired despatches had been sent on to Reval. Two of the fastest sailers of the fleet were sent to bring them back, but six days were thus lost. At Reval Norris had obtained from De Veth the promise to join "in such a cruise as will not only serve for the security of our commerce, but also enable me to answer the other purposes of his Majesty as far as the time will allow."[1] But now the Dutch admiral "found in the Dutch prints that the States had since his coming from Holland given a public account, that his orders were to observe an exact neutrality," and therefore declined to take offensive action.[2] When the despatches arrived, they were found to contain Townshend's of 14 June o.s., above cited, and others which merely expressed the king's satisfaction with the decision of the two admirals, in the first place to see the traders safely to their ports. De Veth received no orders to take the offensive, and consequently declined to do so. And as the St. Petersburg traders had been ordered to be ready to sail thence on 10 August, and must be met, it was decided to return to Reval. Sail was accordingly made on 28 July, and the Danes were left to defend themselves as best they might. Reval roads were re-entered on 3 August.

The fleet remained there on this occasion three weeks, it being found necessary to allow the merchantmen at St. Petersburg ten days further to complete their cargoes. The time was fully occupied in a way which will be noticed later. On 10 August came a despatch from Townshend of 5 July o.s. and Robethon's of 21 June o.s. To him Norris replied that he must leave guardships at Riga and Dantzig, as those roads were open and undefended. He would use all the haste he could in bringing back the convoy, in order to be free afterwards to take up the desired position off Bornholm. Townshend informed him that the Dutch ambassadors in London had announced that the States-General had given orders to Lintelo, their minister at Berlin, to go to Stralsund to make upon the king of Sweden like demands to those made by Great Britain, and, if satisfaction were refused, to direct De Veth in similar fashion to make reprisals. But on communicating this information to his

[1] To Townshend, 24 June o.s. To Robethon Norris wrote the next day, "I cannot sufficiently express the good behaviour of Mr de Veth in his readiness to act in conjunction with us."

[2] Journal, 11 July o.s. Particulars of the Dutch position may be read in Dr. Bussemaker's work in *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche Geschichte en Oudheidkunde*, Series IV, Vol. I, parts 3, 4 (1900).

colleague Norris was answered that De Veth had received definite orders to the contrary, namely, to confine himself strictly to the defensive.

Waiting for Norris at Reval was a Danish frigate bearing letters to him from Püchler of 28 June, from the Danish ministers Krabbe and Sehestedt of 6 July, and from Admiral Raben of the 8th. The first-named adjured him to blockade Carlskrona and to let the king of Denmark know, when he could reach those waters and how long he could stay; Raben desired to concert a joint plan of action for the British and Danish fleets; the others made like requests. Norris replied politely, saying that he would bring the fleet to Copenhagen as soon as possible and be ready then to execute his master's further commands. What he thought of it all we know from his letter to Admiral Aylmer of 30 July o.s.:

"You see the state I am in, . . . I have orders, as Lord Orford was pleased to express himself in presence of Lord Townshend, that I should not on any occasion, though I were weaker than the Swedes, join the Danes or act with them, and that very article of joining the Danes was scratched out of my Queries. I pray Mo^r. Robethon may be made sensible of this, how hard it seems for a servant of our Master's to report I am to do that which my directions forbid me . . . I must be excused for my concern, for my reputation is much more valuable than my being, and since from my youth I never avoided a warlike action that was in my power, so I will preserve that character till I am no more . . . I will not make further complaints of what you know I have just cause to do in the ill manner the Admiralty have sent me in for a state of war, Lord Orford declaring there could be no such thing, and would only allow me the ammunition of peace."

On 17 August came in the king of Prussia's letter of 27 July. Norris could only reply to it, that the Dutch admiral would not take the offensive with him, and that he had no orders to join the Danish fleet. His tone to Robethon and to Püchler by the same post was distinctly curt. To Aylmer he wrote that the king of Prussia had pressed him "to leave all other business and join the Danes, which in the present situation of affairs is impossible, if I had orders." [1]

Reval was at length left in a violent gale on 24 August, and the St. Petersburg convoy coming up next day, after the loss of a Dutch man-of-war by striking a rock in those dangerous and little known waters, the homeward voyage was begun. Dantzig

[1] In the same letter (8 Aug.): "It looks to me, if the Swedes continue with that force in the sea when we come down with our trade, that they will attack us, their ships being larger, and no great difference in the number of our cannon. But I think we have been more used to action than the Swedes, and must value ourselves something on our experience."

was reached on the 31st and there the Riga merchantmen were found, arrived before their time. Now Norris received his third letter from the king of Prussia of 8 August. As he also had news from Püchler of the sea-fight of that day, wherein the Danes, using (as Norris had urged them to do) their whole available force, had had the mastery over the Swedes, he was able to reply that this news gave him the greatest satisfaction, and that the affair of Stralsund would now easily be carried through.[1] On 3 September, eleven ships coming in from Königsberg, the convoy was complete, and next day it started homewards, 340 sail. Bad weather delayed it under Bornholm,[2] and Danish waters were not reached till the 13th. A frigate of that nation now brought an important despatch from Townshend of 2 August o.s.

Prussian and Danish expostulations had not been confined to Norris but had been vehemently expressed at the court of St. James's. Frederick William wrote twice to George on the subject.[3] The failure to fight the Swedes, it was contended, was a clear breach of his engagements. Peremptory demands were made that the merchantmen should be sent home as quickly as possible and that the British squadron should remain in the Baltic to help the confederate cause.

But this could not be. In the first place, the traders had still the North Sea to cross, in the second, a junction with the Danish fleet would be a definite act of hostility against Sweden, whereas separate action could be justified on the plea of reprisals. It was for this reason that Norris had received orders not to join the Danes, for this that he declined the tsar's request to take on board his ship a Muscovite officer, who should see for himself the state of the Swedish fleet.[4] Thirdly, the fleet had neither provisions nor munitions of war for a stay in the Baltic, and these could not be provided by the Danes, for it was more than they could do to furnish their own ships.

The discussions ended in a compromise,[5] the terms of which were conveyed to Norris in the despatch mentioned. The king, it was said, approved his conduct, considering the safe return of the convoy " of the last consequence to the nation." But only a

[1] Similarly to Aylmer, 22 Aug. o.s.; the Danish victory " must make everything easy to their Majts. of Denmark and Prussia in the affair of Stralsund." In regard to the orders given to De Veth, he wrote : " when I see you I will tell you more my opinion on that head, than is proper to write in a letter that goes by the Post."

[2] I do not find anything to support Michael's suggestion (p. 726), that the delay under Bornholm was made with the object of covering the operations against Rügen.

[3] 15 and 27 July, Michael, pp. 723, 725.

[4] 27 June o.s., Add. MSS. 28144.

[5] See Michael, pp. 726–27.

part of the services contemplated had been performed; the king of Sweden had made no reply to the demands made upon him; if the fleet came home, the Swedes would again be masters of the sea, British commerce would be exposed to the same violences and interruption as before, and the desired reprisals could not be made. The king had therefore decided, "in order to support the right of his people and the just demands he has made in their behalf," to leave a portion of Norris's command in the Baltic; and as a sufficient number of ships could not be left to oppose the Swedes alone, the detachment was to join and act in concert with the Danish fleet. Unless, when the despatch arrived, the season were too far advanced for further operations, Norris was to appoint eight ships under command of a discreet officer, not a flag, to perform this service.

The Hanoverians then had gained the victory in the London councils. The English ministers had been obliged to assent to the employment of a British naval force to help to reduce Stralsund, at the risk of war with Sweden. The plea of commercial interest was but a cloak; the season for trade was over, and if the privateers came out again, they would find no prey. Norris openly stated in his reply to Townshend that Rügen would probably be conquered by 21 October, meaning that the eight ships could then return.

Command of these was given to Captain Edward Hopson, of the *Burford*, and in the choice of the other captains regard was had to political opinions, as well as to the efficiency of their vessels. The instructions, which Norris gave to Hopson, were based upon Townshend's despatch. He was to arrange with the Danish admiral for supplies of provisions, etc. If his stores were reduced to a seven weeks' supply, and he could not replenish them, he might use his judgment about returning home.

Norris himself and De Veth passed the Grounds on 14 September. Some days were spent in arranging for supplies to Hopson and in complimentary visits to the court, more in awaiting an opportunity to leave the Sound. This could not be done till 10 October. Renewed tempests attended the voyage home, scattering the fleet to all points of the compass. However the Nore was at length reached, without loss to the king's ships, on 29 October.

The immediate effect of Hopson's reinforcement was to send two or three of the Danish ships into harbour for repairs. For two months the combined fleet sailed backwards and forwards to and from Rügen. Hopson complained of the difficulty of obtaining provisions, in spite of the undertaking to supply him, and of the omission to summon him to take part in the Danish admiral's councils. This latter neglect, however, was remedied

after remonstrance. Nothing of importance was done, and orders to return home were gladly received. Copenhagen was left on 31 December, and eleven days later Hopson was safely at the Nore.

How far the presence of the eight English ships contributed to the fall of Stralsund it is difficult to say. Rügen was not taken till two months after Norris's departure, but during nearly the whole of that time the weather was exceptionally stormy. Did the Swedish fleet refrain from crossing on that account, or because the addition of the English ships gave the Danes the superior force?[1] We know that Admiral Taube did bring reinforcements for Stralsund before Hopson left, arriving just too late.[2] Whatever the truth may be, Great Britain escaped the actual commission of hostilities against her nominal ally.

One more episode remains to be told, of great interest to Norris and of considerable importance to his country. Peter the Great had welcomed the advent of a fleet, which would open trade to St. Petersburg and Riga and possibly engage his foes in battle.[3] He even proposed to revoke a late edict for the re-transference of trade from St. Petersburg to Archangel, being only deterred therefrom by the impossibility of bringing back the goods which had been sent to the latter port before the summer ended.[4] As soon as he heard of Norris's arrival at Reval he sent to him his secretary Ostermann to press him to stay till he himself should come thither.[5] Necessities of the convoy and of weather forbade this then, but on the second visit to Reval the Russian fleet was found there, nineteen of the line with Count Apraksin in command and Peter on a 62-gun ship as vice-admiral of the blue. Three weeks of festivity ensued. Peter entertained the foreign admirals and officers; they received him, the tsaritsa and the court on board to dinners and dances, while the governor of Reval did his part by being married and giving occasion for a festivity, at which Peter's taste for riotous conviviality no doubt found full licence. He examined carefully every detail of the English ships, and Norris was allowed freely

[1] Michael (p. 729) takes the latter view. Droysen (pp. 140–42) says that at the beginning of November twenty Swedish men-of-war were taking troops on board at Ystad, but were kept there by the weather.

[2] See p. 98.

[3] He early made himself safe from possible interference with his Finland operations by hurrying off all his galleys at St. Petersburg to the shallow waters of the Bothnian gulf, where the great ships could not follow.

[4] Mackenzie, 4 April o.s. 1715, R. O. Russia 8. The war maintained the preference of Archangel as a port of export for some years yet. La Vie, the French commercial agent at St. Petersburg, wrote on 2 Jan. 1717 that five-sixths of Russian produce were to be sent that year to Archangel and only one-sixth to St. Petersburg (*Sbornik*, XXXIV. 111).

[5] The original letter from Peter in Russian is preserved at the British Museum, Add. MSS. 28154, f. 133.

to inspect the Russian. He saw three new 60-gun ships, built at St. Petersburg, " in every way equal to the best of that rank in our country, and more handsomely finished." [1] The powder-room arrangements he considered superior. The tsar, he says, had " two English builders that have shewn themselves great masters, all his want is to make seamen, which he labours to do out of his soldiers." [2] Norris advised him to make Cronslot his mercantile emporium, as more accessible than St. Petersburg. The intermediary between the monarch and the admiral was the Scotch doctor Robert Erskine, who was much in favour, says Norris, and by his influence of great service to the British.[3] The two parted on excellent terms with each other, Peter conceiving an esteem for Norris which led him at a later date to offer him the supreme command of his navy.

About the time that Norris returned to Copenhagen Count Gyllenborg at length presented his master's reply to the British demands. It set forth that, but for Charles's assurance of the friendship of the king of England and the moderation of his ministers, he would have been obliged to receive as a declaration of war a document filled with terms and threats such as would scarcely be used between sovereign and sovereign even after a rupture. The despatch without proper notice of so considerable a squadron to the Baltic came as a surprise. He had expressed readiness to give all reasonable satisfaction for injuries to English vessels inflicted contrary to the tenour of the treaties and of his ordinances. Nothing was being done under the edict complained of that had not been done in former years by England against France. The blockade of the prohibited ports could the less be removed, seeing that the subjects of Great Britain, against the clear sense of the treaties of 1661 and 1700, had been furnishing the tsar with everything he needed, even with ships of war with officers and crews complete, so that it might be said that his fleet was not Muscovite, but Anglo-Dutch. The surest way to re-establish freedom of trade would be for the king of England, in accordance with the treaties, to recover for Sweden the ports taken by the tsar, in return for which all commercial privileges would be granted, which could reasonably be expected. Sweden had her own complaints against Great Britain. Former injuries to her shipping had never been repaired, engagements for the maintenance of the protestant religion and the balance of power in the north had not been carried out. Yet she had never

[1] To Aylmer, 30 July o.s., and similarly to Townshend, same date.

[2] To Robethon, same date.

[3] To Aylmer, 22 Aug. o.s. This was the man who later was accused of inspiring the tsar with Jacobite sentiments. He was a brother of Sir John Erskine, and a cousin of the earl of Mar. His name usually appears as Areskine ; Norris spells it Eraskin. He thought him a man of sense and honour.

supplied arms to the enemies of England on the contrary, up to the peace of Ryswyk she had furnished to king William a contingent of 6,000 men, and had arranged that peace herself. The British squadron should have come to the Baltic rather to save a great protestant nation than to convoy a few merchantmen. Let the English beware of the rising power of the tsar, who intended to monopolize the Baltic trade. Let their fleet be employed not to destroy Sweden, but to save her.

In support of this document Gyllenborg advanced (1) a protest of 1689 by Charles XI against the prohibition of trade with France, (2) a memorial by the Swedish minister to the Lords Justices in 1697, showing that, in spite of the hard treatment of Swedish ships during the war, the king had not on that account withheld his stipulated aid. The present prohibition, said Gyllenborg, would have been exactly parallel to that of 1689, had it been extended to all the enemy's coasts instead of to three or four ports only. Charles XI had ordered his protests to be made by " instances très pressantes, mais de bouche, et avec toute la douceur imaginable." Would not a like method have been preferable in the present instance to the " mémoire menaçant de Mons^r. Jefferyes," would it not have had more effect, and had not the king of Sweden the right to expect such, rather than a kind of declaration of war ? [1]

Thus Charles founded his cause upon pleas of precedent and justice, recking nothing of difference of circumstance, of expedience, of the little chance of success his representations had, or of his desperate situation. The representations were completed by a protest against the addition of the eight English ships to the Danish fleet, an action equivalent, it was said again, to a declaration of war.[2]

Townshend in reply to the whole [3] expressed the king's surprise that, after the treatment suffered from the Swedes during so many years and lately " poussé à toute outrance," such terms should be used of the measures adopted by him to protect the interrupted commerce of his subjects. Gentle measures, arguments, expostulations, had been fully tried by the late queen, who, when these failed, had yet taken every opportunity to show her friendly feeling towards Sweden but could never get redress for the injuries complained of. The present king had made similar instances, and had hoped that on the king of Sweden's return the remedies desired would be granted. Instead of that, the seizure and confiscation of

[1] All the above from Gyllenborg's memorial of 12 Sept. o.s., R. O. Foreign Ministers 62. Charles's instructions therewith.

[2] Gyllenborg, 3 Oct. o.s., ibid. ; Lamberty, IX. 297.

[3] 11 Oct. o.s., R.O. Foreign Entry Book 256.

vessels had been pursued with greater rigour, and the ordinance of February had destroyed all hope of friendly treatment. Claim had been made for damages to the amount of over £69,000, and this sum had been since increased. The trade was not only of private interest, but by the nature of its commodities of vital importance to the state. The prices of naval stores had risen by 40 per cent., and it had been necessary to seek them at great expense in Italy and elsewhere. Hence the sending of the fleet, which had put the king to enormous expense,[1] which he would gladly have spared. The proceedings of the allies of 1689 could not be pleaded in justification, for the exclusion of contraband and of naval stores from France had been enforced in the interest of all Europe. The king had been absolutely obliged to send the fleet to the Baltic and to leave there the eight ships of war. There was no convention with Denmark as to this, as Gyllenborg suggested. If the presence of the ships were objected to, let commerce be declared free and the sums claimed be paid ; they would then be recalled.

Here we have a quibble. What Gyllenborg suggested was that the eight vessels were left in obedience to the terms of a treaty concluded between Hanover and Denmark for the cession of Bremen and Verden. And this was true enough, even if verbally, there being no convention between Denmark and Great Britain, Townshend was correct.

A week before the letter quoted was written Stade and the duchy of Bremen were at length handed over by the Danes to Hanover.[2] The stipulated declaration of war duly followed. The arguments brought forward in the Hanoverian manifesto [3] were much the same as those contained in the preambles to the treaties. The whole blame of the rupture was laid upon Charles as the disturber of the empire's peace, while George figured as the dutiful upholder of it.

The declaration of war was of course made solely on the part of Hanover, but it necessarily prejudiced the relations of Sweden with George's greater sovereignty. By itself, the transference of Bremen and Verden to Hanover was of advantage to Great Britain.[4] To quote the words of Horatio Walpole, intimate in the counsels of the Townshend ministry, it was clearly for her interest " that those countries which command the navigation of the Elbe and Weser, the only inlets from the British seas in Germany, and which in case of any disturbance in the North are most capable of

[1] The cost is given as £163,584 19*s.* 4*d.*

[2] 15 Oct. Particulars of the delay, Schartau, pp. 188–96.

[3] Staatsarchiv, Hanover.

[4] And of very great advantage to the duchies themselves, see Michael, pp. 730–31.

protecting or interrupting the British trade to Hamburgh," [1] should be in the hands of Hanover rather than of Denmark or of Sweden. Indeed the arbitrary and violent interference of the Danes, since their occupation of Holstein, with British shipping in the Elbe had been the subject of continual complaint and remonstrance never redressed. George would not be likely to molest the vessels of his own subjects; rather he might be expected to grant them privileges. It was true that he laid heavy burdens on the importation of goods competing with his own industries,—on woollen cloth in particular,—but these imposts dated from earlier times and now pressure might be brought upon him to relax them, and certainly he might be expected to encourage the English merchants as against the Dutch, who still held the greater portion of this as of the Baltic trade.

But what of the consequences in the north? More than anything else Charles XII abhorred the idea of giving up any fraction of the dominions he had inherited. When George took over these provinces of his, he gave cause for an enmity which could not be expected to distinguish the elector of Hanover from the king of England. In the following years British policy was seriously embarrassed by the belief that Charles was preparing to invade Scotland in the interests of the house of Stuart, out of revenge for the action undertaken against him. When British squadrons were sent to the Baltic, after 1715, the first charge of their admirals was to prevent such invasion. Nor was the change of mastership in the Baltic from Sweden to Russia, which British action hastened, of advantage, for Peter the Great had no thought but for the advancement of his own country. This soon became apparent, and after Charles's death British statesmen showed themselves anxious that the naval power of Russia should be destroyed. Great Britain, in fact, by her action in the Baltic was brought into enmity with both Sweden and Russia, an enmity which, in the latter case, lasted for twenty years; and though that action was only partly due to Hanoverian influence, it must be admitted that, so far as that influence went, it was to her disadvantage.

Yet it is difficult to condemn the policy of the ministry of the day. Was it worth while, under existing circumstances, to retain Charles's friendship? He refused to contribute in any way to the composition of the commercial quarrel; he made demands, but offered no favours in return; if Great Britain fulfilled these demands, she would still be but the unprofitable servant, doing

[1] *The interest of Great Britain steadily pursued*, a pamphlet issued by Horatio Walpole in 1743 in answer to *The case of the Hanover troops in the pay of Great Britain impartially and freely examined*, an indictment of British continental policy since 1714. Cf. also Townshend, Coxe. I. 87.

that which was her duty. Naval stores must be got from the Baltic, and the tsar was in possession of the chief ports from which they came. There was, at the time, a better prospect of commercial advantage from coming to an accord with him than by restoring to Sweden her former supremacy. Nor was it expected that Charles, as an enemy, would be dangerous. His cause seemed lost. He would be fortunate, considering his scorn of danger and his affection for the fore-front of the battle, if he escaped from Stralsund alive. A pacification seemed imminent, under which he would lose his German and his eastern provinces, retaining only Sweden itself and Finland. It was surely better to court the victor than the vanquished. No one could have foretold the improbable course of events, have reckoned with the personality of Goertz, or have suspected the difficulties that were to arise with yet nascent Russia. In fine, no government in 1715 could have found arguments to oppose to the wishes of the sovereign.

CHAPTER VIII

PRELIMINARIES TO THE CAMPAIGN OF 1716

CHARLES XII, having protracted the siege of Stralsund to the extreme limit of possibility, went on board ship in the night of 21–22 December 1715, and miraculously escaping the fire of the Danish batteries and the cruisers' watch, and braving ice and contrary winds, landed safely at Trelleborg in Scania on the 24th. Shortly before the end he had offered terms, which earlier might have been accepted.[1] A war-worn veteran of thirty-three, he had earned undying fame for himself and his soldiers, had systematically harried, to feed them, an enormous tract of eastern Europe, had lost province after province across the Baltic, and had reduced his country to a state of misery, the accounts of which verge on the impossible.

Stralsund conquered, the next objective of the confederates was Wismar. It had fallen an easy prey, but that Admiral Taube at the beginning of January was able to throw into the place a reinforcement of 700 men and supplies for four months. These had been intended for Stralsund, but Taube arrived on the Pomeranian coast only in time to save Müllern and his clerks of the chancery from capture by a Danish cruiser, in a sad plight after five days' battle with the ice-floes.[2] Consequently a regular siege had to be undertaken. In this Russian troops were to take part, in accordance with treaties concluded by Peter the Great with Denmark and Prussia in September and October 1715, which engaged him to furnish fifteen battalions of infantry and 1,000 horse to aid in the siege of Stralsund, or, if that were ended, in that of Wismar.[3]

[1] See Carlson, p. 87, Droysen, IV. ii. 142, and Croissi's despatches.

[2] " Outre que le canon des ennemis tua quelques personnes dans le bâtiment où j'estois, le perça deux fois sous l'eau, et que les glaces le poussèrent très rudement durant cinq jours, nous faillîmes aussy à estre pris par une frégate Danoise quand nous fûmes entré en mer, sans l'arrivée de l'escadre sous le Vice-Amiral Taube, laquelle avoit été tant attendue à Stralsund." Müllern to Croissi from Ystad, 8 Jan. 1716, M. A. E. Suède 136. Also Campredon, 21 Jan., ibid. 135, and Jackson, 7 Jan. o s., R. O. Sweden 22.

[3] Bacmeister, II. 15; Solov'ev, *loc. cit.;* Droysen, p. 139. There was no stipulation, at least in the Danish treaty (6 Sept.), that these troops were to be employed in an invasion of Scania, as Droysen (p. 152) and others say; see Holm, p. 11.

Nor could George I avoid now sharing in the burden of the war. He had pressed upon the court of Denmark the great importance of the undertaking.[1] To save his Hanoverians, he tried to hire three of the Russian battalions, but could not get them. The king of Prussia expressed the hope that he would find no difficulty in providing six battalions of infantry and eight ships of the line as his contingent, himself undertaking with the king of Denmark and the tsar to provide what else was necessary. And he made further demands in February through Bonet in London for other soldiers and ships to secure Denmark from the danger which threatened of a Swedish invasion. It was pointed out that, though the king of England had gained two valuable duchies, he had given little or no help to the siege of Stralsund, where much Prussian blood and money had been sacrificed.[2]

George replied that he himself had long insisted upon the necessity of pressing the war; that he was quite willing to send the assistance asked for Wismar; and that he did not doubt but that he would come to an accord with the king of Prussia on the subject of further operations under the terms of their treaty. But to his minister Heusch at Berlin he wrote in a different strain. He had learnt, he said, from Heusch's despatch of 12 February that not only was artillery desired of him for the siege of Wismar, but sufficient money besides to make the cost to himself one-third of the whole. He begged to be spared the fresh and varying demands constantly made upon him; such conduct, he said, might lead to a quarrel and made the reports of a Prussian understanding with France the more credible.[3]

Indeed the relations between the English and Prussian courts were in their customary state of strain. Heusch, in his despatch cited, enumerated a number of grievances nourished at Berlin, from a claim to diamonds which had belonged to the electress Sophia to the complaint that George desired to profit by the war without contributing anything towards its cost. For the reference to France, it is to be observed that the regent was believed to be at least in sympathy with the Jacobite rebellion, if he were not actually supporting it, and that it was a cardinal point of French policy to cultivate the friendship of Prussia in counterpoise to the power of Austria. In fact a defensive treaty between France and Prussia was concluded in the autumn of this year.[4]

But with the principal enemy of Sweden, Peter the Great, George

[1] Staatsarchiv, Hanover, in a rescript of 29 Nov. o.s. 1715 to Püchler.
[2] 21 Jan. and 15 Feb., ibid.
[3] 14 and 17 Feb. o.s., ibid.
[4] See p. 150.

was just now on cordial terms. He had concluded a treaty with him in October 1715, the treaty of Greifswald.[1] This guaranteed to Hanover the duchies of Bremen and Verden and to the tsar Ingria, Carelia, and Esthonia, with the town and district of Reval. It was agreed to employ all necessary energy in prosecuting the war to that end, to send ministers to Berlin to arrange the extension of the treaties between Denmark, Hanover and Prussia to include Russia, and to concert measures in detail for conducting military operations and concluding peace. And further George agreed as king of Great Britain, and Peter agreed reciprocally, to advance the interests and second the intentions of each other to the best of their ability. The preamble of the treaty set forth, as usual, that the steps taken by Charles XII to light the flames of war within the empire required counter-undertakings to assure its tranquillity and to place the Swedish provinces therein in more pacific hands.

Peter represented to George that Charles XII would infallibly attempt some operation against Denmark, and urged that the best way to force him to make peace would be to carry the war into Sweden itself. He himself, he had said, would do all he could, and the king of Denmark likewise, but the resources of the latter were completely exhausted, and his own nearly so. Hanover had suffered little by the war, and had made a splendid gain. The king of England could well supply the money which would enable the campaign to be prosecuted vigorously in order to end the war. He should consider what great good would be done thereby to the common cause and how gravely that would suffer, were Denmark reduced to impotence. The cost would be much less than that of fitting out another squadron, and, to judge from the experience of the previous year, would be of greater use.[2]

George, as Peter was expected shortly in Germany, replied to this communication through Heusch.[3] He pleaded the large sum paid to Denmark for the duchies and the great expense imposed upon the British treasury by the Jacobite rebellion. (He could not, of course, confess the truth, that British money was not available to

[1] Staatsarchiv, Hanover, printed by Dr. Felix Stoerk in *Das Greifswalder Bündniss*, where see fully for the negotiations. The treaty was signed on 28 Oct. and ratified by the tsar at St. Petersburg on 18 Dec. o.s. Ranke (*Preussische Geschichte*, V. i.) slips in naming Esthonia, Livonia and Carelia as the possessions guaranteed to the tsar. George was also endeavouring again to bring Peter into alliance with the emperor, see Weber's despatches at Hanover and the packet *Ministerialakten der Londoner Kanzlei betr. die zwischen dem Kaiser und dem Czaaren zu errichtende Allianz*. The main ground upon which the emperor declined a treaty was that he would be disabled thereby from acting as mediator in the affairs of the north (rescript to Count von Metsch at Brunswick, 2 Jan. 1716).

[2] This through Weber; see his despatch of 27 Jan., Staatsarchiv and Stoerk, p. 75.

[3] 14 Feb. o.s., Staatsarchiv.

finance operations against Sweden.) He went on to say that as king he was not at war with Sweden, and as elector would perform the engagements of his treaties. More could not be required of him than the eight men-of-war promised. The money wanted must come from the tsar. He agreed that the best way to prevent a Swedish descent on Denmark was to make a counter-invasion. A week later[1] he wrote to Peter in very friendly terms in reference to the treaty of Greifswald, and about the same time to Püchler, that more troops must be sent to Wismar, that the tsar must take part in the projected invasion of Sweden, and that he himself was sending a strong squadron to the Baltic.[2]

Peter the Great was now changing his intentions in regard to Livonia. He instructed Prince Kurakin to declare privately to those ministers of king George, who were well disposed, that he was not now willing to hand over that province to Poland. After drawing him into war with Turkey for her defence the republic had deserted him, with the result of a disastrous treaty costing him towns worth many millions; and for that he must have compensation. Kurakin must represent to king George's ministers in confidence, if occasion served, that it would not be of advantage to the sea-powers that Poland should regain Livonia and Riga, seeing that that unstable government might easily lose them again; besides, all kinds of burdens and restrictions would be laid on commerce, whereas the tsar was ready to conclude with the sea-powers commercial treaties with advantages previously unknown. Kurakin might strengthen his arguments by presents up to 200,000 crowns.[3]

Other negotiations conducted by George at this time had reference to his position in England, of whose insecurity the near success of the Jacobite rebellion had made him very sensible. The Dutch, in accordance with their treaty, had given him most valuable help, and he now bethought himself of obtaining other guarantees.[4] This was a principal object in the negotiations with Austria, which resulted in the signature of the treaty of Westminster on 25 May o.s. To Denmark and Prussia George proposed that they should guarantee the protestant succession and the Dutch Barrier treaty, undertaking to send at their own expense

[1] 21 Feb. o.s., ibid. and Stoerk, p. 77.

[2] 17 Feb. o.s., Staatsarchiv.

[3] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[4] As Townshend wrote to Horatio Walpole at the Hague on 13 March o.s.: the king approved "particularly the Memorial you gave in, and what you added by word of mouth to the Deputys for foreign affairs concerning the strengthening the Guaranty of the Protestant Succession by inviting and admitting new Princes and States into it" (R. O. Foreign Entry Book 82). But Walpole was not successful in persuading the Dutch to join in the proposed treaties.

8,000 and 10,000 men respectively to serve in Great Britain or Holland as required. Those powers in return would guarantee to them their late acquisitions in Germany, sending to the Baltic to protect them in each year, while the war lasted, a squadron of sixteen men-of-war.[1]

The king of Denmark's reply was favourable ; he sent orders to Baron Söhlenthal in London to negotiate the treaty.[2] But from Berlin came a brusque refusal. Frederick William had no desire to send his cherished soldiers abroad, and did not want naval protection for Stettin. Besides, his relations with the Dutch republic were even more strained than those with Hanover. One reason which he gave for his refusal was, that he could not be expected to guarantee a treaty such as that of the Barrier, which infringed the rights given to him by those of Utrecht and Baden in Upper Guelders.[3]

The fourth to whom George opened the subject was his new ally the tsar. Kurakin, who had quitted London to negotiate the treaty of Greifswald, was invited in the utmost secrecy thither again.[4] Bernstorff, he narrates, on the day that he arrived (27 March) informed him of the attitude of the kings of Denmark and Prussia and said that his master was willing to enter into closest relations with the tsar upon the principle of mutual defence and guarantee, including a British guarantee of the Russian conquests and a Russian guarantee of the Hanoverian succession. But the negotiation must be conducted very privately, in order that it might not come prematurely to the ears of parliament. First, on account of the long-standing friendship and of the importance of the trade-relations between Great Britain and Sweden, must come a commercial treaty, to prepare the ground for the treaty of mutual guarantee. Next day Townshend spoke in similar terms, adding that his government would request the States-General to join in the guarantee, in return for a like undertaking

[1] Draft of the proposed Danish treaty, dated 20 Jan. 1716, Staatsarchiv, Hanover. Special provisions were that the Danes should blockade Gothenburg and Marstrand, to prevent Swedish privateering, and should set at rest in the general interest the apprehensions entertained of designs on their part against Hamburg and Lübeck.

[2] Püchler, 17 March, ibid.

[3] Rescript to Bonet of 15 Feb. above cited. Frederick William's own note on the subject was, as reported by Heusch, " man will haben dass ich den Barriere-Tractat mit garantiren soll, obgleich derselbe mir die helfte von dem mir zustehenden geldern entziehet und wegnimmet " (ibid. and Stoerk, p. 69 ; cf. Droysen, pp. 147–48).

[4] I take what follows from Hartman, not having been able to find any reference to Kurakin's visit to England in the records of London or Hanover. A Russian subject, working from Russian records, Hartman naturally puts Peter's conduct in the most favourable light.

on the part of the tsar in regard to the Barrier treaty. With the accession of Denmark a coalition would be established strong enough to withstand opposition on the part of other powers. He thought that Great Britain could supply from twelve to fifteen men-of-war against the tsar's 8,000 to 10,000 men, and said that it was intended to send another squadron to the Baltic, not only to protect the merchantmen but to bring the northern war to a successful end. As soon as the squadron arrived in the Baltic the admiral would send to Charles XII a declaration requiring him to make peace upon such terms as the situation warranted. The pretext for this would be the harm that was being done to British interests in the north. If no answer were received, or it were not satisfactory, the king of Sweden would be informed that his evil intentions not only towards his neighbours but towards Great Britain, in his aim to restore the Pretender, were known, and that his conduct could not be endured any longer; force would be employed to compel him to make peace. The English ships would then unite with the Danish and Russian in offensive action.[1]

As a fact, the decision to send a squadron to the Baltic again this year was already taken. Memorials from the Eastland and other merchants had early urged the necessity of doing so. At the time of Kurakin's visit the Danish envoy Söhlenthal reported home that Townshend and Sunderland had promised that one should be sent, that it should give active help to the cause, and that they would find excuse to parliament.[2] But it was revealed neither to him nor to Kurakin that the squadron would go, whether concession in return were made or not. It was represented to the latter that its despatch would be dependent upon the conclusion of the commercial treaty proposed.[3]

But when, after a week's delay, drafts of a commercial and a political treaty were submitted to him, Kurakin found that the terms of the latter by no means corresponded with the ministers' assurances. Peter's obligations were set forth fully, but those of George were small and indefinite. It would seem that members of the government objected to the proposed undertakings against Sweden.[4] Bernstorff evaded Kurakin's request for a more categoric explanation by recommending the transference of the negotiation to the Hague. A few days later he surprised him by a proposal that he should sign a commercial treaty at once, as, in default of that, instructions could not be given to the British admiral to

[1] Hartman, pp. 24–28.

[2] Holm, p. 50. Söhlenthal wrote that Bernstorff was as eager for the despatch of the squadron as though he had been a minister of Denmark himself.

[3] Cf. Townshend's despatch of 3 Aug. o.s., cited below.

[4] See Hartman, pp. 30, 31.

attack the Swedes. But the ambassador declined to do anything of the kind without fresh instructions. Then on 15 April, the day before Kurakin left London, Bernstorff and Bothmer handed him the draft of a guarantee treaty, intended to serve as a basis for further discussion. It was suggested now that on his arrival at the Hague he should declare to the English ministers there that he would not conclude a commercial treaty, unless the British government at the same time took upon itself a guarantee of the tsar's conquests.[1]

The preamble of this proposed treaty[2] set forth that the king of Sweden's conduct obliged the king of England to send a strong squadron to the Baltic to protect commerce, to exercise reprisals, and to prevent the transport of Swedish troops to Germany or elsewhere, a proceeding which might rekindle the flames of war which it was so earnestly desired to extinguish for the good and the repose of Europe. Being persuaded that the strong representations which he would make to the king of Sweden would have their best effect, were he to enter into engagements with the powers most able and willing to support them, he agreed with the tsar as follows: firstly, the treaty of commerce to be concluded at the same time to be strictly observed; secondly, in case of an attack upon the king of England's dominions or rights, the tsar to send to his help to serve under his orders 5,000 to 10,000 infantry, transporting them as far as Lübeck at his own expense; thirdly, if the States-General acceded to the treaty, the tsar to send like help to them for the security of their Barrier, and to admit them to the treaty of commerce; fourthly, the king of England to send to the Baltic a certain number of ships of the line to prevent the king of Sweden from transporting troops across that sea or troubling the tsar in the territories actually in his possession. A separate article engaged the king of England to send each year to the Baltic at his own expense, to protect trade and to ensure the advantages of the commercial treaty, a squadron of men-of-war to act in concert with those of the tsar, until such time as the king of Sweden should revoke his ordinance of February 1715, should give satisfaction for the damage done, and should grant the freedom of commerce in the Baltic so long demanded.

With these proposals Kurakin returned to the Hague. In June he received from the tsar counter-projects for both treaties, with instructions allowing considerable concessions on certain points, if required.[3] But the situation was different now from what

[1] Hartman, pp. 35, 36.
[2] Printed in full by Hartman, p. 153.
[3] The whole printed by Hartman, pp. 158–72.

it had been in April. The Jacobite rebellion was extinct, the treaty of Westminster had been signed with the emperor, and a new system of relations with France was in conception. A Russian guarantee of the protestant succession was no longer of importance. The new proposals for a commercial treaty were submitted to the Board of Trade and amended in accordance with the merchants' advice.[1] But what Townshend wrote of as "the project for a defensive alliance with the Czar formerly transmitted, which his Majesty saw and disapproved, as leading into too extensive engagements," was now reduced to a separate article of the commercial treaty stipulating that a squadron should be sent annually to the Baltic during the continuance of the war.[2] For this the regency in England (king George being at Hanover) substituted another, providing that the squadron should only be sent so long as the privateer edict remained in force. Townshend pointed out, and the argument detracts from his reputation for uprightness, that the altered clause completely met the Russian requirements, because there was not the slightest expectation that the king of Sweden would revoke the edict before peace was made; whereas that previously proposed was not in a form which parliament could accept.[3]

But Kurakin could hold out no hope of the tsar's approval. He saw difficulties in regard to only two of the commercial amendments, permission to British subjects to trade in Kasan and Astrakhan, and the principle of determining the monetary value of dollars.[4] But he insisted that the commercial treaty and the political treaty must go together, they being in the tsar's view inseparable.

The British government, indeed, could not undertake to do

[1] Copies of the amended treaty at the Record Office, and, with copies of the correspondence in connexion as sent to Admiral Norris, at the British Museum, Add. MSS. 28154.

[2] See Townshend to Stanhope at Hanover, 3 Aug. o.s., R. O., S. P. Dom. Entry Book 268, and to Walpole, same date, Foreign Entry Book 82. The article was transmitted by Walpole on 21 July.

[3] "There is not the least room to imagine from the King of Sweden's temper and behaviour that he will ever revoke the Edict, or restore the liberty and security to commerce, till the necessity of his affairs reduces him to seek a general peace, and while that Edict remains in force the protection of the British commerce in the Baltick will make it indispensably necessary for the King to send annually a squadron thither, of a force at least equal to what the Czar insists on. So that if a good Treaty of Commerce with Muscovy can be purchased upon the terms of this article, it will be just so much gain'd to His Majesty for an expense which he must have submitted to, whether this compensation had been in view or not" (to Stanhope, as above).

[4] Townshend wrote to Walpole on 21 Aug. o.s. that "the Trade to Casan and Astracan, and the current price of dollars," were very essential, and must be insisted on.

its best to procure for the tsar at the peace the Baltic provinces, and to supply him during the war with ships to protect them from attack. On Peter's insistence on this Stanhope, in the recriminations which took place four years later, laid the chief blame for the failure of the negotiations. For thereby Great Britain would have been obliged to declare war upon her old ally, with results disastrous, in the opinion of the time, to the balance of power in Europe and to the interests of the protestant religion. The English ministers, whether by their own convictions or by their knowledge of the national sentiment, were forced to reject such an obligation. They could not lay before parliament any scheme of operations against Sweden not referable to the protection or encouragement of commerce or defence against the Pretender. Nothing therefore was agreed to at present, and when fresh advances were made by Peter in the winter their chance of success was nullified by what had occurred in the meantime.

Peter had left his capital early in February. He stayed more than two months at Dantzig, inflicting punishment upon the town, arranging with Augustus of Poland for the pacification of that country, and marrying his niece Catherine to Duke Charles Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. But his soldiers came on; not only the battalions hired for the siege of Wismar, but the formidable force promised for the further work of the campaign. For in response to Dolgoruky's intimation of the king of Denmark's inclination to undertake an invasion of Scania, if aided by Russian troops, Peter had offered him twenty battalions and 1,000 dragoons for the purpose, to be maintained by him, and a further force at his own expense.[1] It was necessary to send these troops by land, because a Swedish squadron fitted out by the self-sacrificing patriotism of the burghers of Carlskrona and Carlshamn[2] held the sea. The first of them arrived at Wismar shortly before the place surrendered.

The presence of this foreign army in Mecklenburg dominated northern politics during the next two years. On the one hand its sustenance was a dreadful burden to the people, on the other it gave the upper hand to the duke of Schwerin in the constitutional struggle he had waged with them so long. The rift that was to split up the confederacy, placing Hanover with Denmark, Russia with Prussia, in hostile camps, began to show itself almost at once. Bernstorff, himself a Mecklenburg noble, was heart and soul with his order in its struggle for its rights. Other influential Mecklenburgers were in the service of Denmark or Hanover, or

[1] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*
[2] So Jackson, 1 Feb. o.s., R. O. Sweden 22.

refugees at Copenhagen, Hamburg and Lübeck. The events of the past twelve months in Poland had shown the readiness of Peter to quarter his soldiers abroad and his ability to do so if he pleased. The king of Denmark's assurance that the Russians would pass on directly from Wismar to Copenhagen[1] was not regarded as sufficient. Kurakin went so far as to advise his master to break off the Mecklenburg marriage on the ground of the danger of forfeiting alliances which were of far greater importance to him. In particular he warned him against giving offence to Bernstorff, who had so far rendered such loyal service to the confederacy.[2]

Besides this, there was the question of the fate of Wismar. Report had it that the town, when taken, would be handed over to Charles Leopold, or perhaps kept by the tsar for himself.[3] And indeed Peter had promised in the marriage-contract to endeavour to obtain Wismar and Warnemünde for the duke, or, in default, to pay Catherine a dowry of 20,000 roubles.[4] The idea that such a thing should happen was insupportable. George had written on the matter to Püchler at Copenhagen at as early a date as 6 March o.s.[5] The king of Prussia was named in the despatch as author of the proposal, and it was said that the tsar was likely to agree to it. It may be noted that Frederick William had a distant prospect of succession to Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and was known to sympathize with the duke against the nobles. George warned the Danish court of the consequences, and urged adherence to the clause in the treaty of 1715 which provided for the joint occupation of Wismar by the confederates during the war and the razing of its fortifications and its establishment as a free city of the empire at the peace. Püchler was ordered further to insinuate that, if the duke obtained the town, he would not hold it for long but would hand it over to some other power; an ill thing for Denmark. Another rescript on the subject followed on 3 April o.s.

In accordance with these representations, when it was seen that the fall of Wismar was imminent, the Danish general Dewitz was specially sent thither in order that the keys might be given up to him and not to the Russian Prince Repnin, who would otherwise have claimed to be the senior officer present. And when the

[1] Hanneken, 4 April, R. O. Denmark 36.

[2] Hartman, pp. 45, 46; Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[3] Sir Richard Vernon, 29 April, R. O. Poland 23; *Lettres Historiques*, XLIX. 258; Wiesener, I. 302; Waliszewski, p. 373, etc. Croissi wrote from Hamburg on 1 May that the tsar, "ainsy que Vôtre Majté est informée, veut que Wismar et Rostock puissent luy servir de lieu d'entrepost pour faire par luy mesme tout le commerce de la Russie" (M. A. E. Suède 135).

[4] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[5] Staatsarchiv, Hanover.

surrender took place (19 April) the Russians were denied admission.[1] But they stayed on in the neighbourhood, their numbers continually increased, and ever louder grew the cry of the unfortunate landowners and peasantry who had to feed them.

Writing to George from Dantzig on 25 March Peter repeated his former arguments and appeals. He asked firstly for the king of England's proper quota of infantry, artillery, and munitions of war for Wismar, secondly for a squadron sufficiently strong to make, when united with the Danish and Russian fleets, the projected descent on Scania safe, and thirdly for money for the king of Denmark, the last demand being the most important. Reference was made, as before, to George's acquisition of the duchies and to the little aid he had given to the common cause.[2] With this letter we may take one from the king of Prussia of 14 April, and rescripts from him to Bonet of the 4th and 7th, urging the pressing need of naval assistance to the king of Denmark in Norway, which Charles XII had invaded, lest he should be obliged to send thither or into Jutland the soldiers wanted at Wismar. For if, as seemed probable, Charles were to conquer Norway, he would certainly next invade Denmark, with disastrous consequences to the league.[3]

George, answering Frederick William on 20 April o.s., was able to congratulate upon the fall of Wismar and to announce that the squadron about to sail would visit the coast of Norway on its way to the Sound.[4] In his reply to Peter (1 May o.s.)[5] he acknowledged the services rendered by him in respect of Bremen and Verden, but pleaded that those duchies had been left in so exhausted a state as to be of little value. The actual sum paid to Denmark for them, he said, was twice the amount stipulated. Although he was not at war with Sweden and had no obligation to take part in it, as king, he had sent a strong squadron in the previous year to the king of Denmark's assistance. Effective action on its part had been delayed, indeed, until Bremen was actually handed over, but after that it had been taken. Now another squadron was about to sail for the Baltic, and that in spite of the enormous expense incurred in crushing the late rebellion. As to the greater utility of money, to which the tsar referred, the king of Denmark had particularly asked for a squadron, and had specially sent his

[1] Particulars of this affair, Holm, pp. 22 foll., Hartman, pp. 50 foll. The latter entirely denies that it first gave Peter the inclination to make a separate peace with Sweden, as has been alleged.

[2] This letter, the Russian original and a German translation, with George's reply, Staatsarchiv, Hanover; the translation printed by Stoerk, p. 78.

[3] Staatsarchiv.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid. and Stoerk, p. 82.

privy councillor von Holtze to press for its despatch.[1] The tsar would see upon reflection that to ask more was neither possible nor proper. Wismar had fallen, and there was little doubt that the further measures proposed to force the king of Sweden to make peace would be successful. To prevent his regaining ground in Germany the goodwill of the emperor and empire must be secured. It would not have escaped the tsar's notice, what great offence had been given in those quarters by the entry of so large a foreign force into Germany without leave. France might well avail herself of the example to send an army in support of Sweden. It was to be hoped that the tsar would, of his goodwill and penetration, remove this stone of offence as soon as possible. Again on 11 May o.s.[2] George appealed to Peter on behalf of the duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, who was complaining bitterly of the exactions of the Russian troops upon himself and his subjects. What an ill effect, he said, would such treatment of so prominent a state have upon opinion at Vienna!

Jealousy of the Russian occupation appeared also in further correspondence about Wismar. The king of Prussia wrote to George on 23 May urging the immediate demolition of its fortifications, as agreed upon in the treaty.[3] He was informed in reply that instructions in the matter had been sent to Heusch; they went, indeed, by the same post.[4] Heusch was told that the statement, that the fortifications were to be razed immediately, was inaccurate; the clause in the Prussian treaty left the matter to be decided by the treaty with Denmark, and the terms used in that were only general. The real intention had been to hold Wismar until peace was made, and then to dismantle it and establish it as a free city of the empire. The king of Prussia should reflect whether it would be possible to prevent the tsar from making himself master of the place, if its fortifications were destroyed. The evacuation of Mecklenburg by the Russians must be waited for, after which it might be hoped that an agreement in the matter would be arrived at.

During all this year and the next George fought strenuously against the demolition. He obtained from the emperor an express prohibition of it. But he could not prevail, for the king of Denmark, in spite of all possible arguments and threats, would not support him. Indeed, in the spring of 1716, Frederick agreed in

[1] Püchler reported on 31 March the hurried departure of Justizrath "Holsten" (i.e. Holtze, Holm, p. 48) to London for this purpose (Staatsarchiv).

[2] Staatsarchiv.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Dated 29 May o.s., ibid.

writing with the king of Prussia to the contrary.[1] There was further friction in regard to the artillery and munitions of the place, which Frederick William insisted upon dividing between himself and the king of Denmark, leaving George out. But we need not pursue this matter further.

With the fall of Wismar the task which the king of Prussia had set before himself, the expulsion of the Swedes from Germany, was ended. From henceforth he kept his cherished soldiers and guns at home. His share in the operations of the new campaign was confined to hiring out transports to the king of Denmark, making money instead of spending it.

From Dantzig Peter the Great went on 12 May to Stettin, where Frederick William met him. There had been grave subject of complaint between the two,[2] but a complete understanding was now arrived at. In particular Frederick William consented to Wismar being handed over to duke Charles Leopold as soon as its fortifications were razed.[3] Heusch attended the king of Prussia, and Peter being informed that the British squadron would do little or nothing to help the cause, desired to see him. He expressed his earnest desire for the king of England's friendship, and enquired what the squadron would do. Heusch replied that pretexts were being devised to obtain the assent of the English nation to effective action by it; perhaps the most open confession on the subject that we have.[4] The tsar answered that all depended upon the Swedish fleet being driven back to its harbours. When Heusch attacked Ilgen about the injurious information given, the latter told him that it had come from Bonet, to whom the instructions to Admiral Norris had been communicated. Whereupon Heusch entered into full explanations with him and also with the Russian ministers.[5]

From Stettin Peter went on to confer with the king of Denmark. The meeting had been long in prospect, but was not practicable till Peter travelled westwards, as Frederick would not, in the condition of affairs in Norway, go far from home.[6] It took place at the end of May in the Hamburg suburb Ham und Horn. The conferences lasted six days. On 3 June a convention was signed finally agreeing to and settling the details of the long-contemplated

[1] Holm, pp. 36, 42, 53; cf. Droysen, p. 206.
[2] See Droysen, p. 158, Hartman, p. 55.
[3] Hartman, p. 56.
[4] "Man auf Mittel bedacht seyn, wie unter plausiblender der Englischen Nation convenablen praetexten die Sache dahin zu richten, damit solche Flotte mit effect gebraucht werden könne, welches Ew: Konigh: Majt: nach aller Möglichkeit in der That zu praestiren sich angelegen seyn liessen."
[5] Heusch, 23 May, Staatsarchiv.
[6] Holm, pp. 17, 18, 37.

joint undertaking against the Swedish mainland.[1] It stated the necessity, now that the king of Sweden had been dislodged from Germany, of carrying the war into Sweden itself, and that not only by an invasion of Scania, the province across the Sound, but by a separate descent of 20,000 Russians across the Gulf of Bothnia, as soon as the Swedish fleet should be safely shut up in its harbours. But the former was to be the principal undertaking, and the Danes were to furnish for it 10,000 cavalry and twenty battalions of infantry, the Russians 2,000 of the former and forty battalions, perhaps also another 1,000 horse, if sufficient transport could be provided. The king of Denmark, in accordance with the convention made at Stralsund on 6 September 1715, was to maintain fifteen of the tsar's battalions and 1,000 of his horse at his own expense, and further to transport thirty Russian battalions and 1,000 horse from Rostock into Zealand, these troops to be ready for embarkation by the end of June at latest. The remainder of the Russian guards would come in the tsar's own galleys and " scampavies," and 1,000 horse with the king of Denmark's cavalry by land, the latter providing for their sustenance in the same manner as for his own from the time that they arrived in Holstein. The stores accumulated at Rostock were to be brought over by the king of Denmark with the troops as soon as the sea should be clear of the Swedes. As this transport would be very expensive to him, the tsar undertook to make the most pressing instances with the king of Prussia to hand over the vessels used for the landing in Rügen in the previous year, either gratis or at a low price. To form a fleet of strength superior to the Swedes, to cover the descent on Scania, the king of Denmark undertook to provide eighteen of the line, the tsar fourteen. The combined fleet was to keep the sea as long as the operations required and the season allowed. As to the English fleet expected shortly in the Sound, and which it was hoped would join in offensive action against that of Sweden and help to protect the descent, it was agreed that it would best be employed in a blockade of Carlskrona. The army was to stay in Scania or the neighbouring provinces for so long as the war lasted and only to be withdrawn in the utmost necessity and by mutual consent. The places conquered were to be immediately handed over with all their artillery and magazines to Denmark, excepting that, until the tsar's troops could be withdrawn, and in case of necessity, the half of their garrisons might

[1] Printed in full by Holm, p. 152. The king of Denmark signed it on 3 June at Altona, where he was lodged. As room could not be found in that town for the tsar and his suite, they were accommodated in the adjoining city or its suburbs, and the meetings took place there. The agreement was spoken of at the time as the convention of Hamburg (so the British ministers Polwarth and Wich, and elsewhere), but it is now commonly known as the convention of Altona.

be Russian under Danish command, and Russian magazines might be established in them. Other clauses regulated the command and enjoined the maintenance of strict discipline among the troops while in Zealand. The supreme command was to be held by the two monarchs in alternate weeks, but if one of them should be on board the fleet, he was to be the sole authority there, the other on land. In view of a possible diversion by France or other power in favour of Sweden while the army was in Scania, a positive declaration was to be obtained from the kings of Great Britain and Prussia as to the force which they would put into the field in that event in accordance with the treaties concluded by them with Denmark in the previous year. Particulars of the scheme of invasion were not to be communicated to powers not taking part in it without the consent of both parties. For the guarantee desired by the king of Denmark for the permanent possession of the provinces, islands, and places occupied by him, or to be ceded to him at a future peace, that given by the tsar under his treaty of alliance of 1709 was to be held to be sufficient.

Such was the convention which formed the basis of the year's proceedings. Enquiries as to transport were at once set on foot at Berlin and an agreement was arrived at by commissaries appointed to arrange the matter, formally ratified on 27 June. Fifty of the most suitable Prussian vessels, to be chosen by the Danish commissary, were to be fully equipped, if possible, by the middle of July, the king of Denmark paying for them at the rate of four reichs-thalers per last monthly from the day that they were ready, a month's payment in advance.[1]

In the meantime northern affairs were being actively discussed at the centres of the empire, Vienna and Ratisbon. Memorials, deductions, representations were presented to the diet from Prussia, from Holstein-Gottorp, from Denmark, from Sweden, from Hanover, from Hesse-Cassel, and from Mecklenburg-Strelitz. A decree of the imperial commission on northern affairs, of date 17 January, had a supplement of 52 documents setting forth the course of events from 1706. The emperor requested advice on what should now be done. A "large deduction," with 41 pieces annexed, argued the justice of the cause of Sweden. It was answered early in May by a recrimination from Hanover, which asserted that the king of England, in what he had done, had only performed his duty as an elector and director of his circle, to

[1] Holm prints this agreement, p. 159. On the difficulties which attended its execution, see ibid., pp. 60 foll. In the end the transports were only permitted to leave Stettin on a personal undertaking given by the Danish envoy General Meyer that they should be paid for before he left Berlin. Cf. Whitworth, 15 and 25 Aug., R. O. Prussia 7.

prevent the devastation of Germany by another Thirty Years' War. Swedish answers to this declared that Charles was ready and desirous to treat of a general peace under the joint mediation of the emperor and of France, and for affairs within the empire under that of the former alone; that he would send ministers to a congress at Hamburg or Lübeck, but not to that of Brunswick, which could only deal with the particular affairs of Germany; that the king of England had only leagued himself with Denmark in order to obtain possession of Bremen and Verden; and that the emperor ought to take measures, not against the king of Sweden, but against the princes who were endeavouring to overthrow the constitutions of the empire and to gather the whole power into their own hands. Arguments which made, says Whitworth, a strong impression.[1]

But neither were the conditions which Charles proposed admissible nor, had they been so, was it possible for the emperor to take up his cause. Grave dangers threatened him from two quarters, from the Turks, who in their war with Venice had conquered the Morea and overrun Dalmatia, threatening not only the ancient maritime city but also Hungary, and from the designs of Spain and Savoy upon Naples and the Milanese. In March 28,700 imperial troops were detained there, 107,000 in Hungary and Transylvania.[2] The emperor might protest against the aggression of the Russian and the Dane, he might continue his efforts to make the congress of Brunswick a reality, but he was not likely to despatch a force northwards when he was praying the interested powers, Russia included, for help for the defence of Christendom. So far from allowing him to contemplate a restoration of the settlement of Westphalia, the exigencies of the situation compelled him to conclude with Great Britain the above-mentioned treaty of Westminster, which obliged the parties to maintain each other in possession of and mutually defend their kingdoms, provinces and rights, and though this treaty formally could only refer to the dominions of Great Britain, the new acquisitions of Hanover had figured in the preliminary discussions and it was certain enough that, if the emperor took any steps to dispossess George of Bremen and Verden, the latter would find an excuse against sending ships for the defence of Sardinia and Naples.[3] Charles VI actually intimated to Peter the Great through Count von Metsch that his protest against the entry of the Russian soldiery into Mecklenburg

[1] Whitworth's despatches from Ratisbon, R. O. Germany (States) 172–73.
[2] Schaub, 21 March, R. O. Germany (Empire) 33.
[3] See on this subject Michael, I. 655–78, and Schaub's despatches from Vienna, January 1716, *loc. cit.*

should be regarded only as a formality. When, however, in June Metsch went to interview the tsar at Pyrmont, whither he had gone to drink the waters, and handed in a project of alliance which contemplated the case of a war with France, he only received a counter-project which was quite antagonistic. The emperor's overtures, therefore, to him came to nothing, and thereupon the court of Vienna changed its tone and began to regard Peter as an enemy.[1]

As to France, the regent adhered firmly to his determination to be neutral. Count de Croissi retained during the first months of 1716 his character of ambassador extraordinary to Sweden, residing at Hamburg, and advocating the cause of Charles with all his former enthusiasm. He went so far as to discuss possible conditions of peace with the Prussian minister Knyphausen, and to submit further schemes for helping the Pretender in Scotland by Swedish arms and French money. And he committed other diplomatic indiscretions, inditing a letter to Charles XII in terms of jocose intimacy [2] (which, however, was not allowed to go), and indulging in a paper war with Ilgen. The reproofs he received would doubtless have been more severe, had not the good-natured regent been his personal friend. But it was firmly explained to him that circumstances, of which he was not informed, rendered any but the most general statements on his part most improper. He was ordered to do his best to maintain the king of Sweden in the good disposition of obtaining peace by ceding something, which he had evinced, according to Croissi's report, in the last days at Stralsund. He could not be successful in the war so long as his enemies remained united. The despatch continued, in the name of Louis XV :

"Vous jugez avec raison, qu'il conviendroit aussy à mes intérêts d'en diminuer la nombre. J'ay jusqu'à présent apporté tous mes soins pour y parvenir, et c'est la principale veue que Je me suis proposé dans les différentes ouvetures qui ont esté faites de ma part sur ce sujet. Elles auroient eu vraysemblement plus de succez si J'avois été instruit des intentions du Roy de Suède, et de ce qu'il veut bien céder à la conjoncture, mais vous savez combien il a toujours paru éloigné de vouloir s'expliquer sur ce sujet . . Vous devez seulement asseurer en général que Je désire bien sincèrement de contribuer à la pacification du Nord, mais sans vous expliquer en aucune manière sur les moyens que Je croirois propres pour y réussir. Il faut qu'il paroisse dans tous vos discours que Je désire véritablement de

[1] Particulars, Hartman, pp. 47–50. Cf. Solov'ev, on the apprehensions aroused at Vienna by the northern developments, particularly in regard to their effect on the war with Turkey.

[2] He concluded by congratulating Charles on the death of his grandmother, and the expression of a hope that she had left him a good sum of money.

contribuer à avancer la paix du Nord sans vous expliquer plus particulièrement sur les moyens que Je crois propres à avancer cette négotiation, et si vous remarquiez que les conférences que le Comte de Rottembourg a eues depuis quelque tems avec les Ministres du Roy de Prusse eussent fait naître des soupçons de quelques négotiations pour mes intérêts particuliers, vous asseurerez qu'il n'est rien passé qui puisse en quelque tems que ce soit préjudicier à aucune des Puissances intéressées dans la guerre du Nord, et vous éviterez surtout avec soin de donner lieu de croire que Je prenne aucunes mesures pour diviser les ennemys du Roy de Suède, ny qui puissent aussy être contraires aux intérests de ce Prince."

If the tsar came so near Hamburg that Croissi could not with decency avoid waiting upon him, he was to assure him that it was the king of France's great desire, as that of his great-grandfather had been, always to maintain the best understanding with a prince whose great qualities had brought him into universal esteem and to omit no effort to efface the prejudices which, it was known, had been sedulously inculcated to the contrary.[1]

In May Croissi was accorded the permission he had long craved to return to Paris. He was told (8 May) that

" Une relation aussy incertaine et aussy irregulière que celle que l'on a présentement avec la Suède ne permet pas de faire un fondement solide sur ce que l'on en apprend souvent trop tard pour en pouvoir faire usage, et d'ailleurs par les voyes indirectes qui ne peuvent autoriser les démarches dont on pourroit espérer le plus d'utilité si elles estoient faites à propos ; ainsy il est bien nécessaire que l'on puisse prendre sur ce sujet de nouvelles mesures et concerter avec plus de facilité avec le Roy de Suède les moyens de prévenir par une bonne paix la ruine ou mesme la perte entière de son Royaume."

As soon therefore as Croissi could find means to satisfy his creditors, for he had lent large sums of money to meet the pressing necessities of Charles and had lost certain sources of income by his absence from Paris, he left for home, passing the Hague on his way in order to confer with his equally Swedophile colleague de Castagnères, Marquis de Châteauneuf.[2]

[1] Louis XV to Croissi, 21 March, M. A. E. Suède 135.
[2] Croissi's despatches, ibid.

CHAPTER IX

THE BALTIC EXPEDITION OF 1716

CHARLES XII, immediately upon his return to Sweden, collected a force to cross the frozen Sound into Zealand. Copenhagen, however, was saved by the sudden break-up of the ice, and then Charles turned his arms against Norway, and continued to fight in that country, with varying fortune, till June.[1] The enterprise was so far successful that it obliged the king of Denmark to send a squadron and troops for the defence of Norway, and thereby so disorganized his always indifferent resources as to cause the failure of the great enterprise of the year, the invasion of Scania. Meanwhile Count Gyllenborg continued his expostulations in London, denying that his master was in league with the Pretender, protesting against the arming of ships in the Thames for the tsar's service, and declaring afresh that the measures of the king of Sweden against trade were only designed to close the prohibited ports and that satisfaction would be given for damage done contrary to treaties. As was to be expected, memorials in these terms had no effect; but when Gyllenborg opened to Townshend the possibility of the cession of Bremen and Verden to Hanover, if England would help to recover what had been lost elsewhere, a basis for serious discussion was afforded. In the conversations which ensued Townshend declared that the king of England would give proof of his sincere desire for Sweden's welfare upon receipt of a satisfactory answer to the demands made. About Bremen and Verden he could not, as an English minister, speak, but he believed that his master would meet the king of Sweden in the matter; if Gyllenborg would write to the latter on the subject, the despatch should be carried by the fleet about to sail. At a second interview he communicated the instructions given to Admiral Norris and stated that the king would not restore the duchies. Gyllenborg asked, would Great Britain help to drive Russia from the Baltic, destroying thereby the tsar's dangerous power and compensating Sweden for her losses in Germany by the recovery of her Eastern provinces?

[1] See for particulars Bain, *Charles XII*, pp. 270–72.

Townshend replied that the only promise he could make was that his master's good offices would be employed to procure for the king of Sweden an advantageous peace, provided that he would give up the thought of recovering his German provinces. On a third occasion he declared that Great Britain would not allow hostilities to be undertaken against Sweden, if Charles would show himself disposed to peace. No help, he said, was to be expected by him from France or Holland, the latter was "too Danish." Great Britain was the only power on whose assistance he could reckon.

These discussions assured Gyllenborg that king George was determined to keep what he had got. He saw that the only resource was to set the country against the sovereign. A year before he had strongly advised some relaxation of the privateer edict. Now he took upon himself to recommend to Charles the removal of the prohibition altogether, so far as English vessels were concerned, and even to give satisfaction for the damages inflicted. By so doing, he said, Great Britain would be deprived of all pretext of quarrel and nation and court would be divided; if the former were pacified, the latter could do no harm.

For the time, indeed, his relations with the English ministers were distinctly improved. They assured him of the willingness of the king to bring to life again the old good feeling. Sweden, they said, would lose nothing by giving up her German provinces, which had always been a burden to her, while she would recover Esthonia and Livonia and possibly get St. Petersburg. It was evident, Gyllenborg reported, that the British government was much alarmed at the growing power of the tsar, and he considered the situation particularly favourable for gradually arranging terms, by its intervention, between Sweden and her other enemies. One of the ministers, he said, had told the Spanish ambassador that there was a general anxiety in the country to avert the ruin of Sweden, and that, if the king pushed too far his private interests in Germany, the government would set itself against him.[1]

But all this was futile, because the demands made upon Charles were such as he never would accept. He replied to Gyllenborg's advice that the court of Hanover asked a great deal of positive advantage for itself and its allies but only gave in return a vague promise to attempt to procure for Sweden an honourable peace. He could not explain himself on so delicate a matter until the king of England had precisely declared what was to be expected from him in return for the proposed concessions.[2]

[1] Gyllenborg's despatches, *Handlingar*, Vol. X; Larsson, pp. 18 foll.; R. O. Foreign Ministers 62. Cf. Carlson, p. 92, note.

[2] Torpum, 8 June o.s. 1716, R. O. Confidential 1[a], copy. This volume and 1[b] contain the bulk of the Swedish correspondence intercepted or seized in 1716-17.

The command of the British squadron sailing for the Baltic was again committed to Sir John Norris. It consisted of nineteen of the line and two frigates, the former comprising the *Cumberland* and *Shrewsbury* of 80 guns, the *Burford* and *Essex* of 70, four of 60, nine of 50, and two of 40. It had been intended to send only sixteen ships, but the number had to be increased because the Dutch would only furnish six. Horatio Walpole at the Hague did his utmost to obtain a stronger force, but though his arguments —the chief of them the absolute necessity of obtaining naval stores—were backed by the merchants of Amsterdam, they were countered and foiled by considerations of expense. Norris sailed from the Nore on 18 May o.s. and reached the Sound safely in ten days.[1] His instructions had reference this year not only to the protection of trade but to prevention of the invasion which Charles XII was supposed to be meditating in the interests of the Pretender. It was believed that James Edward, after the results of Preston and Sheriffmuir, could not have ventured to land in Scotland and assume a royal state at Perth, had he not the expectation of help in money and ships from France and soldiers from Sweden. Reports at court and coffee-house had it that 12,000 of the latter were coming, and that France was about to declare war.[2] Jacobite correspondence, regularly intercepted, treated of these things as facts. In reality they were but creations of the exiles' sanguine imagination, but the alarmist reports of Lord Stair gave their lucubrations undue weight.[3] The attitude of the French government was unconciliatory indeed on some points, as on the question of the Mardyk Canal, but there was no intention of going to war whether for Sweden or for the Pretender. Says Bolingbroke, "The Regent never intended from the first to do anything, even indirectly, in favour of the Jacobite cause. His interest was plainly with the other side, and he saw it."[4] The Swedish invasion was a chimera. Sparre, inveighing against Stair's "conduite bizarre et outrée," his "chimères pour bercer son maître et son parlement," and his "armement imaginaire," allowed that it

[1] Authorities for the Baltic expedition of 1716: Norris's despatches, etc., R. O. as before; his journal and letter-book, and despatches of Townshend and Stanhope, B. M., Add. MSS. 28128, 28145, 22510; despatches of Lord Polwarth and General Bothmer, R. O. Denmark 36 and Staatsarchiv, Hanover. Those of Polwarth leave a good deal to be desired; Townshend complained on one occasion that they were very "lame and imperfect" (Coxe, II. 87).

[2] See on the subject the despatches of Townshend to Horatio Walpole at the Hague in the spring of 1716, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 81. Walpole found in the belief a chief argument for the conclusion of the treaty of Westminster.

[3] Stair earned in consequence of these reports the character at Paris of one who desired to set France and England by the ears (Torcy's *Memoirs, passim*; cf. the invective of Saint-Simon).

[4] *Letter to Sir William Windham.*

would not be at all surprising if his master desired to avenge himself upon his unworthy and perfidious enemies, but had to confess that such revenge was out of his power.[1] But this was not understood in England, and suspicion deepened into certainty when on the one hand the regent declined to expel the Pretender from France and on the other came the news of the invasion of Norway. Accordingly Norris was instructed, after reference to the events and demands of the previous year and the refusal of the king of Sweden to give satisfaction upon any point, that now he appeared to have allied himself with the king of England's enemies and with that design to have embarked upon the conquest of Norway, "the most ready way to enable him to cut off entirely the commerce of our subjects to the Baltic, and to afford him greater opportunities of carrying on those projects, which from good grounds we cannot but apprehend he is forming against the peace and safety of our Kingdoms." On coming to the Sound Norris was therefore to make upon him by a memorial to be delivered into his hands by a special messenger,—a duplicate being sent to Jackson at Stockholm for presentation to the Chancery there,—the following demands: (1) reparation for damages inflicted, revocation of the privateer edict, and guarantees for the future, (2) a solemn promise not to assist the Pretender directly or indirectly and not to harbour in Sweden Jacobite refugees,[2] (3) the abandonment, in the interests of commerce, of all design of conquering Norway or any of the Danish islands. If he would give the satisfaction demanded, the king of England would be most ready and desirous to restore his former good understanding with him and would heartily employ his good offices to procure for him as good a peace as the situation of affairs would allow. Having despatched his express Norris was to await an answer and pending its receipt was not to act "in any respect offensively against Sweden, unless there appears an absolute necessity of joining with the Danes in order to defend the Kingdoms of Norway and Denmark against the attempts of the Swedes." If, in the interval of waiting, the tsar and the king of Denmark should offer to undertake a descent on Scania, Norris was in the strongest terms to dissuade them from it. Should they persist in spite of his friendly arguments he must threaten to leave the Sound with his squadron and allow the fleet of Sweden to act freely in its own defence. As soon as the king of Sweden's answer was received it was to be transmitted to the king, and his instructions awaited. If Norris considered it full and satisfactory, he

[1] To Gyllenborg, 30 March 1716, *Handlingar*, X. 357.

[2] For Kenneth, Lord Duffus, mentioned by name, see the *English Historical Review*, XVIII. 692, note.

was in the meantime to behave towards the king of Denmark as above said.[1] Besides this, but as a secondary matter, Norris was to take care of the traders, and the instructions given him by the admiralty only touched this point. He was to concert with the Dutch " the proper methods to protect and secure the trade of both nations in such a manner as may best suit with the service on which you are principally sent."

Consistently with the above George employed direct persuasion at Copenhagen to induce Frederick to postpone at least the invasion of Scania.[2] What Gyllenborg had said as to a cession of Bremen and Verden seems to have been credited, and the hope of an accommodating reply from Charles to have been seriously entertained.

The moment that Norris appeared in the Sound he received an urgent summons through Püchler to bring his squadron on to the Bay of Kjöge or the Moen to cover from Swedish attack the vessels conveying troops and supplies from the mainland. For the Swedes were actually infesting the coasts of Denmark. Early in May Admiral Wachtmeister had seized a number of vessels carrying timber to Copenhagen. At the beginning of June he looked in on Dantzig and gave a fright to the Russian galleys there, though he could not touch them. In the absence of Admiral Gabel's squadron in Norwegian waters the Danes were not strong enough to meet him. It was understood, said Püchler, that Norris had authority to act as requested, and he could await the king of Sweden's answer as well in the Baltic as in the Sound. He was also asked to send two of his ships to Norway to join Gabel.

Norris replied that he would come himself to Copenhagen to discuss the matter and sent off Püchler's letter to Townshend, with a request for instructions. He had sent his memorials to Charles and to Jackson on the day of his arrival, the former by one Stambke[3] with orders to deliver it into the king's own hands. On 5 June o.s. he wrote again to Townshend, recounting what he had done at

[1] Droysen (IV. ii. 160) says that the memorials sent in by Norris included proposals drafted by Bernstorff for the cession of Norway to Sweden, with compensation for Denmark in Sleswick. Such may have been, as he says, submitted to the court of Copenhagen, and advocated there by Bernstorff's countrymen and cousins, but there is no such thing in Norris's instructions, nor anything more in relation to a peace than the offer of the king of England's good offices. Holm declines to believe this and other statements of Droysen in connexion without authority given for them, see his note, p. 52. He says that there is no trace of such proposals by Bernstorff in the Danish archives.

[2] Holm, p. 53.

[3] A man supplied for this service by Gyllenborg. As he returned from Sweden at the end of June in company with Goertz, it seems probable that he was the Stambke who became secretary to the latter and was arrested with him in the following February.

Copenhagen and how he had informed the king of Denmark that he was obliged to await in the Sound the king of Sweden's answer and the arrival of the Dutch contingent. Ten days later he learnt from Jackson that the memorial delivered by him had been simply sent on to the king.[1] Of Stambke he heard nothing. Sehestedt, the Danish secretary of state, sent him another appeal to come on, to which he replied as before that he could not, adding however that, if the Swedes attempted anything against the kingdom of Denmark, he would very readily do his best in defence of it. Another letter from Püchler obliged him to request Townshend to observe to the king of Denmark, "how much more is desired of me than I can undertake in my present circumstances, which I endeavour to behave in according to my orders." But still no reply from Charles, and other letters from Püchler of 21 and 24 June, the latter containing the significant phrase, "Vous jugerez aisément . . . à quoi on attribuera icy tout le mal qui leur pourra arriver, et le delay de l'ouverture de la campagne, se persuadants outre cela que par une prompte descente en Scanie le Norwegue pourra être secouru suffisament." Norris complained loudly of this to Townshend and to Admiral Aylmer, the relative on whose influence at home he so much relied.[2] On the 19th o.s. he sent an account of a second visit to court. Assured by the king of Denmark of the earnestness of the desire to effect the descent as soon as possible,[3] he could only reply civilly in the same terms as before. Not being able to satisfy the king, he went on to see Sehestedt, and enquired whether the descent upon Scania could not be given up in favour of some other method of relieving Norway, in which he could himself join.[4] The proposal was referred to the king, who replied that earlier something might have been arranged, but that now his word was pledged to the tsar to make the descent as soon as possible;

[1] The memorial and reply, Lamberty, IX. pp. 650–52.

[2] "So while I am obeying my orders, which I endeavour strictly to observe, I shall be complained against by the Danes and Muscovites, and perhaps the Swedes at last prove so stubborn, as not to admit the offers of coming to an accommodation. Thus between Sila and Caribdis I am like to give neither content . . . I pray, Sir, don't fail often to speak to Lord Townshend and Mr. Berrinsdorff to consider of me" (16 June o.s.). "I don't write to Mr. Berringsdorff till I hear he is o' this side the water, and pray you will make him my compliments. Robethon told me we were not to correspond this year, which is the reason I don't write to him, but you will please to make him my compliments that we may stand right with him" (12 June o.s.).

[3] But Hanneken, the British secretary at Copenhagen, had already advised Norris (20 June) that such was the backwardness of the preparations, that in spite of the peril of Norway the expedition could not be ready before the end of August or the beginning of September. Holm says that even in July it was impossible to fit out a fleet (p. 57).

[4] Sehestedt says that Norris told him that it was likely that Charles would make acceptable proposals of peace (Holm, p. 54).

it was the only way to save Norway, and only by force of arms could the king of Sweden be brought to reason. "It is my opinion," wrote Norris, "the government of Denmark put all their hopes in this descent, and that their state is under such difficulties as it must procure them a good or ill peace, because the charge of another year's war will be extremely difficult for them to bear." No one there thought that the king of Sweden would ever agree to a treaty.

The admiral's difficulties were increased by the impatience of the merchantmen, numbering over a hundred after the arrival of those collected at Newcastle. He thought that, as soon as the Dutch fleet came in, he might have to detail three of his ships to strengthen the convoy. On June 20 o.s. he wrote of the situation as follows:

"I have further to observe to your Lordship, they [the Danes] express themselves not at all obliged by our being only defensive to them; and yet, under the umbrage of our being in these seas, the Suedish fleet may be kept from attempting to disturb the descent, upon a view we may join the Danes; and if the King would not have me do it, I am not instructed to let the Suedes on the other hand know it, to make their use of it in defending themselves. I think his Majesty has this in his power, (if the King of Sueden would come to terms), by his commands to me to concert in that case with the Suedes, we might prevent the descent on Schonen; or if the King of Sueden will not by a prefixt time give assurances of peace, then his Majesty commanding me to assist in covering the descent would cultivate a good correspondence with the crowns of Denmark and Muscovy, or if we were to withdraw ourselves from these seas, since the descent is to be made by the Danes and Muscovites, it would shew an exact neutrality. But the King of Sueden is reputed to be of a resolution not to listen to terms, and if the descent be not made, he will in time carry Norway, it being more easy to him to strengthen his army with horse and everything as he advances in that country, than it is for the Danes to defend it, who, in all such cases, must do it by transportation from Jutland, which they find too troublesome, and especially in their horse."

A day or two after this, Norris received important despatches from Jackson. Wachtmeister's squadron consisted of eleven ships of from 70 to 50 guns. He had been revictualled for six weeks and reinforced by six of the large vessels of Sparre's squadron. Another detachment of smaller vessels was on guard towards Finland, a third of ten, with four of 50 guns, lay ready for sea at Gothenburg. Goertz had met Stambke at Wenersborg and had forbidden him to proceed till he should receive a summons from the king. He was likely to remain there for some time. An English ship from Stockholm reported twenty-eight Swedish men-of-war at sea near Bornholm.

There was impatience in England at the absence of any answer

from Charles XII. Fresh despatches from Townshend of the 12th and 15th o.s. reached Norris on 7 July. The king, he was told, now thought that, as the Dutch were only sending six men-of-war, they would not be strong enough to convoy the traders up the Baltic alone; on the other hand, some parts of Norris's instructions forbade him to take the whole fleet on that service or to send a sufficiently strong detachment. But by taking up a station off Bornholm or elsewhere near Carlskrona he might prevent the Swedish fleet from attacking the traders, thereby enabling the Dutch to proceed in charge of them and remaining sufficiently near the Sound to execute such orders as might be sent him upon receipt of the king of Sweden's answer. He was to concert this affair with the Dutch commander. Norris replied (30 June o.s.) that the Swedish fleet, according to his information, had 1,362 guns against his 1,070, with double the proportion of men to each gun. As soon as the Dutch had parted from him it might be expected to attack. Nothing could suit the Danes and Russians better, for, whatever the result of the action, both fleets would be disabled, and they be masters of the sea. But if he could have orders to join the Danes he would take with him a squadron of theirs, and after despatching the convoy would cover the transportation of troops to Zealand and so forward the affairs of Denmark better than in any other way. He reminded Townshend of his instances in favour of a much stronger armament: "I have not known in my time our sea affairs in that character, as to be in action with the disproportion here stated, with the want of fireships, &c. &c."

Two days later the Dutch fleet at length arrived, six men-of-war with upwards of two hundred sail of merchantmen, the whole under the command of Commodore H. Grave. A council of war was at once held, when it appeared that the Dutch commander had orders not to go up the Baltic alone. It was resolved that, seeing that "by accidents of wind or weather it might happen that the squadron could not keep in a station between Bornholm and Carlscrone during the time the trade shall be in the East sea," and that the refusal of the Swedes to receive a letter from the States-General or to allow anyone to land at Helsingborg[1] showed their intention of attacking, the fleet should remain where it was till further orders.

[1] Charles's orders were so strict, and his people so imbued with the necessity of obeying them literally, that Neugebauer, his envoy at Constantinople, travelling to him with important despatches, was not allowed to land from a Dutch boat. At the second attempt the Dutch sailors threw him into the water, and he clung to a pile for nearly an hour before he was permitted to come ashore (Jackson, 14 July o.s.).

The purport of Norris's fresh instructions was immediately known at Copenhagen, for Bernstorff had at once imparted it to Söhlenthal in London.[1] The arrival of the Dutch squadron was the signal for the renewal of Danish importunity. Sehestedt enquired (14 July) how many ships Norris could spare to help to blockade the Swedish fleet, and when they would be sent. He recommended prompt action, as delay would only embolden the enemy. Norris reported in reply the resolution of the council of war, and added: "to prevent mistakes I further acquaint you, I have not any orders to act offensively against the Swedes; so that were I in that station [Bornholm], and they neither attempt to disturb our commerce nor to make war upon me, I have no direction to make war upon them." The king, he said, being now on his journey to Hanover, the king of Denmark could communicate easily with him; after which Sehestedt and himself could concert measures. In forwarding the correspondence to Townshend Norris expressed the opinion that the Dutch, as their trade could not be carried on but in conjunction with other nations, ought readily to join in forcing the Swedes to end the war. The fleet of the latter should be driven into port, the descent be made, and the traders then proceed in safety to their destinations to return either that year or the next.

George left London for his electorate, like a boy going home for the holidays, on 18 July. The strongest objections had been made by his English schoolmasters to his departure. In particular Townshend urged the difficulty of conducting northern affairs, when despatches arriving from the Sound must be forwarded to the king for his perusal and returned. The Baltic expedition, he said, alone secured to the king "the balance and arbitration of the North," and its failure might not only expose his German dominions to danger, but give to the malcontents in parliament "every handle of traducing and making odious his Majesty's administration." This would be the journey's "most fatal inconvenience."[2] George recognized the difficulty, but met it by taking the northern negotiations out of the hands of his ministers in England altogether. Stanhope accompanied him to Hanover and transmitted his orders directly to Norris and to Lord Polwarth, who arrived at Copenhagen as envoy at the beginning of August. Norris still sent to Townshend duplicates of his despatches to Stanhope, but only received in answer assurances of the approval of the Prince of Wales acting as regent, and directions to shape his conduct on orders from Hanover. For

[1] Holm, p. 55.
[2] To Bernstorff, 19 May o.s. 1716 (Coxe).

the rest, George conducted his negotiations with the tsar and with the kings of Denmark and Prussia to a great extent through his German ministers.

Peter the Great was back at Schwerin from his course of waters at Pyrmont by the end of June, by which time the bulk of his army had been assembled at Rostock or Warnemünde ready to embark.[1] But in the first place no transports were ready for them—some which had arrived from Pomerania had been sent straight on to Norway [2]—and in the second there was no fleet to protect their crossing. Peter himself in his impatience got over to Falster on 14 July on a hoy and put up at a fisher-village with what fare he could get. His galleys arriving next day, he was able to appear at Copenhagen with the troops which they conveyed on the 17th.[3] On the 29th arrived from Reval seven men-of-war of the line with three frigates and three schooners. This squadron had left that port three months before, but had been frightened back by the superior force of Sweden. Besides these, four large ships had sailed from Archangel in the previous September ; two of them had reached Copenhagen at the beginning of December, two had wintered in Norway. These and another came in on 8 or 10 June with four from England and Holland. As one went on to St. Petersburg, the Russian admiral Scheltinga, on the arrival of the Reval squadron, found himself in command of a fine fleet including fifteen of the line.[4]

On 24 July (and Sehestedt [5] knew it the same day and sent in a fresh appeal) Norris received further despatches from Townshend of date 3 July o.s. The king, he was informed, approved of his strict adherence to his instructions. If the Swedes were again, as was reported, at sea, the six Dutch ships would not be strong enough to escort the traders, and in that case Norris must send a sufficient detachment with them. As it would then be dangerous for him to remain with his weakened force in the Sound, he should go forward and await the king of Sweden's answer in

[1] Particulars of the voyage of the Russian galleys from Libau, Hartman, pp. 62–65, and of the march of the troops, pp. 72–76.

[2] Holm, p. 45.

[3] Ibid. p. 63. Hanneken says that there were fourteen battalions of these troops, and that the galleys, thirty-six in number, had hugged the coast to Lübeck (Travemünde, it may be presumed), and crossed to Falster thence. He further says that twelve more galleys arrived at Copenhagen on the 21st. The force amounted to nearly 10,000 men, all in excellent trim (18 and 21 July, R. O. Denmark 36).

[4] Particulars, Hartman, pp. 66–69. Norris records that seven men-of-war arrived on 8 June, but Hartman's computation of eight includes the *Samson* frigate. Fourteen of the line with four frigates and three schooners formed the Russian rear-guard of the joint fleet in August.

[5] Advised by Söhlenthal on Bernstorff's authority as before (Holm, p. 56).

the Bay of Kjöge, or elsewhere thereabouts. If there should be any apprehension of danger from the Swedes he might join his ships with those of the Danes. And as the king of Sweden had sent no answer, and probably would not send any, Norris was no longer to "give any hindrance to the Danes in their descent upon Schonen either by representations or otherwise."

In a private despatch, sent with the above, Townshend informed Norris that he had particular commands to acquaint him with advices received from France to the effect that Baron Eric Sparre had concluded with the Jacobites at Paris a treaty for taking them into the service of the king of Sweden in the rank and station they had enjoyed under the Pretender. This, it was said, and the seizure of ships bound not for the prohibited ports but for Stockholm,[1] gave further proof of the king of Sweden's intentions, and it was thought that more vigorous measures should be employed against him, particularly to divert him from his enterprise on Norway. When therefore Norris had arranged for the protection of the traders, he was to cover and facilitate the descent on Scania as the best means to that end. And, if the Swedish fleet approached to interfere therewith, he was to give it battle with the Danes,

"His Majesty's intentions being that you should observe no measures towards Sweden in any case where the assistance of his fleet shall be necessary to deprive them of any signal advantage, or where your joining the Danes may procure them some signal advantage over Sweden. But without one or the other of these two cases you are not to give the Danes such a degree of assistance as may be interpreted to amount to an open rupture with Sweden."

On receiving this despatch Norris moved on with the whole fleet into the roads of Copenhagen (Sunday, 26 July). The same day he was summoned to a conference with the two monarchs and their ministers. Asked how the transport of troops from Mecklenburg and afterwards the descent on Scania could be covered from a Swedish attack, and when he would take measures therefor, he replied that the answers to expresses sent to the States-General and to his master must be awaited; thereafter, if the whole naval force of Denmark and Russia could be sent with him to a station off Bornholm or Carlskrona, and it were ascertained that the Swedish fleet lay harmlessly in port, the traders might be sent on under

[1] The cargoes of some of the vessels seized by the active privateers of Gothenburg were actually the property of Stockholm merchants. But they were nevertheless declared lawful prize, and Charles, in revenge perhaps upon those very merchants who had pleaded inability to raise the supplies he wanted, confirmed the sentence (Jackson, 2 and 22 June and 3 July o.s.).

a detachment, and the rest of the combined fleet remain for the purposes desired.

On 30 July Norris received further important instructions from Osnabrück, where George was resting on his way to Hanover. They bore date 24 July, ten days later than his last from England, and after it was known that Charles had sent back his memorial unopened.[1] Norris was now ordered to sail so far eastward in the Baltic as should be necessary to enable the traders to go on with a convoy sufficient to protect them from privateers and frigates, and then with the main body of the joint fleet to observe the motions of the Swedes, and in consequence of the extraordinary contumacy of the king of Sweden to make reprisals as instructed in that case. For this purpose he was to obtain the strongest Danish squadron he could to sail with him, and in consideration of that service he might help to drive the Swedes back to their ports and so secure free navigation for the ships of the king of Denmark and his allies. Stanhope also instructed Lord Polwarth to add his instances to those of Norris, and, as the tsar had probably arrived at Copenhagen, to solicit him to send his ships also. He wrote to Norris that the request would willingly be granted, and later, that the tsar was willing that he should have command.

Peter went on board his ship on 30 July. Norris and he exchanged visits and compliments and the next day there was a general conference, when the admiral formally communicated his new instructions. It was proposed to take action in accordance with them. Two days later Sehestedt sent in enquiries, firstly, as to the mode of sailing, the number of ships, their division, and the command, secondly, whether Norris would attack at sight and make dispositions therefor beforehand, thirdly, whether, if the king of Sweden at the last moment offered satisfaction, he would consent to terms. The answer to the second question was affirmative, to the third negative; as to the first, Norris recommended that a line of battle should be formed of six Dutch, nineteen English, eleven Danish, and fourteen Russian men-of-war, the six Dutch to be subsequently detached with five English to convoy the merchantmen. Gabel's squadron should not be waited for; it might follow.

In the account of the conference which Norris sent to Stanhope he reported that the tsar was very willing to sail, but the Danes were not so ready. Moreover they pretended to the command,

[1] Jackson says that Charles showed great heat, declaring that he knew nothing of Norris and would receive nothing from him or otherwise than through the proper channel (3 July o.s.).

which, as "a right the British nation never gave up," he had declined to concede.[1] Though the orders sent to the Dutch commodore were very strict against his taking offensive action, yet he could not go up the Baltic before the Swedes were forced into harbour; therefore "I shall use all the means I am able, if it must come to an action, to do it before the Dutch part from us, that their state may share in the rupture as well as in the safety the action, whenever it occur, will procure to their commerce." But Grave on 3 August definitely declared that he could not take a place in the line of battle, although he allowed that unless it were formed the traders could not proceed. In the vehement discussions at the Hague which followed the receipt of his request for further instructions, Horatio Walpole's arguments had been opposed by those of William Buys and his following, now as during the war with France the steady advocates of peace.[2] These gained the day, and Grave declared accordingly. Writing again on 4 August Norris stated his belief that the desire of the Danes to wait for Gabel's return was a pretence. Since the Russian troops would be able to come over, as soon as the fleet had sailed, the Danes would be put to the expense of keeping them, and this it was desired to avoid till all was ready.

On the previous day Peter had sailed on a two days' excursion to view the character of the coast on which the landing was to be made. On the 8th Gabel arrived with seven men-of-war, and on the 10th a conference was held, at which Norris and Polwarth met the Danish and Russian ministers and admirals. The line of battle was first considered: Norris undertook to supply fourteen ships thereto, sending on his other five with the merchantmen; Admiral Gyldenlöve promised eighteen, Vice-Chancellor Shafirov fourteen. Then came the question of command: Norris declined to be under the orders of the Danes, they and the Russians declined to be under him. Norris then proposed to apply the principle already arranged for the conduct of the Russo-Danish army, that is, the monarch present in the field to command in chief, or if both were there, they to command alternately. As the tsar was to sail in person, he would on this principle command the Danes and Russians, and the English would act with him. If he left the fleet, its movements must be concerted at councils of war. The English would form the van, the Danes the centre, the Russians the rear-guard. Then at a council of war on 12 August

[1] Stanhope wrote in return (to Polwarth) that it was "pretty extraordinary that the Danes should pretend to have the command, it is a thing His Majesty will never yield to."

[2] The discussions reported in Walpole's to Stanhope of 12 Aug., R. O. Holland 254. Cf. Lamberty, IX. 620–21.

Norris and Grave arranged that the convoy should go on from Bornholm as soon as it was known that the passage was safe, and should assemble on its return at Dantzig. Next day Admirals Gyldenlöve and Sehestedt hoisted their flags, and on Sunday the 16th the tsar his standard on the *Ingria*; and on the 18th the whole expedition quitted Danish waters, a noble fleet of some sixty men-of-war and over 400 merchantmen.

The voyage went on in better harmony than might have been expected from the preliminary discussions. Gyldenlöve indeed complained that Norris did not salute his flag, but the latter justified himself. Bornholm was reached on the 19th. Cruisers were sent out, and reported the Swedish fleet safe in Carlskrona. On the 22nd therefore the convoy was sent off, the British portion under command of Captain Lestock of the *Weymouth*.[1] Norris had already issued orders to his captains to carry out reprisals by chasing and seizing any Swedish vessels they should meet with.

The convoy gone, Norris proposed to the tsar that a detachment should be sent to Rostock to protect the transport of his troops, and either the rest of the fleet or some cruisers proceed to observe Carlskrona. The latter alternative was decided upon. One Danish ship had to go to Riga (or Königsberg) for cables, so ill-provided was that squadron. It also appeared that Gyldenlöve had orders on no account to proceed further up the Baltic than Oeland point. The tsar desiring now to quit the fleet, new arrangements had to be made for its direction. He proposed that the British and Danish admirals should lie next each other, so as to be on equal terms and to consult, each nation taking orders from its own flag; and when Gyldenlöve made difficulties, he told him that, if he would not agree to this, he would take his ships back and have nothing more to do with the operations. The Danes, therefore, assented, with the modification that one of each side should lie between the flagships. Councils of war were to be held on board the Russian ship the *Marlborough*.

The tsar being gone,—he sailed for Stralsund to look after the transports,—next day (26 August) the admirals met. Norris enquiring whether, in case the Swedes followed the traders up the Baltic, Gyldenlöve would join him in pursuit of them, the latter replied that he might not go beyond the point of Oeland. It was agreed that the rendezvous of the fleets should continue to be off Bornholm, and that six cruisers, two of each nation, should lie between that island and Carlskrona, and report every four days. This went on, the fleet sailing from point to point, or separating

[1] His other ships were the *Falkland* and *Strafford*, also of 50 guns, the *Charles* galley and the *Lynn*, 40, and the *Blandford* frigate.

to water, the cruisers continually on the watch, till 20 September, when all were back at Copenhagen. A fresh dispute on ceremonial between Norris and Gyldenlöve was the only incident, and this was composed.

Meanwhile the Russian troops were coming over from Warnemünde, where 186 transports had been collected by the end of August. By 15 September all of them, who could be carried over, were in Zealand, thirty-seven battalions of infantry and three regiments of dragoons, some 29,000 men, of whom 3,000 to 4,000 were non-combatants.[1] The combined army of invasion numbered about 52,000.[2]

[1] So Hartman, who gives full details, pp. 79–83. Forty battalions is the number usually given, and so General Bothmer, who reported six regiments of cavalry in addition.

[2] Wich computes the Danish forces at 10,298 horse and 12,599 foot, or nearly 23,000 (18 Sept.). So also Holm, p. 78.

CHAPTER X

THE INVASION OF SWEDEN ABANDONED

When, at last, everything was ready for the invasion, the transports on the spot, the crossing safe, Peter the Great suddenly declared that the season of the year was too late to undertake it with any prospect of success. His pronouncement was consequent upon two reconnaissances upon the Swedish coast. The first was made on 10 September by himself. Shots were exchanged with the batteries on shore, and the "snow" which carried him was hit. He proposed the abandonment of the expedition to his council the next day. Subsequently some Cossacks landed at night, overmastered two Swedish posts, and brought back three prisoners. These reported that the invaders would be met by an army of 20,000 men, and that the whole coast was strongly fortified with redoubts and guns.[1] After five days' discussion the tsar's proposal was unanimously agreed to by his ministers and generals, and the result was announced to the Danish court on the 17th.[2]

There can be little doubt that the decision was a wise one, although in the event it wrecked the confederation. The lesson of the Pruth was not forgotten, nor was Peter's fear of and respect for Charles less than in former times. The invasion must probably have ended in a grave disaster. At an expenditure of 1,200,000 rix-dollars the Swedish magazines had been furnished for the year, the fleet provisioned till October, and payment of the troops arranged for to the same date.[3] Charles had returned from the Norway frontier, setting up his head-quarters at Lund on 13 September. He had been in no hurry to come back before, reckoning correctly that no invasion would be attempted before the trade was safe and his own fleet blockaded.[4] He was now awaiting his enemies with an army of 12,000 horse and 10,000 foot,[5] a force

[1] Bacmeister, II. 52.

[2] Hartman, pp. 102–04, Holm, p. 83, Bacmeister, pp. 52, 53.

[3] Report of General von der Nath, Stockholm, 18 Aug. o.s. 1716, *Handlingar*, VIII. 267.

[4] *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 206, 21 July o.s.

[5] Jackson, 11 Sept. o.s. But reports made it of double the strength (Hartman, p. 106, note).

not large in comparison with theirs, but eager and confident in him. The coast was strongly entrenched from Helsingborg to Malmö. Even should the invaders gain a victory, they would not find sustenance and their numbers would destroy them. Already in June Charles had sent orders that all corn in the southern provinces should be bought up and carried into Malmö and Christianstad, that Landskrona should be provisioned for six months, and that large sums should be spent in the furnishing of magazines.[1] In August he repeated the orders about the corn, and proposed to have Lund, Landskrona, and Helsingborg completely evacuated by their inhabitants, and the two latter towns burnt to the ground if the enemy really landed.[2] In these circumstances an invading force would not have been able to live. The resources of Denmark were barely sufficient to keep the army supplied at Copenhagen, and to furnish it across the water would be impossible.[3]

It seems hardly necessary to seek reasons for the Russian decision other than the obvious one. Peter had for years been anxious to finish the war by carrying it into Sweden itself. Time pressed upon him, his resources had been heavily drawn upon, he required rest for the completion of his great reforms at home and the consolidation of his new empire. It is difficult to think that, if he could have concluded the alliance he desired with Great Britain, or if the king of Denmark had been ready at the appointed time, he would not have carried his army across the Sound. But he would have been mad to do so when, in his opinion, the prospect of success had vanished. If, however, we must have other reasons, we pitch first upon the distrust which Peter had conceived of his allies. This was no new thing; the incapacity and rapacity of the Danish ministers was no unusual theme in Dolgoruky's advices. Now, in Whitworth's phrase, Peter "could not conceal his discontent at the slowness and haughty airs of the Danes."[4] Many things made him doubt whether they intended honestly by him. His chief cause of complaint—and this was alleged by him as one reason for his action—was that the ships promised to reinforce

[1] *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 199. This and the following letters to the prince of Hesse give particulars of the preparations made to meet the double attack on Scania and on Svealand. Descents on the latter province, near Stockholm, actually took place in September. We may note that Charles gave strict orders that nothing was to be taken from the country people except for cash.

[2] Ibid. p. 209.

[3] To quote Whitworth (22 Sept., R. O. Prussia 7) the tsar and his generals "unanimously agreed that the season was too late for such an enterprise, the Swedes having had time to reinforce their army, and carry all their corn and forage into their strong places, and the Danes having no magazines sufficient to maintain so many troops, till they could hope to find subsistence in the enemy's country. Thô therefore they should get ashore there was little appearance of success at last."

[4] Whitworth, 19 Sept.

his Finland squadron had not been sent. It was believed that the transports had been delayed for trading purposes. Then the exclusion of his troops from Wismar was not forgotten. Danish protests against his arbitrary proceedings in Mecklenburg had been added to those of Hanover. Important men at court and in the army, as I. G. Holstein and General Dewitz, the leaders of the Mecklenburg party, were personally obnoxious to him. The latter had been in command at Wismar.[1] Admiral Gyldenlöve had all along made difficulties. When the Russian troops arrived in Zealand, special measures had been taken to prevent any excesses on their part in Copenhagen, and, though precautionary, they were not the less offensive. Preposterous delay had taken place in the preparations, and though the difficulties had been at length surmounted, the incompetence which not uncommonly accompanies arrogance remained in evidence.[2]

Of course a number of other reasons were alleged and bruited abroad, as soon as the abandonment of the descent was known. In particular Peter was accused of having a secret understanding with Sweden [3] and of having conveyed his army into Zealand for the purpose of seizing Copenhagen and the fortified places of the island. Such reports were absurd, but there was some colour for them, in view of the overtures which the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was known to have been making to Peter on behalf of Sweden.[4]

Peter asserted that he desired only to defer the descent till the following season. But the Danes could not contemplate this prospect with like equanimity, having no resources for a new campaign. They entered the strongest remonstrances, representing that the enormous sums spent would have been spent for nothing, that the treasury would not bear the expenses entailed by a postponement to the following year, that delay would be all to the advantage of the enemy, that an English fleet would not, perhaps, be there another year to help, in fine, that the expedition, whose success was almost certain, must take place now or never.[5] Besides, they had to contemplate the possibility of the Russian troops being quartered upon them for the winter. This was unendurable, and they appealed for support to Hanover.

King George was not less concerned at Peter's decision than was Frederick IV, and that not only because the invasion was to

[1] Whitworth goes so far as to say that " the chicanes and slights of Monsieur Dewitz and other ministers at the Danish Court were the first and real occasion of laying aside the descent " (20 Oct.).

[2] See on these matters Holm, pp. 83 foll.

[3] Ibid. pp. 123 foll.

[4] See pp. 163–64.

[5] Holm, p. 96.

be abandoned, but on account of the prospect of the return of the Russian troops into Mecklenburg. Continually since 1711 that province had been a prey to the demands and ravages of passing armies, and the Russian exactions in the summer had almost completed its ruin. George had entered the strongest remonstrances at Copenhagen against the delays which had prevented the transference of the tsar's troops into Zealand, and he had moved the emperor to protest against their stay in Germany. Thus the Danish envoy to the diet had been desired to exhort his court "to disentangle themselves from the Muscovites, for the Emperor and Empire could in no ways suffer the injustice and violence of the proceedings in Germany," [1] and in August the emperor wrote to the tsar in strong terms to demand the withdrawal of his troops.[2] But the Russian reply had been that the reports of their misdoings had been greatly exaggerated, and that the tsar was perfectly justified in his attitude towards the Mecklenburg gentry for the want of respect which they had shown towards himself and his niece, their new duchess, and for the pernicious correspondence which several of them had maintained with Sweden.[3] Now the expectation that the Russians would return moved the court of Hanover to desperation. Bernstorff, personally interested,[4] is credited with a proposal to seize the Russian ships and even Peter's person, and hold them until his troops should have quitted Denmark and Germany.[5] It was of little use for Peter to give an assurance that none of them should be quartered upon Bernstorff's estates or on those of his colleague

[1] Whitworth, 25 June. But he continues: "I do not see how they can well hinder them, now the war with the Turks goes on."

[2] 6 Aug. A French abridgement of the Latin original with Wich's of 2 Oct., R. O. Hamburg 33.

[3] Hanneken, 16 Aug., R. O. Denmark 36.

[4] Robethon wrote in July 1717 that the occupation was costing Bernstorff 700 or 800 crowns a month (Wiesener, II. 20).

[5] See the correspondence printed by Coxe, II. 84 foll. On Bernstorff's making the proposal to him, says Stanhope (25 Sept.), "I went immediately to the King, who asked, how far I could venture to give orders to Sir John Norris. I told him that as far as joining his offices with those of the King of Denmark, I would make no difficulty, and I will accordingly write to Sir J. Norris by an express, which shall be despatched to-morrow to inform him on which side the King inclines." This despatch (26 Sept., B. M. Add. MSS. 28145) had no reference to the violence proposed. It ran: "That which more sensibly affects His Majty is that there is great reason to apprehend a misunderstanding between the Czar the king of Denmark and the Empire, and that the Muscovites intend by force to take winter-quarters in Denmark, Mecklenburgh, and other territories of the Empire." A strong representation against this would be made by the king's German ministers, but Norris should intimate to the tsar that, if the apprehended misunderstanding broke out, the king of England would feel himself obliged to favour the king of Denmark, and he must "on all occasions take the properest measures to prevent the breach which must infallibly be the consequence of such a proceeding of the Czar's." If, however, the tsar should insist on molesting the king of Denmark, Norris must in the best manner he could aid and assist the latter.

Bülow.[1] But to accuse the former, as does the author of Peter's diary, where (in the German version) he is called a " boshafter und gewissenloser Mensch," of compassing through his friends and compatriots at Copenhagen the delay in the preparations which caused the failure of the expedition,[2] is going too far, for his interest plainly lay the other way, to get the Russians out of Mecklenburg across the water. In the present circumstances George was ready enough to fall in with the king of Denmark's appeal and did his utmost to persuade Peter to reverse his decision; both through the Russian envoy at Hanover, Baron Schleinitz,[3] and through his own representatives at Copenhagen.

One of these, Lieut.-General Bothmer, brother of the minister, had just been sent thither in order to watch the operations of the descent. He was specially instructed to observe the tsar's policy in regard to Germany, to beware of Prussian intrigues, and so on. Arriving only in time to hear of Peter's declaration, he found confusion and excitement reigning,—" allerhand Missverstandniss," he says. As further instructions from Hanover could not reach him for a fortnight, he set to work at once to urge the Danish case. The answer to his report (26 September) approved of his action, and he was now ordered to demand an express audience of the tsar and his ministers, with the object of persuading them to undertake the invasion in the interests of the league. The arguments he was to use were set forth at length. In particular he was to enter emphatic objection to the return of the Russian troops to Germany.[4]

Norris, too, immediately upon his return to Copenhagen, was called upon by the king of Denmark, as one " well in the opinion " of the tsar, to add his arguments to those of Bothmer. At interviews with Peter himself and with Shafirov he urged, in addition to the rest, the danger that the king of Sweden, if left alone, might " advance in power, and would even become very formidable to Russia." At a formal council of the Russians he was placed in a room apart and had further lengthy discussions with the tsar and his vice-chancellor. Peter came to him with a plan of the Sound in his hand and discussed with him the best points for a landing. He talked of the Swedish force which would oppose it, of the disgrace it would be if the undertaking miscarried, of the agreement that the transport should be ready in July, of the refusal to send ships to assist in a descent from the Åland Isles, the failure of which design had enabled the Swedes to concentrate

[1] At an interview with Norris on 9 Oct. This Bülow was presumably Joachim Henry, the wealthy Grand Bailiff.

[2] Bacmeister, II. 56.

[3] Hartman, pp. 108–09.

[4] Bothmer's despatches, and rescripts to him, Staatsarchiv, Hanover.

in Scania, of the lateness of the season, and of the accidents that might thereby attend the undertaking. When Norris asked for some agreeable message which he might take to the king of Denmark, he was told that he might say that the tsar was truly desirous of a good correspondence with that monarch, that he had come with his troops purely to be of use to him, that at this time of year he did not see how the descent could properly be undertaken, that he was willing to leave him fifteen battalions for his defence during the winter,[1] and that "he was ready to treat about making the descent next year and all other reasonable things which should be proposed to reduce the King of Sweden to terms of peace," but that his present resolution was final. Norris upon that, having been introduced to and taken leave of the council, went off to consult with his colleagues Polwarth and Bothmer and to deliver his message to the king of Denmark through Sehestedt.[2]

Frederick's answer was that the force offered was too small, that he must have twenty-eight battalions, and that the tsar with the rest of his forces must leave the country. But Peter stood to his decision. The king thereupon demanded formally that the Russian troops should get on board ship as soon as possible.[3] But whither could they go? The Danes required them to leave Denmark; king George that they should not re-enter Germany. They could not at this season get to Poland by sea. And they were already embarking. Norris and his colleagues proposed to Peter that he should take them home and in the spring make a descent upon Sweden from the Åland Isles simultaneously with a Danish invasion of Scania.[4] Then they opened the same subject to the Danes. Polwarth expressed his master's great concern at the abandonment of the expedition and his hope that a scheme for a fresh one would be agreed upon before the tsar left Copenhagen. He intimated the readiness of himself and his colleagues to use their utmost diligence in the matter. Bothmer supported, and Norris informed the king of his particular orders to serve his interests. They were answered that, since the tsar had arbitrarily broken up the scheme concerted, proposals for a fresh one must come from him. Norris was desired to arrange with the Danish admirals measures to convoy the Russians out of the king's dominions. The three then met the Russian ministers, who asked

[1] Holm says (p. 98) that these troops were to be at the king of Denmark's disposal for any service he might require, and that the tsar promised that his galleys should render all possible assistance to a descent.

[2] Norris to Townshend and others, 15 Sept. o.s.

[3] Holm, pp. 99, 100.

[4] This through Robert Erskine, above mentioned. Bothmer wrote of him: "durch welchen der Admiral Norris, wan er etwas bey dem Zaaren zu suchen, sein gantzes Negotium thut" (7 Oct.).

whether they had authority from the king of Denmark to make a proposition. They answered that they hoped that such would come from the tsar. A long discussion led to no result, and Norris had to write, "thus ended all the efforts we were able to make, and the jealousies and chagrins which have been between them will, I fear, prevent any hearty relyance on each other for the future." [1]

These interviews took place on 2 October, and others followed in the next three days. Peter insisted that the sole reason for his withdrawal was the lateness of the season and stated his willingness to leave fifteen battalions and 1,000 horse in Denmark and the rest in Mecklenburg till the time for the invasion next year came round. The three negotiators on the contrary requested that all his troops should retire to his own dominions and that the next campaign should take the form of a double descent upon Svealand and Scania and a blockade of Carlskrona. On the question of removing the troops Admiral Gyldenlöve desired to know when Norris would be ready to join him in escorting them. Norris asked whither, and on learning that it would be to Rostock, objected, proposing instead Dantzig or Kammin. In naming Rostock, however, the Danes did not intend, they said, that the Russians should stay in Mecklenburg, but expected them to pass on into Poland. They made it a condition of assent to a new plan of campaign that the tsar should oblige himself by treaty to withdraw all his forces out of the empire, and should leave only 8,000 to 10,000 men even in Poland, to return to Denmark next year. And they further asked that the northern invasion should be the principal one, theirs upon Scania only in the nature of a diversion. But Peter insisted on the opposite: the latter to be the main attack, and his troops which should take part in it to pass the winter some in Poland, some in Mecklenburg, and some in Denmark. For this he would enter into a convention, and would give the king of England satisfaction as to his soldiers' behaviour.[2]

Bothmer on 5 October sent in his prescribed memorial to the tsar, informing him that the king of England, in fulfilment of his duty to the empire, could not permit his soldiers to return to Mecklenburg. And Norris attempted to prevail upon the king of Denmark to aid him in resisting any such design by force. But he was answered that force must not be used, only gentle request; also that for any project the tsar must find the money. Norris, after seeing the latter, expressed the belief that he would do this,

[1] To Stanhope, 22 Sept. o.s.

[2] For the Russian project and Danish counter-project for a joint invasion of Sweden in the following year, formally communicated on 11 and 12 October, see Holm, pp. 104 foll.

and also, if his ships wintered at Copenhagen, would allow their guns and powder to be taken out of them and stored in the Danish magazines. Further, he imparted to Sehestedt the news that twenty-two Swedish men-of-war had sailed in the direction of Dantzig, and asked that the Danish fleet might accompany him therefore to Bornholm. But his demands were put off; Gyldenlöve told him that he had no orders but to convoy the Russians to Rostock. When 2,000 dragoons had sailed, it was believed for the Trave, the question of preventing the Russians from landing in the empire was discussed afresh, but no resolution was come to, and Norris expressed the fear that the Danes would only exert themselves to prevent a landing in their own territories.

Despatches of 3 October to Norris and Bothmer instructed them to continue to employ their utmost application and skill in persuading the tsar either to proceed with the invasion or to withdraw all his forces to his own country or into Poland, with the exception of those which should remain for the king of Denmark's defence. A greater service, Norris was told, could not be rendered to his king and country than to procure the former, and he might declare very plainly that the king of England could not suffer the tsar to take up winter quarters for his troops anywhere in Germany. Bothmer was ordered to inform the king of Denmark in confidence that orders were issuing to Norris to post his ships in such a manner that the Russian transports could not proceed towards the German coast but must shape their course direct for Poland and indeed beyond the Vistula; and to request the aid of the Danish fleet in enforcing this.

It does not appear that Norris ever had such definite orders. But, in any case, the king of Denmark could not be persuaded. He was only anxious, says Norris, to get rid of the Russians somehow, as their supplies were running short and he would have to feed them. He asked, could the king of England's ministers show a signed declaration that in the last resort the debarkation in Germany would be hindered by force? As they could not do so, he said he could not in that case resolve to use force and throw the tsar over entirely. Next day the envoys were able to show their orders of 3 October, but were told that it was now too late, for the tsar had been informed that he might land his troops at Rostock without hindrance from Denmark, he on his part undertaking not to land them in any Danish territory.[1] The orders to Gyldenlöve,

[1] Wibe, Sehestedt, and Krabbe carried the day in the Danish councils against the Mecklenburgers. Their chief argument was that only Sweden would benefit by a breach between Denmark and Russia, and it was feared that the first thing that the tsar would do, if that took place, would be to try to effect a separate peace with the common enemy (Holm, p. 116).

Norris learnt, were to join the British and Russian squadrons in escorting the troops to Rostock or not further than Rügen, and to prevent in conjunction with himself their debarkation in any port of Denmark, Holstein, Sleswick, Danish Pomerania or the islands. He announced, in consequence, that he would indeed see the Russians out of Denmark but would not go to Rostock, lest his master should be accused in the empire of consenting to and assisting in their landing there. He would take up a station in Kjöge bay or thereabouts, in order to observe the movements of the Swedes and be ready to cover the return of the traders. He prayed that Gyldenlöve might have orders to join him there, if necessary. He received an answer entirely approving of his design and informing him that the orders requested would be given. At an interview on the 9th he warned the tsar that the landing in Mecklenburg "would inevitably oblige the empire to an open rupture." Peter replied that nothing but necessity impelled him thereto, his transports and galleys being utterly unable at this season of the year to make a longer voyage. Asked for an assurance that his troops should not remain in Mecklenburg but march through into Poland, he gave it, excepting only as regarded the men required for service on the galleys, which must necessarily winter in the former country. Returning on board Norris dressed his ships and fired salutes, it being the anniversary of a Russian victory over the Swedes. The tsar was greatly pleased at this, complimented him, and asked him to accept an order.

Such amenities found no echo at Hanover. Peter's assurances were not believed, and Norris was forbidden to accept the offered decoration. George began to collect a force upon the frontier of Mecklenburg, sent for the troops of Münster and Saxe-Gotha, which he had at call, and sought for others from Hesse-Cassel.[1]

Another portion of Stanhope's despatch of 3 October dealt with a subject which still gave grave disquiet to the British government, the plottings of the Jacobites. "From the advices we have received," he wrote, "from many places,[2] 'tis certain that our Jacobites both in England and everywhere else do expect succours from Sweden." Extracts which he enclosed from Townshend's despatches set forth that "our only apprehensions are from Gothenburg," that the discontent "fomented" on the score of the absence of so large a squadron in the Baltic would be much increased, unless some of the ships were detailed to watch that port, and that the kingdom was in so defenceless a state, that ten or twelve men-of-war

[1] Stanhope, 16 Oct., R. O. Regencies 1.

[2] Including, it seems, from Copenhagen. Polwarth says that Sehestedt handed him such advices, and he forwarded them (15 Aug.).

thence might easily come up the Thames, destroy the docks and naval stores, and land an army in the heart of England. It was much to be desired that Norris should set, if he could, a watch upon such threatened accidents. Norris in reply (10 October) pointed out that the alarm was a false one, there being in Gothenburg only four or five ships of any size, the same number of smaller ones, and some privateers of two to four guns apiece.[1] A Danish flotilla with three men-of-war lay off the coast. He must stay in Danish waters to cover the returning traders, otherwise the Swedes would fall upon them from Carlskrona. After their arrival the season would be so late, that it would be proper for him also to come home; but he might leave six or seven ships behind in the Cattegat, and they might, if desired, winter in a Norway port, at Flekker Ö, for choice, as that port was never frozen, was fortified, and had two outlets. He would see Sehestedt about provisioning them. He also learnt that, if the king pleased, four Russian men-of-war could be added to their number.

On 4 October Stanhope mooted a new project, very likely to be successful, proper for the tsar to agree to if he would prove the sincerity of his professions, and likely to divert him from the idea of taking up winter-quarters in Denmark or Germany. This was a combined attack upon Carlskrona. The moment that Norris received this despatch he communicated the idea to Sehestedt and the tsar. Both showed themselves agreeable to the undertaking, if it were found practicable. The next day, 10 October, a formal council was assembled to discuss the project. Norris opened: Shafirov and Sehestedt expressed their general concurrence. Proceeding to details, Norris said that, in order to enable the fleets to enter the port and destroy the Swedish ships, an army of 25,000 to 30,000 men must attack the place from the land side and capture the forts. The Danish admirals replied that such a venture could only be carried out if the tsar would hazard his galleys for the transport, they having no provision for the purpose themselves. But the Russian admiral Scheltinga pronounced it to be absolutely impossible for the galleys to keep the sea. Then the Danish generals gave their opinion. They could provide, they said, the required number of men, but not the heavy guns required for a siege, as they had not horses to drag them. They raised difficulties as to feeding the army when landed, in view of the king of Sweden's dispositions, unless the fleet could furnish its supplies, and they held that, to make the undertaking possible, the fleet must enter the canal, bombard the five forts commanding the harbour, and so enable the

[1] Yet some of these Swedish privateers were reported about this time off Yarmouth. Norris says that there were sixty prizes in Gothenburg.

infantry to carry them by escalade or otherwise. But if the attack failed, they asked, what would become of the army? Bothmer having expressed the opinion that infantry might be landed from the fleet in small boats, this proposal also was condemned as impracticable, and after further discussion Norris was obliged to allow that the undertaking could not be carried out at so late a season. In view however of its extreme importance he desired that a formal convention might be drawn up for its execution in the following year. He begged the ministers present to report to their masters and to observe absolute secrecy as to what had passed. Polwarth and Bothmer concurred, and the conclusion was adopted.

On 13 October the court of Hanover still hoped to keep the Russians out of Mecklenburg. Bothmer was ordered to speak "mascule" to the Danes on the subject. If the troops had not sailed, he was to insist in every possible way upon the Danish fleet taking up positions to prevent them landing in Jutland, Sleswick, or Germany, and to compel them to shape their course for Poland by way of Dantzig. If, on the other hand, they had already disembarked at Rostock, he was to express the king's great regret that they had not been hindered and to remonstrate against their staying in Mecklenburg for the winter. For that might bring the tsar to war with the empire, and he would have no resource but to ally himself with Sweden. The consequences to Denmark were easy to foresee. In any case the tsar, possessed of Rostock and Wismar, would be free to carry out his designs against Lübeck; the king of Sweden would have breathing time; and the league, and in particular Denmark, would be ruined. Hanover, Denmark, and Prussia must combine in measures to get the Russians quietly away to Poland.

The negotiations of these three weeks had been kept as secret as might be. It was known, of course, that the Russian troops had re-embarked, but their destination was uncertain. Now the king of Denmark made the whole thing public in a declaration designed to exculpate himself.[1] He revealed the tsar's undertaking of the previous autumn to furnish fifteen battalions of infantry and 1,000 horse to the confederate army. He referred to the Hamburg convention of June. He recapitulated in brief what had passed after the tsar had declared his intention of withdrawal, and argued that the delays of which he was accused had been unavoidable. Unable to shake the tsar's resolution, he had declined, he said, to

[1] Printed by Lamberty, IX. 624 foll. He dates 12 Oct., and claims his to be the most correct version, implying that there were others. A copy however which Wich sent home bears date the 10th, and so Droysen, p. 174. The declaration was entrusted for publication to the Danish resident Hagedorn at Hamburg.

have anything more to do with his troops, and had demanded their immediate departure in order that the transport vessels, which were costing him 40,000 crowns a month, might be sent home, and his subjects be relieved of an intolerable burden. What caused most stir, perhaps, was the assertion that the ministers of Great Britain had been expressly charged to make, and had made, every effort in their power to induce the tsar to carry out the invasion. This disclosure was of course as little agreeable to the British government, whose attitude towards Sweden was supposed to be one of defence and reprisal only, as it was opportune to its critics in parliament and in the country.

In consequence of this declaration Norris, Polwarth and Bothmer were summoned by the tsar on 16 October to hear a formal statement in reply. The three were requested to urge the king of Denmark to enter into his views, and, in case of failure, to report the circumstances fully to their master, as whose good and faithful ally the tsar genuinely intended to prosecute the war with a view to a secure peace.

But the Danes would not yield. They declined to promise to take part in a future invasion, unless British protection were guaranteed them. This, they were informed, could not be done, until the Russians had quitted the empire. Norris could only go so far as to say, "if the two crowns of Denmark and Russia would adjust the great project of a descent in Schonen, or from Finland, and the Czar not embarrass the King of Great Britain by taking quarters in the Empire, it was our opinion his Majesty would give the same assistance next year he has done this, in order to procure a peace in the North." [1] The Danes asked in reply that full powers should be given to the British envoy and admiral to conclude a formal convention in this sense, and they enquired how many ships would be sent, and how many now be left to winter in Danish ports. They were answered that the king of England must first be definitely informed of the plan concerted. They replied that twenty Russian battalions had been asked for, with which and his own troops the king of Denmark would duly invade Scania.[2] This, it was objected, was not enough; before incurring useless expense the king of England must have before him the whole plan of campaign, in order that he might judge of its feasibility. It was essential that the tsar should remove his troops from the empire. Not a single man of his should, with the king of England's consent, be

[1] To Townshend 6 Oct. o.s., and similarly Polwarth, and Norris to Stanhope.

[2] And so in the Danish counter-project of 12 Oct. The troops were to be maintained at the tsar's expense except for lodging and fire, and might be employed, if desired, in Norway (Holm, p. 106, Polwarth 22 Oct.).

disembarked or take quarters anywhere therein.[1] If such a thing took place he would give no help, nor put himself to any expense in the matter.

On the 21st Peter told Norris that the king of Denmark raised so many difficulties that it was impossible for them to act together. If England and Holland would agree to cover with their ships a descent next year from the Åland Isles, he would make it by himself. Norris replied that, if he would at once order his troops out of the empire and himself provide the transports, the king of England might be disposed to give such assistance and endeavour to persuade the States-General to do the same; and he asked for a proposal in writing, which was delivered. He strongly recommended its acceptance, adding that the tsar desired the matter to be kept entirely secret from the Danish court. But the same day, on the advice of his colleagues, he asked for a more explicit assurance in regard to the withdrawal of the troops. The paper was accordingly amended, running, as Norris has preserved it, to the following effect.[2] If the king of England would oblige himself to send to the Baltic in May or June a squadron with positive orders to cover a descent from Finland, as Norris had had them to cover that on Scania, then the tsar would remove all his forces out of the empire, excepting those required to serve on board his galleys, and would undertake the said descent in suitable strength. He made these proposals with a view to a peace advantageous to the northern nations and in particular to British trade, and was ready to conclude a definite treaty to carry them out.

On 22 October Bothmer wrote that the tsar adhered firmly to his own plan, to make simultaneous descents on Sweden in the spring, the one in conjunction with the Danes on Scania, the other in the north, upon condition that the king of England facilitated them again by sea as in the present year. He would leave the king of Denmark for the purpose the twenty battalions asked for, he to provide them with shelter and fire; if however, he desired to send six or seven battalions to Norway, he must support them himself, but the tsar would repay him the cost. If his plan were refused the latter would withdraw his troops altogether and take his own measures alone. Bothmer further wrote (24 October) that the king of Denmark was ill, thoroughly upset by what had passed, and that his ministers expressed great sorrow at having incurred the king of England's displeasure by their inability to comply with his wishes, but could not help themselves; they had been obliged

[1] "Ils ne sauroient jamais consentir, qu'un seul homme débarquoit ou prît quartiers quelque part que ce soit dans l'Empire" (Polwarth, 20 Oct.).

[2] B. M. Add. MSS. 28154, f. 322.

to avoid a rupture with the tsar, who threatened to quarter his troops in Denmark.

By a despatch from Stanhope of 16 October, Norris learnt that the king entirely approved of his conduct. His principal, indeed his only care at present, he was told, must be to secure the safe arrival of the traders. His proposal to leave a squadron on the coast of Norway was very much approved, and he was authorized to make the necessary dispositions. "His Majesty," Stanhope went on,

"is very well pleased that you avoided entering into any negotiation with the Czar and the Danes, touching any operations for the next campaign. The behaviour of both these princes to his Majesty is such, as will not make him forward to contract any new engagements with either, and for this reason alone his Majesty cannot consent, that at present you receive from the Czar any publick and distinguishing mark of favour."

Norris might be sure that the king was so well satisfied with his behaviour that he would "never want the favour of any other Potentate whatsoever." Bothmer, however, was not so well satisfied with the admiral's conduct, as is shown by several passages in his despatches.[1]

Of the king of Denmark Bothmer wrote:

"Vôtre Excellence trouvera en effet, que S.M.D. n'a pas eu tout à fait tort de songer à ce qu'il faisoit ayant été mené de la sorte, et ayant craint outre cela de ne se pouvoir pas débarasser d'une armée si supérieure. Il est si peu Russe, que je suis persuadé que s'il voioit sa seureté, il feroit volontier partie contre eux."

For the rest, Bothmer's despatches at this time were chiefly concerned with the question of the twenty Russian battalions. A rescript of great length of the 28th ordered him to impress upon the king of Denmark that nothing was so necessary for him as to keep them, whether for the invasion of Scania or for his own defence, especially in Norway. He must adhere to the plan of invasion, and the Russian general must be under his orders. The tsar must act by himself in the north. The embarrassments and endless difficulties arising from a joint command had been so clearly shown in the present year, that it was to be hoped there could be no desire on the part of the Danes to encounter them again. The point was urged again in a rescript of 9 November.

Detained at Copenhagen by contrary winds, the bulk of the Russian troops did not sail thence till 23 October. Norris says that they numbered some 35,000. The Danes were heartily glad to be rid of them. We read of burghers hastily armed to defend

[1] Cf. the *English Historical Review*, XIX. 68, 69.

the city, of cavalry patrols along the shore, of guns turned upon the laden transports. In spite of the emphatic pronouncements from Hanover the army landed at Rostock, and General Sheremetev received orders to quarter the infantry and one cavalry regiment in Mecklenburg and the rest of the cavalry on the Polish frontier.[1]

Norris too had been urgent to sail to meet the returning traders. Gyldenlöve on the 13th informed him of his orders to accompany him to Bornholm, if necessary, after he had seen the Russians to Rostock. Having news that thirteen Swedish men-of-war had been seen at sea, Norris asked him to do this at once, which was agreed to. He further requested that, in case it were found that the Swedes had made for Dantzig, the Danish fleet might be allowed to pursue them, upon the decision of a council of war, and this also was conceded. The combined squadrons eventually left Copenhagen on the 23rd. From Bornholm the Russian men-of-war went straight on to Reval. The Swedes were found to be in Carlskrona, and orders were therefore sent to Dantzig for the traders to come on. Lestock arrived at Bornholm with the British division on 8 November. The next day all these returned to Copenhagen, the Dutch coming in on the 11th. On the 15th Norris began his voyage homewards, leaving behind him six men-of-war under Captain Cleveland, instructed in default of further orders to depart not later than 11 December, bringing home any merchantmen that lagged. In the Cattegat the fleet was beset by fog and calms, in consequence of which several merchantmen were carried off by the privateers to their den at Gothenburg. On the 20th the fog was succeeded by a frightful tempest. When, two days later, the weather cleared, only thirty-seven sail were to be seen. The whole Dutch fleet and convoy with some fifteen English merchantmen and the *Garland* frigate had returned to Elsinore ; the *Auguste* had been wrecked on the isle of Anholt, whence her crew and stores were rescued by Cleveland.[2] Others of the fleet had taken refuge in Norway ports. When Norris on the 24th left the Naze but a single merchantman remained with the balance of the battleships. However, in spite of further storms, many of the traders rejoined before the Nore was reached (29 November o.s.), and all the men-of-war except the two mentioned.

Cleveland at Copenhagen did nothing in particular. He kept an eye upon the Swedes, and especially on Gothenburg, but nothing called for action. Of the Danish men-of-war two were sent to Norway with three small frigates and 3,000 infantry, four of the

[1] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[2] With the exception of 36 men who got to shore at Helsingborg. See Jackson's despatches. An account of the wreck with his of 29 Dec. o.s.

largest cruised off Möen, the rest were laid up, as also was the Swedish fleet in Carlskrona. On 17 December Cleveland sailed for home, leaving the Dutch still at Elsinore. He reached the Nore on the 22nd o.s. One of his ships stayed in Danish waters till 4 January, returning then with the remainder of the British merchantmen, a large number of which had been freighted at St. Petersburg with stores for the Russian army in the west.[1]

At the end of November Charles XII, who spent the autumn and winter at Lund reviewing his army and organizing it for work next year, at length found time, or inclination, to cause his chancery to reply to the memorial delivered by Jackson in June. As was to be expected from the events of the autumn, his tone was uncompromising. He considered it unnecessary, the answer stated, to recapitulate his well-grounded reasons for prohibiting commerce to the eastern ports. He referred to his declaration of the previous year, rejected, he suggested, by the advice of the king of England's Hanoverian ministers, but still open for acceptance. The privateer edict could not be revoked. In regard to the Jacobites he would behave in accordance with his treaties with Great Britain, requiring the king of England, on the other hand, not to permit ships and munitions of war to be purchased or crews recruited in English ports for service against him. The objection to his invasion of Norway he did not understand. He was always ready to maintain a good intelligence with the king of England, but the latter had shown of late little disposition thereto, having as elector of Hanover declared war upon him without provocation and having left men-of-war in the Baltic in the previous year to strengthen the Danish fleet.[2]

This document was not received in London till 28 March o.s. 1717, after the disclosure of the so-called "Swedish Plot" had resulted in the arrests of Count Gyllenborg and Baron Goertz.

[1] Polwarth, 28 Nov., 5 Jan.
[2] Transmitted by Jackson, 7 Dec.

CHAPTER XI

THE CONFEDERACY BROKEN UP

PETER THE GREAT left Copenhagen on 27 October, ostensibly in perfect friendship with the king of Denmark. Leaving the tsaritsa at Schwerin, he went towards the end of November to meet the king of Prussia at Havelberg. In him he found one who alike valued his friendship and feared his enmity; the former, because Peter could lend him support against Hanover and Austria, the latter, because, in case of a rupture, his province of Prussia, isolated from Brandenburg, lay at the mercy of the Russian army stationed in those parts.

It might have been expected that the presence of the Russian army in Mecklenburg would have been as distasteful to Prussia as it was to Hanover. But this was not the case, both for the above reasons, and on account of Frederick William's sympathy with Charles Leopold above referred to. When a deputation from the nobles of Mecklenburg-Schwerin came to Berlin to seek his help, he refused it.[1] His views in regard to the Russian occupation of the duchy are exposed to us by Whitworth, who had been sent to Berlin from Ratisbon in August, when it was found necessary to keep Lord Polwarth at Copenhagen.[2] Whitworth had long and frequent interviews in September and October with the king and his chief ministers, and with the Russian ambassador Alexis Golovkin. He devoted all possible efforts to bring Prussia into line with Hanover and Great Britain in the northern crisis. Against the stay of the Russian troops he urged the interests of the empire and the danger of alienating the emperor, whose confirmation of the changes of ownership in Germany would be required. The main object of the kings of England and Poland, he said, in aiding to drive out the Swedes, had always been to secure the quiet of the empire, and that was in no wise possible,

[1] Alexis Golovkin to the tsar, Solov'ev, *loc. cit.* The duke, Golovkin was told, was favoured for the tsar's sake.

[2] The following from Whitworth's despatches, R. O. Prussia 7. Cf. Hartman, pp. 115–16, who cites Golovkin's despatches.

while a foreign army with unknown designs remained upon its soil. That it should stay there could be of no advantage to the tsar; a fresh attempt on Scania, in view of the discontent and jealousy of the king of Denmark and his inability to make fresh preparations, could not be made; if the troops returned to their own country, a descent could be made next year upon "Old Sweden." The tsar must not be allowed to consider himself irresistible. True, that if it came to hostilities the 35,000 Russians in Courland and Poland might overrun Prussia before any succour could be sent from Brandenburg, but would the king's dominions be less in danger, were the tsar permitted to take post in Mecklenburg, if he should occupy Lübeck and Wismar, and come to terms thereafter with Sweden? The king of England had as much interest in maintaining a good understanding with him as any prince could have, nay more, in view of the importance of the British commerce; but he could not allow himself to be treated with indignity. The proper policy for Prussia was to work in close understanding with Hanover for the good of the empire and the destruction of the threatened tyranny of Russia.

Such arguments were repeated from interview to interview, and were supported by the Hanoverians Heusch and Spoerken, the latter sent specially to Berlin to treat of these matters. They were answered in gist that the tsar, in the position he held, must on no account be exasperated. He could not well be hindered from taking up winter-quarters in Mecklenburg, if he so desired. He was "passionately inclined" to support the interests of the duke his nephew, and the king of Prussia must side with the latter, as his father and grandfather had done, seeing that he himself had "distant expectance" of the succession. It was hard, no doubt, for private gentlemen to suffer, but public considerations must take precedence of their interests. The neighbourhood of the Russian troops would be of advantage to Prussia, should the Swedes attempt an invasion of Pomerania or a separate peace with Denmark. The tsar had always been found "a hearty and fair ally, and his troops regular in their passage"; he had been "the life of the Northern war." If he were to abandon the king of Denmark, Prussia and Hanover would have to keep the latter supplied with men and money for the defence of Norway and Zealand. He was "easy to be disposed by fair means, but extremely sensible of what he thought a hardship." The king of Prussia would join in representations to him, provided that they were made in moderate and friendly terms. In fine Whitworth drew the conclusion: "this

Court would willingly have the Muscovites stay in Mecklenburg, and studies to find some colour for it."[1] In the importance of using temperate language towards Peter he concurred, expressing the hope that "in the firmness of his Majesty" no unguarded or unreasonable expressions had been used to offend him. He was disposed to agree with Golovkin that "most of these discontents might have been prevented by moderate and gentle representations at the first, but that it was hard for a prince at the head of 40,000 men to see himself immediately threatened, without giving him time to recollect or take his measures." [2]

There was therefore no hope of common action between Hanover and Prussia. It was believed, indeed, at Berlin that king George desired to possess himself of Mecklenburg, at Hanover that the abandonment of the invasion of Scania had been directly due to Prussian instigation. George instructed Bothmer to represent at Copenhagen that the king of Prussia desired to quarter the Russian troops upon the new Danish possessions in Pomerania,[3] and Bernstorff even began to work out a scheme of attack by Austria and Hanover upon Prussia and the tsar.[4]

When, then, Peter arrived at Havelberg he found the ground for his overtures well prepared. Of what occurred at the conferences, which took place on 24 November and following days, little seems to have transpired at the time, the void being filled by much sensational surmise.[5] The gist of the agreement between the two monarchs was, in case any of the northern allies retired from the league and under any pretext or with anyone attempted to compel them to restore to Sweden what they had conquered, to give to each other assistance either by supplying troops or by making diversions against the aggressor's territory, but with especial observance of the treaties of 1715 and with the Christian object of concluding a general peace with Sweden on reasonable terms. Further, that for the safety of the league the fortifications of Wismar

[1] 31 Oct.

[2] 24 Oct. According to secret information given to Golovkin, king George's ministers went much beyond what is said above, suggesting that the tsar intended to possess himself not only of Mecklenburg, but of all Pomerania and of Hamburg. He himself, however, was assured that such insinuations were attributed to the ill will of Bernstorff and were not believed, and that it was desired to keep on good terms with the tsar, whose troops were wanted in Mecklenburg to aid Denmark in case of a Swedish attack (Solov'ev).

[3] Rescript of 9 Nov.

[4] Droysen, pp. 181, 187–88.

[5] E.g. Whitworth, 14 Nov.; cp. Droysen, p. 185, note. Stanhope referred on 11 Nov. o.s. to "a project upon the anvill between the Czar and the King of Prussia for a new repartition of the Swedish provinces," and expressed the fear that France was being pressed to join in the scheme, in which case she would be at the head of 100,000 troops in Germany (R. O. Regencies 1).

must be razed, and the sooner the better.[1] Frederick William advised that the tsar should enter, like himself, into relations with France, and wrote to the king of Denmark that it was far better for him to place reliance on the tsar than on the king of England.[2]

The treaty with France to which Frederick William referred had been concluded in September in accordance with the instructions given to Count Rottembourg in 1714. He received a guarantee of Stettin and its dependencies, should by the mediation of France the king of Sweden consent to cede them; if he would not, then the regent undertook to use his good offices to obtain for him an indemnity of 4,000,000 thalers instead, stopping the Swedish subsidies. For protection against trouble elsewhere, in particular against imperial attempts to sequestrate Stettin, Frederick William was to receive an annual subsidy of 600,000 crowns. French interference in northern affairs was to be confined to mediation. For the rest, reciprocal guarantees were given of the treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht, and Baden, while France undertook not to molest the empire while the northern and Turkish wars went on, and Prussia to endeavour to prevent the emperor from declaring war at any time upon France, reserving however his duty as a prince of the empire should such take place. The treaty was to be kept inviolably secret, and to last for ten years.[3]

Peter did not yet give up the hope of coming to an arrangement with George for the next year's campaign. He desired to meet him personally, having sent him a particular message to that effect before he left Copenhagen.[4] And now he tried to arrange a meeting on his way to Holland. But George declined the interview, and only sent George Ernest von Werpup above mentioned, who had entertained Peter at his country-seat near Ratzeburg in 1713, to offer him compliments at Altona. Negotiations, however, were continued.

From Schwerin Peter had sent instructions to Baron Schleinitz at Hanover as follows.[5] Seeing that to make a descent upon Sweden from Finland in the coming summer the transports must be protected and that his own fleet was not strong enough for the purpose he required George to engage himself by treaty to send each year to the Baltic, till peace was happily concluded, eighteen to twenty ships of the line, including some three-deckers, to join

[1] Droysen, pp. 184–85, Hartman, p. 117. They point out how important it was for Peter to obtain the support of Prussia.

[2] Hartman, pp. 118–19; Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XXXIV. xxiii.

[3] Dated 14 Sept. 1716, *Recueil des instructions*, XVI. lxii, Tessé's *Memoirs*, II. 328. Droysen (p. 179) dates from the Berlin records 17 Sept., presumably the date of the Prussian counterpart. He makes a slip in writing francs for crowns.

[4] Norris, 9 Oct. o.s.

[5] 6 Nov. o.s., printed by Hartman, pp. 173–76.

with his own in active operations against the enemy and to remain at sea so long as those operations required. If this could not be done, at least twelve ships should be sent and 2,000 sailors for his own fleet. In the treaty to be made the necessary conditions of peace would be laid down, and until those conditions were accepted neither party must retire from the war. The king of England should declare what conditions he would require on his own behalf and on that of the British nation, those of the tsar having already been communicated through Prince Kurakin. If he would conclude a treaty as desired, then the tsar's troops should at once be removed from Mecklenburg to such place as should be most proper, under considerations of climate, for the commencement of operations in the spring, and his galleys should sail as soon as the winter was over. The necessary assistance must be given to the king of Denmark to enable him to take his part in the operations, and measures be concerted with him accordingly. If the king of England would not agree to the terms proposed, then the tsar would carry out the invasion of Scania in accordance with his convention of Altona, and employ the troops he had on the spot for that purpose. He would give every assurance and security that those troops should evacuate their present positions as soon as the time for the invasion came, that is to say at the beginning of April, and that they should not be brought back to Mecklenburg again. He declared specifically that he had no other view in keeping them where they were than the general interest of the northern alliance and the prosecution of operations against the enemy. But if the kings of England and Denmark would agree upon any places in their own dominions or elsewhere, where they would prefer that those troops should pass the winter, then the tsar would fall in with their wishes. Schleinitz was to say to the English ministers that the tsar was ready to conclude a commercial treaty with Great Britain at the same time. If a Danish minister were sent with instructions to support his proposals, he must act in concert with him. The result of his overtures should be reported, if possible, before the meeting between the tsar and the king of Prussia took place. Besides this, Peter instructed Kurakin to apprise the Russian minister in London, Theodore Veselovsky, how to point out to the influential merchants there that the hindrances placed by Charles XII in the way of trade, which entailed the expense of sending a squadron to the Baltic year by year, might at once be got rid of by support given to himself.[1]

[1] Hartman, p. 123. Veselovsky had been secretary to Kurakin at Hanover and in England in 1709–11.

George in reply to Schleinitz insisted that the Russian troops must leave Mecklenburg before anything further could be done. Peter absolutely refused this, saying that he did not know where else to post them with a view to the coming campaign, that he could not submit them to the hardships of a winter march, and that their presence was required to protect the king of Denmark's dominions from a Swedish attack. In vain Stanhope gave hopes of a British declaration of war with Sweden and promised a squadron of thirty of the line, if Peter would do what was asked; in vain Bernstorff said that the stay of the troops was useless, as he knew for certain that the king of Denmark would not undertake the invasion of Scania on the plan proposed, and that the battalions to be left for his defence might be allowed to winter in Holstein, if the rest departed. Peter would have his treaty first. Nevertheless he sent another minister to Hanover, Count Peter Tolstoi, who arrived on 17 December. In his instructions fresh stress was laid on the fact that the army stayed in Mecklenburg only for the common interest, and it was threatened that, if a combined plan of operations against Sweden were not concerted, that army would be withdrawn altogether and the tsar would wash his hands of his allies. Conferences began at once and fresh proposals and counter-proposals were put forward; but they came to nothing. On 26 December the Russian ministers received their answer to the following effect. It was well known with what care the king of England had maintained up to the present a close correspondence and friendship with the tsar, and he desired nothing more than to continue in the same sentiments. If the latter would consider maturely the nature of the affair in question, he would come to the conclusion that it was not proper to stipulate any conditions for the evacuation of the empire. That a foreign prince should quarter troops in the territories of a power with whom he professed to live in peace and amity was wrong in natural equity, and their removal could not be conditional. What the tsar proposed must be the subject of serious deliberation, and really concerned Great Britain; the king must take thereon the advice of his council, of whom only two members were at Hanover. As a member of the empire and a director of the circle of Lower Saxony, he neither could nor would separate himself from the emperor in this or any other matter. To his great regret, therefore, he could make no such engagement as was proposed, so long as the tsar did not desist from all proceedings against the empire. If he would at once, and without being longer a charge to states thereof, withdraw his troops, then the king of England would like and would do his best to come to an understanding with him in all that he should consider agreeable or useful.

But in the meantime he could not but be very sensible that his instances so far had had but little effect, that complaints from the afflicted province were redoubled, that its inhabitants had been forbidden to supply provisions to Wismar, that Travemünde had been seized, and that the citizens of Lübeck were being compelled by strongest threats to promise transports for the next year.[1] Wherefore he prayed that the tsar would not delay the removal of his troops, as well as of every other obstacle which could hinder the maintenance of good relations.

Before breaking off the negotiation the Russian ministers saw Bernstorff privately, desiring to know whether the king was really willing to enter into the proposed concert. Bernstorff replied that no written undertaking could be given, but if the tsar would trust the king's word, and remove his troops, he should not repent it. The Russians said that a promise without a written undertaking was of no value. Bernstorff then handed them a short declaration (4 January) to the effect that the king would only treat about the conditions of peace after consulting his English council; that as British interests in the matter were mainly commercial, a treaty of commerce must be concluded, and the materials first to be sent to London; and that the king would give the desired naval assistance, if the tsar would show himself to be his friend and the emperor's by withdrawing his troops from Germany. This document was amplified by another of 16 January, containing conditions which, as the court was now leaving Hanover, Bernstorff proposed should be signed at the Hague. It prescribed exact and severe regulations for the quartering and maintenance of the three regiments of guards about Rostock, who were to sail with the galleys not later than 15 April, and of the infantry which the tsar was to lend to the king of Denmark. Two-thirds of the former were to be quartered upon the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin instead of upon his subjects. The remainder of the army was to begin its march on 24 January and cross the Oder, exact stipulations again being made as to its maintenance and behaviour. Considerable concessions were offered in the direction of these requirements by Kurakin and Tolstoi at the Hague, but Bernstorff, on the contrary, rather increased his demands. And although final proposals and concessions were offered from the Russian side on 25 January, they had as little effect.[2]

[1] As had been done in the summer. The allusion to Travemünde, the port of Lübeck, referred to a late event. General Sheremetev had sent thither 500 men to meet some galleys which had arrived with clothing for the troops, and this was magnified into an attack on the place. Peter blamed the general severely, and to compensate made some concessions in regard to the quartering of his infantry (Hartman, pp. 131–32).

[2] The above mainly from Hartman, chap. vii. In his appendix he prints in full

When George came to the Hague he saw neither Peter nor his ministers. The reason alleged for the former neglect, the tsar's illness, may have been the true one, for ill at Amsterdam he was. But there was certainly no anxiety on George's part to see him, and reports of his personal animosity were general.[1] The excuse made to the ministers was that the king would gladly have received them, but had to sail hurriedly on account of the tide. There seems to have been no love lost either in their regard. Preis, the Swedish resident, tells us of quarrels which occurred, and how Shafirov called Bernstorff "fripon." [2]

A main reason for George's resolution in rejecting Peter's demands, even in their latest form, was the change which had lately occurred in his position in Europe. In the spring France had still been regarded both as the enemy of the Hanoverian establishment in England and as the principal support of Charles XII. The latter suspicion, at least, was unfounded, for Sparre's efforts to rouse the regent to take up arms in his master's cause had still been fruitless.[3] Even the subsidies promised by the treaty of April 1715 were stopped for a time. When Sparre requested their payment he was rebuffed by the reply that his master would do nothing towards peace, was invading Norway, and would not consent to treat at Brunswick without preliminary assurances from the emperor, to whom he had not even accredited a minister.[4] But now the regent was George's ally under treaty. The overtures made by him in the summer through the Abbé Dubois had not, indeed, been regarded with great favour. But the developments in the north had brought about a change. A convention was arranged with Dubois at Hanover for an alliance between Great Britain, France and the United Provinces, and before he left orders were sent (9 October) to the British envoys at the Hague to bring it to a conclusion speedily; if the States-General held back, they

the instructions to Schleinitz of 6 Nov. o.s., Bernstorff's declaration of 4 Jan. 1717, the Russian ministers' proposals of the same date, those of Bernstorff of 16 Jan., with the tsar's remarks thereon, and the latter's final proposals of the 25th. The answer to the Russian ministers of 26 Dec. I take from a paper at the Record Office (Foreign Ministers 51) in Robethon's hand, entitled: "Traduction de la reponce donnée aux 2 ministres Russes à Hannover le 26 Xbre 1716."

[1] So Saint-Simon (ed. 1829, XV. chap. 3): "Le czar était avec le roi d'Angleterre en inimitie ouverte, qui allait entre eux jusqu'à l'indécence, et d'autant plus vive qu'elle était personelle." The reason which he gives for this is a curious one. Perhaps the canal referred to was the Prussian one joining Elbe and Oder eventually completed by Frederick the Great.

[2] 9 Feb. 1717, *Handlingar*, XVIII. 411. There are many interesting particulars regarding the tsar's doings in Holland in these despatches of Preis.

[3] A translation of Sparre's address (end of May 1716) and other papers in this connexion, M.A.E. Suède 135.

[4] 6 July 1716, *Handlingar*, VIII. 219. Secretary Stiernhoek however now received credentials to the emperor as resident (Carlson, p. 89).

must sign a preliminary treaty with France alone. This was done on 28 November and was followed in due course by the signature of the Triple Alliance on 4 January 1717. George, therefore, when negotiating with Peter the Great in December and January, was secure of the support of France as well as of Austria, and could be the less anxious to avoid a breach with him.

And similarly he could face the further straining of relations with his son-in-law of Prussia, who exerted himself strongly on the side of Peter. In December Baron Knyphausen, Ilgen's son-in-law, who had represented Prussia at Copenhagen and, after taking a leading part in the Havelberg conferences, had been appointed to attend the tsar in Holland, called on his way thither at Hanover. The main object of his visit, says Whitworth, was to obtain the promise of another British squadron for the Baltic. Frederick William, too, wrote on this matter himself.[1] He offered assurance that, if the promise were made, the tsar would agree to any reasonable propositions. Whitworth imputes to the Prussian court the desire to have peace made, or war carried on, at no cost to itself in men or money, its own work having been done in helping to drive the Swedes out of Germany.[2] He omits to observe that the policy of Hanover was precisely the same. King George replied to Frederick William that he had set his allies a good example in what he had done already, that he kept himself free to send a fleet or not, as he pleased, and that before he took his resolution in the matter he would wish to be assured how far his allies, and the king of Prussia in particular, were prepared to contribute to the operations.[3] Knyphausen, therefore, failed to move the court of Hanover. More, he embittered its relations with his own by giving out, as was reported, that the present want of harmony between the two was due to the refusal of Prussia to join the Anglo-French alliance lately concluded,[4] whereas the opposite was really the case, namely that Prussia had desired admittance, but king George had refused it. The report, of course, roused grave

[1] 5 Dec. 1716, Michael, I. 735.

[2] 22 Dec. 1716 : " they seem persuaded England is rich and generous enough to do it, without much scruple, or any valuable consideration." And in a private letter of the same date : " This Court seems to think it reasonable that the Czar should do what he pleases, that they themselves should do nothing at all, and that England should either declare war, or at least send a fleet into the Baltick to be at their service, without offering us a good word."

[3] 10 Dec., Michael, p. 736.

[4] An undated memorandum by Robethon, perhaps of June 1717 (R. O. France 161), states that immediately after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance the king of Prussia ordered his minister at Vienna to declare to the emperor that he had been strongly pressed by the king of England to join it, but had refused out of regard to him, and that Knyphausen had held similar language to Pendterriedter, the Austrian envoy at Hanover.

resentment, and Heusch at Berlin had orders to complain.[1] Other things too excited mistrust, for instance, the visits of Cassel agents to Berlin. Ilgen denied the obvious inference, overtures on behalf of Sweden, but was not believed.[2] Bernstorff began to fulminate against Prussia, telling Bonet in London that his court was playing a double game, that it was its fault that the Russians stayed in Mecklenburg, that it would have to pay for playing with the king of England, and that it had done nothing to carry out the provisions of the treaty of 1715.[3] On the other hand Bonet was ordered to abstain from efforts to procure a better understanding, when such were only misused on the English side.[4] When George hired regiments of Anhalt, Wolfenbüttel and Münster to strengthen his own forces, it was taken as a demonstration against Prussia.[5]

The beginning of the year 1717, therefore, saw the break-up of the confederacy against Sweden. George I, strong in the support of Austria and France, was openly at variance with the tsar and the king of Prussia. The king of Denmark, who had most to fear from the Swedes and was only desirous to prosecute the war, doubted which side to take; the question was hotly debated at his court. The way was opened for separate negotiation with Sweden for peace, and the coming year saw George and Peter actively engaged therein.

[1] "Mr. Heusch has orders to complain of Kniphausen for telling a parcell of egregious lyes at Hanover, especially to Pentenriether" (Whitworth in a private letter of 23 Jan. 1717).

[2] Whitworth, December and January.

[3] Droysen, p. 204. Copies of "deductions" on the ill conduct of Prussia will be found with Sunderland's despatches of June 1717, R.O. Foreign Entry Books 82 and 218.

[4] Droysen, ibid.

[5] Torcy's *Memoirs*, II. 120. He writes: "L'ennemy le plus dangereux pour la maison de Brunswick, et celuy toutefois qu'elle auroit deû le moins compter au rang de ses ennemis, étoit le Roy de Prusse, irrité au dernier point contre son Beau-Père."

CHAPTER XII

BARON GOERTZ IN HOLLAND

George Henry Goertz von Schlitz has been well described as "a man who was a past master in all those subtle devices and dexterous arts which Charles XII neglected or despised, a man who seemed made by nature to be the right hand of a hero in extremities."[1] After the failure of his sequestration scheme of 1713 and his expulsion from Berlin in the following year he had determined to go to seek out Charles in Turkey, in order, as he himself expressed it, to render him a faithful account of the state of affairs in the north, to explain the measures necessary to redress it, and to ascertain whether he was in the mood to undertake them.[2] On his way he stayed some time at Vienna to learn the views of statesmen there. Arriving at Herrmanstadt in Transylvania he met Fabrice, who informed him that Charles would not at present speak about affairs to anyone but was awaiting at Pitesti an answer to the enquiries he had made of the emperor relative to his journey homewards.[3] Goertz thereupon drew up and forwarded to him a memorial embodying the information on the subject which he had gained at Vienna.[4] This memorial, says Carlson, was the beginning of his influence with Charles; and that influence he thoroughly established at Stralsund, whither he followed, and where he remained during the siege.

"All heads," wrote Jackson in February 1716, "are now at work at Ystad framing projects to raise money." The state was to all appearance bankrupt, its debt was enormous, its credit exhausted; while the royal treasury had long been empty. Taxes

[1] Bain, *Charles XII*, p. 277. See also for Goertz's character Droysen, p. 175, Carlson, pp. 77–78, etc. Waliszewski's portrait of him (p. 374) is unwarrantably dark, though he is right in saying: "il n'a gagné à ces démarches que la plus mauvaise réputation diplomatique de l'Europe." The baron had certainly, for instance, a remarkable power over men (cf. Carlson, p. 110).

[2] To Count Gyllenborg from Hanover, 30 Aug. 1714, R. O. Foreign Ministers 62.

[3] George Fury from Vienna, 31 Oct., Whitworth, 1 Nov. 1714, R. O. Germany (Empire) 225, (States) 169.

[4] Carlson, p. 76.

for years had passed the limit of reason, burghers and country-people were all but ruined, in the standstill of industries and commerce excise and customs were sterile.[1] Yet Charles XII was able in 1716, as we have seen, to attempt conquest in a fresh quarter, to keep in their ports the navies of Denmark and Russia, and to show a bold and successful front to an overwhelming invasion. That he could do this was in the first place due to the unparalleled constancy and endurance of the Swedish people, a glory to their country greater than the most brilliant feats of arms, and in the second to the untiring exertions and inventiveness of the man who found Charles money—by ruinous devices, it is true, but still money—and whose object in prolonging the war was to procure the best possible terms of peace.[2]

The immediate need was to equip a fleet. To see what could be done Goertz was despatched to Stockholm. He assembled the burghers, and made known to them the object of his mission. But they protested that it was not in their power to provide the stores required, even for cash payment; the different articles must be ordered from abroad, and it might be April before a letter could be got out of the country.[3] Besides, the advances already made and the interruption of commerce had exhausted their means and credit. And when Goertz turned from the assembly to put pressure upon and to cajole individuals neither his threats nor his extravagant promises were more successful. He only laid the foundation of a hatred which on Charles's death hurried him to the scaffold.

At the end of February the visit was renewed. Goertz stayed at Stockholm two months, "assuming to himself daily more and more authority in all money matters."[4] Without actually entering Charles's service, he was invested by him with the supreme control of finance[5] and even with authority personally to receive taxes and contributions, a thing which "more and more incensed all

[1] Detailed particulars in G. E. Axelson's work; see also Bain, pp. 302 foll., 269. Jackson and the French minister Campredon bear witness to the general desire at Stockholm for Charles's death.

[2] Goertz's desire from the first was to stand on the defensive and to negotiate. He was no party to the invasion of Norway. He wrote to Gyllenborg: "Autant que je le comprend, l'intention est de bien assurer la défensive et d'abandonner le reste à la négotiation. Nous n'aurons pas de peine de réussir dans le premier, puisque nous aurons vers le mois de Mai plus de 50[m] hommes sur pied, à quoi il ne manquera pas un aiguillon, et tous bien et exactement entretenus. Mais quant à la négotiation, elle dépendra de la destinée" (Ystad, 13 Feb. o.s. 1716, R. O. Confidential 1[a]).

[3] In fact Jackson's despatch of 7 Jan. o.s. 1716, which tells of this, was not received in London till 18 May o.s.

[4] Jackson, 12 March o.s.

[5] "Le Roi m'a chargé de la disposition de touttes ses finances. . . . N'allés pas vous imaginer, que je suis entré dans le service du Roi. Sa Majesté m'a fait

degrees of people against him." [1] When towards the end of April he and Feif, another devoted henchman of the king, issued a proclamation that the copper tokens ordered to be coined in the previous September would be put into circulation, whereas in March they had previously proclaimed the contrary, and when it was further known that the bonds for the merchants' loan of the previous spring were to be exchanged for others only due for payment in four years, there was danger, says Jackson, of his being torn in pieces. The burghers' discontent was shared by the nobles, who found themselves by the new appointments deprived of all authority. In fact, the resentment of all classes against the war fell upon the man who would find the king means for its continuance.

However, by extraordinary and ruinous expedients, the king and Goertz were successful in equipping a squadron of sufficient strength to terrorize the Danes and Russians. But further money could not be obtained in Sweden. Debts could be paid in pretence by tokens and paper, supplies in kind could be compelled, but money was not there. It must be got from abroad. At length it was decided that Goertz should go to seek it in Holland and France. Sailing at the end of June, he reached Amsterdam on 13 July. A Danish frigate captured the servants and baggage of himself and his companion General Poniatowski, but they themselves escaped with their papers.[2] The next six weeks were spent by Goertz partly at Amsterdam and the Hague, partly on a journey to the French frontier to meet Sparre. He asked of

la grace de m'accorder la demande, que je lui ai faite, que je ne serois pas employé qu'en volontaire, sans engagement et pour cette année seulement ; cela n'empêche pas que sa confiance ne soit sans bornes, et qu'Elle ne m'ait donné plus de pouvoir et d'autorité, que je n'ai voulu avoir " (to Gyllenborg from Ystad, as above). When in Holland, Goertz asked Sparre not to address him as Excellence or Superintendent of Finance, for he was only serving the king in the character of a volunteer (*Handlingar*, VIII. 251). And he wrote similarly to his relative president Goertz at Hanover (Beskow, *Svenska Akad. Handlingar*, p. 195). He was, Beskow observes, at one and the same time minister of home and foreign affairs, of finance, war and marine.

[1] Jackson, 31 March o.s. The pulpit swelled the invective of the market. One pastor called him a foreign ass with a yellow halter, alluding to his Prussian decoration.

[2] To Sparre, 16 July, *Handlingar*, VIII. 249. Goertz's full powers, dated Torpum 30 May o.s. 1716, ran as follows : " Plenam potestatem damus in usum Nostrum conquirendi comparandique pecunias in exteris Regionibus, deque conditionibus rite conveniendi, et accepta pecunia necessaria insuper instrumenta inque optima forma instructa autographa extradendi illis qui eam Nobis commodo dabunt, verbo Regio spondentes Nos non solum ratum gratumque habituros ac plenae executioni mandaturos quicquid praedictus . . . ea de re transegerit atque concluserit, rerum etiam debitam curam gesturos, de summae pecuniariae commodato acceptae justa solutione " (*Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, Appendix ii).

the Dutch government a subsidy on the security of the Swedish copper and iron mines, and then for its guarantee of loans to be advanced on the same security by private individuals. Both requests were refused, and he was referred to the moneyed men of Amsterdam.[1] He also tried to get naval stores sent to Sweden and to engage sailors for service in the following year, offering passes to Dutch and Dantzig shippers which should protect them from the privateers, and to the sailors wages at five crowns a month and maintenance.[2] But in the first place so many Dutch ships duly provided with passes had nevertheless been taken by privateers and condemned, that little reliance was placed upon his promises, and in the second the ever watchful ministers of Hanover and England roused the authorities against him. They believed that he was trying to procure ships to serve as privateers. Although the government, moved by Horatio Walpole to make enquiry, could not find that any such thing was being done, the magistrates of Amsterdam were warned. And Walpole was assured that no one in that city would fit out a ship to prey upon his fellows. The "more piratical" Zeelanders might, but not the Hollanders.[3]

At the end of August Goertz paid in all secrecy a visit to Paris, remaining there till 13 September. He saw the regent, but only, the latter averred to Stair, on the subject of the subsidies.[4] Returned to the Hague, he sent to Sparre an urgent appeal for funds. An officer, he said, had come from the king desiring money to be sent immediately and at any price, the officer himself requiring 10,000 crowns to prosecute his journey to Poland and beyond. A financial negotiation was in hand, but it required time, the undertakers desiring to send to Sweden to investigate its conditions. The money required could only be got at Paris. Certain persons at the Hague would advance 300,000 crowns on assurance thence that the security was good. He well understood that the arrears of the French subsidy could not be obtained, and that for the 300,000 crowns to be borrowed assignations to double the amount must be provided. But if Sparre could get 150,000 crowns in cash, he (Goertz) could raise an equal sum upon

[1] Uhlenbeck, p. 192.

[2] *Handlingar*, VIII. 255.

[3] Horatio Walpole to Robethon, September 1716, with two enclosures from an Amsterdam correspondent, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 229, ff. 66 foll.

[4] "A propos to Sweeden the Regent told me that Gortz had spoke to him of nothing but the payment of the subsidys, that he desired to know whether the Regent was making a treaty with the King, against whom he said the King of Sweeden his master was more piqued than against any of his enemys . . . The Regent said to me to-day, I am oblig'd to pay him subsidys for a certain time but I will medle no more with his affairs" (Stair to Methuen, 28 Sept. 1716, R. O. France 160).

that at the Hague. The need was urgent, and the king would be prompt and great in recognition.[1] Money must be obtained, for

" il n'y va pas moins que de la ruine et de la destruction de tout le royaume. Si la France veut bien contribuer à nous en garantir, il est tems de faire. Aut nunc aut nunquam . . . Si la Suède est renversée, n'y le Roy d'Angleterre, n'y le Roy de Prusse ne feront guères reflexion sur la France." [2]

The negotiation alluded to was a contract with certain merchants of Amsterdam to ship to Sweden silver ingots, to coin these there for their own profit to the amount of at least two million rix-dollars, and to purchase in exchange and export iron, copper, wire, pitch and tar. The undertakers would have to buy from the king's subjects or coin for them all bullion offered, at six per cent. profit to the vendors. They might establish foundries of their own in Sweden. All contrary contracts and rights would be annulled. The term of the agreement was three years.[3]

The negotiation was fully exposed to Bernstorff by one Dirck Wolters, a merchant of Rotterdam in British pay.[4] The head of the syndicate, he found, was the Amsterdam banker Amiot (an Englishman, we learn elsewhere); Pieterman, whose name was used, was his valet. Goertz was to advance 150,000 florins to purchase the first consignment of ingots (this being the money, we may suppose, which he so urgently desired of Sparre). The company, having coined the same in Sweden, would purchase there goods for Amsterdam and with the proceeds export further ingots. The king's object was to replace the paper money in circulation by silver, to pay his debts, and to foster home industries. The arrangement, Wolters pointed out, would be highly prejudicial to English commercial interests.

To thwart the scheme, Wolters put in practice means suggested by Robethon.[5] Firstly he tried, through an agent at Amsterdam, to frighten Amiot and his fellow-contractors from their undertaking, and two persons going to Sweden to investigate from venturing upon the journey, by assuring them that the ships must infallibly be captured by the Danes. But this failed, the expectation of profit being too great, and the deputies sailed, in spite of a

[1] 24 Sept. 1716, *Handlingar*, VIII. 268.

[2] 29 Sept., ibid. p. 285.

[3] Copies of the contract, somewhat differing, R. O. Holland 254 (H. Walpole, 2 Oct. 1716); *Handlingar*, XXI. 358 and X. 388; *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, Appendices, with papers appertaining; Lamberty, IX. 656. It bore date 30 Sept. 1716 and was ratified by Charles 30 Dec. 1717. In Lamberty it forms part of the pamphlet mentioned below.

[4] His letters, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 229, 29 Sept. to 28 Dec. 1716.

[5] Ibid. f. 262.

temporary arrest of their ship. Secondly, the same agent drew up and had printed a pamphlet exposing the scheme, which was distributed among the other merchants of Amsterdam to make them jealous.[1] And in the meantime he introduced himself into the service of Goertz and Amiot, obtaining charge of the first consignment of silver, so that whatever took place, Wolters wrote, would be known.

Such was one of Goertz's financial schemes, and such the activity of king George's ministers to thwart them. That the danger from Danish cruisers was real was shown by the experience of James Cooke, the merchant who had advanced so much money to Charles in Turkey, and who about this time journeyed to Sweden to try to get some of it back. Gyllenborg, Goertz and others entrusted him with large packets of despatches. He sailed for Gothenburg in a Dutch ship with a number of Swedish officers returning home. But when off that port their ship was boarded by one of the Danish men-of-war on watch, and Cooke had to throw the whole of the despatches into the sea.[2]

Another contract made by Goertz was with one John Hecker for a regular service of vessels every fortnight or three weeks between Amsterdam and Gothenburg. The ships were to carry any passengers named by Goertz, and in return Hecker was to have the sole right of importing tobacco to ports on the west coast.[3]

The most pressing object for which Goertz wanted money was to buy ships of war. Not frigates, he says, there were enough of them at Gothenburg, but ships of the line, carrying up to 80 guns.[4] It was reported, as we have seen, that he had no success in this matter at Amsterdam, but by his own account he obtained two in some Dutch port. And he had the offer of three, or four, in France, which were at the disposal of the banker Hogguer, the man who had contracted in the previous year for the timber from Pomerania. Torcy tells us that Hogguer had fitted them out to import masts from Norway for the royal magazines; that he had three at Brest and a fourth of 58 guns, the strongest, at Le Havre; that under cover of his contract with the government he was very willing to serve the king of Sweden, and believed that all would be easy if only the latter, in his own interest, would

[1] *Lettre d'un Ami de Petersbourg à un Ami d'Amsterdam*, printed by Lamberty, IX. 656. See *Stowe MSS.* 229, ff. 294, 312.

[2] Cooke from Marstrand, 14 Sept. 1716, addressed "To his Lordship the Earle of Guillenborg" (R. O. Confidential 1[a], original).

[3] *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, Appendix vii.

[4] To Gyllenborg from the Hague, 11 Aug. 1716, Record Office. The phrase used is "vaisseaux de haut bord."

put him in a position to carry out exactly its conditions; and that he hoped to send to Charles a large number of sailors, recruited ostensibly for the service of the four vessels, and to procure him on the part of France other facilities according to events.[1]

Such was one portion of Goertz's work, but not his whole commission. He was empowered besides to treat for peace. The necessity for Sweden to come to terms with some, at least, of her assailants had long been obvious; excepting Charles, all Swedes and friends of Sweden, who could, had worked hard to that end. Count Vellingk never relaxed the efforts of whose success he despaired.[2] Gyllenborg and Petkum did their best in England, Sparre at Paris, Stiernhoek at Vienna. The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel made overtures both to Hanover and Russia; to the tsar at Pyrmont through his privy councillor von Kettler.[3] But at that time Peter was set upon prosecuting the campaign. None recognized the necessity more clearly than Goertz himself, though he thought that peace would best be obtained by showing a bold front.[4] When he renewed his engagement with Charles for the year 1717, he made it a principal condition that negotiations for peace should be earnestly pursued.[5] He knew that Charles would not have it forced upon him, but expected by continuing the war to break up the confederacy against Sweden. Hanover, he thought, might be bought off, or, if not, terms be arranged with the tsar at the king of England's cost.

Goertz was named one of three plenipotentiaries to a prospective

[1] *Memoirs*, I. 864–65. After the arrests of Gyllenborg and Goertz Dubois took credit for stopping this business of Hogguer, a very advantageous one, he said (to Robethon, 17 Feb. and 16 April 1717, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, ff. 37, 72).

[2] See his letters to Müllern of April and May 1716, *Handlingar*, Vol. VI.

[3] Carlson, pp. 92, 93; Droysen, p. 177.

[4] Thus to his countryman, Count von der Nath, 3 Oct. 1716: "Il est absolument nécessaire, que pendant l'hiver nous fassions tous les efforts imaginables par rapport aux préparatifs pour l'année prochaine, si nous voulons, qu'entre ce tems la négotiation aille bien ci-dehors, pour sortir une bonne fois d'affaire et pour parvenir à une fin heureuse." And again, 27 Oct., "J'aporteroy avec moi un plan pour la paix, qui sera au goût du Roi à ce que j'espère. Pour le faciliter d'avantage il est absolument nécessaire que Sa Majesté se mette en état de se faire respecter et craindre" (*Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, p. 132).

[5] Carlson, p. 113; *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, p. 203. The other conditions stipulated by Goertz, as given in the latter work, were, that his service should only be for the year 1717, that in the course of that year Charles should find a substitute, that all revenues without exception should be paid into Goertz's general fund and no main expenditure be made without his knowledge, that the ruinous "Constitutions" should be abolished and a better system substituted, that the arrangements for forced recruiting should be modified, that the fleet should not be kept up at the expense of other departments, and that the accounts for 1716 should be revised. All these conditions, says our author, were granted, but on Goertz's arrest in Holland the king took the direction of financial affairs upon himself.

congress,[1] and it was intended that he should go to Vienna, but advices came that his presence there would be unacceptable. But on his arrival at the Hague he was able to confer with the Austrian envoy, Baron Heems. A particular question was, whether for the affairs of the empire the emperor should preside at a congress as judge or as mediator. The Swedes insisted upon the former, with restitution as the basis of arbitrament. Goertz went so far as to hint to Heems that a peace might be arranged without reference to Vienna at all. He expressed to his countryman Von der Nath the opinion that the emperor would agree to anything, rather than allow the settlement to be taken out of his hands.[2] But Heems held firm language, blaming the king of Sweden's obstinacy and saying roundly that his master, engaged in war with Turkey, could not take up his cause against the northern allies, even if he would.

To further the success of his mission Goertz took care, when he came to Holland, to spread reports of negotiations on foot with Russia. The *Amsterdam Gazette* announced that Prince Kurakin had received him, but, if this were true, nothing immediate resulted, and it is likely that Goertz supplied the paragraph himself. Kurakin denied in November that he had had any intercourse with him.[3] This, however, only applied to Goertz ; towards the end of August advances were being made to Kurakin by the landgrave's minister General Rank, a Swede by birth, and Peter the Great, advised of them just when he was meditating his momentous resolve, authorized him (15 September) to receive them and to ask for some definite declaration on Charles's part, doing this entirely on his own responsibility and under pledge of secrecy. A month later, however, he informed the prince of his conviction that the surest way to procure peace was to prosecute the war, and in November he refused with decision terms of accommodation proposed by Kettler, which were indeed absurd.[4]

Another intermediary through whom Goertz sought to open a channel of negotiation was the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. He

[1] Carlson's assertion to this effect (p. 88) is confirmed by the French archives. A despatch of Charles of 18 June 1716 to Sparre set forth his views in regard to a congress at length, and long memorials on the subject, nugatory and wearisome, were delivered to the French court by the latter (M.A.E. Suède 135, 136).

[2] 28 Sept. o.s. 1716, *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, p. 140.

[3] Hartman, p. 148. Goertz, on the other hand, stated the exact opposite, namely that he had succeeded in opening direct intercourse with Kurakin, and that the latter showed all the anxiety for an accommodation that could be wished for (20 Nov., *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, Appendix xix). Hartman doubts Goertz's truthfulness in this case also. Holm (pp. 129 foll.) discusses this subject fully, and concludes that there was nothing actual, as least so far as Goertz was concerned, before the middle of September.

[4] Particulars of the above, Hartman, pp. 140 foll., Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

pressed Vellingk to represent to him that his safety depended upon the stay of the Russians in his country and upon a reconciliation between Charles and Peter. Vellingk, however, could effect little.[1]

As for Charles XII, he expressed himself not disinclined to treat with the tsar now that he was separated from his allies, and especially from Denmark. He stated to Goertz that the belief entertained at Vienna and Paris, that he would not accept the mediation of those courts, was wrong.[2] Consequently on 24 December Goertz gave Heems a declaration to the effect that the king of Sweden would accept mediation for a general peace, and that of the emperor alone, if his enemies objected to France being conjoined; that he would not refuse Brunswick as a place of congress, if that were named; and would consent, if it were desired, to affairs of the empire being dealt with by accommodation instead of by tribunal.[3] In January Charles admitted to his brother-in-law, the hereditary prince of Hesse, that it might be "not unserviceable" to take advantage of the discord prevailing among the allies to break up their league, but thought the time for such endeavours not yet come. An arrangement with Denmark appeared to him easier to make than one with Russia. With the king of Poland nothing could be done; his friendship was as useless as his enmity was harmless. From the king of Prussia he was ready to receive moderate proposals in writing, while not crediting him with any real desire for peace.[4]

To encourage Goertz in his disappointing endeavours there came in November report[5] of a remarkable letter from Robert Erskine, the tsar's confidential physician, to his cousin the earl of Mar. Erskine was alleged to say that the tsar would undertake nothing more against Sweden, had quarrelled with his allies, could never come to an understanding with king George, whom he hated mortally, recognized the justice of the Pretender's cause, and wished for nothing more than for an opportunity to restore him to his kingdoms. Having the advantage of the king of Sweden he could not make the first proposals, but would respond readily to the smallest advances on his part. Goertz was quick to seize this opportunity. He wrote that, if the tsar came to Holland and an

[1] Correspondence of Goertz and Vellingk, Oct. and Nov. 1716, *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, Appendices xiii. foll. Cf. Carlson, p. 94.

[2] See his letters to Goertz and to the landgrave of 23 and 31 Oct. o.s., ibid. xxviii and Holm, p. 136.

[3] Lamberty, IX. 688, X. 23. Stiernhoek disbelieved the genuineness of the declaration, it being not in accordance with Charles's sentiments, as he knew them (27 Jan. 1717, in Whitworth's of 6 March).

[4] *Egenhändiga Bref*, pp. 213–15.

[5] In Gustavus Gyllenborg's letter to his brother the count of 17 Nov., No. 11 of those cited in the next chapter.

interview with Erskine could be arranged, good progress would certainly be made, always supposing that the latter's account of his master's disposition were well founded.[1] But later[2] he wrote to Vellingk that he was unable to reconcile Erskine's statements with the fact that Kurakin, though very ready himself, had not received orders from his master to treat. However, he obtained letters of introduction to the doctor through Count Gyllenborg, who further proposed to send to the tsar a certain experienced and trustworthy gentleman, a Russian subject, who might expose to him the aim of the king of England to get Bremen for himself at his expense.[3]

At the end of the year Goertz went to Paris again. It was arranged, it seems, that he should have an interview with the tsar on his return, and that Erskine saw him at Amsterdam with that object.[4] But the intention was frustrated by his arrest, consequent on the proceedings now to be narrated.

[1] 12 Nov., letter No. 12.

[2] 30 Nov.

[3] Gyllenborg, 22 and 29 Dec., letters Nos. 18 and 20. The author of certain *Remarques sur le Mémoire du Czar* (R. O. Foreign Ministers 51) informs us that this person was a native of Podolia named Sinavoidye, that Sir Jacob Banks provided him with money, that he obtained a post in the Russian chancery to translate from English into Russian, and that he had formerly been employed by the earl of Oxford.

[4] Westrin, pp. 115–16.

CHAPTER XIII

THE "SWEDISH PLOT"

UNSUCCESSFUL in either branch of his commission, in the one Goertz could not put up with failure; he must get money, and he could not be scrupulous about its source.

The Jacobites, as we have seen, had been ready to find money for Charles XII, when he was in Stralsund, in return for military aid. Their proposals were rejected, but Müllern, when he explained to Gyllenborg the reasons therefor, advised him nevertheless to humour the proposers, to express to them the king's sympathy, and to hint at the possibility of assistance at a future time. And he desired him to discover in particular what money they could advance and how it might be sent to Sweden.[1]

The Jacobites, therefore, were encouraged to continue their advances. Negotiations between Bolingbroke, Sparre and the regent of France in February 1716 came to nothing in consequence of the failure of the Jacobite rebellion.[2] Then, when James Edward returned to Paris from Scotland, he had an interview with Sparre (2 March), when he requested him to forward a letter from himself to the king of Sweden. This Sparre declined to do, but reported the matter home. The reply which he received was again a refusal to enter into the plans of the Jacobites; more, he was censured for having intercourse with them at all.[3]

However, the Chevalier was determined to send his letter, and appointed to take it (in July) Robert Erskine's brother, Sir John Erskine of Alva, who had been sent to France in February to buy powder and arms. Himself and his friends, James Edward wrote, regarded the king of Sweden "as reserved by Providence to put the last hand to my establishment and to theirs. And the more we appear abandoned of the rest of Europe, the more we have confidence in our cause, and in those heroic qualities which have led your Majesty to take the part of him who is unjustly oppressed." Erskine was to

[1] 3 July o.s. 1715, *Handlingar*, X. 197–98.
[2] See Westrin, p. 96.
[3] Ibid. p. 97; Carlson, p. 97.

represent that Charles had now just cause to make war upon "the Duke of Brunswick," that at least three-fourths of the English people desired to restore their legitimate and natural king, that therefore success would certainly attend an expedition of eight to ten thousand men with twenty to fifteen thousand arms, and that his friends in England would prefer to own their deliverance to a prince of their own religion and to a nation always friendly. He was further to descant on the advantages which would accrue to Sweden from the proposed alliance.[1]

I have not found what was the result, if there were any, of this mission of Sir John Erskine, or whether it actually took place. The Pretender and his friends, in any case, continued their efforts, for help from the Swedish king was now their only hope, and, if they were rebuffed abroad, they found encouragement from Gyllenborg in London. When Goertz came to Holland and was made acquainted with the Jacobite proposals, he saw in them a means to further his own schemes. He worked, in his usual fashion, alone, deceiving alike his master, his clients, and his colleagues.[2]

We must observe that there were on the Jacobite side three parties to the negotiation; firstly, the exiles in Paris or at James Edward's court at Avignon; secondly, the French sympathisers with him and with Sweden, adherents of the old régime, chief among them Torcy and D'Huxelles; and thirdly, the malcontents in England, inspired less by loyalty to the Chevalier than by hatred of Hanover. Many of these held seats in parliament and were neither declared Jacobites nor anxious to declare themselves so, unless with fairly certain prospect of success. From this last-named party had to come the bulk of the funds. They treated with Goertz through Gyllenborg, the others mainly through Sparre.

On 25 September the last-named enquired of Gyllenborg the truth of a report that he had an authorisation from the king to enter into arrangements with the Jacobites. Were that true, he said, he would be delighted to second him, even indirectly, pending a similar authorisation to himself.[3] Gyllenborg in reply

[1] Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report IV. 525–26.

[2] The principal part of what follows is taken from the correspondence of Goertz and other Swedish ministers. Besides the mass of seized and intercepted correspondence preserved at the Record Office (the bulk of it now in "Confidential" 1ª, 1ᵇ, but part under other heads), there is a good deal printed in the *Handlingar*, Vols. VIII, X, from Swedish sources. The part of the Record Office collection which concerns us now consists mainly of copies and extracts, not always, as is proved by comparison with the *Handlingar*, correctly deciphered. A selection from these was published in French and English by the British government at the end of February 1717 to justify Gyllenborg's arrest. An abstract of the publication appears in the pages of Tindal and of the *Parliamentary History*.

[3] *Handlingar*, X. 362; the first of the published letters.

denied having said that the king of Sweden was disposed to help the Pretender ; on the contrary, he had always expressed ignorance of his wishes in the matter. He had promised to write to Sweden on the subject, but had no reply. It was the custom of the Jacobites to exaggerate, and one could not be too much on one's guard against them. Townshend, for instance, had lately told Petkum that he knew for certain that Sparre was negotiating in the Pretender's favour. He himself would take no step of which he did not render a faithful account to Sparre. He held that a king of England with dominions in Germany could never be a friend of Sweden, and that they ought to try to replace him. He had said this before the late queen's death, and was right.[1]

The report had reached Goertz's ears also. Gyllenborg wrote to him that overtures had indeed been made by the Jacobites, but that he could hardly proceed without an express order from the king. But, he added, 10,000 men brought over from Sweden would effect what was required, and he believed that money would not be wanting.[2] To this Goertz replied that anything in connexion with the said overtures might be confided to him, but must not be reported to the king. It must be clearly explained, how a force of 10,000 men could carry out the scheme proposed, what were its details, and what motive could be suggested to the king to induce him to embark upon it.[3]

In answer Gyllenborg wrote the emphatic passage beginning, " Il n'y a point de milieu, il fait ou sacrifier Bremen ou les Hanovériens." To upset the latter was not difficult. The malcontents only asked for a body of regular troops, which they could join ; such a body transported in March, when east winds blew and there was little thought of danger, would raise a general revolt. Arms for 15,000 to 20,000 men, and horse-equipment, must be brought over ; the horses would be found on their side. In his own humble opinion, there was no other course to take. The soldiers once landed, he would answer for the rest. In a country where nine out of ten were rebels, and where everything abounded, nothing could be wanting. He would write more precisely later. It would be a glorious enterprise, which would at once put an end to their ills and punish the authors of them.[4]

To this Goertz replied that money must on no account be spoken of, nor anxiety shown to know the plan proposed. Gyllenborg should only listen ; it would be time enough, when the proposers had explained themselves, to form a judgment on the solidity of

[1] 27 Sept. o.s., *Handlingar*, p. 317.
[2] The second of the published letters, 29 Sept. o.s.
[3] Letter No. 3, 16 Oct.
[4] Letter No. 4, 12 Oct. o.s., postscript; the greater part in the *Handlingar*, X. 371.

their ideas, and what scheme might be formulated.[1] This letter was crossed by one from Gyllenborg, announcing that two of the principals in the affair assured him that £60,000 would be ready as soon as he could show them a personal assurance from the king of Sweden that he would send them help.[2] To which, however, it was replied, " l'on repète qu'il ne faut pas de tout parler d'argent, mais écouter simplement les gens pour apprendre ce qu'ils sont en étât de faire, et me le mander sans s'expliquer avec eux." [3] And before proceeding further, Goertz thought proper to set the negotiation before Charles XII. Some of the principal Tories in England, he wrote to him on 4 November,

" have offered the sum of 300,000 thalers for your Majesty's service, if it can be shewn them that they might expect assistance upon their furnishing a definite plan. As your Majesty's thoughts hereon are entirely unknown to me, I have not in any way taken upon myself to enter into anything with these people on such a footing. But I have let them know that your Majesty has fully empowered me to negotiate for money for your Majesty's service on moderate conditions, and that, if they should be inclined to lend, I can arrange the business with them ; further, if they would prepare a plan for their other work, I shall not fail duly to submit it to your Majesty. I think that in this I have done nothing which can displease your Majesty, who can well be indifferent from what private persons the money wanted might come, as the king of France also formerly negotiated loans from private people in Holland. I can besides take for granted that your Majesty may listen to the proposals of the said parties without prejudice. The English court does not deserve any consideration, seeing that it would not unwillingly see your Majesty deprived of crown and sceptre." [4]

Gyllenborg, in reply to Goertz, urged that advantage should be taken of the present animosity of his friends and said that the " principals," hazarding as they did life and property, would not speak out without good assurances [5] ; and Sparre forwarded a copy of a letter from Ormonde, which promised the payment of £60,000 as an example of the Chevalier's goodwill.[6] There seems to have been a proposal for a written convention as to the employment of the money.

Goertz now expressed his readiness to enter into a money negotiation, but only on his own plan and without specifying any

[1] Postscript of 30 Oct., letter No. 7.
[2] Postscript of 16 Oct. o.s., letter No. 6.
[3] Gustavus Gyllenborg, brother of the count and secretary to Goertz, 3 Nov., letter No. 8.
[4] Translated from the German text given by Westrin, pp. 105–06.
[5] 13 Nov., letter No. 10. As to the " gens du second ordre," said Gyllenborg, their propositions were of too little consequence and too ill concerted to be listened to, and it was better not to say anything to them at all.
[6] Gustavus Gyllenborg, 17 Nov., letter No. 11.

service in return. His letter to Sparre of 12 November was to the following effect.[1]

As to the English business and the duke of Ormonde's letter, he could not but say frankly that, if his own plan were not agreed to, he could not enter into the affair at all. It was on the basis of that plan that he had opened the affair to the king.[2] To depart from it would be to spoil all. Any reasonable person would recognize the impossibility of concluding a formal treaty. In trusting to its being kept secret both sides would risk too much. The best thing was for each to prepare the necessary papers; there would be time enough to make treaties, when they were in a position to put the work in execution. He himself was not at all sure that it would be proper to do what was asked under the name of aid lent; better, perhaps, to put forward the pleas of self-interest and sympathy with English liberty. The other side must exhibit enough confidence to furnish what was necessary to make its proposed supporters useful. The sum required was not excessive; 300,000 crowns might suffice for the present, the only thing wanted being a reinforcement for the Gothenburg squadron. He did not see what risk Sparre's friends would run, for he would give sufficient security. Besides, everybody knew the king's humour. If he could not acquit the loan by giving real help he would repay the money, the more so as he would not have it known that he had taken it as a loan.[3] Further to remove scruple, repayment could be fixed for the following May. The other side could easily express its offer in terms in accordance with the conditions of the plan, despite that on his own side he (Goertz) would only accept them as a simple business negotiation. But everything depended on a prompt decision and firstly on the advance of 100,000 crowns to buy the ships, without which nothing at all was to be hoped for. He was on the track of a fourth to be had in England. The secret about them must be religiously kept and appearance be made of depending entirely upon the friendship of France, for the

[1] Letter No. 12, also in the *Handlingar*, X. 376, which version I use, there being errors in the deciphering of the Record Office MS. For instance, before the words "cent mille écus pour les vaisseaux," "trois" is arbitrarily inserted, and hence, in the translation, "un quatriême" appears as "a fourth hundred thousand," instead of "a fourth ship." For "Stockholm" I suspect "Deux-Ponts" (Zweibrücken), that being the place specified by Torcy, and much more probable.

[2] "Que j'ay actuellement entamé la chose auprès le Roy." These words have been cited (for instance, by the author of the *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*) to show that, in spite of his own and Goertz's express declarations to the contrary, Charles was privy to the scheme of an invasion of Great Britain. But I think that they need only refer to the letter to Charles cited above.

[3] "D'autant que Sa M^té^ ne voudroit pas qu'il fut sceu qu'Elle eut touché de l'argent dans la veu qu'il est prêté."

undertaking was extremely delicate, and Sparre was to blame for having alluded to it in a written memorial.

To Gyllenborg similarly Goertz admitted that quickness in arranging the affair was necessary, but demanded prudence. The other side must show that success in the enterprise was probable and must assist with money. The leading members of the court of Avignon offered on their master's part £60,000 *ad captandam benevolentiam*. He had due authority to accept money for the king's service against his assurance of repayment. If Gyllenborg's friends would communicate a plan for this principal affair, he would forward it to the king, who would either accept it or return the money. So that there was no risk, while there was prospect of great profit. If the rest were approved, he would add the project of a change of scene in England.[1] On this basis the thing might go, otherwise nothing would result. In a word, money; after that, they must know what could be done in England.[2]

We may illustrate the above from Torcy's account. After Goertz and Sparre, he says, had conferred on the French frontier, and when they perceived themselves likely to be abandoned by France, they resolved to try to profit by the troubles in England. The Jacobites asked for 10,000 men, and Gyllenborg reported the proposed undertaking to be feasible. It was decided to make no communication to Charles XII for the present, especially as despatches might fall into the hands of the enemy. But the regent desiring to send a man to Sweden, they tried to get one Lenck appointed, formerly colonel of Sparre's regiment. Every day the partisans of the Pretender became more urgent. They offered considerable sums of money. One of them told Sparre in October that 30,000 "pièces"[3] had already been sent to Holland, and that more were coming, that they offered the money to the king of Sweden in expectation of doing better, and that they who furnished it were only troubled as to the means of transmitting it and of prevailing upon him to accept it. Sparre proposed that Ormonde and Mar should put in writing their master's offer, and that the sum sent to Holland should be made up to 60,000 "pièces." The money was intended for Hogguer's ships and sailors. The Jacobite emissary, knowing of these preparations, promised that it should be at Goertz's disposal by the end of December and handed over a letter for him from Ormonde, which contained assurances that James Edward would shortly have money at his

[1] "Le projet d'un changement de théatre à procurer en Angleterre."
[2] 23 Nov., letter No. 13.
[3] I.e. pièces d'or; translated in the letters "pounds."

disposal for the king of Sweden's service. Sparre, though dissatisfied with the letter, thought it sufficient to act upon.[1]

In a retrospective account Goertz says that he did not listen to Sparre's proposals to help the Jacobites until a certain Englishman, not of that party, counselled him to accept the moneys offered and himself promised to find some. The man spoke thus from fear for his country's freedom, in case the king should get the duchy of Bremen and thereby an open road for bringing Hanoverian soldiers into England. Ships and crews were wanted at Gothenburg. Four men-of-war were found in France and two in Holland. But there was no money to pay for them. Goertz was assured that the Jacobites were well provided therewith. They were found willing to make advances on the security of state bonds. He obliged himself to nothing more than to repayment. The king knew nothing of it; he acted on his own responsibility, having full powers to pledge the credit of the state.[2]

On 4 December Gyllenborg reported to Goertz an important conversation with one of the leaders of the movement, an old and intimate friend, who spoke of the mistake of the court of Avignon, a mistake now realised, in believing that all was settled. The money demanded by that court was the last that would be found, if it were not to be employed as specified and if positive assurance of the help requested were not given. Gyllenborg, this man said, must keep silence about this misapprehension, lest he should ruin the credit of the chevalier and alienate his English friends, who would then throw Sweden over, though hitherto the chief advocates of her cause in parliament. Grave attacks were being prepared on Sweden both by pamphlets in the press and by the merchants. His friends would not risk their money for profit; they could get 7 or 8 per cent. in the public funds. They would put more trust in a single word from the king of Sweden than in all securities or bonds given by others. If he would give his personal assurance, they would make such efforts that he should not repent thereof. But after three months' negotiation they were still in uncertainty. How could they take active measures, and then by the king's refusal be stranded, exposed to betrayal by individuals anxious to save themselves? Sweden risked nothing. The king of Sweden had full justification for making war on England. Prospects of success were bright. Half of the present army was likely to be cashiered next session. In case of failure, would the government be more the enemy of Sweden than before? So great an opportunity should not be let slip. A positive assurance delivered at Avignon would set all in motion; without that, everything

[1] *Memoirs*, I. 859 foll. [2] Carlson, p. 102.

would languish. The greater part of the nation was Jacobite "à toute outrance." But it would join no one but in that cause; against a mere invasion of foreigners the whole country would combine. In particular, maintenance of the Anglican Church must figure in the king's manifesto.[1]

Goertz replied that it was superfluous to suggest to his side motives of action, when no spur was needed. Even before he left Sweden there was disposition there towards the projected expedition, and such must presumably have increased with the increasing hostility of the English court. The only question was the means of satisfying the just desire for revenge. Sweden had soldiers for that purpose, but not the ships for transport and convoy. Nor was it known how the troops, when landed, would be fed. Horses must be found to mount the cavalry and the force required must be specified, in order that transport for it might be got together. He had passed the contracts for six men-of-war of from 60 to 70 guns, all armed and equipped, to be at Gothenburg at the beginning of March. The money he had asked of Avignon was solely destined for the purchase of these vessels. If he had proposed its advance as a simple business arrangement,[2] it was only to guarantee the parties interested on either side against the risk of the secret being ill-kept. To lift the mask too soon would be to give the English ministers a good excuse for rousing the nation to war. Holland would probably be drawn thereinto without much trouble, wherein was a danger of the gravest consequence. The objection in regard to the money was a trifle. What better security could the king of Sweden promise himself for the recovery of Bremen than the reduction of king George to the rank of elector, obliging him to seek his friendship as in former times? Could good faith and word of honour, after their experience of such and of treaties, hold against so solid and evident a motive? The question, whether, was in fact decided; the present one was, how. Those who furnished the money risked nothing. They could do it as Dutch merchants seeking profit; could even make a contract like the other one. Danger could only arise by delay in the execution of the design, but, if confidence was had in the king's word, scruples fell at once. His Majesty piqued himself too greatly on performing his engagements to admit of doubt. A resolve must be made promptly, or nothing more be thought of the affair until next year. The movers must try, as proposed, to get half the English army cashiered and to prevent another fleet from sailing. They should say how many troops would be retained. Ten to twelve thousand

[1] Letter No. 15.

[2] "Un simple négoce de particulier."

Swedes might be despatched, including 4,000 cavalry. As soon as the business was arranged, Goertz would go himself to Sweden to push matters on.[1]

At the same time Gyllenborg was reproved for putting forward to Müllern, as a reason for an accommodation, the threats of the English ministers. That, he was told, was the worst way with the king; besides, it was derogatory to himself to write in such a strain.[2]

Gyllenborg was now informed that 20,000 " pièces " were ready against his acknowledgment that he had received the same for his master's service, and that 8,000 had been paid to Sparre. He asked for authority to give the acknowledgment. He also wrote of the " hommes fougeux," (Sunderland and Stanhope, that is,) who were about to have the direction of affairs, and that Townshend had avowed to Petkum that what the latter had written on this subject was true.[3]

Goertz replied to the same effect as before.[4] He was now at Paris, having arrived there with Gustavus Gyllenborg on 3 January. The object of his visit, he had written to Sparre, was to satisfy himself whether the latter's report of the coolness of the French court towards Sweden was true, or his own contrary impression, which he had communicated to Charles.[5] He now sent Gyllenborg a copy of his new full powers, couched in the most ample terms.[6] Sparre had assured him, he said, that he would find at Paris 100,000 crowns ready, but he had been disappointed. Gyllenborg must press for the English money; if it were not forthcoming, everything must be broken off. He awaited an immediate yea or nay. Nothing of the affair must be reported home. The ministers there knew neither of it, nor of the reason for drafting the new full powers in the form they were. When Gyllenborg had got the money, or at least that for the ships, he had better come to Holland on the pretext of conferring further.

On the 13th Goertz wrote that his French friends were charmed with his plan. They had counted out to him 100,000 francs and promised to let him have the rest, to the sum of a million florins, in Holland. He would therefore set to work in all diligence to get

[1] Letter No. 16, 11 Dec.

[2] Gustavus Gyllenborg, writing for Goertz, 11 Dec., R. O.

[3] 1 Jan. 1717, letter No. 21.

[4] 8 Jan., letter No. 23.

[5] 25 Dec., *Handlingar*, X. 398.

[6] These, dated Lund 23 Oct. o.s., were in quite general terms, power being given to conclude " nomine Nostro cuncta ea quae ex usu Nostro et ad Commodum Nostrum spectare poterunt " (published with letter No. 23). Whitworth, criticizing them after Goertz's arrest, said that they allowed the disavowal of anything done as not to the king's advantage, and that they were " a sort of letter of attorney to borrow money of the merchants and treat with particulars about their trade to Sweden " (13 March 1717, R. O. Prussia 7).

the ships. Gyllenborg must get the English subscriptions at once, or they would not be ready in time. He himself would return to Holland as soon as possible.[1] Then on the 16th that Gyllenborg might assure his friends that the English expedition was at present his sole preoccupation. It depended upon two things, on getting firstly the ships of war, and secondly the money. Without the latter he could not sign the contracts for the ships. He must have it, and there was no time to lose. He had been assured that it would come at once. Gyllenborg's letters told him that 20,000 " pièces " were ready. He enclosed the form of receipt that would be used. One-sixth of the money was to be repaid every four months, and it would bear interest at 6 per cent. As to Gyllenborg's parliamentary efforts, he entirely approved of them, and enquired whence might arise the good disposition which Robert Walpole was reported to show.[2]

On 18 January Gyllenborg reported that he had seen " l'ami qui dirige toute l'affaire," who told him that an order having been received from Lord Mar to remit immediately 20,000 " pièces " for Swedish account to the queen dowager in France, it had been done, and he hoped that Goertz had received the money. The same friend had asked Mar for instructions as to where the remainder should be paid. Sparre no doubt knew of all this. There was talk in England that that minister and Goertz were not at one. The idea of Gyllenborg's going to Holland had given pleasure. But he had said he would not go with empty hands; he must have, at least, 10,000 " pièces " to take with him.[3]

Goertz, still at Paris, replied on the 27th that the friends in France were being pressed to get the full million florins sent from England, and he could do nothing in regard to the ships till he had them, for it would never do to begin the business and then have to abandon it for lack of funds. He contradicted the report of dissension between himself and Sparre.[4] Gyllenborg replied (10 February) that his friends had assured him that everything arranged with Goertz about the money had been punctually executed, and did not doubt but that he would receive word thereof in the baron's next letter. The Baltic squadron would sail early, apparently because of the imminent danger believed to threaten Denmark; their own ships therefore must be the first at sea.[5]

Though Goertz might deny in one quarter the report of dissension between himself and Sparre, he owned it in another. " Il me

[1] Letter No. 25, with postscript from Gustavus Gyllenborg, Nov. 26.
[2] Do. No. 28.
[3] Do. No. 29. On the journey to Holland similarly in No. 30, 23 Jan.
[4] Do. No. 31.
[5] No. 36, the last of the published letters.

semble qu'il se fait un plaisir de contrecarrer toutes les affaires qu'il me voit entreprendre pour le service du Roi." He accused Sparre of entirely deserting the plan agreed upon between them, of keeping for his own expenses the balance of a quarter's subsidy paid by the regent, the principal portion of which had gone to the landgrave, and of talking publicly at table about the ships, whereas the essence of success in that affair was secrecy. His brother General Axel Sparre at Cassel and most of the other Swedes there and at home were acting, he said, in the same way. He believed their view to be that, if the king could not get money, he must conclude the peace they earnestly desired, and that they hated, therefore, the man who was enabling him to prolong the war.[1] Sparre on the other hand complained bitterly of Goertz's conduct towards himself.[2]

Sparre was recalled. He gave out that it was at his own request, on the plea of ill-health. But Charles expressed his displeasure at his having entirely departed from the plan concerted for obtaining French subsidies,[3] and this was no doubt the real reason. He did not however leave Paris for some months.

Torcy says that Sparre was cooled in ardour as to Hogguer's ships by the consideration that, if they were used as intended without the regent's knowledge, the persons responsible would infallibly be arrested and the king of Sweden have been put to great cost in vain. He thought of sending the sailors to Sweden by other ways immediately upon receipt of the first instalment of the moneys promised. Goertz on the other hand pressed for the ships, promising Sparre bills of exchange for Hogguer to the amount of 100,000 crowns immediately upon receipt of certain explanations asked for. As he kept back from engaging himself with the Jacobites, his sincerity began to be doubted by those who knew his record, while the appearance of disunion among the Swedish ministers lessened the willingness of the Jacobites to furnish money.[4]

While joining in the plots of the revolutionaries, Gyllenborg had by no means neglected the safer methods of constitutional persuasion and agitation. A majority, probably, of Englishmen sympathised with Sweden in her misfortunes. In commercial

[1] See the *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, pp. 158 foll. The quotation is from a letter to Goertz's distinguished compatriot Count von der Nath.

[2] See Westrin, p. 113.

[3] Charles XII to Goertz, 31 Oct. o.s. 1716, *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, Appendix xxviii. It seems that Goertz had the letters of recall in his possession for some time before he sent them in, and only did so in the middle of December, when he heard of the going of Lieut.-Colonel Grubbe to Sweden. Grubbe, on arriving at the Hague, delayed in consequence his departure (Gustavus Gyllenborg, 22 Dec. 1716; further, p. 196).

[4] *Memoirs*, I. 872 foll.

circles fear of Russian domination began to weigh against the obstacles placed by Charles in the way of trade. He might, indeed, have gained to his cause the mercantile community, the back-bone of the Whig party, would he have made the concessions and reparation asked of him. Many in parliament and in the country objected to the cost of armaments, thought the possession of Bremen and Verden by Hanover a danger to England, or disliked altogether the interference of foreigners in British affairs, and such elements of opposition Gyllenborg did his best to foster. He maintained friendly relations with the ministers, although they, or at least the chief of them, knew of his treasonable correspondence. He could report a favourable reception by the Prince of Wales and Townshend at Hampton Court.[1] He continued to discuss with the latter the possibility of peace with Hanover by a cession of the duchies. He was zealously seconded by Petkum, who had frequent interviews with Townshend and Bothmer and could recommend the friendly disposition of the former to favourable attention.[2] Petkum was perhaps the more energetic in this work, in that he was carefully kept in ignorance of the other branch of the Swedish minister's activity.

Nor did Gyllenborg, so far as his scanty means allowed, neglect the press.[3] He was himself a pamphleteer of power and merit. A critique of his upon the memorial delivered by Jackson at Stockholm, published in September, hit the government hard.[4] Another was to show the little necessity there was of trade with St. Petersburg and Riga, to discuss the Hanoverian declaration of war, and to proceed to deal with the other enemies of Sweden.[5] A third, criticising the Danish declaration of October, may be

[1] To Goertz, 9 Oct. o.s., R. O.

[2] Petkum to Goertz, 5 Oct. o.s. "My Lord Townshend commençant à se déclarer favorablement pour la Suède, je croy d'être de son interest que son ministère en soit regardé de bon oeil, à quoy j'ai toujours contribué." And similarly to his master, the duke administrator, 9 Oct. o.s.

[3] Like the other ministers of Sweden, he could not get his pay. And printers' charges, he says, in view of the risks they ran, were high. The *Post-Boy* was the only journal in which he could get anything published at all, and that seldom (to Müllern, 29 April o.s. 1715, *Handlingar*, X. 159).

[4] *An English Merchant's remarks upon a scandalous Jacobite paper published in the "Post-Boy" under the name of "A Memorial presented to the Chancery of Sweden by the Resident of Great Britain"* (the French version, Lamberty, IX. 667). Gyllenborg's authorship of this was known by intercepted letters. In one, of which Bothmer wrote to Robethon (14 Sept. o.s., B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 229, f. 113), the count avowed it; in another (11 Aug.) Goertz referred to "le raisonnement que vous méditez sur le beau Mémoire de Jackson"; in others, 16 Oct. and 18 Sept., he and Sparre praised the result. Townshend said that no one but Gyllenborg could be cognisant of the facts stated. Petkum indeed defended him against the imputation of its authorship, but Gyllenborg confesses to denying it to him, for good reasons (to his brother, 5 Oct. o.s.; Petkum to Goertz, same date).

[5] To Goertz, 12 Oct. o.s., R. O.

identified with "The Northern Crisis." [1] A fourth was sent to Goertz in January as "un petit avantcoureur du reste." [2]

But Gyllenborg found that he could do nothing with the government unless he could give hope that Bremen would be ceded, compensation to Sweden being obtained from the tsar. Were that preliminary agreed to, he thought the English ministers would be glad to repair the mistake they had made, to bring to the front the defensive treaty and carry the nation to give the aid stipulated therein. Otherwise, both in order to justify their past action and to force Sweden to yield, they would persuade their mercenary parliament to vigorous measures, and even to a declaration of war. They were all "des gens furieux." Sunderland in particular, now learning from the Germans at Hanover, would behave with all imaginable effrontery. Measures must be taken against men who would not stop half-way. "Il faut ou les ruiner, ou périr nous-mêmes." [3] Goertz replied, "Il n'est guère natural que celuy qu'on veut porter à céder une chose qui luy est très chère s'en déclare le premier sans qu'on luy explique les motifs qui le doivent persuader à s'en défaire." The English were certainly mistaken if they supposed that the king of Sweden would cede Bremen from fear of having an enemy the more to fight. If to avoid an unjust war the Swedes must give up everything that the insatiable greed of their neighbours demanded, they would not in the end be sure of their shirts. Nor was the present war so terrible to them as was thought in England.[4]

In reply to despatches from Petkum, which passed through his hands, Goertz argued that it was useless for the British government to claim credit for preventing the invasion of Scania, seeing that, firstly, the king of Sweden could have defeated it himself, and secondly, it was seen from the king of Denmark's declaration what the pretended good offices had been. What were the British advances, to which the king of Sweden might, it was said, with advantage respond? Bothmer's arguments on the difficulty of making peace with the tsar were not badly founded, but the sacrifice of the German provinces was hard of digestion. Were Bremen and Verden ceded to Hanover, the Hanoverians would hardly trouble

[1] The authorship of this well-known pamphlet is attributed to Gyllenborg by Minzloff, *Pierre le Grand dans la littérature étrangère.* Goertz had suggested the subject (27 Oct., R. O.). "Vôtre bon esprit," he wrote, "s'en fournira aisément une déduction propre au génie du pays." Gyllenborg forwarded this on 15 Jan. 1717 as a little piece published at his own expense, containing something of his own, couched in a moderate tone, and praising at the end the Prince of Wales (ibid.).

[2] 23 Jan. "J'ay parlé entièrement en Anglois" (ibid.).

[3] To Goertz, 4 Nov., letter No. 9.

[4] 10 Nov., R. O.

themselves further. "Ce seroit de l'argent trez mal emploié que de se mettre en état de pouvoir se donner plus de mouvement pour acheter les conditions que la cour d'Angleterre voudroit bien nous imposer." To try to excite discord among the confederates was not worth while, it was already rampant. Petkum was not to take upon himself to explain in his conversations the sentiments of the king of Sweden, but must take his lead from Gyllenborg. Certainly the king, desirous to free his hands, and foreseeing endless confusion in a general congress, would listen to the propositions of those who desired to profit by his disposition on a reasonable footing, but as the Russian Secretary with whom Petkum had conversed, and others, did not know "le secret de la Messe," it was useless for him to play the minister with them.[1]

But the Holsteiner was still made use of. Later on Gyllenborg recommended Goertz to express to him satisfaction at his endeavours, as he felt himself neglected. As the letter would be shown, as usual, to Townshend and Bothmer, they might be led to believe what was wanted. If it arrived before the king's return to England, it might foil the violence of the Germans and Sunderland.[2] Accordingly, on 29 December, Goertz sent to Gyllenborg and to Petkum letters to show about. He argued in these the little probability there was that England would declare war, the little that Sweden had to fear, if she did, even in conjunction with Holland, and the needlessness of sacrificing Bremen to avert the danger. He mentioned to Petkum a report current at Hanover, that he had said that the king of Sweden would give up Bremen and Verden to secure the king of England's friendship. This was false; his master was not afraid of England.

On 7 January Gyllenborg wrote that he had shown his open letter to a Whig friend, who was already on the right road. Petkum was charmed with his, and was declaiming against the Hanoverians and the lie told about himself. He (Gyllenborg) was working hard to bring northern affairs to the notice of parliament in his own way.[3]

The letter dated 10 February was the last which Gyllenborg was able to indite,[4] for on the previous night he was placed under arrest. The British government had all along been cognisant of what was doing. Postal business of the time extended to the

[1] 30 Oct. and 3 Nov., ibid.

[2] 18 Dec., letter No. 17. Further about Sunderland's violence, 25 and 29 Dec. Stanhope, Gyllenborg said, having his fortune to make, would also therefore be complaisant to the king.

[3] Letter No. 22.

[4] Gyllenborg would naturally date the day on which the post left.

opening and examination, as well as to the carriage of letters.[1] Spies, too, there were in plenty to discover secrets and report them. Robethon shone particularly in the management of this branch of state-craft. Lord Stair, stationed in the focus of Jacobite plottings and talk, transmitted everything that he could hear, and, if most was untrue, there remained a considerable residuum of fact. In one way or another king George's ministers had a very fair knowledge of what was going forward. But the danger was not pressing, and action was delayed till the king's return to England. Then, at a council held on 29 January o.s., it was decided to arrest Gyllenborg at once, and to seize his papers. Though it was proposed alternatively to wait until advices were received that Goertz also would be arrested in Holland, so that the seizures might be simultaneous,[2] immediate action was determined upon. That very night Gyllenborg's house was surrounded, entered and searched, himself put under arrest, and all the papers that could be found carried off.

This breach of diplomatic privilege roused, of course, immense sensation. Petkum, on behalf of the other foreign ministers, went at once to Stanhope to enquire its meaning. Informed that a declaration would be made to them, they decided to absent themselves from court pending its receipt. On the third day they were informed that the papers seized revealed the existence of a dangerous conspiracy. The Spanish plenipotentiary, a particular friend of

[1] For instance, of the first of the published letters (Sparre to Gyllenborg, 25 Sept. 1716) there are two copies at the Record Office, one of them endorsed, "In Ld. Townshend's Sept. 25 1716," the other, "In Mr. Stanhope's to Ld. T. 9th Oct. The Original of this letter was sent to Mr. Stanhope." These two dates are, of course, in the old style. Other of the intercepted correspondence was forwarded to Hanover later (Townshend to Stanhope, 12 Oct. o.s., Coxe, II. 113). Bothmer wrote to Robethon on 14 Sept. o.s., "Il y a une lettre interceptée de M. Guldenbourg au B. Sparre à Paris." And again on 6 Nov. o.s., "J'ay eu connoissance de la piesse de Gorz à Gul : dont vous parlés, on commence icy à devenir sçavant en cet art" (B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 229, ff. 113, 263). Lamberty (X. 17) says that Goertz's despatches to Gyllenborg were opened, and closed again with a counterfeit seal.

It is therefore incorrect to say, as Droysen and others do (Holm calls attention to this, p. 581, note), that the British government learnt of the plot from despatches intercepted by the Danes. Such indeed of November and December were taken out of a Swedish wreck, and a selection of them was published (in April ?) under the title *Copeyen und Extracten verschiedener in einer durch Sturm und Ungewitter vor einiger Zeit nach Norwegen verschlagenen Galliothe gefundenen Schwedischen Briefe, davon die Originalia allhier verhanden. Copenhagen anno* 1717 (a copy with Polwarth's of 27 April). The letters treat of the state of Sweden, of Goertz's financial schemes, of the urgent necessity for his return, and so on, but his dealings with the Jacobites were evidently unknown to the writers. Other Swedish despatches were taken, on the information of a passenger, out of two Dutch ships which put into the Norwegian harbour of Mandal, but this was late in January, and they remained undeciphered at the end of March (Polwarth, 2 Feb. to 30 March 1717).

[2] See a memorandum in Robethon's hand, 9 Feb. (n.s.), R. O. Confidential 1[a].

Gyllenborg, sent in a strong protest, but the others were content to await the promised publication of the justifying letters.[1]

On the day following the arrest Stanhope sent orders to William Leathes, the British resident at the Hague, to press for that of Goertz and his secretaries. Leathes was referred for arguments to a memorial forwarded a week before to the Hanoverian envoy [2] Klinggraeff. There would be the less difficulty, said Stanhope, in that Goertz was not provided with credentials. It was important to secure papers and ciphers.[3] Leathes was also ordered to despatch at once a ship from Amsterdam to warn Jackson at Stockholm.

Before the required order could be obtained Goertz arrived at the Hague, 17 February. News of the arrest of Gyllenborg just preceded him. It came by way of Calais, an embargo having been laid upon the eastern ports of England. He is said to have heard it at Calais himself, having gone there with the intention of taking ship for Dover. He does not seem to have anticipated danger, but stayed at the Hague to interview Baron Heems, and on the 19th went on to Amsterdam to send an express to Sweden. His secretary Stambke and General Poniatowski went with him. The same day his house at the Hague was entered and his other secretary, Gustavus Gyllenborg, was seized, together with papers of no great importance. The Swedish secretary Preis at once sent to warn Goertz, while Leathes set off to Amsterdam to catch him. But he could not get into the city till next morning, by which time Goertz and Stambke were away to Utrecht. Search at the house of the merchant Tietzen, where they had stayed, revealed twelve packets of despatches for Sweden hidden in a wig-box. Leathes organized pursuit in all directions, and the diligence of one Vleertman caught the fugitives early on the 22nd at Arnhem, just as they were leaving for the German frontier. They were placed in close custody, and treated with the utmost rigour.[4] The arrest was approved by the States-General, but the papers seized were not sent to England; in spite of every persuasion they were kept under seal and finally restored unopened.

[1] Original letters of Monteleon and certain other envoys, R. O. Foreign Ministers.

[2] He received this character at the end of 1714 (B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 229, f. 546).

[3] The last especially because, says Stanhope elsewhere, no cipher was found among Gyllenborg's papers, the want having to be supplied by "the art of the decipherer" (to Polwarth, 5 March o.s. 1717, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5). Gyllenborg stated later that he had burnt his ciphers and all the newest and most important letters (Westrin, p. 114, note). So that the Record Office collection probably consists mainly of copies intercepted in the post. But it includes some originals.

[4] From the accounts of Leathes, R. O. Holland 255, and of Preis in Adlersparre's *Handlingar*, Vol. V. Further particulars, Westrin, pp. 116 foll. Vleertman's letters, R. O. Holland 577, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, f. 42.

It can hardly have been apprehension of real danger from the plot that impelled the British government to act as it did. Watched as the plotters were, there was no danger. True that Gyllenborg was thought to be about to leave the country, and that Goertz was getting the money he wanted to reinforce the Swedish fleet. But a project that was known could easily have been made impossible, and preparations to that end have been justified to the public by inserting reports of Swedish preparations in the usual way in the *Gazette*. The state of domestic politics made necessary something more sensational. A powerful agitation was on foot, as has been said, against the king's northern policy. It was quite possible that a reduction of the army might be insisted upon [1] and grants for a Baltic fleet refused. And there was schism in the ministry. Townshend from various causes had lost the king's confidence and had been relieved in December of his office of secretary of state. He was gravely hurt. Robert Walpole, the ablest debater in the lower house, was his brother-in-law and faithful supporter. If they seceded, they might carry parliament with them. Sunderland and Stanhope,—the " hommes fougueux " of Gyllenborg,—and the German ministers saw that to avert the danger the nation must be roused. What so effective as this plot of foreign invasion suddenly made public ? Even after the publication of the papers the king's party hardly had the upper hand. Both houses of parliament, indeed, expressed their indignation in the strongest terms. A bill for prohibition of trade with Sweden speedily became law. A large majority affirmed the estimates for the land-forces. But a month later, in spite of alarming reports received from Copenhagen, the supply against Sweden was strongly opposed, not, it is true, as such, but on the ground that it was unparliamentary to ask for supplies without estimates submitted. In committee on 8 April the government had a majority of fifteen only. On the report stage, next day, this was reduced to four.[2] But for the publication of the papers it would probably have been defeated.

When Charles heard of the arrests he was of course furious. But all that he could do in retaliation was to put Jackson in prison. As Goertz had not credentials, it was not proper so to treat also Rumpf, the Dutch resident ; but a strongly worded protest was handed to him, and he was forbidden the court.[3]

[1] The king actually announced in May a reduction of the land-forces by 10,000 men (*Parliamentary History*, 6 May o.s. 1717).

[2] *Parliamentary History*, dates old style. When however on 12 April, after Townshend and Walpole had resigned, Stanhope proposed a supply of £250,000 against Sweden, the resolution was carried without a division. On report there was a government majority of 21.

[3] 19 March o.s., Lamberty, X. 38.

To recapitulate, so far as Goertz was concerned the "Swedish Plot" was essentially a money negotiation. Search as he might, the only purse he could find open was the Jacobite. To draw upon it, he must seem to enter into the Pretender's cause. But he refused to bind Sweden to any political convention. The money, he insisted, would be advanced against security in the ordinary commercial way. The lenders must rely for political result upon the obvious interest of Sweden. If such reliance were disappointed, the money would be returned. But in the meantime he would have got his ships and sailors and have enabled Charles to continue to defy his enemies. It was, of course, believed at the time, and has been held since, that Charles was privy to his machinations. But in view of his emphatic denial, of that of Goertz after his release, and of the testimony of the papers cited, it seems impossible to maintain the assertion.[1]

In spite of the severity of his treatment at Arnhem and the close watch kept upon him, Goertz found means to keep up a correspondence with his friends outside, in particular with Preis and the Holstein secretary Frederick Joachim Creutz, who came to stay at Arnhem to try to effect his escape or release. He fretted most at the interruption to his work, whether in obtaining funds or in negotiating for peace, and expressed himself willing to pay 100,000 florins for his freedom. He urged his friends to press for it in all quarters, supplying them with arguments to use whether with the Dutch deputies or with the ministers of France and Austria, and his mind was continually occupied with his various projects in hand. And thus he kept these in train until at the beginning of August he was set free, as is narrated later.[2]

[1] See Carlson, pp. 99 foll., Westrin, pp. 132–34. The evidence adduced by them seems to deprive the arguments, for instance, of the author of the *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld* (pp. 178 foll.) of weight. We may add the opinion of Châteauneuf, the French ambassador at the Hague, delivered to D'Huxelles soon after Goertz's arrest (Lemontey, *Histoire de la Régence*, Appendix ii). "Le but de M. Goertz à été de tirer de l'argent des Anglais, et le roi de Suède n'a rien su des espérances qu'il leur donnait . . . Comment ce prince aurait-il projeté des descentes quand il a peine à se défender chez lui ? Comment les aurait-il concertées avec le czar, quand la paix n'est pas faite entre eux ? . . . M. de Goertz ne parle pas sensément. Il passe depuis longtemps pour un fripon. Il merite à présent le titre d'étourdi . . . Sa négotiation est celle d'un filou." Cf. also Lamberty, X. 23.

[2] Goertz's letters from his prison have been printed in the *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1898, with the introduction by Westrin cited.

CHAPTER XIV

RELATIONS WITH THE NORTHERN POWERS EARLY IN 1717

PETER THE GREAT arrived at Amsterdam on 17 December 1716 and stayed on in Holland till the end of March, ill for six weeks, for the remainder of the time fully occupied with business and pleasure. A principal part of the former was to engage artificers and sailors and to find money to build ships. He had by all accounts but little success, for powerful influences were brought to bear against him and the reports of his treatment of the Dutch sailors already in his service were discouraging. The British government did all it could to foment the jealousy and apprehension which his rising power excited in Holland. Already in November Cadogan had begun to talk on the subject of the sailors with Burgomaster Hooft and other Amsterdam merchants, with whom he had influence by reason of his kinship.[1] The Dutch, he wrote, would readily support the king. Hooft assured him that the tsar would get not a single man, and that such was the feeling against him in the city, that if his officers made the attempt in public the mob might rise and slay them.[2] Preis, the Swedish resident, tells us that Peter's stay in Amsterdam did him much harm in the eyes of the people there, who had now little respect for him, and that, in his vexation at not being able to get the money and ships he wanted, he had refused 10,000 ducats from the merchants.[3]

In England jealousy of Peter's power was growing rapidly, for Russian dominion in the Baltic threatened to be worse for British commerce than the Swedish had been. It was becoming daily more evident that the main object of Peter's military enterprises was to further the economic development of his new empire. In September 1716 Stanhope had forwarded to London a long report on the measures undertaken to extend Russian trade. It treated of the importation of hundreds of French and Dutch artificers and

[1] Cadogan's wife was a daughter of Councillor Munter by his wife Cecilia Trip.

[2] Cadogan to Robethon, Nov. 1716 to Jan. 1717, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 229.

[3] To Müllern, 10 April etc., *Handlingar*, pp. 415 foll. Preis has a story of the wives and children of sailors in Peter's service, whose wages he had not paid, mobbing him and compelling him to flight by a back door (1 Jan. 1717, p. 402).

manufacturers to St. Petersburg, of the preparation of handbooks on all kinds of scientific subjects, of the establishment of regular caravans to Persia, Astrakhan, Mongolia, and Chinese Tartary, of canals to connect the Baltic with the Volga and the White Sea, of another by which ships of the largest size might ascend to St. Petersburg, avoiding the sandbanks of the Neva, in fine, of the tsar's intention to make his new capital the emporium of commerce between east and west.[1] Whitworth had lately warned his government of the likelihood that Russian trade, as soon as the Baltic was free, would resume its old course through Lübeck and other German ports, to the detriment of the British companies. The voyage, he pointed out, could be made six or eight times in the year, and the old Hansa competition might be revived.[2] The English had long complained of the exactions and frauds to which they were subjected at Russian hands,[3] and protests had been useless. Peter knew that the merchants must come to him for naval stores and must submit to things as they found them. In return for naval aid he would grant commercial concessions, but by themselves the latter were useless to him.

In illustration of the state of feeling in England may be cited Townshend's reply to Stanhope. He admitted the injury which a breach with the tsar would inflict upon British commerce, the probable seizure of ships and cargoes and prohibition of traffic, whereby it might even be impossible to fit out a fleet for the next year for lack of naval stores, but he thought that in spite of this, if the tsar really intended " to make himself master of the whole coast of the Baltick, . . . the measures proposed in your letter, or any other, be they never so strong or vigorous," should be taken to thwart him. His behaviour was certainly not the consequence of a sudden change, but of a long-formed plan, of which the Mecklenburg marriage was good evidence. As he seemed to have no respect for the king's power in Germany, a proper measure might be to mobilize 20,000 men there immediately, an act which would at once confound him, " establish the King's interest all over Europe, and keep everything quiet here." Peace with Sweden would be " the shortest way to put an end to all these disturbances."[4]

[1] R. O. Regencies 1, 8 and 11 Sept. 1716. Pamphlets against the commercial advance of Russia, Droysen, p. 193, note, one of them printed by Lamberty, IX. 663, but wrongly entitled *Mémoire d'une personne interessée*, etc., instead of *désinteressée*. Wich, who sent home a copy of this on 8 Jan. 1717, attributed the authorship to Vellingk.

[2] 2 July 1716, R. O. Germany (States) 173.

[3] See Mackenzie's despatches, 1714–15, R. O. Russia 8, in particular the detailed list of the merchants' grievances, 10 March o.s. 1715.

[4] Townshend to Stanhope, 23 Sept. o.s. 1716, and Poyntz, representing his sentiments, 25 Sept. o.s., Coxe, II. 87–92, quoted thence by Lord Mahon.

After George's return to England the campaign against the stay of the Russian troops in Mecklenburg was vigorously prosecuted. The emperor threatened that, if they were not withdrawn, measures would be taken in concert with the princes of the empire to expel them, and Baron Heems at the Hague conveyed the intimation to Peter personally.[1] When Abram Veselovsky, the Russian resident at Vienna, gave strong assurances of the tsar's friendly feeling and asked the court not to believe the contrary advices from Hanover, he was answered that words were one thing and deeds another ; Mecklenburg was being ruined by the Russian occupation.[2] In February fresh representations were made by the imperial resident Vossius at Berlin.[3] Under these circumstances, and when instructions were sent to the Prussian Knyphausen to support Heems, Peter made some concession. Orders were sent for twelve battalions to march, for the quarters of those remaining to be re-arranged, and for the necessary levies to be made equally on all and nothing taken beyond the necessaries of existence.[4] The twelve battalions were actually across the Oder early in March,[5] and at the end of the month Heems had assurance that the rest would follow in a fortnight. In this, however, he was misinformed. Peter instructing Theodore Veselovsky to say that they would be removed when a conclusion had been come to with the court of Denmark.[6]

The inclusion in the papers published of Gustavus Gyllenborg's letter incriminating Erskine obliged the issue of disclaimers on the tsar's part of any understanding either with the Jacobites or with Sweden. This was done both privately and in form. Duvenvoorde, a Dutch statesman who combined intimate relations with the Russian ministers with proved devotion to the house of Hanover, protested that the tsar desired a close union and understanding with the king of England.[7] Schleinitz offered congratulations to Robethon on the discovery of the conspiracy, urged the desirability of such an understanding and the despatch of a British fleet to the Baltic, and gave assurance that his master was only awaiting overtures from the king to give proof of his favourable disposition.[8] Secretary Veselovsky delivered in London a formal

[1] Cadogan, 22 Jan., R. O. Holland 255, a copy of the emperor's letter of 2 Jan. with his despatch. Lamberty, X. 105.
[2] Solov'ev.
[3] Whitworth, 23 Feb.
[4] Bacmeister, II. 64 ; Preis, *Handlingar*, XVIII. 411. See also Lamberty, X. 106–07.
[5] Whitworth, 27 Feb., 6 and 9 March.
[6] Solov'ev.
[7] 26 and 30 March, R. O. Foreign Ministers 22.
[8] 2 March 1717, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, f. 38.

memorial[1] asserting the good conduct of Erskine during thirteen years and representing that it was the less possible for him to be mixed up in a criminal conspiracy, seeing that he was not admitted to any of his master's state counsels or affairs, but only employed in what regarded his profession. We cannot accept the truth of this statement, knowing that he acted as interpreter and intermediary in the confidential interviews which Peter had in 1715 and 1716 with Admiral Norris. The memorial went on to state that, as soon as the tsar heard that certain of Erskine's relations were concerned in the rebellion, he forbade him to have intercourse with them, even on domestic affairs. Erskine himself pledged his life that he had written no letters of the kind mentioned to Mar or to anyone else. The tsar's late negotiations with Great Britain, his guarantee of the protestant succession, and the mission of Tolstoi to Hanover were cited to prove the friendly sentiments he entertained in spite of the exertions made to his prejudice at various courts and of the rumours of negotiation for a separate peace between Hanover and Sweden to his detriment. It was suggested that the whole accusation came from the enemy, and proof of what was alleged against Erskine was requested.

Replies were delivered separately on the part of Great Britain and of Hanover.[2] That by Stanhope was couched in very conciliatory language. The king had no suspicions of the tsar; Erskine's name could not be kept out of the published correspondence, any more than certain expressions odious to the English ministers themselves. No complaint against Erskine had been made. The king was very sorry that the tsar's indisposition had prevented their meeting in Holland, and would have received there with great pleasure Kurakin and Tolstoi, but that they arrived as he was embarking, when he could not lose the tide. If British ministers in Germany had supported the emperor in the matter of the Russian troops, their action was justified by the old alliance between Great Britain and Austria recently renewed. To the accusation of negotiating a treaty with Sweden the Hanoverian ministers would no doubt reply, as it only concerned the electorate. The king would always be ready to enter into negotiation for treaties with the tsar.

The Hanoverian reply reciprocated the friendly expressions of Veselovsky's memorial. It justified the king's efforts to get the Russian troops withdrawn, such efforts, it was said, being quite open and in no way different from protests addressed to the tsar

[1] 12 March o.s. 1717, R. O. Foreign Ministers 51; Lamberty, X. 42.

[2] The former, 19 March o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 254. Both in Lamberty, X. 47, dated by him respectively 2 April and 31 March.

directly. The report of steps taken towards a peace between Sweden and Hanover was an invention of the Swedes, nor had the king ever credited similar reports against the tsar. For the rest expressions were used similar to those of Stanhope.

These professions, however, were purely formal. Leathes, for instance, was informed that the tsar's pique against king George for his alleged endeavours to alienate from him Prussia as well as Denmark was so great, that "but for some particular reasons which he did not think it fit at this time to declare, he would long since have marched his troops out of Mecklenburg into the territories of Hanover." [1] And, at the time that this threat was made, proposals for the converse, namely that Hanoverian and Danish troops should be concentrated east of the Elbe to oppose any possible designs of Russia and Prussia against Lüneburg or Holstein, were actually on paper, in the form of a projected treaty with Denmark.

Advances from the Danish court in November had been answered that all union between Hanover and Denmark must cease, if the latter lent consent to any project directed against the empire or countenanced directly or indirectly the stay of the Russian troops therein. The court of Denmark, it was said, was very much deceived if it expected to obtain any advantage from the northern war by any conduct to the prejudice of the emperor and the empire, but, if it could release itself from engagements of that nature with Russia and Prussia and concert action with the king of England, then the support of the latter by sea could always be counted upon; in the contrary case, certainly not. According to the answer received, the six ships left by Admiral Norris in Danish waters would have orders to remain there or to return to England.[2] The reply given was that the tsar had departed neither as an enemy nor as a friend, and no agreement with him had been come to. The king of Denmark was well aware that no offence must be given to the emperor or the empire, and entirely disapproved of the quartering of the Russians in Mecklenburg; but it would be a very serious thing for him to come to a rupture with the tsar, for whom the king of Prussia had declared; the king of England's maritime power was great indeed, but he had not troops in Germany enough to guarantee Denmark's safety.[3] To which it was answered that the king of Denmark must declare open-heartedly and positively, whether he wished to continue in alliance with Hanover, or no.[4]

[1] Leathes, 19 March and 2 April, R. O. Holland 255.

[2] Bothmer, 3 Nov., and the king's rescript in reply, 8 Nov. 1716, Staatsarchiv, Hanover.

[3] Bothmer, 17 Nov.

[4] Rescript to Bothmer, 28 Nov.

For the Danes the situation was one of great anxiety. A fresh invasion of Norway was probable, one of Zealand possible if an English or Russian fleet were not at hand to succour. General Meyer expressed at Berlin the readiness of the king of Denmark now to take the twenty Russian battalions which had been offered, asked for Prussian troops also, and tried to move the court to use its influence in getting the Russians out of Mecklenburg on the ground that otherwise the king of England would do nothing. His master, he said, was willing to invade Scania, if the tsar would make a simultaneous descent from Finland. As to king George's letter last cited, Meyer thought the complaints of the conduct of the Danish court and of its partiality for Prussia and the tsar hard, seeing that its conduct was only inspired by caution, and that the king of England's friendship was earnestly desired.[1]

Frederick William had already advised Frederick IV that much greater dependence could be placed upon the tsar than on the king of England,[2] and Peter himself urged that none could give better help, in case of a renewed attack on Norway, than himself, insinuating that George was not to be trusted, seeing that he had even suggested the removal of the Russian troops into Danish Pomerania or Holstein. In January Peter made proposals for a next year's campaign, with threats, if they were not accepted, similar to those made to George.[3] But Frederick would not come to terms with him. Careful to avoid an open rupture, he preferred the prospect of a good understanding with Hanover and Prussia, in fine, upon a continuance of the treaties of 1715.

After the arrests of Gyllenborg and Goertz new prospects opened, including that of a British declaration of war with Sweden. Söhlenthal in London was sanguine; Bernstorff, he wrote, was all fire and flame.[4] The approaches of the Swedish ministers to Peter were known at Copenhagen, while the overtures begun by George were not as yet suspected. On 6 March Bothmer was able to write that the king of Denmark had that day written to the tsar in Holland refusing the twenty battalions offered him, on the ground that he would no longer bear the blame for the stay of the Russian troops on that plea. Thereupon drafts of treaties with Great Britain and with Hanover were prepared and sent to Copenhagen and were returned amended in April; and Bothmer was informed that full powers had been sent to Söhlenthal to conclude the former. The German treaty, however, he was told,

[1] Whitworth, 22 and 26 Dec. 1716.
[2] Hartman, p. 119.
[3] Holm, pp. 576–77. For the discussions which took place between General Bothmer and Prince Dolgoruky at Copenhagen, see Solov'ev.
[4] Holm, p. 582.

would be kept entirely secret from all the Danish ministers abroad, in order that jealousy on the part of the tsar and the king of Prussia might not be excited.[1]

The draft of the British treaty, to be made for mutual security and convenience and the protection of commerce in the Baltic and the North Seas, provided (1) for joint naval armaments, (2) for payment of a subsidy of 400,000 thalers and of the arrears from the French war, (3) for the annulment of the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls, (4) for the recovery of former Danish possessions in Sweden, (5) for efforts to be made to obtain imperial confirmation to Denmark of the Swedish provinces in Germany now occupied by her and of the duchy of Sleswick. A separate and secret article was concerned with the possibility of land-forces being sent from England in addition to the naval aid. In the Hanoverian draft provision was made for the assembly of a joint force at Bergedorf across the Elbe, while the king of Denmark undertook to hold at king George's disposition at four weeks' notice 10,000 regular troops, 6,000 of them cavalry or dragoons, and the latter to provide 12,000 men of his own and to make up the number to 20,000 by means of imperial and other German contingents. The other clauses engaged the strong support of Hanover for the stipulations of the English treaty. These treaties came to nothing, as we shall see, but the proposals of the latter show the animus prevailing at Hanover during the first half of 1717 against Russia and Prussia.

Frederick William, however, was evincing a desire for the restoration of good relations. He seems to have been fearful, if we may believe the French accounts, of going too far, on account of what action the emperor might take. At the end of March Whitworth reported a discourse by Ilgen on the necessity of restoring a good understanding among the northern allies, and particularly between his own master and the king of England. And when, early in April, Whitworth was transferred to the Hague, he gave an account of what had passed at his audience of leave-taking ;[2] in answer to which " curious and important " despatch, as he styled it, Sunderland expressed " the King's good dispositions and desire to have all misunderstandings entirely healed."[3] The king of Prussia, says Whitworth, gave him a " free and plain " explanation of his grievances. He had given the king of England, he said, early evidence of his friendship in offering him at the time of his accession military help, should it be required. But in return he had only

[1] Bothmer, 10 April 1717.
[2] From Amsterdam, 15 April, R. O. Prussia 7.
[3] 19 April o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 82.

met with "constant opposition and chagrin." He had been very sensible of the proposal made to land the Russian troops at Kammin instead of in Mecklenburg, "as if the interests of a few nobility were to be preferred to his who was a son-in-law." He could not get paid the arrears due to him for his troops, little more than 70,000 crowns being offered him instead of 230,000; he was worse used in this respect than the kings of Denmark or Poland. "In his several law-suits" decrees of the emperor addressed to Hanover "were pressed upon him with the eagerness of a party instead of being warded off or delayed as might be expected from a friend." He had no intention of offending anyone, God forbid, but if he were attacked, he would not be at a loss to make his party good; he had troops and a friend, who, if he had no money, had plenty of men. Everything was required of him, not the least thing offered in return. He was quite ready to reciprocate good feeling, but was "sincere, and went roundly to work, and those who would be well with him must act alike, and use no little acts or fetches of ministers." He held with the proverb, "ein Mann ein Mann, ein Wort ein Wort."

These last reflections, Whitworth went on, chiefly pointed to his treaty with Hanover, "in which he is persuaded he has been led too far, and that his judgment as well as interest has suffered in the negotiation." It seemed that "the principal reason of his declining the interview last autumn was the fear of being pressed on the conditions of the 5th article,[1] which he was resolved not to perform, and yet had not the least excuse or colour to justify the refusal." He would not listen to any reply, preferring to speak rather than to hear.

Whitworth then proceeded to criticize the Prussian ministers. "By this account you will best see, how industrious and successful some persons have been in misleading the King in his opinions. . . . In the King's proceeding there is at least some air of sincerity; but I am afraid you will not ever have that opinion of what passed with Mons. Ilgen." He recounts the interview, roundly accusing the first minister of hypocrisy.[2] Grumbkow, he says, was used by him to sound the king's temper, and influence him by hints

[1] That is, the article providing for the cession to Hanover of Prussian rights and patronage in Brunswick-Lüneburg, see pp. 61, 72.

[2] Cf. General Meyer's report of what Frederick William said to him in 1718, cited by Holm, p. 619: "Il me dit avant de me quitter qu'il n'y avait rien que trompeur dans les maximes politiques d'aujourdhui et que c'était à celui qui s'en acquitterait le mieux." And openly at table: "que les ministres qui trompaient le mieux étaient les plus habiles, et il répéta derechef que ce n'était que généralement tromperie dans toutes les négociations et que cela était usité dans tous les lieux du monde."

the more impressive as they seemed to be undesigned.[1] Dönhoff, however, and Printz had "certainly better intentions, and see with regret the turn their affairs take." In their opinion the fifth article above mentioned was the great stumbling-block, and there was no hope of the king's receding from his resolution in respect thereto. There were over 50,000 men on foot, and the cavalry was being augmented. The magazines were well filled, the artillery in sound order, and five or six million crowns were in the treasury. Yet the army was a great burden, and still inadequate to defend so disjointed a territory. But the king thought this position very formidable. "The disease," Whitworth concluded, "being thus laid open, you will best judge what may be the proper remedies, and how far the cure may be worth the attempt." If that could not be achieved it might be worth while, at any rate, to prevent the sore from festering.

With the above may be compared what Baron Eltz wrote to Bernstorff from Berlin early in the following year.[2] "M^r. Ilgen et M^r. Printzen m'ont assuré avec de grands serments conjointement et séparément que nous n'aurons jamais satisfaction de l'article V du traité, si nous ne nous y prenons d'une autre manière." The king was very indignant both at the arrears not being paid, and especially against Bernstorff in the matter of the three villages. It might be well to hazard £10,000 or £12,000 to see

"si cela pourroit adoucir le chagrin qu'on a contre nous, au moins les ministres prétendent que leur maître a véritablement l'intention d'être bien avec le nôtre. . . . Le maître et les valets sont également dissimulés et ne souhaitent au fond que de nous voir dans l'embarras et dans le malheur. Il faut, M^r, que je vous recommande au reste d'user de beaucoup de circumspection et de ménagement dans les ordres que vous donnez contre les intérêts de la Cour de Prusse. J'ai nié comme un beau menteur ce qu'on m'a reproché là-dessus, mais ils sont avertis de tout et ils se plaignent amèrement que vous les traversez dans les quatre coins du monde."[3]

Eltz had been given, he said, a long list of twenty "griefs," but refused to take it, on the ground that it should be sent to Bonet.

King Augustus of Poland, lastly, desired to unite himself with George in regard to northern affairs. He promised to enter into any separate treaty that he might make with Sweden and to do anything to give satisfaction to him, and expressed the hope that if the war continued he might have part in the honour of delivering the mortal blow.[3] But he could be neglected. Later, when

[1] Confirming what Carlyle says of this minister.

[2] 28 Jan. 1718, quoted by Droysen, *Abhandlungen zur neueren Geschichte*, p. 294.

[3] Whitworth, who advised encouragement, 16 Jan.; Count Nostitz to Robethon, 8 Feb. and 3 March, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, ff. 20, 44. Nostitz was the king of Poland's envoy to Great Britain, but at this time in Dresden.

he found his overtures coldly received, he tried a kind of threat. Count Flemming wrote to Bernstorff (5 June) that his master was ready to enter into the closest relations with the king of England and into all his views whether in regard to affairs of the empire or the pacification of the north, and only awaited overtures. But as the stay of the tsar at Paris furnished material for reflection upon the engagements which he might make with the court of France, and as his propositions there might hinder the king of Poland from being able to take the line he desired, it should be considered whether it was not time for the king of England to speak out clearly and positively. There was nothing that the former would not do for a closer alliance with him, but, if that were refused, he must not be blamed for making more binding the friendly terms which, as was well known, he still maintained with the tsar.[1]

[1] B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, f. 131, original. One matter which gave Augustus anxiety was the disposal of the 30,000 men which the termination of the civil war in Poland had thrown back upon his hands in Saxony. An Anspach regiment in particular was hawked about for hire. The king of Prussia would not agree to its being sent to occupy what was now Danish Pomerania, in support of Augustus's pretensions to that province. He took 600 cavalry into his pay, but that was all. The British government declined to employ any of the troops, on the ground that it would act against Sweden only by sea (Whitworth, 23 Feb. and 3 April; Nostitz, *loc. cit.*).

CHAPTER XV

MEDIATION BY THE REGENT OF FRANCE AND BY THE LANDGRAVE OF HESSE-CASSEL

The arrests of Gyllenborg and Goertz were immediately followed by endeavours on the part of the British government to set itself right in the matter with Charles XII. Intermediaries were found in the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and the regent of France. To the former was despatched James Haldane, accredited since August to the tsar.[1] He arrived at Cassel on 21 February. He seems to have been an eager credulous young man, whose anxiety to please is shown in the portentous length of his reports. The landgrave, he says, received his explanations well, was sure that the king of Sweden would disapprove his ministers' conduct, abused Goertz,[2] earnestly desired to bring about an accommodation between England and Sweden, descanted on the dangerous advance of Russia, and expressed the wish to send a man to Charles to explain the arrests to him in their true light.

Such a man was at hand at Cassel at the moment in the person of Charles's devoted adherent, the distinguished Polish general Poniatowski, and indeed he shortly set out. But the British overtures were not entrusted to him but to General Rank, whom we have seen employed in negotiation with Peter the Great, and who had passed the greater part of February and March in England. Though warned against him by Robethon,[3] Haldane believed his assurances,[4] not being informed that he carried a Russian

[1] His credentials to Cassel, dated 31 Jan. o.s., R. O. King's Letters 19; his despatches, Germany (States) 118. He seems to have been a son of John Haldane, of Gleneagles, Co. Perth, and, if so, was a nephew of Sir John Erskine of Alva, before mentioned, and of Dr. Robert Erskine. He reported on 9 Feb. a most amicable conversation with the latter at Amsterdam.

[2] The landgrave, said Goertz, as we have seen (p. 177), was mainly actuated in his dislike of him by the representations of Axel Sparre and others of the opposing party, and by the belief that he had acted against the interests of Hesse at Vienna (*Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, p. 163).

[3] Haldane, 22 April, private letter.

[4] He "swears himself a true English man and a faithfull servant of His Majesty" (6 April).

as well as a British passport.[1] Rank arrived at Cassel on 1 April, left on the 7th, and was safely with Charles at Lund at the beginning of May.[2]

Haldane was made acquainted with Rank's instructions in regard to Great Britain. Charles was to be informed that, if he would release the English and Dutch ministers[3] and claim his own at the same time, the latter would at once be set free, and further that the landgrave was positively assured that, if the duchies of Bremen and Verden were ceded to Hanover and the reasonable claims on either side in respect of the capture of ships adjusted and liquidated, then the king of England would be ready to execute and renew the defensive treaty of 1700 and to concert measures in accordance therewith, whereby the other lost provinces of Sweden might be recovered. To this end the king of Sweden might send over a confidential minister to treat, or provide the landgrave with full powers and instructions: the negotiation to be secret. Rank was further to represent the inconveniences which the seizure of British ships inflicted upon Sweden itself and to propose that the privateer ordinance, so far as they were concerned, should be withdrawn: otherwise the English prohibition of trade would be continued and the Swedes might soon be without the bare necessaries of life.

The regent of France was not less willing to mediate than was the landgrave, his principal motive being to prevent war between Sweden and Great Britain. That a Frenchman, approved by the king of England, should go to Sweden to negotiate, had been proposed in the previous autumn.[4] Lieut.-Colonel Grubbe had been actually sent, as said.[5] Now was chosen Count Louis Peter De la Marck, a general of distinction,[6] who had been entrusted in the previous year with a secret mission to the tsar.[7] After consulting at the Hague the Pensionary and the British minister, and receiving English and Danish passports, he embarked at

[1] Preis knew of this at the time (*Handlingar*, XVIII. 416), and so did De la Marck (below), but not Whitworth, who, travelling to the Hague, crossed Rank at Hanover: see his despatch of 16 April, R. O. Prussia 7. Haldane learnt the fact five weeks later.

[2] *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 169.

[3] But only Jackson had been arrested.

[4] E.g. Stair to Robethon, 20 Nov. 1716, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 229, f. 268. To this perhaps refers Stanhope's expression, "I am about getting a man sent to Sweden" (16 Oct. 1716, Coxe).

[5] P. 177, note. His arrival at Lund was notified by Jackson, 13 Feb. o.s., 1717, and Campredon, 20 Feb., M.A.E. Suède 138.

[6] "Maréchal du camp" under Villars in 1709, and commander of the left wing at Malplaquet. See Baron Chestret de Haneffe's work on the De la Marck family, and the *Biographie Nationale de Belgique*, XIII. 539.

[7] See pp. 219, 220.

Travemünde on 6 May, was captured by a Danish frigate and detained, and finally reached Lund on the 17th.[1]

The instructions given to him, of date 7 and 28 March,[2] expose to us clearly and conveniently the policy of France in the north. It took little thought of Sweden's welfare. There was one power to be feared, Austria, two to be cultivated, Prussia (in counterpoise) and Great Britain. The emperor, it was stated and repeated, must not be allowed the increase of prestige which would result from his sole mediation in northern affairs. France must share therein, and the king of Prussia and his ally the tsar be brought to desire her good offices. In any negotiation satisfaction to the former would be insisted upon. It was also important to detach him from the tsar and to reconcile the king of England with him, in order that the two might work together for the peace of Lower Germany. Endeavours were being made to bring both these things to pass. But the principal support of France would be given to the interests of the king of England.[3] Prospects of success in this were seriously endangered by what had lately happened. It was to be feared that resentment on the part of the king of Sweden[4] at the arrests of his ministers would drive him into the arms of the tsar to obtain revenge. There would then be war between Great Britain and Sweden, and not only would the latter country be finally ruined but France, in consulting the interests of the former, would be compromised with the other allies of the north.[5] One difficulty was that the French government had never been able to obtain any indication of the intentions of the king of Sweden. His ministers were ignorant of them. Even Goertz, while requesting the good offices of France to procure peace between Sweden and Russia, had pretended that it was for his master's enemies and not for him to put forward conditions. De la Marck must proceed with the greatest caution gradually to bring the king of Sweden to entertain sentiments of peace. He should first of all ingratiate himself, assure Charles of the king of France's interest in his welfare,

[1] See his despatch of 22 May, and General Bothmer's of the 15th, Staatsarchiv, Hanover. I take what follows in regard to De la Marck and Campredon from the French archives, M.A.E. Suède 135 foll.

[2] Printed in the *Receuil des instructions*, Vol. II.

[3] "Sa Majesté se proposoit de ménager principalement les intérêts du roi d'Angleterre dans la paix du Nord."

[4] Who, "quoique rempli de lumières, consulte beaucoup plus son courage que ses forces, et ses disgrâces ont plutôt confirmé sa fermeté qu'elles ne l'ont émoussée."

[5] "Sa Majesté veut en effet ménager l'amitié du roi d'Angleterre en conciliant, s'il est possible, les intérêts de ce prince avec ceux du roi de Suède, et plus ce qui vient de se passer peut éloigner l'exécution de ce projet, plus il y a lieu de craindre que les autres alliés du Nord, s'apercevant par le peu de vivacité de ses offices en leur faveur qu'ils sont subordonnés à d'autres considérations, ne se portent à prendre des mesures et même des engagemens avec l'Empereur pour parvenir à leurs fins, et pour profiter des mouvemens du ressentiment du roi de Suède."

and insinuate that it would be a greater glory to give his people peace than to seek for further victories in arms. He should explain that the regent desired more certain information of the king's views and try to incline him to an understanding with Great Britain, to which Prussia would be a party, or at least privy. The king of England would want Bremen and Verden, the king of Prussia Stettin and its dependencies. But, if an accommodation with Russia were preferred, the tsar would certainly insist upon having Reval, Narva and Viborg, which Sweden could not suffer. The ministers of Great Britain had intimated, informally but sufficiently, that the king of England would be content with Bremen and Verden, and, if they were ceded, would abandon his allies, excepting Denmark, and would furnish to the king of Sweden the succour stipulated in the treaty of 1700 and more, to enable him to recoup himself in other quarters. But the utterances of the said ministers on the subject of Denmark were probably intended only to disarm suspicion in regard to a negotiation in which the Danes had not been invited to take part; were they assured of the cession of the duchies, their support of Danish interests would probably be feeble, and that king might be obliged to disgorge. As to the arrests, as the king of England had not only approved De la Marck's mission but had thanked the king of France for it as a mark of friendship, it had been thought proper to represent to him further that the envoy's hands might be strengthened were he empowered to let it appear, when assuring the king of Sweden of the personal esteem which the king of England entertained for him, that the former would receive evidence thereof so soon as he should explain his sentiments. D'Iberville had been instructed to suggest in London that the king of Sweden would regard it as a mark of personal consideration if Gyllenborg and Goertz were restored to him, and he would inform De la Marck of the result of his suggestion directly, so that the latter might act without delay. The object of the missions of Rank and Poniatowski was to stay precipitate action on the part of the king of Sweden and to represent to him the advantage of reconciliation with the king of England. As it was improbable that either had been sent without being provided with the means of success, D'Iberville had been further ordered to request explanations on this head, and to represent that it was suitable neither to the dignity of the king of France nor to the interests of the king of England that De la Marck, in his like mission of conciliation, should be left in ignorance of what had been confided to them; the advices which De la Marck might expect to receive in this matter would enable him to regulate his conduct therein. To prevent the king of Prussia from allying himself closely with the

ambitious projects of the tsar he must have such assurance of support as should calm his apprehensions of being left without allies, exposed to the enterprises of the court of Vienna or to the resentment of the tsar and perhaps also of the king of Sweden. The best way "fixer ce Prince incertain" was to procure his admission to the Triple Alliance. It was believed that the mistrust existing between him and the king of England, and still more between their respective ministers, was in a fair way to be overcome, and it was known that the Dutch, for the security of their frontier, would regard the admission as a very happy event. De la Marck therefore must unite the interests of these two kings in his negotiation and must apply the same instances in the one case as in the other. While pointing out the dangers threatening Sweden from the tsar, and so on, he must avoid creating the belief that the sole object of his mission was to induce the rejection of ideas of reconciliation which might at present be preferred. No doubt the first overtures for the cession of Bremen and Verden and Stettin would be rejected as impracticable, but nevertheless De la Marck must continue to represent that only thus could the kings of England and Prussia be detached from the league. If he could bring the king of Sweden to the point of confiding the conditions upon which he would be prepared to make concessions, he must report at once, and if they were not such as could serve for a basis for peace, he must insinuate that moments were precious, and must contrive, if possible, some means by which a part of the forces destined to act against the king of Sweden in the coming campaign might be diverted to his service. In the absence of knowledge of the king of Sweden's intentions more particular instructions could not be given; matters must be left to De la Marck's prudence. Another thing which might perhaps drive the king of Sweden to come to terms with the tsar was the British prohibition of trade. If such a thing appeared probable, De la Marck must redouble his exertions to make the former understand the consequences, that similar action would probably be taken by the Dutch, that his alliance with the tsar would cause no disquietude, and that, in fact, he must yield to circumstances and sacrifice his resentment. D'Iberville had been instructed to suggest suspension of the prohibition pending information as to the king of Sweden's disposition. Of the progress of the negotiation consequent upon the overtures made by the king of Prussia and the tsar jointly to enter into alliance with France[1] Châteauneuf was instructed to inform De la Marck fully, and he must give reciprocal information of his own doings.

The attitude of the regent is further illustrated by the failure

[1] See chap. XVII.

of Sparre at Paris to persuade the French court to intervene as the common friend of Sweden and Russia,[1] and by the despatches to Campredon at Stockholm in December and January.[2] Campredon was ordered, if Charles came thither, to express the regent's admiration for him and his hope that he would take serious steps for the conclusion of peace, in which the regent would be glad to help. But nothing specific was to be said; if assurances were asked for, Campredon was to plead want of instructions and to say that he knew that frequent explanations had been made at Paris on the subject for a long time past. He was to intimate regret that Charles was not profiting by the state of his enemies' affairs and that he had taken no steps to aid the friendly efforts of the king of France.

King George does not seem to have been very well pleased with this policy of the regent, as explained to him by D'Iberville. Lord Stair, returning to Paris in May, was instructed to say that the reasons given for an alliance with the tsar and the king of Prussia (the inclusion of the former in the Triple Alliance having been suggested, as well as of the latter) merited much reflection, but that there were grave difficulties. The king of Prussia might be said to be endeavouring to enforce his admission to the Triple Alliance without deigning a single word directly whether of his desire to be so admitted or of what he would do for the king of England if the latter consented. Any engagements which could be undertaken with him and with the tsar would be entirely contrary to the accommodation with Sweden which the French government desired, and any resolution on the subject must be deferred until the disposition of the king of Sweden and the result of De la Marck's mission were known. For the king of England to make further advances to the former would only be to strengthen a prince of his humour in his hostility, especially as it was certain that he was engaged in private negotiation with the tsar. No alarm indeed was entertained at that, it being known that the Russian demands, the cession of Reval in particular, were quite incompatible with the safety of Sweden. The suggestion that something should be done to mollify the king of Sweden's temper was surprising, implying as it did that the king of England had given him some great offence. It was very unpleasant that De la Marck should carry to Sweden such ideas. The whole question was, would Gyllenborg's conduct be avowed or

[1] See, for instance, the account of his interview with the Marquis de Canillac in Torcy's *Memoirs*, I. 869, and his memorials before referred to.

[2] Campredon had been the French minister resident at Stockholm since 1701. He had been previously with the marquis de Bonac at the Hague and had gone with him thence to Sweden and in pursuit of Charles XII to Courland and Livonia. See his memoir. He returned to Paris in this year 1717 at his own request.

disavowed. In the latter case the king of Sweden could not refuse to do justice upon him, in the former he would be restored in exchange for Jackson. Goertz's case was quite different, he could only be considered an adventurer and could not be reclaimed.[1]

A third power, whom the British government attempted to move to pacific intervention in the north, was the Dutch republic, the desire being intimated that the States-General should propose some plan for a general peace. But the reply disclaimed the possibility of separate action and it was suggested that preliminaries should rather be drawn up by the parties to the Triple Alliance jointly. Whitworth mentioned some points which it was considered must form part of such a plan, but thought it would certainly be very difficult to meet the views of everyone.[2] Sunderland wrote further to him that, " as to what a considerable man in Holland let fall to you with relation to overtures for making a treaty in the North," the king would want more specific explanations, particularly as to what the Swedes would desire to be restored " of their territories in Livonia and Germany." This Whitworth had better attend to himself, but any plan for a congress had best " be insinuated by France." [3]

The first despatches from Sweden came from Poniatowski, and Haldane was shown an extract from a letter of Charles of date 26 March o.s., in which he said that he would only liberate Jackson if and when Gyllenborg and Goertz were released with their servants, papers and other property, that orders to return had been sent to them, that complaints of their conduct must be addressed to himself as their lawful judge, and that he would give an equitable decision according to circumstances, but they must be entirely

[1] Private instructions to Lord Stair, 7 May o.s. 1717, R. O. France 161. Stanhope, forwarding to Leathes at the Hague a despatch for De la Marck, had instructed him to say that it was for the king of England to demand reparation for the injury done to him by the Swedish ministers, but that, if other matters could be accommodated upon a just and reasonable footing as already intimated to the landgrave, then, on news of Jackson's safety, Gyllenborg would be released. " By this you will be able to judge how little His Majesty thinks of any satisfaction to be given to the King of Sweden previously to any general treaty to be set on foot " (24 March o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 82).

[2] Sunderland, 25 May o.s., ibid. ; Whitworth in answer, 11 June, Holland 256.

[3] 4 June o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 219, a volume reserved seemingly for very private despatches. De la Marck wrote from the Hague on 2 April about a conference held with Pensionary Heinsius : " Il se croyoit obligé de me faire sçavoir que la Ville d'Amsterdam, qui est la plus intéressée dans le commerce du Nord, ayant insisté prez de luy pour qu'il fît sçavoir par moy au Roy de Suède que la République ne fera là-dessus aucune démarche qui puisse être préjudiciable à ce Prince, à moins que luy mesme ne l'y force par la conduite qu'il auroit avec Elle, il pouvoit estre en repos de ce costé." In regard to England, all that the States-General desired was " aplanir les obstacles qui pourroient empêcher à la paix du Nord, à laquelle eux-mêmes sont plus intéressez que personne." And similarly 9 April.

at liberty to justify themselves.[1] According to Haldane's interpretation, he "was entirely disposed to enter into such measures that were proper for an accommodation . . . did not approve of what his ministers had done, but promised, if His Majesty would send them to him, he would give him satisfaction if they were found guilty." Further negotiation was postponed till Rank's return, and Haldane was desired to procure against that occasion full powers to treat.

But now the young envoy began to suspect that he was being played with, and that if something was told him, much was kept back. For one thing, he became aware of Rank's Russian passport. He understood that despatches from him also had come, but had been kept secret, and that Poniatowski had endeavoured to exasperate Charles against Great Britain and had advised a treaty with Russia. At the end of May he paid a flying visit to Hanover, and heard no good there.[2] President Goertz said for certain that Rank had endeavoured to persuade the king of Sweden to make peace with Russia. Haldane reported further that the Swedes at Cassel were "very uppish . . . and caballing together, as if great matters were a doing among them," and that the rumours of a separate peace with Russia increased every day.[3] Moreover suspicions of his sincerity, prompted, he says, by letters from London, arose on the Hessian side. At an interview on 17 June the landgrave "fell into a very undecent passion, and discovered very different sentiments from what he pretended to have" before, using "bitter invectives against the unjust ennemys of Sweden." On the same day Poniatowski appeared,[4] but professedly without further despatches, his story being that, closely pursued by a Danish "caper," he had thrown them overboard, and having landed near Dantzig had been taken into custody by a bailiff of the king of Poland, who handed him over to a Russian officer, who released him in virtue of the tsar's passport.[5] He reported that everything was granted that was desired, but that his own knowledge of the affair was only general. The landgrave told Haldane that Verden could be ceded.[6] His demeanour, says the envoy, now was altered, and

[1] Copy with Haldane's of 17 May, but the bulk of the letter not deciphered.

[2] "Most of His Majesty's ministers at Hanover doubt very much of his Highness' good intentions towards His Majesty." He (the landgrave) would certainly do nothing against the king of Sweden (3 June).

[3] 10 and 14 June. Whitworth commented on these matters in one of his familiar letters to under-secretary Tilson: "I here send you a letter from Mr. Haldane, you see by that how far he and his Landgraff were out in their Politicks, it looks as if the Landgraf was not in the secret with Sweden" (18 June, R. O. Holland 256).

[4] He had left Lund, De la Marck tells us, on 22 May.

[5] Haldane, 17 June.

[6] 21 June.

was " more than ordinary gracious and civil," as though to make amends.[1]

On 5 July came Rank's despatches, but not himself. He had left Lund on 6 June,[2] but after being long delayed by contrary winds and by the difficulty of crossing—Admiral Byng, in command this year of the Baltic squadron, was requested to see him safely to Travemünde, but refused[3]—his ship was forced by Danish pursuers to run on shore at Borth in Pomerania. He was captured and lodged a prisoner in Stralsund, but there had been time to bury his papers, and his servant, being allowed to proceed, dug them up and took them with him.[4] The principal packet was for Vellingk, conveying to him full powers to treat secretly with England under the landgrave's mediation.[5] Charles offered to pledge parts of Bremen and Verden to Hanover for twenty years, reserving his rights of jurisdiction and vote in the diet. The old alliance was to be renewed, and energetic measures concerted to drive the tsar from the Baltic. Compensation might perhaps be paid for the ravages of privateers, if the like were granted in respect of the Swedish ships made prize in England during the French war. But first and foremost Gyllenborg and Goertz must be released.[6]

These instructions were importantly amplified in a private letter.[7] Vellingk was empowered to put forward as his own suggestion that, if the king of England insisted upon having part of Bremen and Verden in perpetuity, Sweden should be given other territory instead, Danish to wit, the king of Denmark having begun an unrighteous war without any provocation and injured Sweden to the extent of so many millions. To obtain compensation from him was the duty of the king of England under William III's defensive treaty. But it must be taken in land, as Denmark could not pay damages in cash. What would be accepted would be the isle of Bornholm and a strip of Norway at least as far as the Glommen. If the king of England would pledge himself to require the king of Denmark to surrender these, then Charles might cede to him part of the duchy of Verden in proportion, or, if that duchy were not enough, then perhaps a part of Bremen also. Vellingk might point out that the district of Norway required was of greatly

[1] 5 July. The change was partly attributable to news received from De la Marck by way of the Hague.

[2] De la Marck, 6 June.

[3] Polwarth, 29 May.

[4] Haldane, 5 July ; Wich, 2 July, R. O. Hamburg 34. We learn further from Wich that the British ministers exerted themselves on Rank's behalf, but could not obtain his release before 21 August.

[5] Haldane, 5 July ; Carlson, p. 105.

[6] Carlson, ibid. The despatch was dated Lund, 30 April o.s.

[7] *Egenhändiga Bref*, p. 419, same date ; Carlson, ibid.

inferior value to land in Germany by reason of its barrenness, but that Charles desired it to rectify his frontier and because it formerly belonged to the province of Båhus. The cession would not affect English trade, as the only port on that piece of coast was Hall (Frederikshald), which obtained all its supplies from Sweden, and besides was now in ruins and its harbour choked with sunken vessels. The terms proposed might be embodied in a secret treaty or article. But if this scheme did not find acceptance, and the king of England would not be content with less than a mortgage of the whole of the duchies, then in absolutely the last resort Vellingk might offer this for as large a sum as their revenues warranted and for the time specified, the king of Sweden keeping his seat and vote in the diet, his directorship of the circle of Lower Saxony, his jurisdiction in both duchies and all other rights therein, and so much of their revenues as should be necessary to carry on the administration. But, if both duchies were pledged, no part of them could be ceded, even for compensation in Norway, and, on the other hand, if some compensation were given, they could not be entirely pledged.[1]

At the same time that these instructions went to Vellingk others of even date empowered Preis at the Hague to negotiate with Russia. He was to desire a complete restoration of Swedish provinces with satisfactory recoupment of other losses suffered by the war, or, alternatively, a truce for twenty or thirty years, during which time the tsar should be left in undisturbed possession of St. Petersburg and of communication thence with his dominions. But all other Swedish places must be restored, and Marshal Rehnsköld must be set free.[2]

With the above may be compared two memorials which Goertz had presented at Paris in January.[3] The king of Sweden, he said, objected to a general congress on the ground of the imperial claim to decide the question of the German provinces. Separate negotiation with Russia or Great Britain would be preferred. Prussia might be satisfied with Stettin; Denmark and Poland could be neglected. He put forward as acceptable the following preliminaries: the king of England to have Bremen and Verden on the footing of an "achat de rétrovendition" for a certain term and

[1] "När bägge härtigdömmen skulle blifva förpantade, så kan intet något cederes deraf till Konungen i Englandh, fast än han ville påtaga sig at förskaffa oss något vederlag uti Norje. Däremot ock när något vederlag gifves, så kunna bägge härtigdömmen intet helt ock hållet förpantas." The passage is hard to understand.

[2] Carlson, p. 106. This despatch, he says (p. 107, note), was sent off on 20 May o.s.

[3] Printed in the *Receuil des instructions*, as "notes additionelles" to De la Marck's instructions. There is in the French archives a mass of papers relating to Goertz's negotiations at Paris (Suède 138).

sum, the king of Prussia Stettin and as little as possible else of Swedish Pomerania, the tsar St. Petersburg and a sufficient portion of Carelia and Ingria therewith, excluding Narva and Viborg. The provisions of the treaty of Westphalia to be applied in the case of the provinces taken by Denmark and in that of Holstein, but Great Britain not to be pressed to force Denmark to give up Sleswick.

Soon after the arrival of Rank's despatches Haldane took upon himself to return unauthorized to London, to explain the situation to Sunderland by word of mouth. He did this, he told Whitworth, at the instance of the landgrave, and as " the only means he saw of coming to the bottom of the Swedish intentions and knowing the certainty and extent of Count Welling's commission." [1] That he did not fall into disfavour by his venture is shown by his further employment in the following year.

De la Marck's first despatches reached Paris on 12 June, and their contents enabled the following communication to be made through D'Iberville:

" Le Roy de Suède ne pourroit faire aucune déclaration formelle au Roy d'Angleterre, qu'il n'a eu aucune part aux projets de ses ministres, sans blesser sa dignité qu'il regarde comme vivement offensée dans ce qui s'est passé à leur égard, et qu'il seroit injurieux pour luy d'entrer en justification sur une chose dont on ne peut pas croire qu'il ait esté jamais capable ; mais que les déclarations que ses ministres auroient ordre de faire de sa part dans les cours étrangères doivent effacer jusqu'au moindre soupçon qu'il ait eu part aux prétendus desseins qu'on luy a imputez sur l'Angleterre, et que par conséquent le Roy de la Grande Bretagne doit être porté à luy renvoyer le Comte de Ghilembourg dont il fera bonne justice s'il a abusé son caractère ; qu'enfin il renvoyeroit aussy le Sr. Jackson." [2]

This was not sufficient for king George. He insisted that a formal and specific declaration should be made in a manner suitable to the importance of the affair, that nothing appeared of any inclination on the king of Sweden's part to peace, and that he could not even consider the release of the Swedish ministers until that king had " by a declaration from himself made and signed according to the forms of that Court disowned all the proceedings of Goertz and Gyllenborg against his Majesty and the nation." [3] But in consequence, mainly, of the growing feeling in Holland against the further detention of Goertz he consented to an expedient which should " shorten the affair," expressing his willingness to accept from the regent as mediator a formal declaration to the effect

[1] Whitworth to Tilson, 23 July.
[2] Dated Paris, 16 June 1717, R. O. Foreign Ministers 2, Lamberty, X. 70.
[3] Sunderland to Whitworth, 11 June o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 82.

that the king of Sweden disowned the practices of his ministers, and on receipt of such to release Gyllenborg, Jackson to be set free at the same time. Punishment of the former would be left to the king of Sweden, whose honour was principally concerned. The latter should return in the ship which carried Gyllenborg to Sweden. In regard to Goertz, though "neither a subject nor a minister of the King of Sweden," a like concession would be made, it being "determined to go all lengths that the nature of such a proceeding can possibly admit of." He also should be sent back to Sweden, but in view of his character and behaviour must not return to Holland whether with credentials or without.[1]

The expedient proposed was accepted by the regent after the receipt of further despatches from De la Marck on 10 July. He formally declared his knowledge that the king of Sweden neither before nor now had any intention of disturbing the quiet of Great Britain, that he had no part in any of the designs attributed to his ministers and regarded as injurious the mere suspicion of it, and that when his ministers were restored to him he would enquire into their conduct and do justice upon them if they had abused their powers.[2] Gyllenborg was thereupon released and after a time placed on board a frigate and conveyed to Gothenburg. There was delay in the release of Jackson, because Gyllenborg's papers had not been returned, as stipulated; but De la Marck eventually obtained it, and he landed at Harwich on 10 October o.s.[3]

The feeling in Holland about the continued detention of Goertz at Arnhem came near to cause a serious breach between Great Britain and the republic. His brother-in-law Count Reventlow and other Holsteiners, with Preis, Poniatowski and others, worked sedulously for his release, and the States of Gelderland desired to be rid of him. On the other hand Leathes, Whitworth and L'Hermitage (of whom below) had made every possible effort to obtain his removal to a place of custody in the province of Holland. But they could obtain neither this, nor the examination of his papers. Feeling in the country in his favour became almost irresistible when the news was received from De la Marck and Rank of the attitude taken up by Charles, and further of his readiness, if Goertz were released, to grant the Dutch all the advantages and satisfaction they could wish for their trade.[4] It was formally

[1] Sunderland to Whitworth, 18 June o.s., R. O. ibid.; Addison to Stair, 18 and 24 June o.s., Foreign Entry Book 29.

[2] Declaration by D'Iberville, 20 July, ibid. and Foreign Ministers 2 and France 161; Lamberty, X. 71, 81. The whole set forth in a despatch to De la Marck of 17 July.

[3] R. O. Sweden 22.

[4] As in De la Marck's despatch of 22 May.

intimated to Whitworth that the States-General would be glad to arrange with the king of England for the baron's release. The French ambassador pointed out the proof that would be given of the king's justice and generosity, while the Pensionary drew attention to the general approval of the king of Sweden's frankness and said that the release could not be long delayed. But in reply Sunderland instructed Whitworth to hold firm, adding that the Dutch seemed to build too much on general expressions, that the desire to release Goertz was premature and unreasonable, and that the king of England would look upon such an act as a violation of the treaties.[1] After long arguments Heinsius and Whitworth parted " in no good humour, each of us sticking to his opinion, though agreed to prevent, if it was possible, such a dangerous misunderstanding." The latter then urged upon his government the advisability of concession, the States-General being really " in a ferment " ; only, he says, " the prudence and coolness of some persons could have kept them in a tolerable temper so long." He had softened, he said, to a great extent the terms of his instructions. Thereupon came a further despatch approving of his conduct in so doing, and informing him of the expedient devised in concert with the regent. " On the whole matter the King has resolved to go all the lengths he possibly can in this affair to make it end as easy as may be to the States without prejudice to His Majesty's own honour." The condition of release would be that Goertz should be put on board ship and sent direct to Sweden, and never return. In consequence of this Whitworth could write, " the satisfaction is now as general, as the uneasiness seemed to be some days before," and that the States-General had separated without taking any action. And when news came that the regent had consented to make the declaration asked matters were well in train for a settlement, and discussions turned upon the manner of it.

But suddenly all was upset. Reventlow and the other friends of Goertz obtained from the States of Gelderland a resolution for his release,[2] and set free he was on 2 August. Everybody protested ; the British government and Whitworth in strongest terms, but also the States of Holland, the burgomasters of Amsterdam (although the merchants of that city had been urgent for the release), and even the deputies from Arnhem ; but nothing could be done against the sovereign rights of the provincial parliament, in which the votes of the last-named had been outweighed. Sunderland had

[1] 11 June o.s.

[2] " The faction in Guelderland has spoiled the whole affair by the precipitate release of Baron Goertz just when all was winding up to mutual satisfaction " (Whitworth, 3 Aug.).

to advise Whitworth that the king thought it of his honour to concern himself no further in the matter, and that Goertz must be left to find his way to Sweden as best he could.[1] The other Dutch captive, the younger Gyllenborg, was set free about the middle of September, king George being tired of the cost of keeping him. As to the papers, Whitworth was ordered not to concern himself further about them, but to leave them to the Dutch to deal with as they pleased.[2]

[1] Fully on the above in Whitworth's despatches and Sunderland's replies; also Lamberty, X. 73 foll.

[2] Whitworth, 14 Sept.

CHAPTER XVI

ACTION AGAINST SWEDEN IN 1717

THE measures which had been adopted by the British government in regard to Sweden during this time only lacked the name of war. Perhaps worse was found in Gyllenborg's papers than was anticipated; certainly news came from Copenhagen which made the danger from the "conspiracy" appear real. On 6 February Polwarth wrote that the Swedes were equipping their fleet in Carlskrona with all diligence and were sending seamen to Gothenburg, on the 20th he confirmed the news, adding that the Danish fleet would not be ready to oppose them, and on 2 March he wrote, "it is certain that Schonen is shock full of troopes, and the king of Sweden has made secure all ships of Carlscron, Helsinborg, and Gothenborg and equipped his fleet at Carlscron and Gothenborg with all diligence and makes preparation for embarking of troops." If he would pass the Sound, there was none to stop him. Twenty-six ships of the line lay at Carlskrona, two large and four smaller ones at Gothenburg. And on the same date General Bothmer advised that it was not to be doubted but that the king of Sweden intended to bring the Carlskrona fleet to Gothenburg, and to cross (to Scotland) with 10,000 or 12,000 men. These last despatches reached London on 1 March o.s.[1]

It had been intended in any case to send a fleet to the Baltic.[2] But whereas in previous years some twenty vessels had been deemed sufficient and the end of May early enough for them to start, now orders issued for the equipment of over thirty to sail as soon as possible, and the instructions given to the admiral had no regard to the protection of trade—the merchantmen were to come with other warships later—but solely to the prevention of a Swedish invasion. One man-of-war, the *Deal Castle*, Captain Willis, was

[1] Polwarth's despatches, R. O. Denmark 37. Jackson reported on 13 Feb. o.s. only 5,000 men available to man the Swedish fleet; at Stockholm one ship of 56 guns, one of 48, one of 40, two of 36, and some dozen smaller; at Gothenburg two of 50, three frigates, and four galleys; at Carlskrona nineteen serviceable, viz. :— two of 90 guns, five of 70, two of 64, one of 60, and nine of 56 to 50. But this despatch did not reach London till 16 April o.s.

[2] Cf. Michael, p. 736.

hurried off at once to see what was doing in Gothenburg.[1] He was prevented from looking into that port by bad weather, but going on to Copenhagen he learnt that it held two 50-gun ships and ten smaller ones[2] and upwards of 100 merchantmen, none of the latter, however, fitting out as transports, so far as was known, nor any troops there except the garrison. As to Danish armaments, three of the line and some small frigates were off the coast of Norway, while another squadron of like strength had lately gone out to cruise off Gothenburg; at Copenhagen were seven vessels of from 90 to 60 guns "without the boom," and within it two three-deckers, two 70's and two 60's getting ready, but not likely to put to sea before the middle of May. There was no news of ships sailing or about to sail out of Carlskrona.[3]

The British fleet was ready by the end of March, but before taking account of its doings we must notice another measure of offence, from which more effect, perhaps, was hoped than from a demonstration or attack in arms. One fact learnt from Gyllenborg's papers was that very great want of corn prevailed in Sweden. The scarcity was mainly caused by the loss of Finland and the interruption of trade from such ports as Königsberg and Dantzig, for the home-harvests had of late years been good. Gyllenborg during the autumn had made great efforts to send supplies from Great Britain;[4] rye was most wanted, and iron was to be taken at Gothenburg in exchange; Goertz provided passes and promised special privileges in the custom-house. A few ship-loads were actually sent. Under these circumstances it was determined to attempt to reduce Charles to submission by threat of famine. The first measure of the session was a bill to enable the king to prohibit by proclamation trade with Sweden. It received the royal assent on 28 February o.s., and the first proclamation issued two days later.[5] It was a rash measure, for it could not be effective without the concurrence of the Dutch, whose Baltic trade was twice as great as that of Great Britain. Efforts to obtain such concurrence

[1] His instructions, 1 March o.s., R. O. Admiralty, Out-Letters, Orders and Instructions 48.

[2] The *Hamstad*, 50 guns, 400 men, 30 of them taken from the wrecked British man-of-war *Auguste*; the *Fredrik*, 48 guns, 300 men, mostly English and Dutch; the *Eastlandfare*, 36 guns, 250 men, formerly an English galley; a Dutch dogger, 6 guns, 60 men, of whom 18 English; a brigantine, 16 guns and 100 men, a good sailer; an English galley, 10 guns, 80 men, formerly the *Onslow*; and six French square-sterned doggers, 6 to 8 guns and 60 to 80 men apiece, fitted out in France.

[3] Copies of Willis's despatches, 26 and 30 March 1717, R. O. Admiralty, Secretary's Dept., In-Letters 4100.

[4] An allusion to this in the *Lockhart Papers*, II. 7.

[5] *London Gazette*, Nos. 5516–17. A like prohibition in regard to the importation of corn and salt into Sweden from Lübeck, Dantzig, and other neutral ports was made by Denmark (Whitworth, 20 March; *London Gazette* No. 5522).

had been begun early in February, when Stanhope wrote to resident Leathes (Cadogan having returned to England), that whereas Sweden was in " an extreme want of corn," which could only be furnished from the British isles or Holland, the king judged it for the public service to prohibit importation from the former, and hoped that the States-General would pass a similar enactment. Leathes was to urge the matter upon the Pensionary and to point out to him " that at present there is no trade between Holland and Sweden but by passports from Baron Goertz, who takes care to give them only for vessels laden with corn." Stanhope continued to press the matter in further despatches.[1]

Leathes in reply reported the result of an interview with Buys, the leader of the Amsterdam commercial party, who objected that to adopt such a measure might not only involve the country in war but also quicken an arrangement between Sweden and the tsar, already too powerful in the north. Moreover, if Great Britain and Holland prohibited the importation of corn, France would benefit and supply it. Then, in March, Leathes presented a formal memorial on the subject. But on the 26th he had to report that they of Amsterdam would consent to nothing of the kind until it was seen whether the king of Sweden avowed or disavowed the conduct of his ministers, but were pleased enough with the English prohibition, as likely to benefit themselves. And on 6 April he advised that fear was entertained in Holland that very ill effects would arise, were the British fleet proceeding to the Baltic to stop the passage of neutral vessels to Sweden, and that, if seizures of Dutch vessels were made, justice would certainly be demanded; it was hoped therefore that instructions to that effect would not be given.[2]

The Dutch then kept steadily to their policy hitherto pursued, to do nothing which might involve them in the northern war or put their trade to further disadvantage. Their financial position could not afford war; the trade, even under existing restrictions, was large and of very great importance. All the efforts of Leathes and Whitworth, when the latter reached the Hague, had no result. The British government found that its hasty action had placed it in a difficulty. Ministers would no doubt gladly have received a declaration from Charles, behind which they could retreat. But he gave none, preferring to preserve indignant silence. King George determined to try what he could do by the mission of a person who might have more influence than his British envoys.

[1] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 82; the quotation is from a despatch of 5 Feb. o.s. In addition to other arguments appeal was to be made to the treaty of February 1716, which engaged help ' etiam si quisquam e vicinis arma in unum vel alterum Foederatorum paraverit minasve illi intenderit " (22 Feb. o.s.).

[2] Leathes, Feb. to April 1717, R. O. Holland 255. Cf. Lamberty, X. 35–37.

This was L'Hermitage, a Dutchman long resident in London in a quasi-official position [1] and devoted to the Hanoverian cause. He was charged not only to press for the prohibition, but to discuss other matters, conditions, namely, for joint action in regard to Russia, Prussia and France. But his mission was so entirely confidential that these charges were kept private even from Whitworth and Leathes, to whom he only stated that, having been obliged to come to Holland for his health, he had been commissioned to represent to his friends there the necessity of ending the northern war. He landed in Holland on 26 April.

Full particulars of his doings may be read in his private despatches to Bernstorff.[2] He could only report that in his opinion the Dutch would not join in measures either for the prohibition of trade, fearing to be involved thereby in war, or for the expulsion of the Russians from Germany, and that in any case they would wait to know the result of De la Marck's mission. He had to listen to sundry complaints against England, the departure of Norris from the Baltic in the previous autumn without waiting for the Dutch, the recourse of Algerian pirates to Gibraltar, the imposts upon trade in Bremen and Verden since the Hanoverian occupation, the non-payment of the arrears owing for military service, and lukewarmness in the matters of the Barrier and of the dispute with the elector of Cologne about Liège and Bonn. At length Bernstorff wrote to him, 24 May o.s., that nothing further could be done, seeing that " l'Estat a pris des résolutions contraires aux intérests du Roy dans une occasion des plus importantes qui pourroit jamais arriver, et que tout ce que l'on leur peut représenter n'est pas bien écouté." He returned to England about the middle of June.

Another matter discussed with the Dutch government was that of the Swedish privateers, whose ravages had continued. In a petition of the Russia Company of 5 February o.s.[3] we find the sum of £45,700 claimed as damages additional to the £69,000 demanded two and a half years before. They were out this year early. Leathes reported on 13 February that they were daily threatening the fishermen of Scheveningen and the Maas. The Harwich packet was taken on 19 March. Captain Willis, on his voyage out, had retaken a Dutch flyboat and an English hoy, which were being sent to Gothenburg as prizes of a pink whose master, a rebel, was proceeding to St. Malo to bring away a ship

[1] Onno Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart*, XIV. 467. L'Hermitage seems to have been attached to the duke of Portland.
[2] B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, ff. 78 etc.
[3] R. O. Russia 107.

of 36 guns bought for him there.[1] By 9 April twenty-two prizes were reported taken into Gothenburg, reducing the price of salt there to 4½ rix-dollars the "tonne."[2] Another packet boat was taken about the middle of the month.[3]

What was proposed was a convention against allowing the privateers to be equipped, or their prizes disposed of, in the ports of either country. Drafts were prepared, one, for instance, providing that, in case of the recapture of a prize by a Dutch or English ship, the rescuer should be paid a part of its value.[4] Success was expected, when the burghers of Amsterdam presented a petition for actual seizure of the privateers,[5] but no agreement was arrived at. To objections similar to those recounted was added the argument that in such a matter France must join.[6] But solicitations at Paris[7] were answered that the existing laws were sufficiently protective. Granted, wrote Sunderland, were the "Ordonnance de Marine" strictly executed.[8] Nor did representations to the emperor in regard to the ports of the Austrian Netherlands meet with better success. Leathes, now at Brussels, had interviews and delivered memorials,[9] and Stanyan at Vienna did the like. But the latter received answer that the emperor must maintain his character as a neutral prince, and could not interfere.[10] Endeavours lastly at Madrid met with replies as cold.[11]

The British fleet sailed from the Thames on 2 April o.s. It was commanded by Sir George Byng, the future victor of Cape Passaro, Sir John Norris having obtained permission to stay

[1] Willis, *loc. cit.*, 26 March. Perhaps this "fly-boat" was the Harwich packet, whose mails were taken to St. Malo. Secretary Crawfurd in a memorial on the subject (29 April, R. O. France 161) says that the captain of the privateer was a Scottish rebel named Moorcroft, called "Le Trompeur," that the crew was chiefly French, and the commission from Goertz.

[2] R. O. News-Letters 119. [3] Whitworth, 20 April, R. O. Holland 256.

[4] *Project of a Convention for salvage of ships retaken from the Swedes*, R. O. Foreign Ministers 22. A draft of a convention proposed by the British government, of date 1 May o.s., Foreign Entry Book 82. Lamberty (X. 149) prints a *Résolution pour une Convention avec la France et l'Angleterre sur les prises faites par les Suedois*, 25 May.

[5] Whitworth, 23 and 27 April, Sunderland, 23 April o.s.

[6] Whitworth, 21 May.

[7] Methuen, 7 and 25 March o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 29; Crawfurd, April and May, France 161. The latter called particular attention to a privateer equipping at St. Malo, to a ship with powder there ostensibly for Madagascar, and to a Swedish man-of-war arrived at Brest.

[8] 14 May o.s.

[9] Sunderland, 2 and 19 April o.s.; Leathes, 20 April, R. O. Holland 255, with enclosures on the subject.

[10] Stanyan, 7 July, R. O. Germany (Empire) 34. But in the autumn complaints of the Ostenders themselves, refused redress by the king of Sweden, obtained from the emperor letters of reprisal for them (Whitworth, 26 Oct., R. O. Holland 258).

[11] Methuen and Addison to Bubb, 28 March and 30 June o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 136.

on shore this summer on account of private affairs. Sir George hoisted his flag on the *Barfleur*, 90. With him were the *Cumberland* and *Shrewsbury*, 80, flying the flags of Rear-Admirals James Littleton and William Caldwall, four 70-gun ships, five of 60, and thirteen of 50, besides three frigates, four fire-ships, and a hospital ship ; a fine fleet. Other men-of-war were to come later with the convoy.

The admiral was instructed to proceed first to Gothenburg, to discover what ships of war and transports might be in that port. If he found that the Carlskrona fleet had arrived there, he was to attack, if practicable ; otherwise to blockade and press for the immediate despatch of the Danish fleet to join him. If he found that the Swedes were already " in their passage for Britain," and that he had missed them, he was to return to the first British port he could fetch and endeavour to get intelligence of and come up with them. But if they had not passed the Sound he was to leave a sufficient number of ships to blockade Gothenburg and himself proceed to Copenhagen. The blockading squadron was to seize all vessels out of Gothenburg and all other Swedish ships it might meet with, and all ships of other nations proceeding thither or to any other Swedish port ; the prizes to be sent to Copenhagen. On arrival there Byng was to acquaint the king of Denmark with his orders to join his fleet, which it was hoped would soon be ready, and further to declare that unless it were so, and of sufficient strength to enable the joint fleet to attack the Swedes, he must retire and concentrate his whole force off Gothenburg, which he was also to do in case he had advice that the Swedes were likely to put to sea and proceed to the Sound with a force superior to his before the Danes were ready to join him. But, if duly reinforced by them, he was to do his best to prevent the Carlskrona fleet from passing the Sound, " which is the great principal service you are to have in your view at this juncture " ; and to that end he was to proceed to Carlskrona with the Danes and attack or at least blockade the port. " And you are to joyn in all such operations with the Danes as may most effectually annoy the Swedish fleet, and prevent their country from being supplied with provisions," but at the same time " to favour and protect the ships of all nations in amity with Great Britain which shall not be bound to any port of Sweden." [1]

[1] R. O. King's Letters 65, 11 March o.s. Polwarth also was instructed to represent prudently to the Danish court the ill consequences which would ensue to its interests were the fleet not ready to join Byng (Foreign Entry Book 5). He reported on 6 April an interview with the king on the subject, and on the 10th the promise that fifteen of the line should be ready in the following week. Nine large ships, he had previously written (27 March), were already in the roads (Denmark 37).

Sending these instructions to Byng Stanhope explained that, after the junction of the fleets, such arrangements should be made that, "each nation retaining the separate commands of their respective squadrons, this may bring no obstruction to the publick service." If the Russians desired his help, he was to say that the strict friendship between Great Britain and the emperor, lately confirmed by an alliance, "cannot permit his Majesty to give such directions to his fleet as may be construed to be an aiding and abbetting the proceedings of the Muscovites, whilst they forcibly continue to take quarters for their troops in the Empire." If the tsar, having withdrawn his troops, asked for assistance in removing his galleys from Rostock to the coasts of Poland and Livonia, Byng was to reply that his orders to destroy or block up the Swedish fleet would secure a passage as effectually as if he lent a convoy. And "I am further by his Majesty's command to acquaint you, that as by your instructions you are directed to attack the Swedish ships, you are to understand this in such a manner as that you are to endeavour to burn, sink, destroy or take all such ships belonging to Sweden as may come in your way." [1]

Byng reached Copenhagen roads on Thursday, 22 April, having left five 50-gun ships and two frigates to cruise off Gothenburg to watch that port and intercept privateers. Little of interest attaches to his expedition, and we can dispose of it at once.[2] He found that the idea of an invasion of Great Britain, if ever it had existed, had been laid aside, and that warlike preparations in Gothenburg were abandoned; and, when he got into the Baltic, the Carlskrona ships kept carefully out of his way. Eleven of them had appeared in Kjöge Bay on 14 April, flouting Copenhagen and seizing provision-boats from Holstein, but on the wind changing a day or two later Admiral Gabel had gone out with eight of the line and some frigates, and the Swedes had returned to harbour.[3] At first, indeed, Byng's attention was directed to the Russians rather than to the Swedes. Polwarth wrote on 1 May that they were marking out an encampment near Wismar, and that it was probable that their galleys on leaving Rostock would make an attempt thereon. It was presumably in consequence of this that king George proposed to the king of Denmark the immediate despatch of troops by sea and land to

[1] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155, 11 March o.s.

[2] Authorities (Record Office): Byng's despatches, S.P. Dom. Naval 84, Stanhope's and Sunderland's to him and to Polwarth, Foreign Entry Books 155 and 5, Polwarth's from Copenhagen, Denmark 37 and 38, and Admiralty, Secretary's Dept., In-Letters 4100, Out-Letters, Orders and Instructions 48. Sunderland replaced Stanhope as secretary of state for the northern province towards the end of April. Byng dates in the old style, Polwarth in the new.

[3] Polwarth, 17, 20 and 24 April.

occupy Wismar.[1] In accordance with Sunderland's orders,[2] and when he could not persuade the Danes to act in the matter singly, Byng took preventive measures in conjunction with them. He detached some vessels to Rostock and the officer in command actually entered the harbour, much to the surprise of the Russians. However what was apprehended did not happen; when the galleys sailed, Byng, in accordance with further orders, facilitated their course,[3] and on 7 July o.s. could report them arrived off Rügen.[4]

The first thing discussed on Byng's arrival at Copenhagen was what enterprise against Sweden should be undertaken. An attack upon Carlskrona was decided upon, if feasible, in preference to the easier but less consequential one on Gothenburg. On 18 May he sailed to join Gabel in Kjöge Bay, and it was determined to move on to Hanö to gain intelligence and intercept supplies. Gabel, appointed to office, was now replaced at sea by Admiral Raben. On arrival at the island a line of cruisers was stretched across past Oeland to Gothland and others sailed for the Pomeranian coast, while the admirals went to inspect Carlskrona in person. They were back in Kjöge Bay on 1 July. As a result of their report the project of attacking the well-defended harbour was abandoned, and a descent on Oeland and Gothland mooted instead. Byng went so far as to say, "I imagin they really never thought of attempting Carlscroon, since they could not but know that place before we went to see it," and that the Gothland project seemed to him designed for a diversion and some plundering. At a second conference on 8 July he called attention to the dispersal of his men-of-war—six in the Cattegat, five with frigates wanted for convoys eastwards, two disabled—and desired therefore that the Danes should undertake any expedition against Gothland alone, himself staying with the remaining force to watch Carlskrona. But this proposal being declined, he consented to lend the Danes two of his ships for the attack. But the plan was forestalled; at the beginning of August came the news that a Russian force had landed on the island; and thereupon Danish ideas turned to the defence of Norway.[5]

[1] Rescript to General Bothmer, 25 May, Staatsarchiv, Hanover.

[2] 1 and 7 May o.s.

[3] Sunderland, 11 June o.s., Byng, 25 June o.s.

[4] They reached Dantzig on 29 July, forty-three in number (Polwarth, 10 Aug.; Sir Richard Vernon, 17 Aug., R. O. Poland 24).

[5] Eight battalions of foot and two regiments of horse sailed for Norway on 7 Aug. (Polwarth, 10 Aug.). "The King," Sunderland wrote to Byng on 9 Aug. o.s., "was very glad to see that the Muscovites have succeeded in their attempt upon Gotland, since the Danes seem now thereupon to turn their thoughts towards the defence of Norway, which according to the present situation of affairs is the best thing that can happen for the service." And similarly to Polwarth, same date.

In the meantime a detachment under Captain Saunders of the *Superb* had appeared in Dantzig. He reported[1] that three Swedish men-of-war had appeared in the roads shortly before his arrival, had carried off a Danish man-of-war caught unprepared without her guns, and had " put a full stopp to the trade." He found two Muscovite vessels in the mouth of the bay examining all ships entering, on the pretext of preventing trade with Sweden. A British ship had been seized by them within the harbour, and a merchant shot dead.[2] The magistrates of the city said they were powerless to interfere, because of the Russian army camped outside their walls.[3] Returning, Saunders picked up a small privateer off Oeland, and next day, 28 June, came up with a Swedish man-of-war.[4] Attacked by two of his 50-gun ships with two others in support the Swede made a gallant fight, partially disabling one of her assailants and killing thirteen English and wounding about the same number, including two officers. But she was overmastered, and her crew were sent prisoners to Copenhagen.

But at home the uselessness of maintaining so large a fleet in the Baltic had become apparent. Orders had already been sent to Byng to send home seven of his ships, if in his discretion he could spare them, since otherwise " the necessary expense will exceed very much what parliament has provided for." Two of them might escort any merchantmen ready to return, the ships specially appointed to convoy the Baltic trade remaining for that service. On this head Byng should maintain a general watchfulness, particularly in regard to the port of Dantzig, but for the rest he must devote himself to perform the other services intended.[5] And he was now ordered, and this time not only on account of expense but because the tsar was " seeming to come into measures with the King," to send home as many more ships as he should deem

[1] 13 and 18 June o.s., with Byng's despatches.

[2] The ship was the *Unity* of Anstruther, N.B., freighted with iron from Stockholm by two British merchants there, and to return from Dantzig with hemp. The man killed was a Dantzig merchant named John Wightman. Full accounts of the affair by Sir Richard Vernon, 21 July, *loc. cit.*, and in the Norris papers, B. M. Add. MSS. 28155, f. 41.

[3] The Russian threats against Dantzig were an important subject of political argument at this time. There were demanded of the city five frigates and 500,000 rix-dollars by way of fine, while a Russian commissary with a sufficient guard was stationed in the port to visit all vessels going in or out (accounts with Sir Richard Vernon's despatches).

[4] " A new ship never at sea before, of a particular built of a deck and a half," 24 18-pounders, 12 8-pounders, 283 men ; commander, Captain Ulrick.

[5] Sunderland, 31 May o.s. Similar instructions came to Byng from the admiralty in regard to the traders loading in Dantzig, Königsberg and Riga, 7 June o.s.

consistent with the safety of the squadron. Ten of the line were thought sufficient to keep the Swedes in check.[1]

On receipt of his first orders Byng had shifted his flag to the *Burford*, 70, and had sent home his three three-deckers and the two 50-gun ships disabled. Now he sent further the *Yarmouth*, 70, the *Dreadnought*, 60, and three of his fire-ships. Others, he said, would follow at once or with the convoys, the last of which was expected to sail the first week in September. He would keep with him three of 70 guns, three of 60 and four of 50, while two others of 50 and the *Lynn*, 40, would remain to cruise off the Skaw or assist, if necessary, the Danish squadron in those waters, greatly weakened by accident.[2]

That is all there is to record of Byng this year, unless it be the desire he expressed to continue to serve at sea in lieu of reappointment to the Board of Admiralty, his pretexts therefor being his freedom at sea from asthma and the unpleasantness of serving at the Board under gentlemen he was not in favour with.[3] He remained cruising in the Baltic till the middle of October and left Copenhagen for England on 12 November, leaving behind him three ships to bring home what traders were yet to come, and three to continue to cruise upon the Norway coast. The last-named at the end of November put in to Copenhagen for provisions. They sailed again, when the last traders arrived on 3 December.[4] The year ended in disaster, for on the 28th H.M.S. *Sorlings* was wrecked on the isle of Borkum, and only Captain Goodall and 35 of his crew were saved out of 180.

The military and naval operations, then, of the year were of small importance. The Russian pillaging of Gothland, the English capture of a cruiser, the unsuccessful Danish assaults by the brave Tordenskjold on Gothenburg and Strömstad complete their tale. We return to the more interesting field of diplomacy.

[1] Sunderland, 10 and 26 July o.s.

[2] From the *Burford* off Bornholm, 15 Aug. o.s.

[3] 17 May and 10 Sept. o.s. Admiral Aylmer is referred to.

[4] Polwarth, 13 and 27 Nov., 4 and 11 Dec. The necessity for convoy even in the North Sea is shown by a report from Dunkirk of 30 Sept. of a Swedish privateer arrived there, commanded by a Jacobite named Errington, which on its voyage from Gothenburg had picked up two British prizes (R. O. Admiralty, Secretary's Dept., In-Letters 4100).

CHAPTER XVII

NEGOTIATIONS WITH PETER THE GREAT, 1717

PETER THE GREAT stayed in Holland till 30 March. He then boarded his yacht at Rotterdam and made his way with various adventures, visiting the chief towns of interest, to Dunkirk, and thence by land to Paris, arriving 7 May.[1] He had a suite of sixty-one persons, including Kurakin, a Dolgoruky, Shafirov, Osterman, Yaguzhinsky and Tolstoi. He stayed in the capital over six weeks. His social doings are recorded for us by Saint-Simon, his diplomatic conversations in the memoirs of Marshal Tessé, specially appointed to attend him and to conduct them.[2] The gist of his utterances, in Tessé's words, was as follows:

"Je veux, moi Czar, vous tenir lieu de la Suède, je veux vous garantir vos traités, je vous offre mon alliance avec celle de Prusse et de Pologne, je ne vous demande nulle garantie de mes conquêtes, je vois dans l'avenir que la puissance formidable de la maison d'Autriche vous doit alarmer; mettez-moi au lieu et place de la Suède, et je vous tiens lieu par ce traité de tout ce que vous pouviez espérer de la Suède contre les justes inquiétudes que vous devez avoir de la puissance de l'Empereur."

The regent had been anxious for some time past to enter into relations with the tsar. Croissi had opened the subject at his audience a year before at Hamburg,[3] and soon afterwards Count De la Marck had been ordered to go to Pyrmont, on the pretext of taking the waters, to meet there both Peter and George. He was ordered to forward the negotiation for alliance with the latter and to open the way to a good understanding with the former, principally with the object of establishing a direct commerce. With both he was to try "effacer, s'il est possible, les préjugés que

[1] Particulars of the journey, Baemeister, III. Appendix x; *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 127–96. Tessé, secretary Crawfurd and Saint-Simon all give the date of arrival as 7 May, but Waliszewski (p. 403) makes it the 10th. The stay at Dunkirk and Calais extended from 21 April to 4 May.

[2] See also Le Dran's contemporary account, Vassileff's work, and elsewhere. Documents in Tessé's *Memoirs*, *Sbornik*, XXXIV. pp. 196 foll. and 510 foll., *Recueil des instructions*, Vol. VIII. On Tessé's fitness for the appointment, Saint-Simon, XV. 79, 80.

[3] Croissi, June 1716, M.A.E. Suède 135; *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 501.

l'on s'est depuis longtemps efforcé de répandre contre la sincérité de la France, aussi bien que ceux que l'on a depuis longtemps de la partialité de Sa Majesté pour la Suède." The cessions to be made by Sweden to the northern allies would in no way be opposed.[1] De la Marck did not go to Pyrmont, as Peter left that place too soon, but he was kept in readiness to seek him there or elsewhere, if opportunity offered.[2] When Peter came to Holland, instructions were sent to Châteauneuf to negotiate with his ministers. An alliance, he was told, was not regarded as important in itself, the tsar's dominions being too far off and his son not likely to carry on his work, but there were higher considerations which made it necessary to cultivate his friendship. The greatest caution must be observed in consequence of the embroilment of the tsar with the king of England, the alliance with whom, just concluded, the king of France was determined to maintain; and the suspicions of the English ministers must in no way be aroused. There was no hope of including the tsar and the king of Prussia in the Triple Alliance, and the latter's ministers should not press too much on the tsar's behalf. A definite alliance with him must probably be postponed until after the pacification of the north.[3] Besides this, the king of Prussia had opened the subject to the tsar at Havelberg, as has been said, and there were conversations at Berlin between Rottembourg and Ilgen, reported by Alexis Golovkin to the tsar at Amsterdam. Rottembourg, on Peter's request for enlightenment, said that France wanted Russian guarantees for her late treaties with Great Britain and Austria (those of Utrecht and Baden), and a defensive alliance with Russia and Prussia to replace the old one with Sweden, which the king of Sweden's refusal to make peace and present desperate condition had rendered useless. He advised that a considerable part of the Russian troops should quit the empire, and the war be carried into Sweden. To which on Peter's part suitable replies were made.[4]

The idea of alliance with Russia was agreeable enough to the men of the old system, though Dubois opposed it as likely to imperil the good understanding with Great Britain.[5] Saint-Simon, for instance, bitterly laments that the English connexion was preferred.[6] But the regent was with Dubois. As Tessé writes: "Le nouveau gouvernement n'avoit d'autre intention que de

[1] Instructions, 18 June 1716, *Sbornik*, pp. 496 foll.
[2] D'Huxelles to De la Marck, 20 July and 21 Dec., *Sbornik*, pp. 506–08.
[3] *Recueil des instructions*, Vol. VIII, 5 and 19 Jan. and 19 March 1717.
[4] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.* He continues with Ilgen's arguments in favour of an alliance between France, Russia and Prussia in the present circumstances.
[5] Vassileff, pp. 76, 77.
[6] In refutation of his views, see Wiesener, II. 28–32.

voltiger et amuser le Czar jusqu'au temps de son départ sans rien conclure avec lui." On the same day that he made his report, 19 May, he received from D'Huxelles formal instructions for his further guidance. The president of the council for foreign affairs began by recapitulating the relations of France with Sweden in former times, the refusal of Charles to meet the advances of the late king, and the treaties of April 1715 with Sweden, of August 1714 with Poland, and of September 1716 with Prussia. He went on to observe that the tsar, aware of the efforts of Louis XIV to break up the northern league, had at the beginning of the present reign entertained feelings of distrust towards France. The object of the regent's present display of friendliness was to remove such feelings, in order to secure his consent to the principle of French mediation in the north and to prevent the court of Vienna from possessing itself exclusively thereof to its further aggrandisement. In view of the engagements with Great Britain and the Dutch republic, any so close connexion as the king of Prussia had desired (the adhesion, namely, of France to the Havelberg convention) was inadmissible, and that king had been warned that his arrangements with the tsar were an obstacle to his desired admission to the Triple Alliance. The French ambassador at the Hague had reported an offer made by the tsar to guarantee the treaties of Utrecht and Baden without asking for any reciprocal guarantee of his late conquests, if he might have during the continuance of the war the subsidies now paid to Sweden and enjoy the good offices of France for peace without partiality to his foe. The reason for such proposals, no doubt, was the tsar's desire to establish himself a member of the general European system. He must be so far engaged as to give up all idea of alliance with Austria. It might be believed that the king of Prussia would favour his ambition to take an important share in the politics of Europe, in order that he might secure to himself his powerful support. Tessé must endeavour to discover, if possible, the tsar's real mind. He might suggest, if necessary, a treaty of goodwill and friendship, or possibly a secret convention of a more particular character, but he must not engage the regent too far, and emphatically to nothing which might be in contradiction to the treaty with Great Britain and the Dutch republic or offensive to those powers. He must give no assurance in regard to the Swedish subsidies beyond a promise that the tsar should be contented by what would be done, nor make any engagement as to guarantees. The French treaty with Prussia must be kept secret, but Tessé might arrange with Knyphausen to say that a guarantee of Stettin had been given to meet the tsar's wishes. He, on the other hand, should be prevailed upon to communicate

his treaty with Hanover and his subsequent proposals to England. A treaty of commerce must wait for explanations and further information. Once again, the regent would not depart from the engagements of the Triple Alliance.

Torcy (and similarly Saint-Simon) says that the king of Prussia intended to meet the tsar in Paris, but was deterred by the assurance of his envoy Viereck that the journey would rouse ridicule generally and suspicion at Vienna. That he advised the tsar that the emperor, who had threatened to drive the Russian troops out of the empire by force, could never be relied on to help them to keep their conquests, and that peace with Sweden, now necessary, could only be concluded by the mediation of France. That the tsar confided to him in return his uneasiness at private information that king George was negotiating separately for peace with Sweden, with a view to a joint enterprise inimical to Russia. That at Paris a treaty between Russia and Prussia was proposed, principally directed against the possible defection of Denmark.[1] That the principal difficulty in the way of a Russian treaty with France was the question of subsidies. That the king of Prussia only sought his own interest, vacillated continually from one side to the other, and lived in constant fear of the emperor. And that Shafirov afterwards professed that his master's main object in undertaking engagements which meant nothing was to embroil France with Sweden.[2] Saint-Simon adds that Shafirov gave the king of Poland's ministers the assurance that the tsar would never make a separate peace with Sweden apart from him, denying that the French had made any such proposition.

The instructions given to Tessé are illustrated by passages from those to De la Marck. Thus on 12 April :—

"Je me propose d'éviter tout engagement avec le Czar qui puisse être préjudiciable au Roy de Suède, mais seulement de prendre de telles mesures que je puisse être asseuré que le premier de ces deux Princes n'entrera avec quelque Puissance qui ce soit dans aucune liaison qui puisse être contraire aux traités d'Utrecht et de Bade, et qui par une conséquence nécessaire puisse convenir aux projets que l'on attribue à la Cour de Vienne."

[1] Torcy and Saint-Simon both give the terms.

[2] *Memoirs*, II. 353 foll., 438 foll. The contemptuous references to the king of Prussia are continual. "Ce prince léger, inconstant dans ses resolutions, varioit d'un jour a l'autre" (p. 356). "La légereté du Roy de Prusse et l'instabilité de ses conseils" (p. 359). "Les intentions du Roy de Prusse étoient également suspectes à Vienne et à Londres parce que son caractère étoit également connu dans ces deux cours. Ce Prince uniquement occupé de son interest embrassoit tous les moyens qu'il croyoit propres pour y parvenir. . . . Il trembloit aux moindres menaces de la Cour de Vienne" (pp. 492–93, and similarly pp. 547 foll., etc.). These pronouncements are interesting as showing the opinion of Frederick William entertained in France.

And on 17 July :—

" Personne n'ignore quels sont les projets de la Cour de Vienne, ils se confirment chaque jour, et l'on sçait qu'Elle se propose, après avoir finy la guerre avec les Turcs, de chercher dans l'établissement de sa domination en Italie des ressources pour entretenir les forces nombreuses qu'Elle a sur pied, et qui, en luy asseurant un pouvoir absolu dans l'Empire, luy donneroient de nouveaux moyens de suivre ses projets ambitieux, capables de rallumer la guerre dans toute l'Europe."

It was this same fear of Austria which made the regent still anxious to secure Prussia by obtaining her admission to the Triple Alliance. But his earnest appeals to king George to this end,[1] though echoed strongly from Holland, were in vain, for his ministers insisted that such a step would ruin " the Plan " ; the scheme, that is, for extending the Triple Alliance to include the emperor, which took form next year under the name of the Quadruple Alliance. If the king of Prussia were admitted, the emperor, they argued, would stay out.[2]

The Paris negotiations were watched with suspicion and anxiety by the courts of London, Vienna and Copenhagen, but they only resulted in a colourless treaty of friendship concluded at Amsterdam on 15 August, which secured the principal objects the regent had in view. Its third secret article engaged the other parties, Russia and Prussia, to admit French mediation for the northern peace, France to make no further engagements with Sweden either for troops or money after the expiry of the existing treaty in April 1718. For the rest, the treaties of Utrecht and Baden were confirmed, the engagements of others and particularly of the Triple Alliance reserved, and the conclusion of a commercial one arranged for. If anything were done to the prejudice of any of the parties, the others were to use their good offices ; and, if these were unsuccessful, help was to be given in money or troops, whose amount

[1] See, for instance, the private letters of Dubois to Robethon, May to July 1717, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230.

[2] Thus Bernstorff to Heinsius, 4 June 1717 (a draft in his own illegible scrawl, elucidated for the copyist by Robethon) : " On nous mande que vous êtes surpris de ce que le Roy n'a pas consenty encor que l'on recust le Roy de Prusse dans la 3ple All. Pour vous en faire conoître la raison je vous feray souvenir, Monsieur, de ce que vous ont dit Myl. Sunderland et M. de Stanhope à la Haye du grand projet que l'on avoit en vue pour la pacification de l'Europe. Vous jugez bien, Monsieur, que ce projet sera par terre dès que l'on voudra mettre dans la dite All. quelque puissance contre le grè de l'Empereur et ainsy donner de la jalousie à ce prince, au lieu de s'entendre avec luy et de se conserver sa confiance. J'ai cru, Monsieur, que vous ne serés pas faché de savoir la véritable raison sur cette matière " (B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, f. 129). See also the instructions given to Lord Stair in May, above cited. Secretary of state Addison wrote to him on 25 July o.s. : " by advices received from Vienna his Majesty is informed that the Emperor has declared he will not come into the Alliance, in case the King of Prussia be admitted " (R. O. Foreign Entry Book 29).

however was only to be determined if the occasion arose.[1] In his instructions for negotiating the treaty Châteauneuf was informed that it must not be concluded "sans l'intervention du Roy de Prusse, regardée comme indispensablement nécessaire pour rendre solides les engagements du Czar."

But one important thing was decided at Paris, namely that the Russian troops should quit Mecklenburg. Whether they had stayed on because of the offensive demeanour of king George and Bernstorff, as Peter and his ministers declared, or, as the regent said to Stair, that they might be sustained at other people's expense,[2] or for other reasons, their position had become untenable. Another imperial protest had issued on 4 March, and Heems at the Hague was further instructed in April to make the strongest remonstrances to the tsar himself and to his ministers, orders which were repeated in June, when an imperial mandate in the matter went forth to the kings of Great Britain and Prussia.[3] The directors of the circle of Lower Saxony had previously been asked what forces they could raise.[4] King George actually began to assemble troops in his electorate. His council at Hanover on 7 May, while discrediting the likelihood of a Russian invasion, advised him that the army was ready in everything excepting horses, General Bülow on the alert, Ratzeburg safe, and arrangements made for exact reports from Wismar, where was the real danger.[5] The landgrave told Haldane "that he was ready to declare against the Muscovites in the manner his Majesty had desired of him by M^r. Eltz, . . . and that he could reckon upon all the troops he could spare."[6] Endeavours also were made to rouse the Danes against the tsar and an army of 25,000 Danish, Hanoverian and other troops, and a Prussian detachment in addition, were talked of.[7] Upon the

[1] Lamberty, X. 109, Flassan (2nd edn.), IV. 459. The latter remarks that it was this treaty that brought Russia into the general system of Europe. The treaty, we learn, was not concluded at Paris because Knyphausen was not provided with full powers (instructions to Châteauneuf, 28 July, *Recueil des instructions*, Vol. VIII, Whitworth, 15 July, R. O. Holland 256).

[2] "Que le grand projet du Czar étoit d'attraper des subsides où il les pouvoit trouver, et de faire subsister beaucoup des trouppes au depens d'autruy" (Stair to Robethon, 5 Oct., B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, f. 242).

[3] Whitworth, 9 July.

[4] The same, 4 May.

[5] Staatsarchiv, Hanover. With this are a great number of other papers having reference to the Russian occupation of Mecklenburg.

[6] Haldane, 17 June.

[7] *Lettres Historiques*, LI. 670. Saint-Simon says that the force was ordered to assemble near Lauenburg on 15 June. Solov'ev gives four reasons for Danish jealousy of the tsar: the abandonment of the invasion of Scania, the reports already in circulation of an intended marriage of Peter's daughter to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Peter's endeavours to obtain French mediation, and belief in his intention to possess himself of Wismar.

threat of an advance, the Russians concentrated and entrenched themselves at Gadebusch. But hostilities were averted by the tsar giving way. His ministers made merit of doing so in deference to the instances of the regent and of his ally,[1] declaring also that the further stay of the troops was prejudicial rather than advantageous to their master's interests. Before the end of July all were gone, excepting some 3,000 men left in the service of the duke of Schwerin. Stair was instructed to render hearty thanks to the regent for his good offices, and to express the hope that the troops in leaving would observe the strictest discipline.[2]

Thus ended the Mecklenburg difficulty, at least as far as Russia was concerned. As an affair of the empire it was continued by further exactions of the duke and insubordination of his nobles. An imperial mandate issued on 22 October to Hanover and Brunswick to enforce obedience to the imperial decrees. But the actual execution did not take place till February 1719, nor does the matter concern our subject further.

Peter left Paris on 20 (or 21) June, charmed, according to Saint-Simon, with his reception, with the things he had seen and the liberty accorded him to see them, and eager to ally himself closely with France, the fatal hindrances to which, according to the memoir-writer, were the interest of England and the private ambition of Dubois. He went first by Namur and Liège to Spa, spent four weeks there, and arrived at Amsterdam on 2 August. Here he found awaiting him his old acquaintance Sir John Norris, appointed with Whitworth to meet him immediately upon his consent to remove his troops from Mecklenburg being known.[3]

Norris was instructed, as Stair had been,[4] to return thanks to the tsar "for the manner in which he was pleased to declare himself at Paris on account of his troops evacuating the Empire," and for his overtures in regard to concerting war or peace with Sweden and a treaty of commerce. For the treaty, an answer to the counter-project delivered to Prince Kurakin was still awaited. For the war, "you shall let the Czar know that we are of opinion that the King

[1] "Ils eurent l'adresse de faire valoir au Régent et au Roi d'Angleterre l'exécution d'une résolution que la crainte de se voir tomber une puissante armée sur les bras ne leur avait plus permis de différer" (Saint-Simon: Torcy to the same effect, II. 434–36). But Droysen in his essay on the Vienna Alliance of 5 Jan. 1719 insists that it was Prussian persuasion that procured the withdrawal of the troops.

[2] Addison to Stair, 3 and 9 June o. s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 29.

[3] Whitworth seems to have doubted the wisdom of this mission. "To hold with the hounds or run with the hare is no sure game, and one view or other ought to be quite drop'd." Such double policy was sure to leak out. "As the Swedish Court has not the least inclination to a general peace, wherever they find the advances on one side fruitless, they will certainly spare no pains, nor offers, to make them succeed on the other" (to Tilson, 23 July).

[4] Addison to Stair, 9 June and 11 July o.s., *loc. cit.*

of Sweden will not be brought to have any thoughts of peace, but by pushing on the war against him with the utmost vigour and with a perfect harmony"; was he ready to make any enterprise upon Sweden in this or in the next year? For the withdrawal of the troops, "we hope and expect from his friendship that he will take particular care that his troops do not make any more exactions, nor commit any disorders nor use violence upon leaving the country of Mecklenburg, or in passing through any other territories belonging to the Empire." The king would employ his best offices with the emperor for a good understanding with the tsar, which might be of great use to the last-named, if he would recover from the Porte what he had lost by the treaty of the Pruth. Lastly, Norris was to inform himself of the tsar's designs, of the treaties he was making, of the condition of his treasury and forces and of any other matters of moment or interest, and to say that the king had resolved to send a minister to him at St. Petersburg upon his return thither.[1]

Conferences were deferred till 6 August, when Whitworth had joined Norris from the Hague. The two envoys opened in the sense of the above instructions. They were answered (1) that the conclusion of a treaty of commerce would take time, (2) that the tsar was ready to make peace upon conditions, but believed that the king of Sweden would never be reduced except by force, (3) that he would not take engagements in regard to Turkey, and (4) that the time of his return home was not yet fixed, but would not long be delayed. The Russian ministers further asked whether Norris and Whitworth were empowered to concert operations for the next year; on being told that overtures were expected on the subject from them, they said that several plans had already been submitted and that the tsar wanted a formal treaty, so as to avoid "the disjointed manner in which the allies had hitherto acted." "As far as we can perceive by the several turns in their discourse," the Englishmen reported, "they will not engage in any real measure before they have some formal treaty with his Majesty for securing for them the advantages which they are to expect by farther enterprises and peace." On the 9th another conference took place. The Russians said that they could do nothing without the assistance of a fleet and preferred to concert measures with Great Britain separately, as other powers would then fall in therewith. They asked for proposals in writing, but Norris and Whitworth said they could not do that, but only listen and report.

To their formal despatches the envoys added their private

[1] Original instructions, 2 July o.s. 1717, B.M. Add. MSS. 28155, f. 17. The volume contains the originals of sundry despatches addressed to Norris on this occasion, with other papers.

reflections upon the situation. The doubt about the issue of the Turkish war was likely, they thought, to raise trouble in Spain and Italy, and that would turn the "league of amity" in negotiation between France, Russia and Prussia into an alliance directed against the interest of the emperor and the balance of power in Europe. France might then help the tsar to retain his conquests in the north in order to secure his support against the empire; "and as he is at present in possession of the countries from whence we have our naval stores, he may in such an intrigue be no small obstacle to the motions of the maritime force of England and Holland." He did not appear to have any particular engagements yet against the former, or for a private peace with Sweden, but desired to draw Great Britain into the war to secure for himself his conquests, offering as the price a treaty of commerce, "which must be precarious as long as the whole market is in his hands." If he could not do this, he wanted the help of a British fleet while the war lasted, which would equally in the end bring about a rupture between Great Britain and Sweden. He seemed to have no inclination for a general concert for peace, nor of embarking upon efforts limited to one campaign. As a precautionary measure it might be well for the king to secure Prussia as well as Denmark.

In answer to the above the envoys received further instructions. The king, Sunderland wrote on 8 August o.s.,

"would have you acquaint the Russian ministers, that as the King had empowered you to wait on the Czar, and hear what propositions he had to make in relation to the several points contained in your instructions, so his Majesty did expect by what the Earl of Stair wrote from France, by the Czar's direction, that he would have let you know his thoughts as well with regard to the operations of the campaign, as to his views concerning peace, and particularly with respect to the treaty of commerce, which was a point mentioned in a more strong and express manner by the Earl of Stair in the Czar's name."

Perhaps the Russian ministers would soon be better prepared and disposed to communicate their sentiments, in which case Norris and Whitworth should transmit their proposals. If they were not, the former need not attend the tsar beyond his stay in Holland, but he might let him know that the king would send a minister to him at St. Petersburg or elsewhere, being ever desirous of his friendship and good correspondence.

In another despatch (6 August o.s.) Sunderland asked that the plans of campaign submitted in the previous winter might be sent again, as they could not be found among the archives, and had probably been left at Hanover. In consequence of "the seeds of new disturbance growing in several parts," the king did not

think that he could send so strong a squadron to the Baltic as heretofore, but he would be very glad that any squadron he should send should work for the tsar's interest. But the court of Denmark must be consulted as to its operations, there being engagements that it should be employed in the defence of that country. His Majesty's ministers at Copenhagen would be instructed accordingly, as well as he who should be sent to St. Petersburg.

On 16 August Shafirov expressed the hope that the British ministers would receive powers to conclude a treaty before the tsar left Holland, which would be in about ten days' time. But no further conferences seem to have been held till the 29th. The Russian ministers then complained that Norris and Whitworth gave " many fair words, but offer'd nothing real or essential." The tsar, they said, must have a regular engagement as to the number of troops and ships and the time and mode of action, as well as an assurance that the ships should stay at sea as long as was convenient, and return every year till the end of the war. He had no mind to make any engagement with Denmark, as he had found that court not to be relied upon. Great Britain engaged, Denmark could be consulted afterwards. But the British envoys could not admit this. The Russians then asked again that overtures should be made to them in writing to furnish the groundwork of a negotiation, but this was still refused on the plea that Great Britain was not a party to the war and that it was only intended to hear what the tsar had to propose. But when the Russians offered to submit their views upon condition that the British envoys should give an answer as far as their instructions allowed, and for the rest report to the king, the latter were obliged to give in, in order " not to give the Czar an immediate distaste, nor any ground to heighten unnecessary suspicions "; they said, however, that the answer must be very general. Shafirov told them " that he saw there would be no peace till England did come into the war."

The next day therefore the Russians handed in the following propositions, saying that they had expected from two such distinguished ministers a circumstantial proposal for a concert against Sweden, and that that king could only be reduced by force of arms. They asked that the king of England should promise for the next campaign a squadron of not less than fifteen of the line, including some first-raters, to join the Russian fleet at Reval at the beginning of May and be at the disposal of the tsar. This granted, the latter would make a descent upon Sweden in proper strength. As the time within which the king of Sweden could be reduced was uncertain, the British squadron must come year after

year until that was effected. In return, the tsar would give every possible facility that he dared towards a treaty of commerce. Lastly, the old allies of the north should be invited to join the concert.

The British answer was that the treaty of commerce must be put in the fore-front, that the propositions should be reported to the king, that it was his earnest desire to co-operate with the tsar for the removal of obstacles to commerce in the Baltic, and that Denmark must be made a principal party in the negotiation.

Obviously this reply could not satisfy the tsar. It removed all prospect of common action between Great Britain and Russia, and drove him to prosecute his negotiation with Sweden seriously. But Sunderland wrote on 27 August o.s.: "his Majesty intirely approves of the reply you made in general terms, as being very skilfully turn'd to avoid the snare which the Russians had probably laid to get something from you, of which they might make an ill use with the other Princes of the North." There was evidently no intention, he said, to enter into close measures with the king, and all that could be done at present was to keep on as fair terms with the tsar as possible. The victory of Prince Eugene over the Turks at Belgrade was very likely to have great influence upon his future doings. On 1 September Norris and Whitworth took leave of the tsar, and found him civil but reserved. No business was mentioned, and he started the next day on his return to Russia.[1]

His treaty with France and Prussia had been concluded, as has been said, a fortnight before. The British envoys, when they went to or left their conferences, would meet Châteauneuf or Knyphausen, or both, coming out or going in. These denied positively that any treaty was in hand, and the former committed the absurdity of maintaining his denial after the regent had informed Stair of the signature, excusing himself on the ground that the tsar had pledged him to secrecy. But Whitworth had long ceased to believe either his word[2] or that of Knyphausen, "digne gendre de M. Ilgen," as he calls him. And Sunderland could write that the regent's attitude left the king very easy on the whole affair.[3] When Châteauneuf was forced to confess to the treaty, he made light of it as of little advantage to France, its chief end being to get French mediation accepted.

[1] The above from the despatches to and from Norris and Whitworth, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 122 and Holland 257, B. M. Add. MSS. 28155. At f. 110 of the last is the copy of a letter from the tsar to king George of 20 August, containing formal assurances of sincerity.

[2] On this occasion he wrote to Tilson (14 Sept.): "Châteauneuf's conduct is very comical, no one believes him now, and he seems to me not to pretend it."

[3] 27 Aug. and 3 Sept. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 82.

In this connexion we may note that his conduct, as that of other French ministers abroad, was a prime reason for the continued English distrust of the regent's sincerity. Saint-Simon names approvingly Rottembourg at Berlin and De la Marck in Sweden as working to confound the policy of Hanover.[1] Whitworth later accused Rottembourg of having been "entirely devoted to the old French ministry, and the Swedish faction."[2] Elsewhere we find Poussin at Hamburg, Besenval at Dresden, Bonac at Constantinople and even D'Iberville in London the subjects of similar indictment. Says Stair, "Châteauneuf contrecoure le Roy en tout à la Haye," Rottembourg "est intime avec Gortz et veut le cacher chez luy," De la Marck "sollicite la paix particulière avec le Czar," Bonac "fomente la guerre du Turc," the most sure way to spoil "the Plan," to say nothing of Poussin and D'Iberville. The regent, he continues, promised to reprimand and even to recall them.[3] Whitworth wrote of Châteauneuf, the chief offender: "all his steps tend to disunite this Republick from the interest and councils of His Majesty," and advised that Dubois, then in London, should be spoken to,[4] and Sunderland: Châteauneuf "has all along layn as a load on the business at the Hague; and has been used as a tool to clog and obstruct every measure that was to be taken in pursuance of the engagements of the Triple Alliance." Dubois was to be spoken to about a successor to him being named immediately; it was better to have no ambassador of France at the Hague, than "one that does nothing there but mischief."[5] Recalled, accordingly, he was, though he did not leave his post till the following September. De la Marck's sentiments are shown in passages from his despatches, such as the following to Châteauneuf:—

"J'avoue que je fais à contre-coeur bien des choses que mon devoir et mon obéissance m'obligent de faire. Quant à ce que vous me marquez de l'effet que produiroit le parti que prendroit Mgr. le Régent de se déclarer contre l'Emp^r. je suis là-dessus du même sentiment que vous, et depuis longtemps. Mais je meurs de peur, que les gens de qui cela dépend ne pensent pas de même que vous. Ce qui est de sûr c'est que peut-être de plusieurs siècles nous ne trouverons pas une occasion semblable à celle que nous sommes sur le point de laisser échapper. Ce que vous pensés, Monsieur, au sujet

[1] "Ils servaient très utilement l'état de travailler à séparer et à brouiller cette ligue du Nord, si utile à la puissance de l'Empereur et de la maison de Hanovre" (Vol. XV. chap. xii).

[2] To Tilson, 23 Nov. 1718, R. O. Holland 264.

[3] To Robethon, 20 Oct. 1717, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, f. 253. Wiesener writes (II. 219): "M. d'Iberville, dont l'hostilité et les intrigues Jacobites avaient tant irrité le cabinet britannique."

[4] 14 Jan. 1718.

[5] 14 Jan. o.s. He had already referred to the prospect of Châteauneuf's recall as "a new confirmation of the Regent's sincere intentions towards his Majesty" (8 Oct. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 82).

d'une union entre la France, la Suède, le Czar et la Prusse est très juste et très sensé. Plût à Dieu qu'on pensât de même à la Cour. . . . Bien loin de recevoir aucuns ordres de la Cour de tâcher d'éloigner la paix de l'Ang^me^ avec la Suède dans cette conjoncture, où l'on voit cette première Couronne si disposée à favoriser l'Emp^r^, au contraire on m'ordonne dans les dernières dépêches que j'ay receues de presser cette paix, et c'est ce qui m'étonne toujours." [1]

He also expressed regret that the "projet de Londres" had been accepted by the emperor. He actually recommended to the regent the quadruple alliance above mentioned, having previously suggested to Châteauneuf a similar league with Holland in the place of Russia, the object being to put a stop to the "vastes projets" of Austria. And he expressed to Châteauneuf the hope that he would not be removed from the Hague; "nous avons plus besoin de vous que jamais." [2]

While the Amsterdam negotiations were proceeding news arrived of the greatest event of the year, Prince Eugene's victory at Belgrade. It was hailed in England with emphatic expressions of relief, in view of its necessary effect upon politics in the north as well as in the south of Europe. King George's position was, indeed, greatly strengthened. Lord Stair could write that but for this success all would have been confusion, but now "les projets du Nord vont avorter." [3] He referred, principally, to the prevalent idea of an anti-imperial coalition of Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Spain, and Turkey. Belgrade checkmated any such scheme; the sultan was put out of reckoning; Alberoni, for the present, found enough to do in maintaining the attack on Italy begun at Cagliari. And the tsar and the king of Prussia had to reckon with interference in northern affairs which might be undertaken by the emperor.

[1] 12 and 19 May 1718, M.A.E. Suède 142.
[2] 23 and 22 May, 30 and 15 Jan.
[3] To Robethon, 2 Sept., B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 230, f. 211. And so various others elsewhere.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE WORK OF GOERTZ AND OF FABRICE, 1717–18

In the meantime De la Marck's work had borne but little fruit. Charles XII absolutely refused the complete cession of the duchies, and declined, De la Marck said, to give up to the king of Prussia anything at all, professing to take no greater heed of him than of the king of Poland, since neither could do him any further harm. He sent a list of reasons for which an arrangement with Russia was generally preferred to one with Hanover.[1] Charles, he went on, was more enraged against the king of England than against any other of his enemies. The news of the attack on the Swedish frigate had destroyed in a quarter of an hour the work of weeks. If he would make peace, he ought to send some one secretly to Sweden, furnished with instructions and full powers. Goertz had promised to do all he could to further such a mission, but said that the English ministers must not know that he had been consulted. It would be proper to give the baron some reward for his pains. Help against the tsar was not asked for, but it would be

[1] Namely, because (1) the tsar held a great number of Swedish prisoners, (2) although he was the only one of the king of Sweden's enemies, who had some pretext for attacking him, he had always shown the greatest admiration for him personally and had offered to give up three-fourths of his conquests to procure peace, (3) the restitutions which he would make would give the king of Sweden the upper hand of his other enemies, and, if Prussia were included in the peace, Bremen and Verden might be recovered and Hanover and Celle ravaged, (4) the cessions required by Hanover and Denmark were very unacceptable, and it was thought better to sacrifice something to the tsar to obtain peace with him and consequently with the kings of Prussia and Poland, (5) in view of the quarrel of the tsar with his son a revolution and general "bouleversement" might occur in Russia, and then, if the cessions to him were not guaranteed by France, the emperor and other powers, they might be recovered, whereas cessions to the king of England would certainly so be guaranteed, (6) the crown of Sweden having achieved its present position by interference in the affairs of Germany in opposition to the emperor, it was very important to keep the German provinces and the votes in the diet and other privileges attaching to them, whereas a cession of Ingria and Esthonia would be less prejudicial and dishonourable, (7) a war with the tsar for the recovery of the eastern provinces would be a long and difficult one, involving several sieges and great preparations, and in its course those provinces would be so devastated, that Sweden would derive no advantage from them for more than a century.

impossible to work for the king of England's interest unless he would put forward some proposition possible of acceptance.[1]

The regent was not indisposed to fall in with the private views of De la Marck, as before expressed, supposing that his own policy were doomed to failure. To counteract the ambition of Austria, he wrote (17 July), a most sure way would be to form a northern league

" qui auroit pour objet le maintien de la paix, et je regarderois les liaisons du Roy de Suède avec le Roy de Prusse et peut être même avec le Czar, si ce Prince soit sincèrement reconcilié avec le Roy de Suède, comme le fondement d'une union qui pourroit être ensuite étendue par l'admission de plusieurs autres Princes de l'Empire, intéressez pour le maintien de leurs droits et leur dignité contre les entreprises de la Cour de Vienne."

And again on 12 August; while the best thing would be a peace with the king of England and with Prussia, as De la Marck had not yet been able to dispose the king of Sweden to this, and as it was of extreme importance that no treaty of peace should be made without the intervention of the king of France,

" Vous devez borner vos soins à deux objets principaux; le premier d'entrer dans les veues du Roy de Suède et de ménager sa confiance de manière que vos offices ne puissent luy être suspects, en sorte que vous soyez, s'il est possible, le dépositaire des ouvertures qui seroient faites de part et d'autre et le lien de la négotiation. Le second objet que vous devez vous proposer doit être de proffiter de la confiance du Roy de Suède pour porter ce Prince à ne traiter avec le Czar que conjointement avec le Roy de Prusse, et à prendre en même tems des liaisons avec ces deux Princes de concert avec le Roy pour asseurer la tranquillité publique contre quelque Puissance que ce soit qui voulût entreprendre de la troubler au préjudice des Traitez d'Utrecht et de Bade."

Provision would thus be made both against Austria and against possible effects of the " instabilité naturelle " of the English people. The goal might be distant, but it was important to prepare the way. The king of Prussia was cognisant of the policy expressed, and had in mind the mission of an obscure agent to Sweden; De la Marck, acting in concert with him, would be able both to confirm the confidence of the king of Prussia in the good offices of France and to discover the disposition of the king of Sweden. Rottembourg was returning to Berlin to advance this policy there, and De la Marck must keep up a close correspondence with him.

Then on 23 September the regent sent the most positive orders to the count to persevere on the lines laid down, with detailed instructions on the methods he should pursue. The essential point

[1] 25 July, M.A.E. Suède 139.

was to secure the participation of France and the inclusion of Prussia in any settlement that should be made.[1] The treaty of Amsterdam had prepared the way. The subsidy treaty with Sweden could not be renewed, as the king of France must maintain complete neutrality, but it might be understood that assistance in money, without a formal engagement, would not be refused.

But only continued failure could be reported. The idea prevailed, De la Marck says, that peace need only be made with one, the tsar or the king of England, for the war could then be prosecuted against the other members of the league victoriously. If Prussia were to receive any compensation it might be in Poland, for instance the bishopric of Ermeland, with Elbing, but not by any Swedish territory. But the demolition of Wismar had aroused special resentment against that power in the king's mind. The latter's repeated absences gravely hindered negotiation.[2] Nothing would really be decided upon before the return of Goertz, whom, it is said in one place, " le Roy de Suède attend comme le Messie qui doit le délivrer d'une partie de ses peines." The baron was believed to have practically arranged terms with the tsar. Unless the king of England, it was repeated in every despatch, gave way upon the question of the complete cession of the duchies, and that quickly, he would find himself anticipated. Gyllenborg had reported harmfully of affairs in England, and it was being said that so soon as the restrictions to commerce were removed, an immediate consequence of peace between Sweden and Russia, parliament would not grant supplies for the despatch of another fleet. An essential preliminary to French mediation was its formal acceptance by king George. This had not been done, and he had actually preferred that of the landgrave. It was most important to procure a definite declaration from him on this head.

But on this point matters remained as in August, when Addison had written to Stair (25 July o.s.) that the king was willing to accept mediation for all matters in dispute with Sweden, but as he could not

" act in this particular but in concert with the rest of the Allies of the Empire, he is of opinion that the only method which the Court of France can make use of in order to carry this point will be to induce his Swedish Majesty to make it his request that the King of France should be joined with the Emperour in the Mediation."

[1] " Son intervention étant nécessaire dans les mesures que je me propose de prendre pour former dans le Nord des liaisons qui puissent contenir les Puissances qui voudroient troubler la paix de l'Europe."

[2] Campredon wrote of De la Marck, 4 Oct. 1717 : " Il faut qu'il négotie seul teste à teste avec le Roy de Suède, il ne peut tirer aucun secours de ses ministres, qui n'ont aucun pouvoir et n'osent luy proposer que ce qu'ils savent contenter sa passion pour la guerre."

As to place, as the emperor certainly would not give up Brunswick, the regent might suggest that as of his own choice. To this Stair had replied (13 August) that the regent seemed extremely touched by the confidence shown, and had said that the king of Sweden desired to have the joint mediation of France and of the emperor and was very well content that Brunswick should be the place of congress.[1]

De la Marck's mention of Goertz had reference to the doings of that active intriguer now to be narrated. But he was unaware that king George, as well as the tsar, at the very time of the conferences at Amsterdam, had instituted separate negotiations for peace with Sweden. Indeed the desire of the British and Russian ministers at those conferences seems to have been less to establish an agreement than to discover intentions. The latter were treating simultaneously with Goertz and his friends, while king George had appointed one of his Hanoverian ministers to hold secret discussions with Count Vellingk.

To begin with the Russian negotiations. General Poniatowski, as soon as he heard of Rank's imprisonment at Stralsund, had set out for Holland. On his way he stopped at Spa, where the tsar was. Hearing of his arrival, Peter sent to him Kurakin and Erskine to ask whether he had powers to treat. He told them that such had been sent to Preis, and they assured him of the tsar's desire to make terms. Then, about the time of Peter's return to Amsterdam,[2] Kurakin met Poniatowski again, but the latter said that, although the full powers had been received, Rank's presence was necessary. Then on 2 August, as said above, Goertz was set free, going next day to a cousin's house at Zutphen. He stayed there nearly the whole of August conferring with Preis, Poniatowski, Reventlow, and others. It was determined not to wait for Rank's release but at least to hear what Kurakin and Erskine had to say. On 8 August Poniatowski and Preis met them at the latter's lodging at Amsterdam. Kurakin produced full powers as ambassador extraordinary to the Brunswick congress, renewed from year to year for three years, and Preis objecting that they did not apply to the present case, he was answered that they were only shown as evidence that others would be forthcoming, if required. Preis then showed his own full powers, and, after discussion, Kurakin declared (1) that the tsar was ready to make a separate peace with the king of Sweden, and preferred his friendship to any convention he could make with

[1] R. O., Foreign Entry Book 29, France 161.

[2] Preis says that this took place on Peter's return. But the latter reached Amsterdam on 2 Aug., while, according to Whitworth, Poniatowski left that city for Arnhem on 31 July. He was certainly with Goertz at Arnhem on 3 August.

the king of England, (2) that he was quite willing to include the kings of Prussia and Poland, (3) that umbrage must not be taken at the negotiations going on with the king of England, which should be broken off if the king of Sweden showed any inclination for peace, (4) that a declaration from him as to his terms was earnestly desired within three months, (5) that it was indifferent to the tsar whether the Åland islands or some other place in that neighbourhood were chosen for a conference, only it must be kept as far as possible secret. Poniatowski then asked for a Russian pass for Goertz to go to Sweden to report the good disposition of the tsar and to bring back a reply, as there were difficulties in the way of his getting thither from Holland, and this was readily agreed to: he and two persons in his suite to go by way of Riga. An exchange of prisoners was also discussed and a further meeting arranged for the 9th, which took place very privately at night at the back of the town hall. Many fair words were exchanged and the pass was given. In fine, Preis ended his report of all this, it seemed that the tsar was earnest in his desire for a separate peace.[1] Afterwards there were further interviews, at one of which, says Poniatowski, Erskine assured him that he had £100,000 in his hands for Swedish use.[2]

On 21 August Goertz paid a visit to the Loo and met the tsar there, accidentally, he says.[3] He was only allowed, it seems, to speak with Kurakin, whom he informed of the king of Sweden's inclination to make peace and asked for a passport to return to Sweden through Russia to fortify that inclination.[4] He learnt, among other things, that De la Marck was distrusted, his commission to favour the

[1] Despatch from Preis of 12 Aug. printed in Adlersparre's *Handlingar*, V. xxi. In another place (*Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens historia*, XVIII. 42, 13 Aug.) he expressed surprise at the earnestness of the tsar's desire to make peace, suggesting as reasons the weak state of his health and the trouble with the tsarevich. The latter was indeed seeking an asylum in Sweden (Carlson, p. 114). But probably what weighed with Peter most was the exhausting drain of the war upon his resources, and the hindrance which it placed in the way of his schemes for the development of his new empire (cf. Carlson, p. 109), besides the altered aspect of affairs in the south.

[2] *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, Appendix xxvi. The date of the letter is misprinted 33 Aug., and referred to in the text as 23 Aug., but Stair wrote on the 18th that Poniatowski was then in Paris.

[3] "Etant allé avant hier à Loo pour m'aboucher avec Monsieur de Dalw. [Baron Dalwigk, the Hessian minister] et pour faire ma Cour à Mad. la Princesse de Frise, le Czar y arriva avec toute sa suite." He could not help speaking to them. If they were sincere in what they said, "il ne faut pas douter que nous ne finissons avec eux" (ibid. Appendix xxvii, 23 Aug.).

[4] So Peter to Veselovsky, 2 Jan. o.s. 1718, *Kurakin Archives*, III. 37, and in Bestuzhev's memorial of Oct. 1720 (p. 450). But Wich was told that "General-Fiscal" Spinola, an Italian, was sent by the tsar to Goertz at Zutphen (7 Jan. 1718, R. O. Hamburg 35). This man went to England, and, being found to have conferred there with the ministers apart from Veselovsky and without orders was recalled (*Kurakin Archives*, III. 40–43).

interests of the king of England being known.[1] The meeting made a great sensation, being taken as a public sign that the tsar intended peace. This was what Goertz wanted, for he saw that the public advertisement of overtures for peace was the only thing which could re-establish the financial credit of Sweden.[2]

There were also negotiations at Paris, whither Creutz, the Holstein secretary, had been sent to press for payment of the subsidies, and Poniatowski now followed. Goertz wrote to the latter[3] that Marshal D'Huxelles, he was informed by Creutz, said that the plan concerted should be punctually adhered to, and that De la Marck had orders to make declarations in accordance with it. But it was not known whether the king of Sweden would agree to it, unless definite information could be sent him on the matter, and it was therefore desired that he (Goertz) should go to Sweden as soon as possible himself. As only preliminary articles had been proposed, the king could only be expected to give adhesion to a peace negotiation on that understanding. Poniatowski must persuade D'Huxelles to be good enough to inform him exactly of the extent to which the French court had penetrated the intentions of all or some of the king's enemies. He should make the most of the Hessian overtures to England having been kept secret from it and should press for subsidies, D'Huxelles having promised every assistance on this head. It should be made clear to Law, who had undertaken to advance money against good security, that if it were necessary to wait till such could be provided he would not get so considerable a " douceur " as was now offered him.[4] There followed a discussion on the relations of France with Great Britain, and the argument that it was not to the advantage of the former to assist in aggrandising Hanover. Further, Poniatowski was to inform D'Huxelles of Goertz's visit to the Loo, and of his contentment at his experience. He earnestly desired to know if the marshal could give assurance that negotiation with the king of England would be more profitable than with the tsar. " Si je ne reçois rien de positif avec le courrier que vous m'envoierez, je tablerai mon plan là dessus à mon arrivée en Suède." As for the subsidies, his whole financial plan depended on them : if the marshal would procure them he could.

Unable to return to Sweden directly on account of the British

[1] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[2] Thus he wrote of " la considération du profit infini, qui résulteroit pour la Suède d'une négotiation de paix générale, entamée publiquement," and advised that Vellingk and Sparre should be nominated to represent Sweden at a general congress (to Müllern, 11 Aug., *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, pp. 248–50).

[3] 22 and 23 Aug., ibid. Appendices xi, xxv, xxvii.

[4] Ten per cent., Torcy says (II. 665).

and Danish cruisers, Goertz was given Russian and Prussian passports to travel thither by land, the latter being obtained for him with difficulty by Poniatowski through Knyphausen, with leave to visit Berlin. Arrived there, the king of Prussia, remembering his former conduct, refused to see him himself,[1] but allowed his ministers to do so. Accordingly Goertz met them in much privacy at places in the neighbourhood of the capital, and not only them, but Count Flemming and other ministers of the king of Poland at Gaben and elsewhere.[2] As he told the Saxons what the Prussians said,[3] and the Prussians what the Saxons said, with much untruth in either case; as he incited them to combine against the tsar, with whom he was known to be in active negotiation; and as Peter and his ministers, coming to Berlin soon afterwards, were made acquainted with it all, the principal result of his work was to increase the badness of his reputation there. This would not have mattered, had the terms he proposed been acceptable, but they included cessation of the demolition of the fortifications of Wismar, temporary possession only of Stettin by Prussia in pledge for a loan of three million crowns, and the recovery of Stralsund.[4] He only obtained immunity from arrest. But with the king of Poland and the tsar he succeeded better; travelling by way of Breslau to Reval he saw Peter again, and returned to Sweden with preliminaries for peace in his possession.

King George would have stopped his passage had he been able. Orders were sent to Admiral Byng to despatch two frigates to cruise off Dantzig and Königsberg to look out for him, should he attempt to sail thence. And General Bothmer was instructed to advise the king of Denmark to stop the passage of De la Marck's letters and to send frigates to help to intercept Goertz, on the ground that the former, it was believed, was really working for a separate peace between Sweden, Russia and Prussia, which would result in the spoliation of Denmark.[5] Byng detached two of his 50-gun ships, the *Worcester* and the *Dartmouth*, which kept watch off the Prussian coast for some weeks. But they did not catch Goertz;

[1] He stigmatized Goertz as a "fripon," but said that he did not care whether his own end was reached through him or otherwise (Droysen, p. 208).

[2] Sir Richard Vernon, 18 Sept. foll., R. O. Poland 24; Whitworth, 1 Oct., Holland 258. A fuller account in Heusch's despatches, Staatsarchiv, Hanover. Goertz and Flemming, says Vernon ironically, "had a long and intimate friendship, which has naturally resulted from the great similitude of their tempers and entire sympathy of their dispositions."

[3] "Natürlich damit das nöthige sofort nach Wien und London gelänge" (Droysen, p. 209.)

[4] "Projet remis pas M. le Bn. de Goertz à M. le Comte de Rottembourg," enclosed in the latter's despatch to De la Marck of 2 Oct. 1717 (M.A.E. Suède 140). There are a number of copies in this volume of Goertz's correspondence of the time with Rottembourg and Ilgen.

[5] Staatsarchiv, Hanover, rescript of 14 Sept.

embarking at Reval, he was safely landed in Sweden under escort of three Russian galleys and joined Charles XII at Lund at the beginning of December.[1]

Peter the Great on his way home fell in with General Rank, who informed him of the full powers sent to Vellingk and Preis and of his own detention, and asked that full powers might be sent to Kurakin, which was done. Peter told Rank that, as he was going home, he preferred to treat at some place between Sweden and Finland, as more convenient to himself and more private. Rank confirmed the statement that the king of Sweden was inclined to peace, but expressed suspicions of Goertz's sincerity. Going on to Berlin Peter saw some of the ministers, but expressed to Kurakin his disinclination to confer with them himself; he, however, might carry on secret negotiations with Vellingk and Preis and declare the Russian terms, as set out to him at Aix. If successful, he should put the Swedish demands in writing for communication to the Prussian court, in order that the Prussians might similarly state their own. Satisfaction ought to be given to the king of Poland; Stanislaus might have a sufficient pension. The king of Denmark also might be brought in, but the treaty must not be delayed on his account.[2]

Returned to St. Petersburg, Peter learnt with surprise from Kurakin that neither Vellingk nor Rank was provided with full powers. He therefore withdrew from him the negotiation, saying that news from Goertz must be waited for. If they should produce full powers, Kurakin must discover their instructions, but say that he could not now proceed with the negotiation himself.[3]

At the conferences at Berlin, on the arrival of the Russian ministers, the terms of peace with Sweden were discussed. The Prussians endeavoured to obtain the restoration of Reval and Livonia, pointing out the dangers of peace being made by the king of England and of intervention by the emperor, whom not

[1] Sunderland to Byng, 6 Sept. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 219; Byng, 1 Oct. o.s.; Vernon, 16 Oct., 11 and 18 Dec.; De la Marck, 3 and 14 Dec. For the dates, De la Marck gives 23 Nov. for Goertz's landing, and 5 Dec. for his arrival at Lund, but Carlson (p. 113) names 22 Nov. (o.s.) for the latter date. He says also that Goertz tarried on the way and reported fully to the king from Upsala.

Byng was further instructed to look out for the duke of Ormonde and another Jacobite, reported to be going to Sweden. The latter was a man who had been in Vienna in the spring under the name of O'Brien (Stanhope to Stanyan, 12 March and 2 April o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 42; B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 232, ff. 3–6), but who was supposed to be Walkinshaw of Borrowfield, who had escaped from the castle of Stirling in August 1716 (*Stowe MSS.* 229, ff. 51, 76). But neither he nor Ormonde crossed.

[2] Peter the Great to Kurakin, Berlin, 11 Sept. o.s., *Kurakin Archives*, II. 127–30; full-powers to him therewith. For the negotiations which took place at Copenhagen, see fully Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[3] The same, 1 and 18 Nov. and 9 Dec. o.s., *Kurakin Archives*, III. 34–36.

only Hanover and Saxony but all the Catholic powers would support. They were answered that nothing could be given up, excepting Finland. Reval must be kept, for otherwise the tsar's fleet might be hindered from going to sea; Livonia, lest the Swedes, posted between Prussia and Russia, should prevent the two powers from coming to each other's help and, besides, raise up a strong hostile party in Poland. It was better to prosecute the war than to resign these conquests. As for the emperor, the tsar could help Prussia against him, and he would not dare to attack her with such powerful allies as France and Russia. The Prussian ministers persisted, but to no purpose. When Peter arrived, the Havelberg compact was confirmed and he promised that everything done in regard to peace with Sweden should be communicated, and no peace made which did not give to Prussia Stettin.[1]

George I, on his part, had entered upon direct negotiation with Sweden as soon as he was informed of the full powers sent to Count Vellingk. Staying with the latter in Bremen city was the Holstein minister Frederick Ernest de Fabrice, he who had been with Charles XII at Bender. As he was a son of one of George's most trusted councillors, Weipart Louis de Fabrice, he was peculiarly fitted to be an intermediary between the two kings.[2] He was in the first place invited by Bernstorff (his cousin) to come to England. Adopting the guise of a Mecklenburg noble and the name of Bülow, he left Bremen about the middle of August. At Zutphen he encountered Goertz and Poniatowski, the latter an old friend of Turkish days. Informed of their views, he arrived in due course at Hampton Court, spent three days there in strict privacy and in communication with Bernstorff, had an audience of three hours' duration with the king and another of four hours with the prince of Wales, and returned. Chancing to meet at Harwich Gyllenborg, about to embark for Sweden, he was able to entrust him with despatches and give him verbal information, in particular as to Bernstorff's arrangements for the conveyance of correspondence between Vellingk and Müllern, the latter in Sweden. In the letters he gave assurance of the particular regard for Charles XII and the desire for reconciliation entertained by king George and still more by the prince of Wales, and information that he had received full powers and instructions for his father to treat with Vellingk. As the former was at his estate at Weihe, a league from Bremen, and as he had been "gar guth Schwedisch" all his life, it was to

[1] Solov'ev.

[2] What follows is principally taken from Fabrice's letters preserved in the Riksarkiv at Stockholm and the Staatsarchiv at Hanover. For further particulars, including extracts from the letters, see the *English Historical Review*, XXI. 57 foll.

be hoped, Fabrice said, that the negotiation would speedily be put on a good footing in the utmost secrecy and by the mediation of the landgrave be brought to a successful issue. Bernstorff had given the strongest assurances that, if an agreement were arrived at, everything possible should be done for the king of Sweden and the tsar be deprived of any footing in the Baltic. Although the king of England could be no redoubtable enemy of Sweden, seeing that parliament, as it appeared, would not consent to war, yet he could be a very useful friend in view of his influence with the regent of France and the republic of Holland.[1]

The instructions and full powers to the elder Fabrice bore date 13 August o.s. He was ordered to observe the most absolute secrecy, and to negotiate with Vellingk only through his son. He was not to meet the count himself, except in case of special necessity. He must let him know that the intimation of the king of Sweden's disposition to make peace had been very gladly received, and must request information on the substance of the conditions which would be required. If they were not satisfactory, he must refer to the king. But in the first place Vellingk must give a stringent undertaking in writing on his word of honour not to divulge in any way or to anyone whomsoever, excepting to the king of Sweden and his ministers in that country, anything that passed. On the other hand Fabrice's counter-promise, and his communications through his son, must be only oral. To justify this he might represent that written declarations might compromise the king of England with his allies, whereas the king of Sweden ran no such risk.

The complete cession of the duchies with all that appertained to them was a "conditio sine qua non." If Vellingk were not empowered to agree to this, the negotiation must be broken off. But if he could and would accept the condition, then the king of England would be ready to conclude peace at once, and further to renew and act upon the treaty of 1700 now about to expire. The great advantage of this to Sweden needed no exposition, but the matter must not be delayed, as it would be much more difficult to make a fresh treaty than to renew the old one. If Vellingk showed a disposition to treat on the above basis, or to refer to the king of Sweden for instructions, Fabrice must then give him to understand that the king's special regard for the emperor and the empire, and his desire to preserve the latter from further disturbance, obliged him to require a truce with Denmark and Prussia for a term of not less than two years, and, if the king of Sweden so desired, the king of Poland might be moved to join in the truce.

[1] Fabrice to Charles XII and to Müllern, Harwich, 25 and 26 Aug. 1717, Riksarkiv.

In the case of Denmark, satisfaction to the house of Holstein-Gottorp would be stipulated. Such a truce would be of advantage to the king of Sweden as giving him time to arrange terms of peace with the parties named and to devote his strength to recovering his other lost provinces. And if, when terms were arranged, the king of Sweden would send plenipotentiaries to the congress of Brunswick, the king of England would do all in his power to further his interests in the final settlement there. No undertaking, however, could be given to recover for him his possessions in the empire, nor for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp his share of Sleswick; nor could any further efforts be made to compose his quarrel with his other enemies. The help to be rendered under a renewal of king William's treaty might be made the subject of a separate article in the treaty of peace. Lastly (in a postscript), if Fabrice saw the possibility, he was to sound Vellingk on a cession of Wismar to Hanover and to insinuate that this would be much more to the advantage of Sweden than for the place to fall into the hands of any other power. But if it did not appear that the proposal would be acceptable Fabrice was not to broach it, still less to insist upon it, but only to represent that under the conditions of status quo of the suggested truce amongst other things Wismar and its fortifications would be preserved, whereas under other conditions Prussia and Denmark would press strongly for their demolition and would proceed with the same, whether with the king of England's consent or not.[1]

Preparations were made, in case Fabrice's negotiation were successful, to send his son to Sweden. Admiral Byng was ordered to send to Travemünde in one of his lightest frigates some discreet person speaking French or German who should go on to visit Bernstorff's son-in-law Werpup at Ratzeburg. The frigate was to stay "till those people are come on board whom M. de Werpup shall send," and they were to be landed very privately at some convenient place in Scania. Letters also sent to him by Polwarth or General Bothmer were to be carried, and others which might be addressed to Vellingk brought back.[2]

Werpup was informed that either the younger Fabrice or some other whom the father should send would come to him to desire transport to Sweden. He was to send orders to the captain of the frigate accordingly, and also for the conveyance of the Holstein general Banier, should he present himself, and he was to inform

[1] Staatsarchiv.

[2] Sunderland to Byng, 9 Sept. o.s. 1717, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 219. Byng chose for the service his secretary William Corbett, who in March was with Fabrice at Lund (B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 231, f. 56) and in May was on the king's business at Lübeck (R. O. Admiralty, Secretary's Dept., In-Letters 4100).

Colonel Bassewitz at Hamburg, in order that he also might avail himself of the opportunity, if he so desired.[1] Everything was to be done with the utmost possible precaution and secrecy.

Further instructions were sent to the elder Fabrice on 20 August o.s., and these were again modified a fortnight later after receipt of a letter from the son of 4 September. In this he notified to Bernstorff his arrival at Weihe and the intended return of Goertz, whom he had just missed at Zutphen, to Sweden through Prussia and Russia, whose ministers appeared to have had some hint about his own negotiation. He was sure that Goertz would listen to their propositions and flatter them, in order to get safely to Sweden. He sent this information in order that Bernstorff might understand that, if the total and perpetual cession of the duchies of Bremen and Verden were insisted upon, the king of Sweden might come to terms with the other parties, for he (Fabrice) knew for certain that the tsar would only ask for St. Petersburg and Reval, and the king of Prussia for Stettin in exchange for a considerable sum of money. The most infallible means of foiling this plan would be to conclude as speedily as possible with Vellingk, to do which the count was fully authorized upon certain conditions.[2]

But as the complete cession was insisted upon, and as Vellingk was not empowered to agree to it, the negotiation stranded. The count urged that Fabrice should go again to England.[3] As to Goertz, "B. Goertz sich annoch umb Berlin aufhielt, und von preusse und dem Czaar sehr cajolirt wändt," the elder Fabrice wrote ;[4] and the son to Sweden, that it seemed advisable to prolong discussions until it was known what success Goertz had ; a view in which Müllern and Vellingk concurred.[5]

[1] 20 Sept. o.s., Staatsarchiv, draft. With Bassewitz was mentioned General Dücker, who had been commandant at Stralsund, but his name is erased from the draft. The two were Swedish prisoners on parole, whose release had been requested of the king of Denmark by king George, as persons likely to be of use in calming the king of Sweden's mind in regard to the arrests of his ministers, but the request had been repeatedly refused, pending the signature of the Danish treaties under negotiation (Bothmer's despatches and rescripts to him, e.g. 16 Feb., 21 May, 6 and 19 July).

[2] Ibid. Fabrice wrote to Goertz on 22 Sept. (Riksarkiv) : "Certaine entrevue que vous avés eue, et la route que vous avés prise pour passer, a donné beaucoup d'ombrage. J'espère pourtant que cela ne servira qu'à nous faire meilleur marché. Je me flatte aussi, M^r., qu'en ce cas vous préférerés nôtre Plan à celui qu'on vous attribue à l'heure qu'il est." He went on, recounting his visit to England, to say that, if Goertz would enter into that plan honestly and lay aside resentment, he could be sincerely reconciled with Bernstorff.

[3] 3 Oct., Staatsarchiv.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Carlson, p. 108. Fabrice thought that there was a disposition on king George's part to purchase Bremen, or hold it in pledge, though the simple cession of Verden he would insist upon as a cheap compensation for the help he would give against the tsar.

Fabrice, as Vellingk desired, shortly returned to England. It was decided that he should go to Sweden, and a passport was made out for him under date 19 November o.s., instructions in respect of him and of Banier being sent to Werpup a week later. It was repeated herein that the success of the business wholly depended upon its being kept absolutely secret, for which reason the captain of the frigate was ordered to land Fabrice at some place on the Swedish coast where the Danes would least be looking out, and to wait there till word was received from him, whence he would desire to return to Travemünde. After landing him the frigate would lie in Wismar or some other convenient port, in touch with Werpup, unless excuse, as of landing goods, could be found for her staying on at Travemünde.[1] Orders in the above sense were sent to the captain of the frigate on 29 November o.s., and he was told that matters were so arranged that the Swedes would not attack him, and he was not to attack them.[2]

But Fabrice only left England at the beginning of January. On the 4th he wrote to Bernstorff from the Hague that, by the last letters received from their " homine longo " (Goertz), the latter expected greater success from their business than from his own.[3] On the 27th he wrote of his arrival at Ratzeburg two days before, and that Werpup had gone on at once to Lübeck to hurry on the English captain to immediate departure. If his mission were to bear fruit, he said, they must be contented with a temporary possession of the duchies, for fifty years, if that could be managed, with reservation of a place for the king of Sweden for the maintenance of his rights as a director of the circle. Instructions ought to be sent to his father enabling him to repair to Weihe, if required, so that he might adjust and sign the treaty with Vellingk without having to wait for fresh orders from England. The commission touching the count's " affaire pécuniaire " must not be forgotten.

Arrived at Lübeck, Fabrice found its port icebound. He reported the receipt of two letters from Goertz, strongly approving his journey and expressing the hope that some one would be sent with him empowered to conclude. Bernstorff, he said, would understand that " res est adhuc integra," and that it would infallibly succeed if concession could be made on the two points mentioned. Goertz's letters indicated that he flattered himself of obtaining the perpetual cession of a part of Verden, with a mortgage of the

[1] Staatsarchiv.

[2] Sunderland, *loc. cit.*, " to the Commander of the ship cruising between Sweden and Travemünde."

[3] Staatsarchiv. Whitworth however wrote to Tilson on 7 Jan. that he wished Fabrice success, but was himself " of the family of the unbelievers " in regard thereto, imputing to France underhand intentions in the matter (R. O. Holland 261).

remainder of the duchies for several years, provided that the king of Sweden could be convinced of the advantages to be obtained from sacrifices so considerable. If Fabrice's own proposition, to leave the king of Sweden in possession of a greater footing in Bremen than only the cathedral and its revenues, could have been accepted, certainly the two plenipotentiaries might have signed the treaty *sub spe rati*. All that could be hoped for now would be a " blanc signé " and new instructions for Vellingk, since he himself could not expect that the treaty, as in the drafts he was carrying with him, would be ratified. The elder Fabrice also wrote of the hopeful character of the contents of Goertz's letters, as communicated to him by Vellingk, who thought that they augured a happy and successful issue.[1]

Against the above may be noted the views of Vellingk, opposed now to the cession of any part of the duchies, though formerly he had favoured the idea, could Ingria and Stettin thereby be recovered.[2] He wrote to Charles XII on 19 January [3] recommending Fabrice personally, but throwing doubt on the honest intention of his instructions. He grounded his suspicions, he said, upon thirty-five years' experience of German and particularly of Hanoverian methods. Advantageous as the offers made might seem, the other side would certainly try later to evade performance. He pointed out that without actual possession of the land the directorate of the circle appertaining thereto would be worthless. Calculating from their revenues the duchies were worth at least eight million rix-dollars, and to their further value in war-time the experience of Charles himself and of his ancestors could testify. It would be derogatory to the king's fame to make any permanent cession of territory to his enemies.[4] If parts of the duchies were to be mortgaged to the king of England, or given him by way of exchange, there must be careful consideration of the amount of revenue to be reserved. Stade at least should be retained, with a clear revenue of 150,000 rix-dollars to keep up establishments and a force of 1,000 men.

Fabrice sailed at length from Neustadt in Holstein on 26 February, taking with him Banier and his family, Major-General Albedyl, released on bail, and the younger Gyllenborg.[5] To his great disappointment on arrival at Lund the next day he found that Goertz

[1] These letters from the Staatsarchiv, 31 Jan. and 5 and 1 Feb. 1718.

[2] See *Pensées sur le parti à prendre*, 1716–17–18, *Handlingar*, XII. 338 foll., where the views of Vellingk in those years are successively set forth.

[3] Ibid. p. 332.

[4] To give up Ingria might be regarded, he thought, as a restoration, not as a cession of territory.

[5] Fabrice from Neustadt, 25 Feb., ibid., and to Goertz from Ystad, 27 Feb., 8 p.m., Riksarkiv.

had just left on his journey to the Åland isles. After a three hours' interview with the king he followed him to Stockholm and persuaded him to come back to Christinehamn, whither Charles had gone on a visit to his sister. The king was found to be set against any concession, but Goertz, keen to have the advantage of dealing with king George and the tsar at the same time,[1] prevailed upon him with much difficulty to consent to a counter-proposal being made. This—obtained, says De la Marck, solely by the " vivacité et instances " of Goertz[2]—contained the following stipulations :—

(1) The king of Sweden would agree to a complete amnesty for all that had passed and re-establish in full extent a sincere peace and reciprocal confidence. (2) As Great Britain had not for many years paid the subsidies stipulated by the treaty of 1700, he thought it just that they should be paid at least from the date of the peace of Utrecht, since which time Great Britain had had no war to sustain, and he asked on this head for payment of 1,800,000 crowns " banco," being at the rate of 600,000 for three years. (3) He desired a renewal of the treaty of 1700 and in virtue thereof the despatch for three successive years of a squadron of twelve men-of-war of at least 60 guns with all necessary equipage, besides frigates and yachts, the said squadron to be at his own disposal for use against the enemy as he should think fit and to arrive each year in the Baltic before the end of May and stay till about the end of October. (4) He was ready to conclude a treaty of commerce to the advantage of both nations. (5) He would consent to an exact estimate being made of the value of the vessels taken and confiscated during the war and give just satisfaction for such claims balanced against the value of the Swedish vessels taken by the English during the two last wars with France. (6) Should he find himself obliged to continue the war against the tsar, he trusted that British trade to the ports usurped by the latter would as far as possible be forbidden. (7) He not only accepted the mediation of Great Britain with his remaining enemies, particularly Denmark, but promised to communicate with the king of England and join with him in measures necessary for a general peace. (8) As to the duchies, he would conclude a treaty thereon with the king of England, as elector of Hanover, on the basis of " rétrovendition." [3]

As conditions of such a treaty De la Marck specifies the reservation of rights and revenues, as before, and the payment of a million crowns, that sum as also the cost of the naval aid, estimated by him at 600,000 crowns a year, to be secured by a mortgage of the

[1] Cf. Carlson, pp. 116–17.
[2] To Dubois, 25 April; cf. Carlson, p. 117.
[3] R. O. Home Office, Secretaries' Letter Book 28.

duchies for twenty years, renewable of itself in twenty-year terms until the debt should be discharged. As the king of England, he says, had agreed to most of the above, the only serious question outstanding was acceptance of a mortgage in lieu of cession. But as Fabrice and Schrader (of whom below) had given to understand that he would accept part of the duchies in pledge for thirty years, perhaps he might be persuaded to extend the concession to the whole. A mortgage would really be equivalent to a cession, as Sweden would never repay the money, and the danger of re-mortgage to some other prince might be guarded against in the treaty. Two months only were allowed for acceptance, and if peace were made with the tsar the situation would be changed, so that the king of England must decide quickly and not be indifferent as hitherto.[1]

In the meantime the absence of news of or from Fabrice, and the knowledge of the conferences arranged between the Swedes and Russians, had caused king George so great uneasiness, that he determined to send a second emissary to Sweden by a surer route. Early in March Captain Willis, of H.M.S. *Deal Castle*, received orders to carry to Gothenburg the Hanoverian privy councillor Schrader and two other foreign gentlemen, to await there the orders of the first named and bring him back, and to keep the affair entirely secret.[2] Schrader's companions were General Dücker and Colonel Bassewitz above-mentioned, who with George's connivance had broken their parole and fled from Hamburg to England.[3] Schrader was given full information of the object of Fabrice's mission and furnished with duplicates of his papers under seal. He was ordered to remain at Gothenburg until he learnt from General Banier whether Fabrice had arrived at court, whether he had opened his business with the king, how he had prospered, and whether he would soon return with the king's favourable

[1] To Dubois, as above, and to Louis XV, same date, Suède 141. De la Marck indites the mistaken sentiment: "Il y a lieu de croire que Sa Majesté Britannique, qui a déjà fait cette première démarche, voudra bien encore dans la veue de procurer la paix à une partie considérable de l'Europe, selon sa grandeur d'âme et magnanimité ordinaire, donner à tout l'univers une preuve convaincante de sa modération en entendant les offres faites icy par ses ministres, en se contentant d'une hypotèque pour la totalité au lieu qu'on ne la propose de sa part que pour une moitié."

[2] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 219; orders dated 28 Feb. and 2 March o.s.

[3] Wich, R. O. Hamburg 35, 25 Feb.; De la Marck to Châteauneuf, 2 April; Holm, p. 610; Michael, I. 744. Haldane, who met Bassewitz at Cassel in August, says that he went to Sweden by way of England in Dücker's company. The Russians later accused the king of Denmark of conniving at their escape (Holm, p. 617). Wich thought Dücker a very proper person to be thus employed in the king's service, as greatly in the king of Sweden's confidence and a declared enemy of Goertz (15 March).

answer. Should it appear that he did not require Schrader's help, the latter was at once to return in the frigate that had brought him, but having first discovered, in whatever way he could, the gist of the king of Sweden's resolution. But if Fabrice had not arrived or begun his work, or if he desired assistance, Schrader was to repair to wherever the king of Sweden was, and either negotiate in Fabrice's stead, or help him. Whichever project was accepted, Fabrice was instructed to transmit it personally, or otherwise, to Vellingk, in order that it might be completed with the elder Fabrice in form. But Schrader might propose, as an alternative, the mission of some person to England with the draft, fully empowered to sign the same with the king's German ministers. And in either case, to save time, the king of Sweden's ratification of it might be prepared and sent to England for exchange against that of the king. If the project and its ratification were sent to England, the Swedish envoy might further be empowered to renew the now expiring treaty between Great Britain and Sweden (the treaty, that is, of 1700). Arrived at court, Schrader was to inform himself whether the negotiation with the tsar was going on or had collapsed. In the latter case his own business would be greatly facilitated, and the king of Sweden could not refuse to accept the conditions offered. If, however, the Russian negotiations were proceeding, but the king of Sweden had not consented to give up Reval or Viborg, then it was to be hoped that he would easily comprehend that the abandonment of Bremen was not to be reckoned in comparison therewith; it was far better for him to sacrifice something in Germany than to yield to the tsar the least thing on the Baltic. Even if an agreement were concluded, or about to be so, nevertheless the king of Sweden must recognize that on the one hand he would lose his best bulwarks and on the other be little helped, or not at all, to recover his German provinces, unless he also made peace with the king of England, for he would not be master in the Baltic nor able to conduct any transport of troops with safety. Whereas, in the contrary case, and with the British treaty renewed, he would maintain his superiority by sea against all comers. Arguments in extenso to be used on these subjects, and on the complaints which Charles had against Great Britain, were given separately.[1]

Schrader on landing went straight to Lund, and, on learning that Fabrice was at Christinehamn with the king, decided to await his return, averring that his instructions contained nothing new. He stayed in strict privacy under the name of Weide, conversing only with De la Marck and Müllern. The latter received commands

[1] Instructions to Schrader, 25 Feb. o.s., Staatsarchiv. The arguments referred to are not included with the instructions, as preserved in draft.

to treat with him, if he had full powers, but Schrader produced none.[1] Meanwhile the secret was out. As late as 25 March Bernstorff had told the Danish envoy Söhlenthal that no negotiation was in progress, but on the 26th Vellingk came to Cassel with a letter telling of Fabrice's arrival at and departure from Lund, and a month later the news was confirmed.[2] The landgrave, of course, was furious at negotiations conducted behind his back, and embarrassing demands for explanation came from Copenhagen and Berlin.[3]

On 21 April Fabrice came back to Lund, and it was decided that he and Schrader should return home by the ways they had come, Fabrice reporting fully to Goertz the purport of their discussions and his views and plans.[4] Schrader, accordingly, slipped away secretly from Gothenburg and was landed by Captain Willis at "Burlington Bay" (Bridlington in Yorkshire) on 10 May,[5] while Fabrice, after visiting Ratzeburg, Lüneburg and Celle arrived on the same day at Bremen; whence he wrote to Goertz, and again from the Hague,[6] expressing a strong expectation of success. But on his arrival in London on 26 May he met with disappointment, for the purport of the unacceptable proposals he brought was known through Schrader.

King George was asked not only to be satisfied with a mortgage of the duchies instead of a cession, but to undertake obligations on the part of Great Britain to which it was certain that parliament would never consent. Goertz himself expressed the opinion that he would have to bethink himself before accepting the proposals, and that the result would be decided by events.[7] Fabrice recounts that Bernstorff said to him, "d'un air très-sérieux et d'un ton fort lugubre," that if he brought nothing better than what he had sent from Gothenburg (through Schrader) he would not be very welcome. However he held his own, he wrote to Goertz, and was graciously received by the king; and he expressed the belief that the cession of the duchies in perpetuity would not be insisted upon, requesting Goertz to continue to keep his hands free, as he had promised.[8] In this belief he was entirely wrong, for the present

[1] Carlson, p. 118.

[2] Haldane, R. O. Germany (States) 118.

[3] In the latter case in a letter from the king of Prussia (Staatsarchiv, original). The answer to it (ibid.) cited in recrimination the doings of Goertz at Berlin in the previous autumn and the conferences at the Åland Isles.

[4] See his letters, 10 to 17 April o.s., *English Historical Review*, XXI. 67–69.

[5] R. O. Admiralty, Secretary's Dept., In-Letters 2648.

[6] 11 and 18 May, see *English Historical Review*, pp. 69, 70.

[7] Carlson, p. 119.

[8] To Goertz, 20 and 24 May o.s., Riksarkiv; *English Historical Review*, pp. 70–73.

developments in European politics were fatal to his hopes. King George's position was so greatly strengthened by the certainty of the Turkish peace, which freed the hands of his ally the emperor,[1] and by the satisfactory progress of the negotiations for the Quadruple Alliance, that he could afford to await the issue of the Russo-Swedish conferences at the Åland isles with comparative equanimity. Fabrice was constantly put off, and at length was told that, as Goertz had made the Russians cognisant of everything, it was not possible to send a plenipotentiary to Sweden, since his proceedings would only be made use of to promote the treaty with the tsar. If a serious negotiation were intended, full powers might be sent by the king of Sweden to him.[2]

So matters went on till August, when Fabrice received from Goertz at Stockholm the following letter, dated 5 July o.s. :—

"Vous aurés veu par ma dernière, que je faisois une excursion vers le Roy. Je l'ay traînée à dessein un peu plus long tems qu'il n'auroit été nécessaire, pour voir quel succés auroit vôtre négociation. Mais voiant par vos lettres du 20e et 24e de May v. st. que la Cour, où vous êtes, a trouvé à propos de biaiser, j'en dois inférer naturellement que ce n'est pas un avis apocryphe qui nous a été donné, lorsqu'on nous a assuré que toutes les propositions qui nous étoient faites par la dite cour ne tendoient qu'à nous amuser. Je parts donc aujourd'hui pour m'en retourner à Aland, et je n'ay point de scrupule de vous dire, Monsieur, que j'y vais avec la ferme intention de finir avec Mrs. les Russes, aiant pour cela les mains assez libres. Vous me sommés sur la parole que je vous ay donnée, mais vous reconnoîtrés sans doute vous même que j'en suis entièrement dégagé, le terme dont nous étions convenu aiant expiré il y a long tems. Je suis fâché, Monsieur, que vous ne devés pas jouir de la satisfaction que vous aviés espéré de tirer de vos peines. Cependant vous voudrés bien que je vous prie pour vôtre propre intérêt de revenir incessamment en ce pays-ci pour vous rendre auprès le Duc, qui vous attend avec impatience."

This letter is characteristic of Goertz. He had actually brought to Sweden proposals for peace, but Charles peremptorily rejected them. It was not to wait for Fabrice's courier that he delayed his return to the Åland isles, but principally because the king could with difficulty be prevailed upon to allow it. As, when back there, he represented to the Russians that Fabrice was on the point of being successful, so he would have it believed in England that his own negotiation was as promising. On the receipt of his letter Fabrice, who had hitherto worked only through the German

[1] "Die Grundlage von Allem bildete der Friede zwischen dem Kaiser und den Türken zu Passarowitz" (Ranke, V. 29).

[2] Fabrice to Vellingk, 8 July o.s., cited by Carlson, p. 137.

ministers, determined to lay the whole matter before the English secretary of state, James Craggs.[1] He wrote to Goertz as follows [2]:

"Je n'ai pas manqué de montrer vôtre lettre à tous ceux, dont j'ai cru pouvoir tirer quelque service dans cette affaire, et surtout aux Ministres Anglois, sur lesquels la chose a fait un tel effet, que le sécrétaire d'Etat, Mr. Craggs, est venu me trouver le lendemain dans ma chambre, et nous sommes convenus que je luy écrirai une lettre en forme de mémoire par raport à la paix prochaine avec les Russes et l'ouverture du commerce avec la Suède. J'ai tourné la chose d'une manière qu'il en a été fort satisfait, et il m'a promis hier, que j'ai dîné chez luy, qu'il espéroit d'en faire un bon usage, et de me procurer au moins une réponse concluante. Caton [Bernstorff] me regarde de travers de ce manoëvre, mais c'est de quoi je ne m'embarasse guères, en faisant mon devoir. Je suis dans l'attente de ce que produira mon mémoire, après quoi je prendrai le parti de m'en aller ou d'attendre l'ouverture du Parlement pour contribuer à la levée du commerce, et pour empêcher le renvoy d'une flotte dans la Baltique. J'espère que je sçaurai vos sentiments là-dessus en réponse à ma lettre que je vous écrivis il y a près d'un mois. Le Roi est à Hampton Court depuis Mardy passé. Je m'y suis établi aussi, puisque je soupe quasi tous les soirs avec S. M. J'y suis fort bien pour mon particulier, mais je voudrois en sacrifier quelque chose pour que les affaires aillent mieux."

Nothing appears to have resulted from this step on the part of Fabrice. The Quadruple Alliance and the peace of Passarowitz had been signed, and George held firm. The gainer by the negotiations was Charles XII, for he, or rather Goertz, could play off one enemy against another, and decide finally for the friendship of that power which asked least and offered most.[3]

[1] His letter to Craggs, 11 Aug. o.s., with that of Goertz (above), R. O. Home Office, Secretaries' Letter Book 28, copies.

[2] 18 Aug. o.s., Riksarkiv.

[3] So the author of the *Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld*, p. 257: "je ein Allierter der Verräther des andern, der Baron von Goerz aber durch diese künstliche Manoeuvre der Depositarius des grössten Theils ihrer Absichten und Geheimnisse und hiemit Carl XII so zu sagen Herr von der ganzen Boutique wurde."

CHAPTER XIX

CONDITIONS IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF 1718

CHARLES XII passed the last year of his life unmolested by his enemies, except for the blockade of his coasts by the fleets of Great Britain and Denmark. Peter the Great occupied himself with the peace-conferences at the Åland isles. George I, when his own negotiations for peace had failed, could only keep his ships in the Baltic and await events. For the Danes the question, hotly debated at Copenhagen, was whether to throw in their lot with him or with Peter, alienation from either threatening ruin. The king of Prussia, on the other hand, had no doubt on which side to place himself, and sought admission to the Åland conferences, while Augustus of Poland offered to each of the protagonists at the same time active help against the other.[1] The regent of France, for his part, exerted himself strongly to reconcile king George with Frederick William, and both with Charles XII, aiming, however, principally, as has been said, to assure French mediation in the north.

The relations of Great Britain with Sweden were peculiar. The two countries were not at war, nominally the defensive alliance of 1700 and other treaties remained in force, though the first was about to expire; but acts of war had been committed, and, if war was not declared on one side or the other, it was because neither the people of Great Britain nor the king of Sweden would have it. The prohibition of trade, in particular, roused great dissatisfaction among the former, the greater through its ineffectiveness. The Danes and Russians had indeed gone further; they were using forcible measures to stop all traffic to Sweden. But they could not effect this; Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Lübeckers, Dantzigers and others, some Englishmen even, defied the proclamations and the hostile cruisers,[2] and British merchants saw their trade cut off only to benefit their rivals. In the important debate in the lower

[1] Sir Richard Vernon, 16 Feb., 28 May, 1718, R. O. Poland 25. Le Coq, he says, was sent to king George, and one Van Tyn to the tsar. This James Le Coq had credentials of date 28 May (R. O. Royal Letters 41, cf. p. 403).

[2] For particulars see the *English Historical Review*, XXI. 461, note.

house on 27 February o.s. it was stated that Swedish iron was being bought from the Dutch at £4 per ton premium, and that the English merchants, instead of gaining £30,000 a year by the trade, were losing £90,000.[1] The statement was contradicted, indeed, and government had a heavy majority, but the popular discontent was very evident. That it had not greater effect was principally due to the general belief that Charles XII was only biding his time to make a descent upon Great Britain in the interests of the Pretender, and that the fresh invasion of Norway, which he was known to be preparing, was undertaken with the object of obtaining possession of its ports as a preliminary thereto.[2]

The Jacobites, indeed, deprived of the support of France, were using every effort now to enlist in their cause the forces of Spain and of the northern powers. The duke of Ormonde was staying at Mitau in Courland in communication with St. Petersburg, part of his business there being to obtain the tsar's niece Anne, the widowed duchess of Courland, for James Edward to wife; Sir John Stewart had been to Sweden; George Jerningham, who had negotiated with Goertz and Poniatowski at Amsterdam,[3] and one "Hooker" (unless, as may be, these were one and the same person) were actually there. Active correspondence was being conducted between the malcontents in England and their exiled leaders through one "Hamilton" in London. All of which things were known to the government by letters regularly intercepted or by the paid spies of the British envoys, the principal information coming from Leyden, where was stationed Lord Mar's brother-in-law, Hugh Paterson. Copies of everything that he wrote or received found their way at once to Robethon; there was earlier information by this channel from St. Petersburg than the Hanoverian resident there could furnish; and the doings of "Hooker," Ormonde, Sir Harry Stirling, the Earl Marischal and the rest were closely followed by its means.[4]

[1] *Parliamentary History*. The Jacobites claimed the credit of getting up the merchants' petition (B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 232, f. 74).

[2] Forty thousand men, De la Marck wrote, were being got ready to invade Norway, but they were half naked and the expense was ruinous; everyone but Goertz against the undertaking. The terrible misery of the country demanded peace with Russia, in order that Finland and Livonia, "la plus belle et la meilleure moitié du royaume," might be recovered (15 Jan., M.A.E. Suède 141).

[3] See Westrin, pp. 115, 130–32. Jerningham is called in the despatches Irnegan or Jernegan.

[4] Robethon's abstracts and extracts from and notes upon the Paterson correspondence and a few of the original copies sent to him are preserved at the British Museum (*Stowe MSS.* 232). It is probable that the information was furnished by the postmasters at Leyden, Nicholas Clignet and his nephew Robert de Neufville. They had been employed in queen Anne's time both by her envoys and by the ministers of Hanover to transmit to England very private correspondence (e.g. B. M. Add. MSS. 7072, f. 79, 7075, f. 9, *Stowe MSS.* 225, ff. 343 etc., R. O. Germany, States, 163). They continued after George's accession to be close friends of

Peter the Great, indeed, explicitly denied any intercourse with the Jacobites. He ordered Veselovsky to declare in this sense formally, and to insinuate that the reports were due to Hanoverian invention. He could not, he said, interfere with what was being done in Courland, but would show Weber, if required, an original treaty with the king of Poland for the marriage of the duchess to a prince of Saxe-Weissenfels.[1]

If there was a great deal more in the sanguine talk of the Jacobites than reality warranted, their aspirations were clear enough. They were set forth, for instance, in a memorial delivered by James Edward at the end of January to Cardinal Acquaviva, who had the charge of Spanish affairs at Rome. It indulged first in those two favourite topics, the intestine divisions of the Whigs and the "Elector's" quarrel with his son. The Tories, it was said, whose numbers greatly surpassed all the parties of the Whigs, had at heart only the honour and good of their country and would unite to further the first serious attempt to be made in "the King's" favour. Of the present course of political affairs Spain might very well be the victim. The faithful in England were doing all they could in parliament to prevent the despatch of a British fleet to the Mediterranean. But they could not work further in the interest of the king of Spain unless some indication of goodwill was given in return. It was money that was wanted. The good intentions of the king of Sweden were clear from his action in the previous year, but the unfortunate discovery of his intentions had ruined all the preparations and had stopped the supply of English money. The tsar was even stronger than he in his hatred of the "Elector" and his friendship for James. There were solid grounds for hoping that the peace about to be made between the two would be followed by united effort on their part to restore him. But he must send them money. He had promised £100,000, and it might be asked of him at any time. He had not got it, and hoped that the king of Spain would furnish or assure it. The establishment of a friendly prince on the throne of England must be of great consequence to him.[2]

Robethon and in his master's employ. Wich, for instance, in 1718 was sending his despatches through them (R. O. Hamburg 35, 22 Feb. 1718). Heinsius told L'Hermitage that Clignet "étoit reconnu le plus habile, le plus entendu et le plus expert dans ces sortes de choses, et le plus zélé" (L'Hermitage, 4 May 1717, *Stowe MSS.* 230, f. 88). Another person employed was Jopin, or Joppain, comptroller of posts in the Austrian Netherlands. Cadogan and Whitworth wrote on 4 Oct. 1718 that he had promised to send copies of all Jacobite letters passing (R. O. Holland 264. Robethon also mentions him in 1713, *Stowe MSS.* 225, f. 99).

[1] Instructions to Veselovsky, 2 Jan. o.s. 1718, *Kurakin Archives*, III. 37.

[2] Gualterio Papers, B. M. Add. MSS. 20292, f. 186, cited more fully by Wiesener, II. 157 foll. The memorial was enclosed to Acquaviva in a letter from James Edward of 27 Jan.

The apprehensions of the British government were increased by the fact that it was not, even now, quite sure of France. Alberoni in the autumn had been making overtures to the regent, which in the absence of Dubois received consideration.[1] The cardinal was known to include in his wide-reaching schemes a confederation of Spain, Russia, Sweden and perhaps Prussia and France against the emperor and the king of England. The prospect was more assured indeed with the new year, when an agreement between France and Great Britain on the subject of the Quadruple Alliance had been arrived at, but political difficulties at home still reacted upon views at Paris. To quote Lord Stair on 7 March in reference to "this troublesome session of parliament":

"as to the situation of the King's affairs, I see plainly it is so very dangerous, that in my way of thinking there is no room left to be afraid, wee must work if wee would save ourselves, I hope courage and good understanding will help us out. If you have not been beat in the House of Lords on Wednesday last[2] I shall be able to make a good countenance at this Court, which is exceeding necessary, for it is weak and feeble in itself and begins to be very distrustful of us, not of our willingness but of our ability to support them. I mean the Regent, for the greatest part of the ministers and the French nation equally hate him and us," etc.

And again on 25 April:

"till our treaty with the Emperor is signed I shall never think it out of danger. . . . You cannot imagine with what ridiculous fondness they swallow all the idle storys can be told of the King of Sweeden and of the Pretender's motions. I'm afraid indeed our good friend Gortz has never had any other intention in the separate treaty with the King, but to use it as a handle to draw the Czar into the measures Gortz had concerted against us. . . . If our treaty had miscarryed and the war against the Turk had continued wee would have found the Northern alliance a very troublesome piece of business."[3]

And James Craggs wrote that it was confirmed from all quarters that a great project was in hand; most to be feared was a plot to assassinate the king. Stair should represent to the regent "with most pathetick but friendly expostulations" how strange it was that France "should not only be an azylum to protect H.M. rebel subjects, but that they should there provide men, arms, ships and money to disturb his government."[4] And similar representations

[1] See Armstrong, *Scottish Review*, LVII. pp. 90, 91 (Jan. 1897). "The issue," he writes, "depended on the personal struggle between the two statesmen of fortune, Alberoni and Dubois. The Frenchman won."

[2] This apparently refers to the great debate on the Mutiny Bill, which took place on Tuesday and Thursday, 18 and 20 Feb. o.s.

[3] Private letters to Craggs, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 246.

[4] 17 April o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 29.

were made at St. Petersburg and Vienna. Whitworth, again, as late as July, wrote to his friend under-secretary Tilson :—

"I am persuaded the Regent has people about him, who not only push him upon precipices, but even act and send orders without his knowledge: for had not Châteauneuf some private directions, he certainly would never venture to play the part he does for these last three weeks, and that is since the French had advice that the Congress was actually begun at Aland. . . . Our war with Spain will probably be soon begun, and since wee are to break, I think it is some advantage to do it before the cockatrice's egg is grown to be a serpent ; [1] for the humour Alberoni is off, wee must certainly have been forced to a rupture sooner or later, now wee shall have the Emperor, and at least the neutrality of the Regent. . . . I wish France has not some side view that way [2] which keeps them in an irresolution that otherwise would be unaccountable ; for the Regent had not signed on the 15th, thô still promised from time to time. You know I have for some years dreaded and foretold such a crise. I wish I may not be too true a prophet ; I know nothing of the northern negotiations, I should be sorry to have any hand in them as they are managed ; but 'tis hard that the main interest of the K. and nation, as well as the continuance of the ministry, must be link'd to such a jumble of proceedings. Châteauneuf and Uxelles certainly act in concert, and till the first be recalled and the latter removed I see no peace for Israel."

Such apprehensions were not entirely removed till it was certain that the peace of Passarowitz and the Quadruple Alliance were safe. Then indeed the case was altered ; France was secured, and the phantom of a great adverse alliance between Spain and the northern powers laid. Then, to quote Droysen, "stolz in Norden ünd Suden den Frieden gebietend stand England da." And of England's old ally ; "dem Wiener Hofe schien die Zeit gekommen, alle Herrlichkeit, alle Macht des Kaiserthums zu erneuern." [3]

There was some real ground for this distrust of France, for the regent continued to instruct De la Marck not to oppose a peace between Sweden and Russia, if it were inevitable, but to act so that in any case a share in the mediation should fall to France. In January, indeed, he had advised him that the king of England "déclare nettement qu'il ne peut s'en désister [of the cession of Bremen and Verden] en aucune partie, prétendant que le partage de ces deux Duchés luy rendroit inutile la portion qui luy en seroit cédée, et que ce seroit pour toujours une source intarissable de démélez." The count must use his utmost endeavours to bring about a reconciliation between the kings of England and Sweden, in spite of all difficulties, seeing that "mon intention est toujours d'employer mes offices les plus pressans pour engager le Roy de Suède à se

[1] That is, before peace between Sweden and Russia was concluded.
[2] Towards the Åland conferences.
[3] Pp. 219, 227.

reconcilier avec le Roy d'Angleterre par préférence à aucun autre de ses Ennemis." Prussia must be included therein, and the king of Sweden must not build hopes upon the sympathy of the British people, for parliament had granted the king of England all the supplies he wanted. Yet at the same time the count's principal object must be to secure that no treaty with any power should be concluded without the participation of France.[1] But when De la Marck continued to report failure, namely that if king George would not make concessions peace would be made with the tsar and that for the king of Prussia nothing could be done at all, although there appeared to be some inclination on his part to reduce his claims—if terms were made with the tsar or the king of England nothing, it was held, need be given up to Prussia[2]—then he was accorded the difficult task of so conducting himself that neither the king of England should have reason to suppose that other interests were preferred to his, nor the other allies of the north that theirs would be sacrificed thereto. He must preserve, he was told (21 March), the confidence of all, and at the same time endeavour to persuade the king of Sweden that the principal motive of French action was friendship for him. It was most of all desirable that peace should be made with the king of England through French mediation, but, as he had not yet confided his final views and the negotiation with the tsar appeared to be well advanced, De la Marck must not only not oppose its course in any way but must find means to have his part in it. The former instructions in regard to Prussia were repeated. The harm which a want of understanding with Prussia and Denmark would do to the king of Sweden's interests in Germany was to be insisted upon, and some abatement of Prussian claims, if possible, obtained. The king of Sweden's attitude might only be an affectation designed to procure such abatement, and would probably be changed so soon as his negotiations with the tsar became assured of success. De la Marck might intimate that the French subsidy treaty would be renewed as soon as the pacification of the north had assumed a definite form, and might give formal assurance that the king of Sweden would continue to receive all possible marks of friendship. His suspicions of Goertz he must dissimulate.[3] His conduct so far was entirely approved.

[1] Instructions to De la Marck, 6 Jan. 1718, M.A.E. Suède 137.

[2] Because " la Cour de Prusse étoit si timide et si incertain, que quelque avantage qu'on luy fît de la part de la Suède et quelque chose qu'elle promette de son côté, elle n'oscra jamais agir contre aucun de ses alliez en faveur de la Suède."

[3] With these despatches from the regent and D'Huxelles went a letter, in which such complimentary terms were used of Goertz, that it was evidently meant to be shown him.

Haldane was back at Cassel by the middle of February.[1] On his way he had ascertained the views of the Swedes and their friends at the Hague, while at Hanover he found the opinion prevailing that an agreement between Sweden and Russia was more probable than one with the king of England, and that a treaty, to include Prussia, was well advanced. One of the first things he did on his arrival at Cassel was to draft, in consultation with the landgrave, a letter to Vellingk, who, in answer, declared his readiness to treat on the basis of the cession of certain bailiwicks in Bremen and Verden, but not on that of the duchies themselves. Haldane insisted that it was not an affair of two or three bailiwicks, or even of the revenues of the whole country, but of the expense which the possession thereof by Sweden cast upon Hanover and of the desire to be rid of so powerful a neighbour. He told the landgrave that he alone was employed to negotiate with Sweden. He was answered that, though it might be kept a secret from him, there was certain information that Fabrice had sailed from a port in Mecklenburg in an English frigate, charged with propositions. If, said the landgrave, the king of England did not trust him, he would interest himself no more; if, on the contrary, he were made privy to the negotiation, he would do his best to second it and would send Rank to Sweden again. Haldane could only reply that he was ignorant of Fabrice's mission and did not credit it, for reasons he gave. He thought that only General Dücker and other Swedish officers, to whom his master had given passes in the previous year, had gone on the frigate. But the landgrave, he says, was not satisfied, and pressed for further information.

If Haldane's professions of ignorance were genuine, he must have felt foolish when Vellingk came to Cassel, as previously said, and showed the letter from Lund stating that Fabrice had had interviews with Charles and had gone on to find Goertz. Vellingk, he says, much affected his company and took great pains to represent the king of Sweden's good intentions. His principal business was to procure the renewal of the treaty concluded at Stralsund and in particular that the Hessian troops appointed to serve the emperor in Italy, seven regiments of foot of 400 men each, should be kept at home to help Sweden. Haldane doubted of his success, seeing that the sums owing to the landgrave amounted to 700,000 crowns and that the fund allotted for paying him was no longer available.[2] Later he wrote that the treaty was signed, but that

[1] His credentials, 19 Nov. o.s., and instructions, 2 Dec. o.s., 1717, R. O. King's Letters 19.

[2] Part of the subsidies payable to Sweden under the French treaty of April 1715, now expired, were allotted to the landgrave in return for stipulated help.

he was assured that there was nothing in it contrary to the interests of the king of England. The troops were only to be used to garrison the Swedish towns in Germany when peace had been made.

On the 19th the hereditary prince's gentleman, Colonel Rave, arrived on his yearly visit, and brought confirmation of the news of Fabrice's journey. Rank also was back from Holland, where he had been busily engaged for some weeks in arranging for necessaries to be sent to Sweden and in trying to persuade the Dutch to send a minister thither.[1] He showed Haldane letters from Vellingk and a copy of one from Fabrice from Stockholm, recounting his experiences. The favour, Fabrice said, enjoyed by Goertz was not to be expressed, and he hoped with his assistance to bring Vellingk in fourteen days full powers to conclude what had been agreed upon. He confirmed the belief that the king of Sweden intended to make peace with the king of England and the tsar at the same time.[2]

At Copenhagen attention was principally given to the proposed treaties with Great Britain and Hanover.[3] The former had been practically agreed to, but the latter was hindered by the anxiety of Denmark to keep well with Russia and Prussia. It was suggested from Hanover that it should be replaced by a declaration to the effect that the king of Denmark, having entered into a treaty with the king of England as king, pledged himself likewise to remain in close alliance with him as elector, and if he were attacked in his German dominions or the quiet of the circle of Lower Saxony were disturbed by any one whomsoever, or if such things only threatened, to come to his assistance with 10,000 regular troops, to be reckoned as auxiliaries under the treaty of 1715. But the Danes desired the substitution of certain words in the draft of this declaration as submitted,[4] and the Hanoverians would

[1] James Dayrolle, 11 Feb., 18 and 22 March, Whitworth, 15 March, R. O. Holland 259, 261; also Kurakin, 13 March, as cited by Uhlenbeck, p. 202. Dayrolle had been promoted from Geneva to the Hague to replace Leathes, transferred to Brussels.

[2] The above from Haldane's despatches, R. O. Germany (States) 118. There is nothing from him during May on Swedish affairs. In the latter part of the month, the landgrave having gone from Cassel, he paid a visit to Leipzig and Dresden to see the court of the king of Poland, considerably vexing by his conduct there the envoy Sir Richard Vernon. His remaining reports during this year on northern affairs consist mainly of hearsay.

[3] See pp. 190–91.

[4] Namely, in the eventuality stated, for the words "dass Wir und des Königs von Gross-Brittannien Majestät zu dessen Abkehrung Etwas vorzunehmen nöthig erachten sollten," to be substituted, "dass Wir endlich beyderseits zu dessen Abkehrung Etwas jedoch ohne prejudice der gemeinsahmen Interesse der gegen Schweden uniirten Puissancen vorzunehmen nöthig erachten sollten." This alteration, Bothmer remarked at the conference on 23 Nov. 1717, was "si nerveux," that it might even prejudice the treaty of 1715. (Protocol of the conference, Staatsarchiv.)

not consent. General Bothmer was told by the Danish ministers that Denmark desired to remain the friend of Great Britain, Prussia and Russia alike. He replied that, if this could be contrived, they would be very clever, and advised his master to declare that, if the king of Denmark would not sign the declaration, everything should be broken off. The leaders of the Hanoverian party at the Danish court, the Mecklenburgers I. G. Holstein and Dewitz, did their best to persuade him of the sincere intentions of the king of Denmark, but he wrote that the ill-intentioned, as he called Wibe and Sehestedt and their party, were entirely in the hands of Russia and Prussia.[1] And indeed they made serious efforts to concert with the tsar a joint invasion of Sweden for the coming year, a Danish force of 40,000 men from Norway, his army from Finland. It was seen that such an undertaking was only possible with the aid of a British fleet, and, as a first step towards reconciling king George with the tsar, the latter was urged to recall his 3,000 men left at Schwerin. But it was soon recognized that action in common between the two was no longer possible, and on 20 November 1717 Polwarth could report that Wibe's party was outvoted in the council, which had advised the king to do nothing, whether for war or peace, except in concert with Great Britain. This resolution, Sunderland wrote in answer, " certainly is the wisest they could take with regard to their own interest, since I know of no other power by which they can expect to be supported." [2] And when the king of Denmark gave proof of his desire for a good understanding by making concessions in respect of the Elbe commerce, further interference with which of late had caused very grave ill-feeling,[3] Sunderland wrote that the king was " very ready to act in concert with him as to the operations of the next year," and " they may be satisfied that his Majesty will continue to assist them with his fleet, as he hath hitherto done." [4]

In the course of the spring of 1718 Bothmer continued to report upon the contest between the " übelgesinnte " and the " wohlgesinnte " at the Danish court. The main demand of Hanover now was that Denmark should participate in the intended " execution " upon the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Bothmer's chief argument the unavoidable ruin of Denmark, unless she made alliance with his master. The Danes contended principally for the yearly visit of a British fleet to the Baltic, an annual subsidy of 300,000 thalers, and continuance of the treaties till peace was made, and in the second place for the subjection of Swedish ships to the Sound

[1] Bothmer's despatches, and rescripts to him, Sept. to Nov. 1717, Staatsarchiv.
[2] 19 Nov. o.s. 1717, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5.
[3] Hamburg and Danish despatches, Sept. to Nov. 1717, *passim*.
[4] 13 Dec. o.s.

tolls and the restoration of a portion of the province of Båhus. The news of the conferences to be held at the Åland Isles, which arrived early in March, had considerable influence, though Peter's strong assurances [1] prevented the Danes from definitely breaking with him. They insisted that they could not advance further to meet the king of England's wishes unless he would declare his intentions definitely. This Bothmer and Polwarth would not do, taking everything "ad referendum." Danish confidence was yet further shaken by the news of Fabrice's mission. Specious explanations were given in reply, but the final argument was that Denmark could not reap any advantage from the war, excepting by close alliance with the king of England.[2]

[1] See Holm, pp. 603 foll.
[2] Bothmer, Feb. to April 1718, Staatsarchiv.

CHAPTER XX

THE BALTIC EXPEDITION OF 1718. NEGOTIATIONS WITH DENMARK

On 26 April o.s. 1718 a British squadron sailed once more for the Baltic. Its departure had been hastened by the knowledge that a powerful Swedish armament was preparing at Carlskrona, either, it was believed, to pass the Sound and attack the British coasts, or to make a descent on Pomerania or Mecklenburg. If it came to Kjöge Bay, General Bothmer was confidentially informed, the provisions and necessaries awaited from Holstein would be cut off and the Danish fleet be prevented from putting to sea at all.[1] The squadron was a small one, for a powerful fleet was required in the Mediterranean. It consisted only of the *Cumberland*, 80 guns, three of 70, two of 60, four of 50, and two frigates. Sir John Norris had the command, and with him was Rear-Admiral James Mighells on the *Buckingham*. A few merchantmen sailed with him, but the bulk of the trade was not ready.

The preamble to Norris's instructions alleged "the violent conduct of the king of Sweden in giving an unjustifiable interruption to the commerce of Our subjects," the fruitlessness of all instances to obtain redress, and the good reason to believe that his "dangerous designs against the peace and safety of Our kingdoms" were still being carried on. Gyllenborg's proceedings, upon examination of his conduct in pursuance of the French declaration, had not been disavowed. On arriving at Copenhagen Norris was to obtain what intelligence of the Swedish fleet he could, and "to concert measures with the Danish admirals for the most useful operations in order to annoy the Swedes, to hinder their fleet from passing the Sound into these seas, and to reduce them to such a temper as may make them comply with Our just demands of a free commerce and due reparation to Our subjects." He was to take under his protection such merchant ships as should go with him and others that should join them later, "as far as is consistent with the principal service of hindering the Swedish fleet from coming into these seas," and he was to take up proper stations

[1] Bothmer, 5 March, Staatsarchiv.

for both purposes. It was hoped that such measures, taken in conjunction with the Danes, would be effectual. And whereas it had proved impossible to obtain the revocation of the ordinance of privateers, so long complained of, Norris was by way of reprisal to intercept and capture all ships belonging to Sweden or having the king of Sweden's commission, and bring them to Copenhagen. He was to inform himself of the instructions given to the admiral of the Dutch squadron appointed to follow and concert measures with him in accordance therewith, and he was to protect the ships of countries in amity with the king of England, which should not be bound for any port of Sweden.[1]

Had the merchants of the province of Holland had their way this Dutch squadron would have been of very considerable strength. As far back as September Amsterdam had asked, " as a temporary expedient," that certain frigates armed by private persons for the Baltic should be given letters of reprisal, the Swedes having taken nearly twenty Dutch prizes in that and in the previous month in spite of the watch kept by the English and Danish cruisers. The British envoys, Cadogan and Whitworth, thought that such a resolve might " in all probability engage them by degrees to more effectual ways of proceeding." [2] The Hollanders went so far as to insinuate that, if the States-General refused their demand, they would send ships themselves to take action not against Sweden only but Denmark also, several of their ships having been arrested by cruisers of the latter nation. But the deputies from the other provinces, especially Zeeland, opposed on the ground of risk of engagement in another war, " which is the watchword," as Whitworth expressed it, " whenever the ill-intentioned have a mind to oppose any measures that seem contrary to the Swedish interest, however their own may suffer by it." [3] Preis and his friends supported their arguments zealously, making known certain concessions which the king of Sweden was prepared to grant, and Châteauneuf, the British envoys said, behaved himself in the matter " rather as an emissary of Sweden than an ambassador of France." [4]

The agitation developed into proposals to fit out a regular squadron, strong enough to act in the Baltic independently of the British. In December the States of Holland passed an unanimous

[1] Authorities for the Baltic expedition of 1718: Norris's journal and letter-book, B.M. Add. MSS. 28128–29, 28145; and at the Record Office his instructions, King's Letters 65, the originals of his despatches to the secretary of state and to Burchett, secretary of the Admiralty, In-Letters 2 in that department, copies of the secretaries of state's despatches to him, Foreign Entry Book 155, and Polwarth's despatches, Denmark 39 and 40.

[2] 5 Oct. 1717, R. O. Holland 258.

[3] 23 Nov., ibid.

[4] 8 Oct., ibid.

preliminary resolution to this effect, and on 21 January a further one naming thirty men-of-war as the complement. But on the other hand the king of Denmark undertook, on receiving payment of 20,000 crowns due to him for arrears, to release all the Dutch ships taken by him, excepting those whose cargoes were clearly designed for Sweden,[1] and to open his ports and give all other assistance to a Dutch fleet. And the devastation caused by floods [2] and cattle-plague prevented Friesland and Groningen from undertaking any extraordinary financial burden. So that at the end of the year the fear was expressed " that in the execution the number of shipps will not be considerable." [3]

A counter-proposal brought forward by the opposition—Whitworth credits Châteauneuf with its inception—was to obtain what was desired by sending a minister to Sweden to treat. Charles XII, De la Marck had written, insisted that a person of quality should be sent " with an excuse for what is past " and was desirous of settling all differences and of renewing the treaty of 1700 for a further period of eighteen years. The argument that all risk of war might be avoided by taking advantage of his friendly disposition was worked for all it was worth by the friends of Sweden. Robert Goes, long stationed at Copenhagen and thoroughly conversant with northern affairs, was actually named to go, but the Dutch government demanded that its resident at Stockholm, Rumpf, should first be re-admitted to court, and Charles refused this, until some one had come with an apology for the arrest of Goertz. As neither side would yield, the proposal came to nothing.

The States of Holland included in their deputation to the States-General special representatives of their three great trading towns, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Hoorn. But although 600,000 florins were voted and 200,000 paid at the end of January towards the expense of the undertaking, on 22 March Dayrolle had to write " the design for the Baltick grows almost impracticable this year for want of the concurrence of all the Provinces, and the impossibility of raising seamen at this time of the year." The necessary final resolution did not pass the States-General till 12 April, and then the lack of sailors made it nugatory. A fortnight later the number of vessels waiting in the Texel had risen to 200, and the merchants were reduced to pressing for at least a convoy. Even this was not provided for another eight weeks, and it consisted of nine ships only. The project of the fleet had been wrecked, so Whitworth wrote, by " les vaines espérances de quelques uns, la

[1] Cf. Lamberty, XI. 2–5.

[2] " If this weather lasts much longer, you will be to look where Holland was " (Whitworth to Tilson, 11 Jan. 1718, R. O. Holland 261).

[3] Dayrolle, 31 Dec., ibid. 259.

timidité des autres, et la mauvaise volonté d'une faction, assez peu considérable il est vray, mais toujours opposée au bien public et à leur union avec l'Angleterre." [1] He might have added the threats of Peter the Great to make reprisals upon Dutch commerce, if they sent a squadron to act in concert with the British.[2]

The Pensionary, however, and the other friends of England were able to meet in some measures the earnest requests of the British government that the Dutch admiral should act in concert with Sir John Norris. Rear-Admiral Van Cooperen, appointed after Admiral Wassenaer had declined so small a command, was instructed to take under his protection all the British merchantmen and convoy them up the Baltic and back to the Sound, during the time that the Anglo-Danish fleet was keeping a watch upon the Swedes in Carlskrona. And some promise was made that, if as a consequence of the Åland conferences the fleets of Sweden and Russia should combine and attempt to pass the Sound, then Van Cooperen, who was shortly to be reinforced, should be instructed to oppose them in conjunction with Norris, the republic being bound by treaty to defend Great Britain.[3]

Peter the Great entertained the gravest suspicion of king George's policy. Replying to Veselovsky's account of the sending of Schrader to Sweden with General Dücker and of the Hanoverian ministers' assertion that the object was only to gain information about the Åland conferences, he ordered him to find out, using money, if necessary, for the purpose, what were the king of England's real intentions and Schrader's instructions, and whether the conditions of peace proposed included the kings of Denmark and Poland, they being reported to have a share in the negotiation. He should declare that the Åland conferences were not yet opened, but that anything which might result from them should be communicated. If he did not meet with like openness, then he should say that the tsar would conduct his negotiations in secret and take measures to protect his own interests. Reports, corroborated by the proceedings of the king of England's ministers at the imperial and French and other courts, had it that that king would make a separate peace at the expense of his allies, and therefore it must be clearly stated that, if he took any such hostile steps, the tsar

[1] 10 May, private. Cf. on the above the documents and text in Lamberty, XI. 9–28. These valuable memoirs unfortunately come to an end here, the writer, a man intimate with state affairs, having been obliged to leave the Hague for Switzerland, his native country, on account of his health (pp. 30, 92).

[2] Peter to Kurakin, 3 and 10 March o. s., *Kurakin Archives*, III. 50, 52. Further 5 May o. s., p. 67.

[3] The above from the despatches of Cadogan, Whitworth and Dayrolle, Sept. 1717 to July 1718, R. O. Holland. Documents in connexion, Lamberty, X. 92–104.

would try to anticipate the evil and to avenge the many insults put upon him. For instance, he would publish his intention of moving a large force on Dantzig, with ulterior views, and would cut off British commerce and seize the merchants' ships and effects. The latter threat Veselovsky should use to rouse the commercial community. If he saw that the king would carry the nation to help the Swedes he must enter a formal protest and agitate in parliament, though not prematurely or without necessity, and doing all things in close consultation with Kurakin and Schleinitz. Perhaps, however, the English ministers would be disposed to make a concert with and send naval help to himself, in which case he was fully disposed to renew the former agreement.[1]

Sir John Norris anchored in Copenhagen roads on 25 May after a slow passage of eighteen days in cold foggy weather. He found the Danes, he said, very apprehensive of a Swedish descent, but did not think such an undertaking probable. Ten Swedish men-of-war had been seen at sea, but the Danes were now the stronger and had 30,000 good troops ready to resist invasion. It is some testimony to the efficiency of the Swedish fleet when Norris recounts how H.M.S. *St. Albans*, which had not reached the Nore in time to sail with him, met in the Cattegat a cruiser of 44 guns from Gothenburg, which " had his guns out and got his spritsail yard alongships," completely outsailing the British man-of-war. The tsar, Norris went on, was reported to have thirty or forty ships in a condition for sea. The return of Fabrice and the voyage of the *Deal Castle* were known at Copenhagen, and " this place is not without jealousies, how the affairs of the North are treating in other places," but the want of money made peace an urgent necessity. Taxes were very high, and " sometimes, when a man is known to be rich, he is particularly requested to lend."

On May 27 and June 4 conferences took place with the Danish ministers, at which Lord Polwarth and General Bothmer attended. Norris communicated the substance of his instructions and replied, when asked whether a joint prohibition of trade to Sweden could be promulgated, that the king of England had already prohibited that commerce to his subjects. Three questions were then put to him, and afterwards again formally in a letter from the king : was he in a condition to join at once the Danish squadron in Kjöge Bay, would he in conjunction with it fight the Swedish fleet, if attacked, and would he go with it to seek and attack that fleet, if there were a likelihood of doing so upon equal terms, or with advantage ? His answer was that he would take the benefit of the first fair wind to join the Danish fleet and would be always ready to concert

[1] To Veselovsky, 25 April o.s., *Kurakin Archives*, III. 58–60.

measures not only to prevent enterprises by the Swedes against the king's dominions but likewise to attack them in such manner as should be proposed for his service and the good of the common cause. He earnestly recommended that the Danish contingent should be made as strong as possible.

On 9 June he sailed for Kjöge Bay, and found there twelve of the line under Admiral Raben. One effect of his arrival was the contrary of what he had desired, for two of the Danish ships were sent back to Copenhagen to refit. Eleven days later, being informed of the orders to be given to Van Cooperen, he expressed his views on the situation as follows :—

The Dutch admiral's instructions were not sufficient. "It has been owing to the middle way of the States, that the troubles have been thus long kept up in these parts." If De Veth had been willing to attack in 1715 they had probably been ended. Now the Dutch desired that Great Britain should engage in war for their benefit. If the king's efforts for an accommodation with Sweden came to nothing the only way to compel that country to reason would be to prevent entirely all navigation up the Baltic for some time, for while there was an open trade from Dantzig, Königsberg, and other ports the wants of Sweden could be supplied. "I should be glad to know, whether when the States propose our acting against Sweden, they have forbid their commerce to that country." The Swedes could not be properly blockaded in Carlskrona, for a fleet could not lie off that place, and if they were enterprising they might attack the traders in the different ports. The Danes would do nothing to prevent this, "as it is a constant maxim with them, never to trust their fleet up the Baltique much farther than Bornholm." These reflections were partly answered by Cadogan and Whitworth from the Hague on 25 June. "'Twas with great difficulty," they wrote, "we brought the States-General thus far, and insensibly we shall engage them as deep as we are; in order to it we must recommend to you the having all possible regard and complaisance for their admiral Van Coper" and a thorough inclination to protect the Dutch trade as well as the British.

On 1 July four Danish men-of-war and the *Port Mahon* frigate sailed for Bornholm and were able to report that no Swedes had been seen off that island for a great while, though fifteen or sixteen of them had been observed before Norris's arrival. On the 10th the Dutch fleet of nine men-of-war and 240 merchantmen arrived in the Sound, and a few hours later three of Norris's squadron under command of Captain Chadwick of the *Launceston*, with about 90 British and 14 Dutch traders. When all were united in

Kjöge Bay a council of war was held, 14 July, when the two admirals communicated their instructions and it was decided in accordance with them that Norris should attempt to persuade Raben to sail with him to Bornholm and to remain on that station in observation of Carlskrona as long as conditions would permit, while Van Cooperen and Chadwick proceeded eastwards with the trade. Dates were fixed, at which the traders should be ready to leave their respective ports, and specific orders were given to Chadwick in regard thereto. On the same afternoon Norris agreed to the above effect with Raben. On the 15th all sailed, and the one division passing between Bornholm and the Swedish coast, the other southward of the island for Dantzig, by morning the two were out of sight of each other. Norris and Raben kept their station for three months, under great difficulties when the autumn storms came on. They constantly sailed or sent cruisers to look into Carlskrona, and as often as they turned their backs on the port three or four of the Swedes would come out, only to be chased back again. There were found to be fifteen or sixteen of the line there ready for sea, besides frigates, so that the watch was very necessary. A great part of Norris's time was devoted to investigating the soundings and navigation of these waters.

When six weeks had been consumed in this work the Danish government desired to bring its own fleet home, leaving only a few cruisers to watch Carlskrona. Two reasons were alleged, the necessity of sending a naval reinforcement to Norway and the expense of provisioning the fleet at a distance. When the Danish ships were in their own waters, Norris tells us on this head, it was the custom to land the soldiers and maintain them at the cost of the inhabitants. He pointed out to his own government that, if they were recalled now, they would hardly be sent out again in the storms of autumn. And at a council of war on 26 August he found arguments to prevail on Raben to postpone his departure pending further orders.

Another danger occupying attention was the possibility of the Russian fleet joining the Swedish, should peace be concluded at the Åland isles. This danger was in view when Norris was yet at Copenhagen. Stair, for instance, had written from Paris on 31 May : " They advise me there has been a considerable summ of money remitted lately from Spain into Sweden, and that a considerable squadron of the Czar's fleet is to joyn the King of Sweden's." [1] Later Robethon hinted to Polwarth that the junction might be prevented by force. Norris replied with some asperity, hating, like other Englishmen, to receive directions from the confidential

[1] Private letter to Craggs, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 246.

secretary, that his instructions contained nothing in reference to the Russians. Was he to make war upon them, he asked, and had the Danish admiral orders to that effect ? [1] Robethon answered that what he had written was only his private opinion, and that it did not now appear, from various information received, that the Swedish fleet was in a condition to put to sea, that the tsar would man more than a few ships, or that the conclusion of a treaty was at all assured. Bernstorff, he said, would move the British government to send the admiral instructions for the case. But at the same time (6 July) Stair was reporting conferences between the Russian minister Schleinitz (who, it is to be noted, was also at this time in charge of the king of Prussia's affairs at Paris [2]) and the ambassadors of Spain and Savoy, and a fortnight later he wrote of a letter to hand from Captain Thomas Gordon [3] to the effect that the Russian and Swedish fleets would shortly join and that thereupon an express would be sent to the Pretender " to come off, to what parts it does not mention." [4] And while it was known that Ormonde's mission to the north had been a failure, that he had been ordered to depart from Mitau, and that Sir Harry Stirling, staying at St. Petersburg with his relative Robert Erskine, had been unable to persuade the latter to plead the cause of the Jacobites with the tsar, letters from " Hooker " to Paterson were of a different tenour.[5] Returning from Sweden in February he had gone to Holland, where he had interviews with Kurakin and Preis, and thence to Mitau, going on to St. Petersburg on the same day that Ormonde left for France (13 May).[6] Arrived there and finding that nothing could be done through Erskine, he wrote, he had obtained an introduction to the doctor's enemy, Shafirov, who had received his overtures extremely well ; " me combla de civilitez." He had told Shafirov that in Sweden he had found agents of king George offering money and ships of war for service against the tsar, that the king of Sweden was nevertheless well disposed towards the latter, that both France and Spain seemed inclined to favour the projected invasion, that at neither of these courts had king George any credit, that there was universal discontent in England and affection for the exiled prince, and so on according to the usual Jacobite fancy. In return Shafirov had assured him that the tsar's support

[1] 20 June o.s.
[2] Stair, 15 Oct., R. O. France 162.
[3] Probably Commander Gordon of the tsar's 62-gun ship *St. Catherine*, promoted to be rear-admiral in Jan. 1719. He had commanded ships in the British navy as early as 1693 and as late as 1715 (Hist. MSS. Comm. Report X. i. 185-86).
[4] R. O. France 161.
[5] 27 May, 3, 16 and 26 June, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 232, ff. 102–10.
[6] Ibid. ff. 70, 75, 79, 84, 88, 91, 95, 97, 98.

might firmly be relied upon and that there was little doubt that he would be allowed to go to the Åland isles and his master be admitted as a principal in the expected treaty.[1] Norris therefore shortly received from Craggs the following orders (dated 8 July o.s.) : " As by your instructions you are directed to hinder the Swedes from passing the Sound, so you are likewise to oppose any others that shall join with them ; and in all cases you are to act against those whom you shall meet in conjunction with the Swedes in the same manner as you are ordered to act against the Swedes themselves." Norris enquired in answer whether, if the Russians showed an intention of joining the Swedes, he should give them battle in advance, since in that case success would be much more probable, and said that Raben had as yet no orders in the matter. And to the Hague he suggested that the Dutch would find it to their interest to support such action, adding however that, whereas at the beginning of the summer, when the Swedes had thought peace with the tsar certain, they had prepared a number of transports for some expedition, now they had again discharged most of these.[2] To Polwarth he wrote later that Raben would not receive orders to assist him, the king of Denmark believing in the tsar's assurance that the case apprehended would not occur. " So our friends in England have sent me an order the Danes won't joyn in," but whatever the reasons might be, " our business is to go through this campaign as well as we can." [3]

Then came the news that Peter had actually put to sea with a considerable force. Craggs on 22 August o.s. forwarded a list of ships that had sailed from Cronslot on 27 July, twenty of the line, with Peter himself in command of the *Ingria*, and three frigates and a couple of bombships.[4] Four more ships were reported already at Dantzig, while from the Hague came the information that 10,000 men would be taken on board at Reval and 10,000 more at Abo.[5] And that a treaty had been concluded was now the general

[1] Account of the audience, ibid. f. 106, 5 June o.s. 1718. " Hooker " stayed on at St. Petersburg till the middle of August (f. 135). La Vie (16 Sept., *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 375) says that he passed under the name of " Desmarets " (cf. p. 285), and that with him was one " Brunet." Lord Mahon (2nd ed., I. 478, note) says that among the Stuart papers is an original passport in Russian and Latin given to Ormonde to go to the Åland conferences, and that he passed under the name of " Brunet." But Ormonde had left Mitau for France in May. " Brunet " would seem to have been O'Brien (p. 239, note), who wrote from Dantzig on 31 Aug. that he had left St. Petersburg, as his longer stay there appeared to be useless (*Stowe MSS.* 232, f. 136). " Hooker " stayed at Mitau during September and October and during November at Dantzig, returning then to Holland (ff. 137–63).

[2] 27 July o.s.

[3] 15 Aug. o.s.

[4] Also *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 367.

[5] R. O. Holland 260, 12 Aug. and 6 Sept.

belief.[1] Accordingly fresh instructions, dated 19 August o.s., were sent to Norris repeating the previous directions of Craggs and adding that he was to endeavour to prevent the Russians from joining the Swedes, if he could, "and thereby disappoint more easily and successfully the dangerous attempts that We are persuaded will be formed against Us and the safety of Our realms." But as this was a point of great nicety, these instructions were to be kept private, so that if there were no occasion to make use of them they should be "burried in silence," as though they had never been given. It was also arranged that the British and Dutch squadrons should join, if the Danish were recalled, Norris going on to Dantzig to join Van Cooperen to bring back such of the traders as were ready and then concert measures for the safety of the remainder and of Great Britain.[2] Really, we know now, the objective of Peter's cruise was the Åland isles and his intention to influence Goertz by a display of force, but this was not patent at the time.

Polwarth entered a formal protest on 1 September against the recall of the Danish fleet. He and General Bothmer received the king's answer through Count Holstein-Holsteinborg[3] on the 8th. It was necessary, the king wrote, to send assistance to Norway, as an invasion of that country was threatened. He regretted that he could not comply with the king of England's desire that his fleet should continue in the Baltic, unless the latter would pay him monthly a sufficient sum of money to equip and maintain another squadron for Norway. The envoys replied that they had been informed before that the measures taken by land and sea to secure Norway were sufficient, and that Admiral Gabel had made the contrary proposition of strengthening the Baltic fleet by recalling six ships from the North Sea and arming others at Copenhagen. The danger, they said, was in the Baltic. If, in consequence of the Danish fleet being recalled, Norris had to join the Dutch to protect the trade, the Danes would be in danger of attack, or the Swedes might pass the Sound and do as they pleased in the North Sea.

Polwarth himself advocated the sending of the money asked to keep the Danish fleet at sea, urging that it must be of great consequence to be sure of Denmark, if it became necessary to take measures against northern powers, for though the financial resources of the country were exhausted it possessed "a tolerable fleet, good seamen, and a good body of troops, especially cavalry." But Craggs was writing to him at the same time that the king of England thought the proposal to

[1] As expressed especially in Polwarth's despatches.

[2] Cadogan and Whitworth, 19 and 26 Aug.

[3] Ulrich Adolphus Holstein, king Frederick's early friend and of great influence with him, cf. Holm, p. 633.

withdraw the fleet so extraordinary, that it could hardly be made in earnest, " and as to the notion of subsidys from hence for maintaining another Danish squadron, H.M. has not the least thought of doing anything like it." [1] However, as the result of what follows, orders were obtained for Raben to remain at sea and to take all precautions in concert with Norris to prevent the transport of Swedish troops to Pomerania or Dantzig, an enterprise, it was said, only practicable with the help of other powers, and to send an immediate account to Stralsund of any attempt on the part of the enemy to despatch armed ships to those coasts.

On 15 September Polwarth had an interview with the king at Warinborg, when the latter expressed his readiness to take the closest measures with the king of England but complained that, having never received an answer good or bad to the last propositions for a treaty, he knew not how matters stood, and he could not be expected to enter into measures for protection of trade or any other object without having his position secured by a treaty, and that for more than one year. Polwarth in reply recalled the reasons for the failure of the last proposals. Though they were limited, he said, to one year, there was a clause providing for renewal if the war were not at an end. He had frequently declared the king of England's goodwill, of which the sending of a fleet for three summers in succession was a sufficient and convincing proof. The king in answer repeated what he had said before. Conferences with the Danish ministers followed on 17 and 20 September. They said amongst other things that, if the peace between Russia and Sweden were made, no doubt measures must be taken against those powers, but if it were not, to take them might suggest to the tsar ideas which would not otherwise occur to him ; that their fleet could not possibly hold the sea beyond the end of September, unless they were assisted with a good sum of money ; that assurance ought to be given that the king of England would hold firmly and inseparably to the king of Denmark until peace was concluded and would put him in a condition to have no fear of the new enemies he might have to face ; and that, if he were in earnest, war ought to be declared upon Sweden by Great Britain. Polwarth and Bothmer still returned evasive answers, but succeeded in obtaining a formal promise that, if they would sign the protocol of the conferences, orders should be sent to Raben to remain with Norris. As they had committed themselves to nothing, they did so, and the orders went forth as said.

At an interview at Frederiksborg on 1 October the king told Polwarth that it was full time for a good understanding to be

[1] 12 Sept. o.s., R. O. Entry Book 5.

re-established between himself and the king of England, since their allies had deserted them. On the 10th the envoy had another conference with the ministers. As an outcome he could write on the 22nd, "they are willing to enter into any measures with our Royal Master for their mutual interest and safety." And three days later he sent a draft of proposals submitted to him, commenting approvingly but disclaiming any part of his own therein. It was hoped, he said, that the matter would be negotiated at Copenhagen, and Baron Söhlenthal, the Danish envoy in London, was not informed of it. An answer was expected with great impatience, and, if the money so much needed were supplied, there would be no difficulty about the terms. It was very necessary to secure Denmark.

The preamble to this draft set forth the damage done to trade and to the common cause by the inaction of some of the allies during two years; the Åland conferences, whose proceedings had not been communicated; and the good reason to believe that measures were being concerted there prejudicial to the quiet of Europe, to the balance of power in the north and to the trade and other interests of their Danish and British Majesties. It was proposed to establish a sincere friendship and alliance to meet these pernicious designs and to secure all possible mutual advantage. The part of the king of England would be to furnish for each year until peace was concluded a subsidy of 300,000 Danish crowns, payments to be made in January and February; to advance on the security of Danish Pomerania a loan of a million crowns, to put the fleet and army on a proper footing; and to send each year to the Baltic, as early in the spring as possible, a squadron of at least sixteen of the line. And it would be well for some of these ships to winter at Copenhagen, so as to be early on the spot. Moreover, as the king of Denmark proposed to invade Sweden in the spring with the army he had in Norway and to reinforce the same would have to transport thither most of the troops in his German provinces, the king of England should guarantee those provinces and Jutland against invasion. And as the Swedes had invaded the diocese of Trondhjem, whither it was almost impossible to send succour without the king of England's help, it was hoped that the latter would assist in this; for which purpose he might use the plea that it was impossible for Great Britain to allow the Swedes ever to possess any part of the kingdom of Norway. For his part, the king of Denmark would supply eight regiments of cavalry for the defence of the other's dominions in Germany and would undertake to have always ready sixteen ships of the line of from 50 to 70 guns to assist him in case of need, and in particular to prevent

any fleet from passing the Sound into the North Sea. Other proposals were that the Dutch should be persuaded to pay up the arrears due to Denmark, which would be more easy in that they still had money-claims on England; that Denmark should be admitted to the Quadruple Alliance; that each party should oblige himself to make no peace nor truce with Sweden without the concurrence of the other, or without stipulating for the other's fullest advantage; that the ships of one should enjoy the hospitality of the other's ports; that a commercial treaty should be concluded as soon as possible, and in the meantime the most favourable treatment in regard to trade in each other's dominions be mutually accorded; and that the king of Denmark should engage not to receive in any Danish or Norwegian ports enemies or rebel subjects of the king of England. A treaty concluded, the former, it was said, looked forward to concert measures for the continuance of the war and conditions for the final conclusion of peace.

The Danes then no more than the Swedes or Russians comprehended the fact that George was dependent for British money and ships upon the annual grants of parliament. But the undertaking to supply them during a series of years was the essential part of the Danish demands. The proposals, therefore, could no more be accepted now than before.

These considerations did not, however, apply to an advance of Hanoverian money; a mortgage of Danish Pomerania would have been for the electoral account. The reason for refusal here was that George did not want that country; but he offered to take Oldenburg in pledge, as he already held Delmenhorst. In this case, so long as the pledge remained unredeemed, he would be in possession of countries of the utmost value to him, but the offer was not one which the king of Denmark could accept.[1]

By this time Norris could report that the Swedish fleet was laying up, and word was sent him that the Russian had returned to Cronslot.[2] And as Raben told him that the wants of his ships were so many, that he must go home, a resolution was taken (12 October) that he should do so, and accordingly he sailed. But Norris stayed for the return of two men-of-war which he had sent to Dantzig to hasten Van Cooperen's return. His own ships, he said, were in nearly as bad a plight as the Danish, being badly knocked about by three months' cruising, while himself and his crews were ill "by the scorbutick air which infects these parts."

[1] Holm, pp. 631–32. He says that the offer was made at a conference on 10 Dec. 1717.

[2] It was back there from its cruise to the Finland coast on 13 Sept. (Bacmeister, II. 86; *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 373).

The weather had for some time been stormy, and now there came on a succession of gales of great violence. Norris was first apprised of the return of the trading fleet by the appearance of two Dutch men-of-war and a number of merchantmen, some disabled, driven out of their course and running for shelter round the north point of Bornholm. On 17 October, the weather having moderated, all sailed, and several ships in distress were met with and taken in tow. But the gales rising again the same afternoon these had to be cast off, and the men-of-war themselves barely escaped running upon the Swedish coast; it was only by the most strenuous exertions that Falsterbo reef was rounded. Arrived in Kjöge Bay on the 18th Norris found there the Danish fleet and most of the Dutch. The merchantmen gradually came in and anchored, or went on for Copenhagen. Van Cooperen sent word that he had suffered so much damage from the storms that he could not meet Norris, but must go on at once to get anchors and cables. The two ships sent to Dantzig had not come in, nor had the *Salisbury* and *Winchester*. The tale of wrecks among the traders amounted to nine lost on Bornholm, five on the Danish coast, and about ten on the Swedish. On Sunday the 23rd Norris sailed for Copenhagen, and four days later the four missing men-of-war rejoined him.

On 25 October Norris attended with Polwarth and Bothmer a conference with the Danish ministers. He was asked whether he would remain with his fleet during the winter, or at least leave some of his ships behind, but replied that he had now fully carried out his instructions, and must return home. He sailed on 2 November, and having detached the *Windsor* and *Salisbury*, as ordered, to the coast of Norway, arrived safely at the Nore on the 9th.

To conciliate British sentiment the king of Denmark issued orders at this time for the release of a number of British ships taken by Danish privateers and detained in his ports, an injury long complained of and the subject of special and emphatic remonstrances at the last-named conference. He seems indeed to have now lost all hope of Russia and to have definitely decided for a close alliance with the king of England.[1] At the same time Polwarth was informed that the latter was "very well disposed to cultivate a very strict amity with the King of Denmark."[2]

Although the traders were well protected in the Baltic, the

[1] See fully Holm, pp. 623–30. The great events of the summer no doubt influenced him. As Robethon wrote to Norris on 25 July o.s.: "That [the Turkish peace] and our Quadruple Alliance signed will be able to show the Danes they will be more in safety with his Imperial Majesty and our King than with the King of Prussia and the Czar."

[2] Stanhope, 17 Oct. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5.

depredations of the Swedish privateers in the North Sea were severe during the year. One of the most redoubtable commanders was a former inmate of Newgate, John Norcross, who, curiously, received a pardon in December. In March one of His Majesty's sloops was chased and would have been captured but for the opportune arrival of her four consorts, who "retook Thomas Cole of Ipswich, saved Capt. Jefferys and several others."[1] In April Captain Willis sent from Gothenburg a list of eighteen privateers of that port or of Marstrand, eight of them large vessels carrying 24 to 50 guns. He saw two English and two Irish prizes brought in and condemned, while two other English and a Dane had been taken shortly before.[2] And although the same commander, cruising off the east coast in June and July on the look-out for privateers, did not meet with any, in the autumn they were active again. One of 22 guns sold the cargo of a large Dutch vessel in Dunkirk and took the ship on to Nantes. Another of 20 guns, which had taken two or three English prizes, was reported off Guernsey, others to have gone south to harry the traffic from the Straits and carry warlike stores to Spain. Cadogan in December asked for a frigate to convoy his yacht across the Channel.[3] Dayrolle mentions two Dutch ships taken into Dunkirk, and "a Swedish Privateer call'd the postillon having 200 men on board has taken upon these coasts eleven Dutch shipps coming from France with wynes and Brandys."[4] Robert Jackson learnt by letters of 15 November o.s. that the Gothenburg privateers had brought thither in less than three weeks about thirty prizes, some English, but mostly Danish, Dutch, or of Hamburg.[5]

[1] R. O. Admiralty, Secretary's Dept., In-letters 4100.
[2] Ibid. 2648.
[3] Ibid. 4101.
[4] 2 and 9 Dec., R. O. Holland 260.
[5] R. O. Sweden 23.

CHAPTER XXI

THE ÅLAND CONFERENCES AND THEIR RESULTS

Peter the Great had word from Goertz, by a letter from Lund of 29 November o.s. 1717, that Charles XII was willing to send ministers to treat at Dantzig, so soon as he knew that that city, proposed by the kings of Prussia and Poland, was accepted as a place of congress. This intelligence he at once communicated to the other courts interested. He had replied, he said, that preliminary conditions must first be drawn up, and for that purpose conferences with the king of Sweden's ministers would be opened at some place in the neighbourhood of Finland. He had appointed to meet them General of Artillery James Bruce, already in those parts on military business, but only to listen and report. He could not but send some one, lest he should appear to be averse from peace. Results would be faithfully communicated in accordance with the treaties, and, if peace appeared possible, a place would be named for a general congress to which he would send his plenipotentiaries, being fully persuaded that his allies would do the same. If, on the other hand, the Swedes were willing to complete the formal treaty in Finland, they would be advised thereof. To the kings of Poland and Prussia he gave assurance that he would consent to no treaty which did not include them. Veselovsky he informed of his knowledge of De la Marck's work in Sweden; his failure was a proof that the king of Sweden only desired to gain time and to produce discord among the allies; he himself thought that the king of England would be best advised in concerting measures for a new campaign.[1] Schleinitz had previously been ordered to protest against the regent's action in favour of Sweden, as also against any other steps adverse to the tsar's interest in contravention of the late treaty. France, Peter said, ought to act as mediator to bring about a general peace.[2]

The place chosen for the conferences was Lofö, one of the Åland

[1] Despatches to Veselovsky and Kurakin, 5 and 6 Jan. and 24 Feb. o.s. 1718, *Kurakin Archives*, III. 42–48, and to Prince Gregory Dolgoruky in Poland, 5 Jan. o.s., *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 285.

[2] To Kurakin, 9 Dec. o.s. 1717, *Kurakin Archives*, III. 36.

isles, but they did not open till 23 May, Goertz delaying his arrival there to the last possible moment.[1] With him was associated Count Gyllenborg, and with Bruce Henry John Frederick Osterman, the young Westphalian so greatly in Peter's confidence and later so prominent in Russian history.[2]

Goertz was soon back in Sweden with alternative proposals, the one, restitution of Finland, Esthonia and Livonia, with no further conditions, the other, that the tsar should keep Esthonia, Livonia, Ingria and a part of Carelia, should give all the help he could to conquer Norway, and should make it his business, without resort to arms, to recover for Sweden her German provinces and add to them Mecklenburg.[3] But Charles rejected both these schemes. According to what Colonel Bassewitz, who was on the spot, told Haldane later, Goertz was only allowed to return to Lofö on the pressing instances of Poniatowski, and his representations that the Poles were anxious to restore Stanislaus Leszczynski.[4] He was back there on 20 July. By the exercise of every diplomatic artifice, in particular by emphasizing the probable success of Fabrice's mission, he obtained amended offers, with which he returned to Stockholm (2 August), sending them on to the king but himself going back. Under the new scheme [5] the tsar was to march 80,000 men into Poland in the spring to restore Stanislaus, Charles acting in concert with him at the head of a powerful army in Germany. If the king of Prussia refused to give a reasonable indemnity for Stettin he was to be offered for it an equivalent elsewhere,[6] but not at the cost of Sweden ; and he was to be invited to guarantee the present treaty and to enter into a defensive alliance with the parties to it. The tsar was to restore Finland and a part

[1] Detailed particulars of the conferences, to Sept. 1719, occupy 232 pages of the *Tagebuch* (Bacmeister, III. App. xvi). For the year 1718 there is a sufficient narrative in Carlson's work, or in English in Bain's *Charles XII*, pp. 282–85.

[2] *Russicè*, Andrei Ivanovich Osterman, but he signed the treaty of Nystad in his German names. La Vie wrote of him at this time : " Monseigneur Ostermann, conseiller de la Chancellerie pour les affaires étrangères, est homme d'un esprit supérieur et qui entend généralement les affaires. Le Czar en fait un grand cas et j'ai ouï dire au baron de Chaffiroff . . . que s'il le perdoit, il perdrait tout. C'est un homme fort doux, poli, infiniment savant et sachant toutes les langues. On peut presque tout faire par lui, tout passant par ses mains " (March 1718, *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 326).

[3] Carlson, p. 125.

[4] Haldane, 25 Aug., R. O. Germany (States) 119. Poniatowski had arrived at Lund from Dantzig on 4 June (De la Marck, 7 June).

[5] I take from documents found among Goertz's papers after his death, copies of which were given by the queen of Sweden to Lord Carteret and were enclosed with his despatches of 20 Oct. o.s. 1719 (R. O. Sweden 25). Carlson's account (pp. 133–35) closely agrees.

[6] Ermeland, to wit, with Elbing, Polish territory. On this Frederick William remarked, " Mit Schweden ist betrügerei ; Elbing, Bisthum, da soll ich in einen neuen Krieg eintreten, solcher Narr bin ich nicht " (Droysen, p. 222).

of Carelia, the line of the future frontier being drawn from Viborg to the Arctic Ocean by way of lakes Ladoga and Onega (plan with the papers). In return for the provinces south of this line he undertook to do his best to procure for Sweden an equivalent, as Norway. To the Swedish army of 40,000 men in Germany he would add 20,000 or 25,000 of his own from Poland, to be under Charles's orders but maintained at his own expense. If any powers opposed he would use his whole force against them. And the Swedish and Russian fleets would unite. But no compensation must be taken from Denmark south of the Baltic. Lastly, the tsar would use his whole force to obtain the restitution of Bremen and Verden with satisfaction from Hanover for damage done, and, if Great Britain sought to interfere, would declare war upon her jointly with Sweden. But if he could be dispensed from this obligation, then he would endeavour to obtain Mecklenburg for Sweden, compensating the duke of Schwerin elsewhere, that is, in Poland. Other powers were to be invited to join the alliance.

Goertz's plan for the execution of this project was as follows.[1] Sweden, Russia and Prussia were to assemble in Sweden before the winter transport for 40,000 men. The tsar meanwhile was to hold his men-of-war ready, and to send his 20,000 or 25,000 auxiliaries into Mecklenburg before the Swedes arrived. As soon as they had come the Russians with 6,000 Hessian and other troops (to be found by Sweden) would march straight into Brunswick-Lüneburg, the Swedes occupying Holstein in order to force Denmark to make peace and be ready to support the Russians, if wanted. The fleets were to remain together during the whole year and to endeavour to close to the Danes the passage of the Belts. Meanwhile another Russian army of 60,000 men was to stay in Poland " sans déclarer ses véritables intentions," since action there should be deferred until affairs were settled with Hanover and Denmark. As to Great Britain, " les deux parties prendront leurs mesures pour ôter à la Cour les moyens d'engager la nation dans quelque démarche contraire." And similarly as to Holland. " La Prusse assemble aussi ses troupes du côté où on le trouvera plus convenable pour la cause commune."

While waiting for the king of Sweden's answer the plenipotentiaries at Lofö elaborated a third form of treaty, of a less definite character, which was actually signed by Peter on 26 August.[2] But a fortnight before that Goertz was in possession of Charles's refusal. It drove him to despair. But he kept it secret and contrived that Peter should return home with his fleet, believing that matters

[1] Carteret, 10 Nov. o.s. 1719, *loc. cit.*
[2] Carlson, pp. 141–42.

were settled. He himself went back to Stockholm and thence on 1 September to see the king.[1]

De la Marck says that Charles was on the point of accepting the terms offered [2] when a long memorial reached him from Müllern, who had been lying ill for a long time at Stockholm in ignorance of what was going on. Müllern's principal arguments were that it was to the prejudice of the king's glory to cede Esthonia and Livonia, as well as against his interests, for the tsar would thereby become too powerful, and that neither he nor the king of Prussia, nor yet France, could be depended upon. He advised that peace should be sought through the mediation of the emperor. At the same time were being circulated, says De la Marck, reports of a probable revolt in Russia against the tsar and the suggestion that the promised release of Marshal Rehnsköld was being delayed for fear of the ill reports that he would bring on this subject.

The grounds stated by Charles for his refusal were the following. He could accept in principle compensation for his country's losses as a basis for peace, but in this case the losses were certain and the compensation problematic. The tsar must restore Esthonia and Livonia, as well as Finland, and give an equivalent for the other Swedish provinces which he had conquered. Help from him was not desired. It was contrary to the king's natural disposition to associate himself with any other ruler in his operations of war, since there could only result therefrom difficulties, mistrust and restraint. He could not agree to an attack upon the king of England, since he had of his own free will offered terms of reconciliation. On the contrary, Goertz should impress upon the Russians the belief that peace with him was all but concluded. As to Poland, the king required nothing more from the tsar than recognition of the treaty of Alt-Ranstädt and withdrawal of opposition to Stanislaus. Peace might be made with Prussia on the condition of Stettin being restored to Sweden, or the tsar might name some part of his own dominions to be given to Sweden in its stead. The promise might be held out to him that the king would recognise and support his newly introduced and yet insecure arrangements for the succession. No help was wanted against Poland, Denmark or Great Britain; Finland could easily be reconquered; the difficulties of regaining the other provinces, if Peter did not keep his word, would be no greater in the future than at present.[3]

[1] Carlson, pp. 145, 152.

[2] 8 Oct., M.A.E. Suède 141. It appears that two brothers Esperiés, Polish colonels, came to Charles successively at the end of July, representing to him the earnest desire of the republic for protection against Austria and Saxony (De la Marck, 9 Aug.), and that his warlike imagination was fired.

[3] Carlson, pp. 143, 146.

From one point of view, the impossibility of carrying out the scheme proposed, its rejection was justified. To cede the eastern provinces was not to get back the German ones. Supposing even that Charles could carry his army over into Germany before the interposition of a British fleet, he would have no fortified base and his retreat would be cut off. He would find opposed to him the whole force of Denmark and Hanover, backed by Austria. The emperor, the Turkish war ended, had 54 regiments ready in Hungary and the adjacent countries and 11 in the Netherlands or at home, apart from 32 in Italy.[1] Saxony would fight the tsar in Poland, Prussia would at best be neutral, France under the new conditions certainly so. If the emperor's dominions were attacked, Great Britain was bound by the treaty of Westminster to come to his aid. If Great Britain were attacked, the guarantee treaty similarly obliged the Dutch. The only advantage that Charles would obtain would be immunity from a Russian invasion, of which he was not particularly afraid. Peter, on the other hand, would keep his conquests, and would look with equanimity on the failure to procure compensation.

Goertz of course knew all this, but he also knew better than anyone else the impossibility of continuing the war in the present desperate condition of the country. He held that it was absolutely necessary to make peace either with the tsar or with the king of England. As the latter's terms had been refused, it must be made at any price with the former. Finland at least would be recovered and Charles, rid of his most dangerous enemy, would be able to make reasonable terms with the others. His personal prestige remained unimpaired. The Åland conferences had roused the greatest apprehension in Europe, had even drawn concessions from Austria in the Turkish peace. Once Sweden had rest her strength could be recuperated, and at a future time war could once more be made upon the tsar and the provinces given up to him be recovered. If he failed to carry out his promises, that would provide excuse for it.[2] On these grounds it may be held that the tsar's terms ought to have been accepted.

When Goertz came back to Sweden at the end of August he set himself to try to change the king's determination. Without Müllern's opposition, he said, he would have had no difficulty in

[1] List of the distribution of the imperial forces in September 1718 given by Baron Heems to the British envoys at the Hague (R. O. Holland 260). Wich, writing from Hamburg on 5 Aug., says that the emperor had then in Hungary 40 regiments of cavalry, 37,260 men, and 38 of infantry, 95,370 men, besides two regiments on board ship and the auxiliaries of Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony (R. O. Hamburg 35).

[2] Carlson, pp. 138–39, 149.

bringing matters to a successful and honourable issue.[1] He obtained orders for his colleague Count Gyllenborg, left at Lofö, to keep the negotiations on foot till Marshal Rehnsköld should actually have arrived. Driven by necessity, he began to turn to the plans of Müllern for a reconciliation with Hanover through the mediation of the emperor. In return for British help against the tsar in money and ships Bremen and Verden, he thought, might be pledged for forty years, or a part be ceded. The emperor might be persuaded to help with troops, and if so, the treaty might be extended to include the kings of Poland and Prussia, the throne of the former being confirmed, the latter receiving Stettin for a certain number of years. Then the tsar might be driven back within his borders, Denmark be deprived of her acquisitions, and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp be restored. And finally Sweden might join the Quadruple Alliance.[2]

The French government all this time had no direct information of what was passing in Sweden. Owing to the stoppage of letters by the Danes nothing came from De la Marck from May to August, while he received no instructions from April to October. Then by a despatch of 19 August he was informed that in the present state of affairs no precise directions could be given him. He must continue to do his best to keep the friendship of the king of Sweden and the opportunity of entering into relations with him and any future allies of his, which could be made closer as events might render advisable, but which could not be solid or of use unless Prussia were included in them. The Quadruple Alliance, he was to say, was intended to restore peace between the emperor and Spain and to settle certain points left undecided by the treaties of Utrecht and Baden. It was indispensably necessary both to avert a great war and to prevent the complete submission of Italy to the emperor. Ten days later D'Huxelles wrote that there was grave suspicion that Goertz was hatching a plot for a Russo-Swedish invasion of the circle of Lower Saxony, in which the king of Prussia would be compelled to join. Although the king of France thought that a league of the northern powers against Austria, to keep occupied the large forces which the emperor had on foot, would be greatly to the advantage of his own interests and to the general good of Europe, he could not accept engagements which would throw fresh burdens on his people and would desire that such a league should be purely defensive. The general state of his kingdom required the avoidance of anything which might engage it in a

[1] Carlson (pp. 147-50) sets forth the opposing arguments of Goertz and Müllern.

[2] Carlson, pp. 152–56.

fresh war, and this was the principal motive for the signature of the late treaty. De la Marck must temporize, letting it be known that the king of France would willingly enter into engagements with the king of Sweden and his friends which should have for their object the maintenance of public tranquillity and the preservation of the rights and liberties of the princes of the empire. If he could not prevent what was feared, he must defer expressing the king's intentions, pending receipt of fresh instructions.

Consonant with the above was the regent's temporizing attitude towards Russia. His true desire, Schleinitz reported him to say, was to stand in close union with the tsar and the king of Prussia. While he was endeavouring with his whole might to reconcile Spain with Austria, yet success would but strengthen those two powers and make them dangerous to France. In counterpoise he wanted alliance with Russia and Prussia and if possible with Sweden, relying, however, principally upon the tsar. If the last-named intended to ally himself with Spain, it was hoped that, in so doing, he would enter into no engagements against France, just as the Quadruple Alliance was in no way directed against him. Dubois also, Schleinitz said, was very open, professing to look forward, when the southern and northern wars were ended, to a league of France, Spain, Russia, Sweden and Prussia.[1]

Inspired, perhaps, by the delay in acceptance of the treaty he had signed, Peter the Great now began to make friendly overtures in London. His advances were well received, for they came at a critical time. As soon as it had become evident that Great Britain would support the emperor against Spain, Alberoni had begun to look to the northern powers for help. Stanhope, who was at Madrid at the time of the battle of Cape Passaro endeavouring to obtain the accession of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance, wrote on his return to Paris: "the common talk of Paris and what is universally believed is that the peace is not only made, but the fleets of Muscovy and Sweden actually joined, and have a great number of forces on board, bound on some expedition against the king," nor had Alberoni been able to disguise from him his hopes of "something considerable from that quarter." The duke of Berwick, whom he had seen at Bordeaux, had news to the same effect and believed the expedition to be directed against Mecklenburg, but that its importance would depend upon the part taken by the king of Prussia.[2] Stanhope heard therefore with relief "that the Czar's ministers had in form notify'd to the King, that the conferences at Aland were broke off, and requested of His Majesty to take

[1] Solov'ev, Book XVII. chap. iii.
[2] 14 Sept., R. O. France 162.

measures in concert, to force the king of Sweden to a general Peace. So this other great resource of the Cardinal, the affairs of the North, is as like to prove abortive as his other schemes." [1] And he wrote later to Whitworth that if any credit was to be given to the Russian assurances the work at the Åland isles was far from a conclusion, " and we may still make almost our own terms at least with respect to the Czar." [2]

It was decided to send Sir John Norris to St. Petersburg. Stanhope wrote to him about Veselovsky's overtures on 5 October o.s. :—

" Such is the King's disposition to live well with the Czar, that he lays hold on the occasion given him by this man's discourse to make a sincere tender of his friendship to the Czar ; and His Majesty is persuaded that your going to him cannot fail to produce one of these two things, either to beget a real good understanding between us, which is on this side very sincerely and heartedly desired, or, if the Czar means only to amuse the King, whilst he is concerting with other Powers measures pernicious to the King and to the Publick Tranquillity, plainly to discover these views and make it notorious to the world, that it doth not lye at our door, if there be not a good understanding between us."

It had been pointed out to Veselovsky, the despatch went on, that the king was doubly engaged with the emperor and that no sincere friendship with the tsar was possible, if he would disturb the empire in any way, to which that minister had replied that, if his master were well assured of the king of England's friendship, the Mecklenburg affair would prove no obstacle, indeed he would do more than was expected and give complete satisfaction. As Norris's presence in England would be " very much for the King's service during the Parliament," he would not be required to stay more than three weeks or a month at the tsar's court. Captain Jefferyes could go with him and remain to reside, with orders to follow such instructions as Norris should leave on his departure. It was yet uncertain whether peace with Sweden was concluded or not. If it were, it did not necessarily follow that the tsar had entered into engagements against the king of England, and it would be of the greatest importance to penetrate his designs. If it were not, its conclusion might yet be averted.[3]

A long memorandum drawn up for Norris's use [4] recapitulated what had passed, recalled the grievances in regard to Dantzig and Mecklenburg, and drew attention to the encouragement given by

[1] To his cousin Col. William Stanhope, the British envoy at Madrid, 12 Sept., ibid.

[2] 3 Oct. o.s., R. O. Home Office, Secretaries' Letter Book 28.

[3] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 122.

[4] Ibid.

the tsar to the Jacobites. Ormonde had been allowed to stay at Mitau, Sir Harry Stirling was still at St. Petersburg, "Hooker alias Du Marets" had been there till lately and had presented memorials on behalf of the Pretender and many fugitive naval officers had been taken into the tsar's service; in fact the rebels had been received with the greatest caresses and assurances of interest. Then everyone knew of the efforts of the tsar's ministers at Paris to spoil the Quadruple Alliance and of those of Prince Kurakin later to prevent the Dutch from joining it. The latter's son had lately been sent to Madrid. "En un mot il ne s'est pas passé depuis quelque tems aucune occasion où la Cour du Czar et ses ministres dans les diverses Cours de l'Europe n'ayent donné au Roy des marques de leur mauvaise volonté." Norris must discover all that he could about the Åland negotiations. If they were broken off, he would no doubt be agreeably received and a concert of operations be spoken of, which concert must be adjusted at Copenhagen. In the contrary case Norris must not let the opinion appear that peace with Sweden must prevent a good intelligence with Great Britain; although there were no concert, nothing need prevent commerce with Russia being cultivated as before. It was hardly necessary to inform him that Shafirov was the man to approach, and he must flatter and caress him in every way, "lui faisant même espérer que Sa Majesté reconnoîtra les bon services qu'il pourra lui rendre."[1]

A necessary precaution taken in connexion with this mission was to give formal assurances at the Hague, Copenhagen and Dresden to the effect that "His Majesty has no manner of by-view in this sudden despatch of a minister to the Czar." No other response could be made to Veselovsky's "earnest instances," and the chief object was to discover how far his assurances could be relied upon. If the treaty with Sweden could be prevented, the king thought that he would have done a signal service for the good of Europe.[2]

Later, Veselovsky delivered a declaration from the tsar disclaiming formally and emphatically all intercourse with emissaries of the Pretender.[3] Some of them, it was said, might have been at

[1] Shafirov was known to be purchaseable. It was a misfortune of which the Jacobites frequently complained, that they had no funds to compete with the "Duke of Hanover" in this class of business.

[2] To Whitworth, 14 Oct. o.s., as above, and similarly to Lord Polwarth and General Francis Palmes (who had succeeded Sir Richard Vernon as envoy to the king of Poland), R. O. Foreign Entry Books 5, 123.

[3] St. Petersburg, 3 Oct. o.s., R. O. Foreign Ministers 52. The words were, "Vous l'assurerez très fortement, que nous n'avons jamais eu connoissance icy d'aucuns commissaires du Prétendant, et que personne de sa part n'a paru directement devant Nous, et que Nous n'avons accepté aucune proposition de luy, ni qu'aucun de ses émissaires n'a été admis auprès de nos ministres."

court privately, but such had been ordered to leave as soon as their presence was known. Stirling was only staying on with his relative Erskine on account of the latter's illness, and he was too young to be capable of entering into such affairs. The tsar's firm and serious intention was to live in closest bonds of friendship with Great Britain, on account of the evident advantage. Mecklenburg affairs would not stand in the way. A British minister at St. Petersburg would be welcomed. There was also a despatch from Weber, the Hanoverian resident at the tsar's court, recounting a conversation with Shafirov, who said that his master would never sacrifice Livonia to obtain peace with Sweden, that he had no grievance against the emperor and desired to live in friendship with him, that the affairs of the south of Europe had no connexion with those of the north, and that nothing was being done at the Åland isles to king George's prejudice.[1]

Stanhope replied to Veselovsky in friendly terms,[2] but it was a different thing to put faith in the Russian assurances, belied as they were by the intercepted letters of the Jacobites. Whitworth wrote :—

> " Having been so long in the Court of Russia you must give me leave never to trust anything that the Russe ministers say by order, and to tell you that the Czar's never so dangerous as when he seems most caressing. I should rather fancy Wesolowski, whilst he endeavours to amuse the ministers, may be underhand tampering with the Jacobites, there is a strong leven in that Court which will not be removed as long as Areskin has credit, and the Czar dares not part with them. I wish the Quadruple Alliance, the Peace with the Turks, and our Victory at sea don't make the Czar clap up his Peace with Sweden on any terms, instead of turning to us." [3]

Robethon wrote to Norris, " We don't trust all this." [4] And Stair, " Les lettres que le Chevalier Stirling a écrit de la flotte du Czar donnent des grandes espérances aux Jacobits icy." [5] And so generally.

And indeed Peter the Great was actually in correspondence

[1] 26 Sept. o.s., ibid. La Vie (30 Oct., *Sbornik*, XXXIV. p. 384) reported a two hours' conversation of Weber with the tsar on the occasion of a wedding festivity, " dans laquelle il parut beaucoup de chaleur, mais elle termina agréablement pour lui, puis que ce Prince eut la bonté, en présence de toute la compagnie, de l'embrasser et de lui porter la santé d'une meilleure conjoncture."

[2] 7 Nov. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 254.

[3] To Tilson, 21 Oct., R. O. Holland 264. Other like expressions of distrust are frequent in Whitworth's despatches, e.g. the tsar " has hitherto never kept his word a minute longer than his interest or necessity obliged him " (30 Jan. 1717, R. O. Prussia 7).

[4] 7 Oct., B. M. Add. MSS. 28145.

[5] 1 Oct., R. O. France 162. For the contents of Sir Harry Stirling's letters (his assumed name was " Hindon "), see B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 232. f. 133, Add. MSS. 20292, f. 209.

with Spain. Overtures had been made to Kurakin and Schleinitz by the Marquis de Beretti Landi and Prince Cellamare, the Spanish ambassadors at the Hague and Paris, for an alliance of Spain and Russia against the emperor and George I. Beretti Landi said that peace between Russia and Sweden was desired and that a large subsidy could be promised to Charles XII, if he would thereafter break into Germany. Peter ordered Kurakin (19 September o.s.) to advise against a hasty conclusion of peace by Spain, in spite of the destruction of her fleet. Her adversaries, he pointed out, could do her no further harm; better to wait for the conclusion of his own peace, after which the king of Spain might hope for help from both himself and Charles XII. But whereas it seemed that the king of England had bribed Müllern and other Swedish ministers, it was very necessary that the king of Spain should employ the same expedient.[1] Kurakin must observe strict secrecy in his negotiation; it was entrusted to him because the regent's people had means of arriving at a knowledge of what was being done by Schleinitz. A week later Peter instructed Kurakin to say that peace with Sweden had not been made, but to give assurances to Beretti Landi, all in great secrecy. Sava Raguzinsky[2] had signified from Venice that the king of Spain was disposed to a marriage of his son with a tsarevna, asking, instead of dowry, for six men-of-war and promising in return subsidies up to two millions during the war; to which it had been replied that all negotiation must be left to Kurakin. Whether the report were true or not, God knew, but certainly the king of Spain wanted an alliance and ships. First, however, peace must be made with Sweden. Terms would have been concluded already, had not Müllern been bought by the Hanoverians, obliging Goertz to return once more to Sweden.[3]

Beretti Landi said that the king of Spain would not make peace, having money in hand confiscated from the British merchants. In November he communicated his answer received from Madrid; 40,000 Spanish troops would be employed against the emperor in

[1] Peter asserted that he himself had no money for the purpose. The persons he particularly named for purchase were, besides Müllern, his nephew secretary Von Kochen, Goertz himself, and Marshal Rehnsköld.

[2] This man was a native of Ragusa, whence his name. Before attaching himself to the tsar he had been a merchant at Constantinople under French protection. He was at Paris with Peter in 1717. One Pardery wrote of him then to the regent, "le Czar a de l'estime pour lui et il lui a donné le maniement de tout ce qui regarde le commerce de ses états" (*Sbornik*, XXXIV. 193). But La Vie (27 March 1718, ibid. p. 326): "Je ne parle pas du faux Ragousinsky, qui était ici sous le nom de conseiller à la cour du Czar. C'est un aventurier venu de Turquie en Moscovie, où il a fait un commerce, dans lequel il a gagné considérablement. Il n'est pour rien dans les affaires. Sa Majesté Czarienne s'en sert uniquement pour quelques correspondances secrètes en Turquie."

[3] 19 and 27 Sept. o.s., *Kurakin Archives*, II. 135–36, I. 4.

Italy, twenty Spanish men-of-war be joined with the Russian and Swedish fleets to drive king George out of England; that done, subsidies would be found for the tsar. Pressed by Kurakin, he said that for the projected invasion of Scotland 7,000 Russian and Swedish troops would be required. He could not name the amount of the subsidies, but it would not be small; their object, to enable the tsar and the king of Sweden to invade Germany and attack Hanover and perhaps the emperor; the war to be continued until a good and lasting peace was made. Kurakin objecting that the money would not be paid until George had been expelled from England, Beretti Landi, after reference to Madrid, informed him that the Irishman Patrick Lawless had been sent to Sweden to win over Charles XII, and that he himself had 200,000 crowns for that king in bank at Amsterdam, which, however, would not be paid until his conquest of Norway was completed, for not till then could the invasion of Scotland be attempted.[1]

Kurakin himself was opposed to taking up the Jacobite cause. In a memorandum of 14 October, principally devoted to a discussion of the prospects of the Quadruple Alliance, he pointed out that Spain had done nothing yet and would not pay money to Sweden until a formal treaty was signed. As to the prospect of an alliance of the kings of England and Poland with the emperor, no doubt the first-named would take all precautionary measures, but it was doubtful whether the emperor would be persuaded. He must still keep a large force in Hungary to watch the Turks, and while danger remained from that quarter he could not dispense with the friendship of the tsar. Everything really depended upon the peace with Sweden, and it seemed to be the tsar's best policy to ally himself with those powers who could keep Sweden in check; Spain was too far removed for this. The best means to force Sweden to peace would be an alliance with the emperor, Great Britain and the United Provinces, and to gain them neither should the Baltic trade be interfered with nor attention paid to the intrigues of Goertz. Whether peace were made with Sweden or not, in either case the outcome should be communicated to the other powers concerned to remove their suspicions, gain their friendship, and prevent them from allying themselves with Sweden.[2]

Norris was anything but pleased with the orders sent him. He objected the season of the year and the state of his health, in

[1] Solov'ev, as last cited.
[2] *Kurakin Archives*, I. 329–40.

addition to disbelief in the sincerity of the tsar's overtures.[1] And, perhaps hurrying his departure on purpose, he left Copenhagen with the fleet before Jefferyes arrived with his instructions, for he, leaving on 14 October o.s. and spending four days on the sea " tossed upon it like a football," only came thither on 11 November, seventeen days from London, and so found Norris gone. A misunderstanding in regard to the despatches and instructions which he carried for the admiral, and which he sent back, delayed him further, so that he only reached St. Petersburg on 1 January o.s. He soon found that the distrust expressed by Norris and Whitworth was well founded. Proposals were not made, but were required of him. A treaty of commerce on the lines proposed of old was scouted. He found preparations making, both military and naval, for the coming season. When he did obtain a document, it turned out to be only the draft defensive treaty presented to the Russian ministers and by them amended and returned in May and June 1716.[2]

Goertz remained in Sweden till November, unceasingly occupied with questions of finance. Then, very unwillingly, on the pressing instances of the impatient Russians and mainly with the object of influencing the emperor and the king of England by the appearance of a resumption of the negotiations, he returned a fourth time to Lofö, arriving on the 17th. He pretended that Charles had only one objection to the treaty, namely, that for a successful invasion of Germany he must have some fortified place for his base. He required therefore, as an essential preliminary, that the tsar should help him to get back Stralsund. It was replied that the tsar was not willing to attack the Danes, but suggested instead that the landing should take place at Dantzig, covered by the Russian fleet. Goertz said that he must refer this suggestion to the king, thus gaining time for development of the English scheme. He departed again on 23 November, leaving the Russians convinced of Sweden's earnest desire for peace. Osterman wrote to the tsar, " if Baron Goertz has not the devil on his back, it is clear

[1] " It seems as reasonable to conjecture that I might as likely go into Sweden, or be frozen in the sea, as perform it [the journey by sea] ; and if I were in condition to make the voyage, it should be by land . . . When the King was pleas'd to send me to the Czar in Holland, I found him no ways dispos'd to make any overtures, but carrying on private intrigues with the Pretender, Sweden, and the Old Court of France ; and when I told Schaffiroph that it was the good disposition the Czar had shewn at Paris which had induced the King to send me to him, to enter into measures for their common interest, he told me plainly they had never given any such insinuation, but that if I had any Plan to offer, the Czar would consider it " (to Stanhope, 18 Oct. o.s., B. M. Add. MSS. 28145).

[2] Jefferyes' despatches, R. O. Russia 9 ; Stanhope to him, Foreign Entry Book 122.

from his declaration, that his intentions about the peace are honest." [1]

Arrived in Sweden, Goertz was informed of the British mission to St. Petersburg. He saw that the ground of his policy of playing off king George and the tsar against each other was cut from under his feet, and decided that peace must be concluded with the former at once and the Russian negotiation be abandoned.[2] But on the day that he wrote to Müllern to that effect, 30 November o.s., Charles XII was killed. Immediately that the news was known, the baron's career ended. He was thrown into prison and only left it for the scaffold. The whole conditions of northern affairs were changed. Alluding to the effect upon the war lately declared with Spain Craggs could write, " The death of the King of Sweden, which is now confirmed with great certainty, is a plain declaration, I think, that our Cause is a just one, since God has so visibly espoused it." [3] But to the Jacobites the event was " a disaster," " un furieux contretems," " an irreparable loss," " a terrible misfortune," " un grand malheur " which would change everything in the north.[4] Alberoni was even now equipping his new armada for the invasion of England, and his principal hopes were placed on the support of the northern powers.[5] True, that " Hooker " wrote from Dantzig on 23 November that he despaired of success, that neither the Swedish nor the Russian fleet was in his opinion of any account, and that there never had been any probability of their joining,[6] but other despatches were full of alarming reports. Particulars were continually arriving about the doings of Beretti Landi and of Cellamare,[7] the mission of Lawless and others [8] to Sweden and to Holland, the remittance of Spanish money thither and financial arrangements at Amsterdam, and other like matters. Stair wrote on 14 January 1719 that the king of Spain had offered Charles XII for a descent upon Great Britain, besides ships, 20,000 arms, 900,000 crowns down, and an annual subsidy of a million.[9] To all this intrigue the catastrophe of Frederikshald suddenly put

[1] Carlson, pp. 157–59, translated. It may be noted that General Rank was at Lofö in November and took part in the discussions (Bacmeister, III. 257 ; La Vie, 30 Oct., *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 385).

[2] Carlson, pp. 162–63.

[3] To Stair, 29 Dec. 1718 o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 30.

[4] B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 232, ff. 176–7–9, 183.

[5] Thus Dubois to Stanhope : " la plus grande ressource que le Cardinal Alberoni se propose est la Ligue qu'il veut former dans le Nord " (7 Dec., R. O. France 162 ; cf. Armstrong, *Elisabeth Farnese*, p. 106, and *Scottish Review*, Jan. 1897, p. 95).

[6] B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 232, f. 155.

[7] The regent, says Stair, told him that Schleinitz lied in his denials of negotiation with Cellamare for subsidies ; he knew it for a fact.

[8] As the Marquis de Possobueno, governor of Porto Longone.

[9] To Robethon, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 231, f. 261.

an end. As Wiesener says, " Le coup de fauconneau, qui termina la vie de Charles XII, déroba au Cardinal Alberoni la plus belle de ses chances, la plus digne de son imagination romanesque." [1]

Nor was the news pleasurable to Peter the Great. Although he had taken no actual engagements with Alberoni, it was clearly to his advantage that Spain and Sweden should agree to make a combined attack upon Great Britain, for then Charles XII might be willing to purchase his support by ceding to him a part, at least, of the Baltic provinces, and he would have the peace which, upon that condition, he so earnestly desired. Says La Vie :—

" Il est à croire que si le roi de Suède n'eût pas deçu ses espérances par sa mort, il n'aurait point été obligé de changer ses démarches comme il fait à présent. La mort de ce prince le porte absolument à prendre de nouvelles mesures, d'autant mieux que toutes ses espérances pour la paix sont évanouies." [2]

And later La Vie wrote of Peter's dissatisfaction at the news of the success of the French arms in Spain and of his restlessness, sleeplessness, and constant outbursts of passion, attributing them to the continued failure of the Åland conferences, the Swedish preparations for war, and the serious reports from Veselovsky in London.[3]

To meet the danger threatening Great Britain George began to get ready every available ship, arranged for the aid of Dutch and French soldiers and sailors, and prevailed upon the regent to declare war on Spain, as he himself had done, although under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance France was obliged only to furnish subsidies. For his protection in Germany he concluded as elector a treaty with the emperor and the king of Poland, which was signed at Vienna on 5 January 1719, just before the death of Charles was known. The three princes agreed to send to each other military aid, in case their German dominions or the circles in which they lay were molested or troubled by war, and to exert their remaining strength in making diversions into such countries of the enemy as adjoined their borders. The defence of Hungary and Poland was included, but George was exempted from the obligation to send troops into those countries ; his aid was limited to the defence of the emperor's German dominions or of Saxony and to making diversions as stated. The king of Poland undertook for himself and the republic to prevent the passage of troops into the empire or Hungary. If the Polish army was not strong enough to do this, and the republic asked for help, it was to be sent as stipulated, and,

[1] II. 314.

[2] 28 Jan. 1719, *Sbornik*, XL. 10, referring especially to the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Poland.

[3] 22 May, 6 June, ibid. 29–31.

if the emperor or the king of England were attacked, the republic was to make a diversion out of Poland or send troops to their assistance. In the case of a general war in the north the parties were to help each other mutually with their whole strength. The alliance was to continue until a solid peace was made; nothing was to be allowed in that contrary to its object; and other powers, especially German princes and states and the republic of Holland, and (by the sixth secret article) Denmark, were to be invited to join.

This treaty clearly was directed in the first place against Russia. Its principal provisions were for the protection of Poland and prevention of the passage of Russian troops through that country into the empire. Its "exordium" under the fourth secret article was the fulfilment of the execution ordered upon the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, supposing that Dantzig or Elbing were not first attacked, and this was promptly carried out. In the second place Prussia was aimed at, should that king take the tsar's part. The undertakings of Hanover, and even of Saxony, to make diversion into neighbouring lands of the enemy could only apply to Prussia. Frederick William and his minister Ilgen, when they received a copy of the treaty, construed it in this sense. In Poland and its dependencies they read Ermeland and Elbing, well-known objects of Prussian desire, and Courland, the hand of whose duchess had now been offered to the Margrave of Brandenburg-Schwedt. To prevent the passage of Russian troops through Poland was to deprive them, they saw, of Russian co-operation. "We 'll rub all this on Whitworth's nose," the king of Prussia noted.[1]

English ministers were not informed of the treaty, till it had been signed. Then a declaration attached to it, by which George, as king, undertook to send a British fleet to the succour of Dantzig and Elbing, if they were threatened, caused great difficulties, as it required an English counter-signature; and this was never ratified, it seems. We have here a good example of the dependence of George I upon his parliament. Nor did the whole treaty ever mature, as the republic of Poland never acceded to it.[2] The withdrawal of the Russian army from Poland was claimed as its first fruits, but this Peter would seem to have decided upon before, requiring all his forces to prosecute the war with Sweden, after his terms of peace had been rejected.[3] But the treaty had a powerful

[1] Droysen, IV. iv. 371.

[2] Under the sixth declaration the treaty was to remain in suspense until the republic of Poland accepted it.

[3] Solov'ev says that Peter sent word in December that he would withdraw his troops. Daniel Moore wrote from Dresden, 11 Jan. 1718, R. O. Poland 25: "His Czarish Majesty signifies likewise that he is extreamly pleased to satisfy His

effect, and especially at Berlin, as was seen there in the negotiations of the summer.[1]

Majesty and the Republick, and that they may name commissaries to conduct his troops into his own country, but that he hopes that the King and the Republic will be so good as to oblige the city of Dantzick to furnish him some frigates as they have already promised." La Vie, as above noted, attributed the withdrawal to the change of circumstances consequent upon the death of Charles XII.

[1] See on the treaty Droysen, IV. ii. 247 foll., iv. 371 foll., and his and Michael's special essays (see list of authorities). Droysen is, as usual, ultra-Prussian. Michael disposes of his view that there was any intention to dismember Prussia, nor can it be held that an attack on her separately was contemplated. The main part of the treaty is printed by Dumont, VIII. ii. 1, and Lamberty, X. 72, but they do not give the seven secret articles and four declarations appended.

CHAPTER XXII

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS PEACE AFTER THE DEATH OF CHARLES XII

The death of Charles XII opened the way towards the peace for which all other Swedes longed and which now was absolutely necessary. The general preference was for making terms with Russia, and if Peter the Great would have restored Livonia and the port of Reval, as well as Finland, peace would almost certainly have been made with him. The alternative was to surrender Bremen and Verden to George I, he, in return, undertaking that Great Britain should help to recover from the tsar the eastern provinces. Denmark and Prussia were but little feared, and of the king of Poland no account was taken at all.

The two candidates for the Swedish throne were Charles's younger sister, Ulrica Eleonora, whose consort was the hereditary prince of Hesse-Cassel, and the young duke of Holstein-Gottorp, son of her deceased elder sister, Hedvig Sophia. Strictly speaking, neither had a right to the succession, female heirs being debarred,[1] and this was taken advantage of by the people, whose unanimous desire was to abolish the absolutism established by Charles XI. Ulrica took immediate steps; Goertz and the other leaders of the Holstein party were thrown into prison on a charge of treason; while the prince of Hesse acquired command of the army.[2] The duke was a backward, awkward youth, lacking in attractive qualities.[3] Ulrica was the popular choice, and she bowed to the popular will by issuing a proclamation[4] disclaiming all prerogatives of absolute sovereignty and summoning the estates, inviting them to restore the old constitution. After further disclaiming, much against her will, any hereditary right, she was elected queen in February 1719 with succession to her male issue, and was crowned at Upsala in the

[1] See Stavenow, p. 5.

[2] For his character and history, see Stavenow, p. 24.

[3] Badly instructed, says Campredon, by his preceptor Cederhjelm, not out of apron-strings till twelve years old, only mounting a horse at seventeen, and not able to dance or even walk well (Memoir on affairs in Sweden, M.A.E. Suède 141).

[4] 15 Dec. o.s., printed.

middle of March. A proposal to declare the duke heir in reversion was rejected, as also was one for association of the prince of Hesse with her.[1] By the election, Wiesener remarks,[2] the most absolute monarchy in Europe was changed into the most limited.

George and the regent favoured the succession of Ulrica. Immediately that the death of Charles was known De la Marck was instructed to make no difficulty in promoting her claim, while yet so conducting himself as not to incur the resentment of the Holstein party, if it appeared that the duke, contrary to expectation, would obtain the throne. The general idea for a peace must be, as heretofore, one with Hanover and Prussia by the good offices and mediation of France.[3]

A plan for the pacification of the north, emanating, it would seem, from the ministers who had signed the treaty of Vienna, was circulated among the European courts in February.[4] Its main proposals were that the German provinces of Sweden, a burden rather than an advantage, should be given up to their present occupants, who would, in return, unite to recover for her Finland and the Baltic provinces, important granaries and barriers against that enemy who was most to be feared. This was to be done by an alliance offensive and defensive against the tsar, who could be allowed to keep only St. Petersburg, Cronslot and Narva, and so much of Ingria and Carelia as depended on them. If he were recalcitrant, he was to be deprived of those places also and of Smolensk and Kiev besides in favour of the republic of Poland. The guerdon of the king of Poland would be the lands and royal revenues of Wismar and the isle of Poel, and a million and a half of crowns[5] to be subscribed by the other beneficiaries. The duke of Holstein-Gottorp was to be restored to the rights of his ancestors in Gottorp and Sleswick upon condition of his granting a complete amnesty, renouncing all claim to expenses, and undertaking, in view of his reversionary claim to the throne of Sweden,

[1] Cf. Stavenow, pp. 10, 12, 15, 16; De la Marck, 15 Feb., M.A.E. Suède 143; and Whitworth, 28 March, R. O. Holland 265, citing a despatch from the Dutch resident Rumpf.

[2] III. 4.

[3] Dubois to De la Marck, 9 Jan., M.A.E. Suède 141.

[4] "Plan projetté pour la paix générale du Nord à traitter a Brunsvic," printed by Dumont, VIII. ii. 8. Droysen (IV. ii. 154) says that it was drawn up at Vienna by St. Saphorin and Count Flemming, the British and Saxon ministers, and Count Sinzendorff, and submitted to the emperor. There are copies with Lord Polwarth's despatches (R. O. Denmark 41) and several in the French archives (Suède 137, 145) received from different courts. Polwarth (4 March) says that the project was being handed about as received "from a private hand at Vienna." James Haldane says that it was reputed at Cassel to have been published by king George's order; he attributed its authorship to the Saxon Schmettau at Vienna (20 March, R. O. Germany, States, 119).

[5] So in Polwarth's and other copies.

not to re-fortify Tönning or any other place in Holstein. Other provisions related to Courland, Deux-Ponts, and Mecklenburg.

That this plan sufficiently represented George's views is shown by passages in the despatches of Craggs to Lord Stair at Paris cited below. The idea of the treaty of January, combination against Russia, was pursued and continued to be the moving principle of George's policy. He was backed in his hostility to the tsar by English public opinion. The feeling in the country was described later by Bonet, the Prussian resident in London, to his master, in answer to the latter's expression of his desire to settle the northern peace in accordance with the united interests of Prussia, Russia and Great Britain.[1] It was desired, he said, to decrease the tsar's power, not to increase it by guaranteeing to him his conquests. Guarantees by him of Bremen and Verden and of the protestant succession were neither wanted nor thought proper. The increase of his commercial power was viewed with great jealousy. He was regarded as deceitful and aggressive, as one whose friendship would be neither useful nor agreeable. In addition, he was thought to be declining in vigour and health, his heir was an infant, the edifice he had raised might fall with him. It was not desired to reduce Sweden further. But the principal objection to union with the tsar was that it might cost the valuable alliance of the emperor. Yet, Bonet went on, a war with him would probably be unpopular, for trade would be interrupted and the Jacobites be encouraged. Though such a war might serve the king's electoral interests it would not benefit those of the English nation, which most of all desired peace. The present expense of naval armaments was enormous, a million and a half; the ministry, though bold and venturesome, might find itself deserted; a new one might reverse everything, as in former instances.

But the views put forward in the circular were not those of the other belligerents, excepting, perhaps, the king of Poland. The Swedes were not prepared to cede the whole of Bremen and Verden nor anything to Denmark or Prussia. The Danes were for pushing the war to its extremity, intending to win back the provinces in Sweden which they had lost sixty years before. Frederick William of Prussia held closely to his alliance with Peter the Great and would have been content with a mortgage of Stettin only. Besides which, it was essential under present conditions to consult the wishes of France, with whom the stress of the war with Spain had brought Great Britain into closer union than ever. The cardinal principle of French policy being always repression of Austria the regent was strong in support of Prussia, already the rival

[1] 18 Aug. 1719, printed by Droysen, IV. iv. 379.

of that power, placing the interests of Frederick William only second to those of king George, and further would have Sweden retain territory in the empire and a voice in its affairs.[1] But if the claims of Hanover and Prussia were to be allowed, this could only be at the expense of Denmark. But George would not readily give up his Danish ally, and, while willing that Prussia should have Stettin and its district, required Frederick William to dissociate himself from his ally the tsar.

We may follow the discussions at Paris in the correspondence of Craggs and Stanhope with Stair and Dubois.[2] The intercourse of the two latter was by no means smooth; the cold insistent ambassador, the quick and nervous abbé were naturally antipathetic, and the irritability of the latter was increased by the difficulties of his position. It required all the soothing diplomacy of Craggs to prevent an open rupture. And Stair was constantly mistrustful of the regent's sincerity in regard to affairs both in the north and in the south.[3] On the other side the treaty of Vienna roused great jealousy. Complaint was made that it had not been communicated, as the friendly relations of the two powers demanded. The answer was that this had not been thought necessary, as neither Great Britain nor France were concerned in any way, that it was natural to take precautions in the north, that the treaty of 1717 of similar character between France, Russia and Prussia had been concluded in like secrecy, and so on.[4] The difference was composed, for the necessities of the regent and of George I demanded its composition, but it was serious.[5]

First we have despatches from Craggs of 12 and 17 January o.s., the latter a very long and important private letter, whose burden throughout was the necessity for the king and the regent "to unite and act together in strict concert upon the Northern affairs." Stair must particularly try to discover French sentiments in regard

[1] Thus Craggs to Stair, 28 April o.s.: "I can perceive by Mr. Destouches here, that the French will not disguise their resolution to insist upon it, that Sueden their old ally should preserve some footing in Germany, a point which, I believe, differs from the King's thoughts upon that subject" (R. O. Foreign Entry Book 30).

[2] Ibid. and France 163 foll.; B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 246–47. See also the letters of Stair to Robethon, ibid. 231, and the luminous narrative of Wiesener.

[3] Private despatches, *passim*, cf. Wiesener, III. 97, 98. Stair's general view was that Great Britain must make herself strong enough to stand alone. He sums up (26 March): "In one word, my dear Craggs, so long as you stand firm upon your leggs you will lead France, when ever wee come to be obliged to lean upon her for support, she'll help to tumble us down."

[4] Stair, 30 Jan.; see on the subject Wiesener, III. 19 foll.

[5] Dubois wrote retrospectively to Robethon on 25 Feb.: "Je vous avoue avec la dernière sincérité qu'il n'y a eu aucune circonstance pendant toute la Régence qui ait fait perdre plus de terrain à S.A.R. que celle-cy" (B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 231, f. 269).

to the tsar. It was very necessary to talk of and to give all public appearance of a desire for a general peace in the north, which should include Russia. But some restitution must be made to Sweden, namely, "those provinces, for whose sake only we can suppose that Sweden will enter into a peace. . . . The question will be, whom we shall pitch upon to come into the general treaty of peace, because they will not be able to make war alone." Confusion would be worse confounded if the king, the regent and the emperor all held different views. Craggs's own opinion, arrived at "by ratiocination," was that it would be a positive advantage to Sweden to be rid of the burden of her German provinces, recovering her eastern ones. A great many Swedes considered them only "a bait to the ambition of their Princes which frequently tempted them to enter into fresh wars." The interest of Great Britain was clearly to renew the old alliance with Sweden and replace the Baltic commerce on its former footing. Stair must endeavour to dissuade the regent from favouring the tsar, but "in a friendly obliging manner rather than by any pressing vigorous remonstrance." To Dubois Craggs wrote praying for his assistance and expressing disbelief in the reports of a French understanding with the tsar. The great thing was to know on what terms Sweden could be accommodated with him. Colonel Bassewitz, "homme très connu et très connoissant en Suède," was going thither to inform the king exactly of what passed, and his reports would be communicated. Then to Stair, 12 February o.s.: it would scarcely be possible to effect a peace were the rigour of the tsar's demands allowed. For Prussia the king was bound as well as the regent to procure the cession of Stettin and its district,[1] and he was ready to comply strictly with his engagements, if the king of Prussia would fulfil his.[2] The king's present views were to settle a plan, if possible, in conjunction with the kings of Prussia, Denmark and Poland "to preserve to each other what shall be agreed upon, satisfying Sweden at the expense of the Czar," who ought to be satisfied with St. Petersburg, Narva and Cronslot and must be, if the powers named agreed thereon. The last letters from Jefferyes at St. Petersburg were convincing on the impossibility of making a peace which should satisfy both Sweden and Russia. The tsar would only consent to conditions acceptable by the former "when he is not able to do otherwise, that is to say, when measures shall be taken to reduce him to it."

On 4 March Stair reported Dubois' utterance of opinion that a

[1] Referring to what Stair wrote on 4 Feb.: "S.A.R. m'a dit qu'elle avait des engagemens avec le Roy de Prusse par rapport à Stettin par un traitté fait avec la tripple alliance," i.e. the treaty of 14 (17) Sept. 1716, see p. 150.

[2] That is, the engagements of the treaty of 1715.

beginning must be made by an agreement between Hanover and Prussia. He had replied, he said, that the king would not be likely to object to this, but could not abandon the king of Denmark ; the interests of the three were compatible and the king of Poland might be included. Dubois answered that France as a guarantor of the treaties of Westphalia might consent to the cession of Bremen and Verden and of Stettin, but could not go further. Stair continuing to urge the cause of Denmark, he had said that he would wait to instruct himself more perfectly on northern affairs. Then on 8 March : the regent agreed that it was impossible to form a plan to satisfy both Sweden and Russia, a choice must be made ; France had several engagements with the former, and the latter must not be allowed to become too powerful in the Baltic. And on 12 March, on the proposed renewal of the Åland conferences, Stair wrote that there was no appearance that the tsar would consent to concessions so contrary to his views as the restitution of Livonia and Reval, and that Dubois had said that the closest union was necessary between France and Great Britain, an opinion with which he had expressed his agreement.

Craggs in reply, 9 March o.s., wrote strongly in favour of the king of Denmark, for " the King in interest and in honour cannot think of abandoning him, who of all the Northern allies has alone kept any faith with His Majesty." A proposal to deprive him would make the emperor and other German princes suspect

" that France is desirous to have the Swedes preserve a footing in Germany, in order to assist them, as formerly, to disturb the Empire, whenever they shall think it necessary. . . . Y.E. is acquainted with the King's thoughts, which are short, by an alliance to be concluded between Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Poland, the Emperor and His Majesty to the content of those Parties to recover to Sweden what the Czar has taken from her, and let him come into the treaty nolens volens upon these terms."

As to mediation by France, claiming as a guarantor of the treaties of Westphalia, if it were to be admitted the regent must declare his intentions favourably. And,

" because the King observes from Y.E.'s letters a continual suspicion that the French do not act openly and above-board in these Northern matters, and some reason to apprehend that, whatever they say, they do not mean the same things with us, but are every now and then returning to their Old Maxims and Politicks, which they will not or cannot understand to be incompatible with their new Treaties,"

therefore he would be very cautious how he put matters into their hands. Stair might give good words and assurances and reasonable hopes as to the mediation, provided that particular explanation

of the conditions to be aimed at were given, for without that the king would not be able to obtain the consent of other parties. Dubois " must perish whenever he deserts our common cause." Though it was melancholy and provoking to see him sometimes swerve from it, yet every step in that direction should convince him of his danger. As to Stair's news about the projected invasion from Spain, no particular alarm was felt, but precautions would be taken.[1]

But Stair still mistrusted, in spite of the assurance of the regent, who, he says,

" m'a déclaré en termes précis, qu'il étoit prêt à nous sacrifier le Czar, ajoutant des raisons peu obligeantes pour le Czar, disant que le Czar étoit un Prince qui ne cherchoit qu'à brouiller l'Europe, en qui personne ne pouvoit prendre confiance ; Monsieur le Régent exprima cecy en termes bien forts. . . . Par rapport aux affaires des Nord, je croy que la Politique de Mons^r. de Torcy n'a pas laissé d'avoir quelque influence à cette Cour ; cette Politique est que les conjonctions du Nord, qui pourroient donner de la peine et de l'embarras à l'Empereur et au Roy, sont utiles à la France." [2]

And such expressions of distrust are constant in his despatches, in spite of renewed explicit assurances on the part of the regent and Dubois.[3] Stair noted their interviews with the Russian minister Schleinitz and advised an alliance between the kings of England, Poland, Denmark and Prussia ; " il y aura des difficultés à ce plan et à l'exécution, mais on ne finira pas autrement." [4]

The first authentic report of Swedish views on the subject of peace came from De la Marck, who had been consulted by all parties, he says, both on that question and on that of the succession.[5] Having stayed on at Stockholm to see the queen elected, he left for Paris before the regent's disapprobation of this step could reach him. He came to Copenhagen on 13 March. No terms, he told Lord Polwarth, would be made with Russia until he either sent word from Paris or returned to Sweden. To the Danes, he said, he brought no proposals, they having never intimated readiness to accept the king of France's mediation, as had the kings of England and Prussia and the tsar, but he did not doubt that a peace might be arranged which ought to satisfy them " if they took their measures aright

[1] Craggs goes on to recount the preparations making by sea and land.

[2] 2 April.

[3] E.g. 14 Jan., 24 Feb., 12 March, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 246–47 ; to Robethon, 11 April, ibid. 231, f. 294 ; to Craggs 29 April, R. O. France 163.

[4] To Robethon, as above.

[5] For instance, by Eric Sparre, who communicated to him a memorandum against ceding anything to the tsar beyond St. Petersburg (5 Jan. o.s., Malmström, pp. 98–104).

with the King of France and the King of Great Britain." They must not expect to keep Stralsund and Rügen, but the question of Sleswick might be arranged. If they sought more they might be the worse off, losing the strip of Norway beyond the Glommen. He further advised delay in sending a British minister to Sweden till it was seen what success his own proposals might have, evidently wishing, says Polwarth, who disapproved, to be himself the instrument of peace. But any one sent, he said, ought to have powers to conclude at once, in order to anticipate the tsar.[1]

De la Marck reached Paris towards the end of April. His plan for peace, communicated after considerable delay to Stair, was as little acceptable as had been the terms offered by Charles XII. It allowed to Hanover and Prussia only partial cessions or mortgages, and to Denmark only ducal Sleswick, with reservation of revenues to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. To Stair's report Craggs replied that the proposals required much consideration.[2]

At Hamburg on his way to Paris De la Marck had much conversation with General Poniatowski, with the Prussian minister Knyphausen, and others.[3] Count Rottembourg later disclosed to Whitworth at Berlin correspondence of his with Knyphausen, which bore a treasonable character in regard to Hanover. This was at once communicated to Stair, who promptly taxed the regent with the intrigue. The latter excused De la Marck, saying that he could not have acted in the manner stated, contrary to his express orders.[4] But we have seen what were the count's private opinions, and, no doubt, he had gone too far. Whitworth would have it that he was entirely in the interest of the court of Prussia.[5] Stanhope wrote to Stair on 7 June severely condemning his conduct and enclosing inculpatory extracts from his letters. He had certainly, he said, deceived the regent as to his action in Sweden

[1] The conversations in Polwarth's despatches of 14 to 28 March, R. O. Denmark 41.

[2] Stair's discussion with De la Marck in his of 6 May, cf. Wiesener, III. 90–93; copies of the proposals with Carteret's despatches, R. O. Sweden 24, also King's Letters 65. The capital point, De la Marck argued, was to separate Prussia from the tsar; hence Hanover and Denmark must moderate their demands in order that Prussia might be satisfied. In the French archives (Suède 137) there is a long dissertation on the possibilities of peace given to the count by a Swedish minister, which it would be tedious to examine. Stress is laid on the particular importance of coming to terms with Prussia. Extracts of letters from De la Marck to Sparre, March to May 1719, are printed by Malmström, pp. 105–08.

[3] Dayrolle, 11 April, R. O. Holland 269.

[4] See Stair's of 30 May. Whitworth had sent to Stanhope a copy of an intercepted letter from Knyphausen to De la Marck of 8 Dec. 1718, referring to a previous letter of 22 Aug. and stating strongly that the king of Prussia would not make peace with Sweden except in conjunction with the tsar, whatever Goertz said to the contrary (R. O. Holland 265, enclosed by Whitworth, 28 Feb.).

[5] 20 May, R. O. Prussia 8.

after the king's death, and the renewal of the Åland conferences was attributed principally to him. Stair must desire that he should not be sent back to Sweden, for whatever orders he had, he could not redeem his misconduct.[1] And accordingly sent back he was not.

Peter the Great, meanwhile, had protested (15 March o.s.) against George's proceedings. The latter replied to him on 12 May.[2] Regretting his dissatisfaction, he pointed out that no other steps could have been taken. The treaty with the emperor and the king of Poland was purely defensive and not directed against the tsar. Measures of precaution were very necessary, for at the very time that the tsar was asking for action in common against Sweden he was engaged in negotiation for a separate peace. He himself, George went on—(with complete disregard for the truth, if the letter is genuine) [3]—had never proposed peace with Sweden. The Holstein minister Fabrice had come to him with propositions, but they were not satisfactory and had been rejected. When Dücker returned home, Schrader had accompanied him to inform himself of the progress of the Åland conferences and of the internal condition of Sweden. To him also Goertz had given projects of peace, but they had been equally unacceptable and no answer had been returned to them.

On 15 May Stair wrote: "Quant aux affaires du Nord vous pouvez compter que le but principal de cette Cour est que la Suède conserve un pied en Allemagne, et qu'elle ne départira point de cette vue." He strongly advised the sending of a British minister to Stockholm to prevent the Swedes from making terms with Russia. Cronström, the Swedish minister in Paris, had confessed to him that only the king of England could recover Livonia and Reval, without which, he avowed, Sweden would no longer be a nation. He also desired passionately to see a British fleet in the Baltic. The most acceptable thing of all, he said, would be a truce with Denmark, in the obvious advantages of which Stair concurred. In the regent's opinion, Stair went on, the thing most to be feared was that the tsar should restore Reval with the object of engaging Sweden in designs against the empire and Poland. He had repeated his assurances that he was ready to take measures with the king of England for the relief of Sweden and to engage himself to furnish succours to enable her to prevail over Russia. Then on 30 May:—

[1] R. O. France 164, S.P. Dom. Entry Book 269. "Il est trop engagé dans les intrigues du Czar et de la Cour de Prusse pour que Sa Majesté puisse reprendre aucune confiance en luy."

[2] *Kurakin Archives*, III. 74–76.

[3] I have not found a copy of it in the English records. But it was probably sent from the German chancery, and the copy may be preserved at Hanover.

" In speaking of the affairs of the North, the Regent told me that he had good hopes that the King of Prussia would come into measures with the King, and that he expected it the rather, because the Czar had refused to comply with the King of Prussia's desire and earnest sollicitations to give up Reval to the Swedes, in order to conclude a peace with that Crown. He told me further that he has good reason to believe that the King of Prussia was not so intirely engaged with the Czar, but that there was still hopes of bringing him off, because Monsr. de Kniphuysen had settled with the Count De la Marck at Hamburgh that, in case the King of Prussia was engaged with the Czar past retreat, he should make use of the expression, *nôtre mariage est indissolubile*, and that hitherto this expression had not been in any of Kniphausen's letters." [1]

Contemporaneous with these negotiations were others carried on with Denmark. On the news of the death of Charles XII Frederick IV had used hearty expressions to Polwarth, saying (in his words), " I am resolved to communicate all that has passed to your Master in writing, and will run the same fate with Him, and haveing the same interests, I hope we shall act with one heart and one mouth, and take measures together." [2] Stanhope had replied that Polwarth was very right in giving the king of Denmark assurances of his Majesty's friendship and might " repeat and confirm the King's good dispositions towards concerting measures for making use of the event of the King of Sweden's death for procuring a speedy peace in the north." [3] And on 30 January o.s. he wrote—a strange pronouncement in view of George's own private overtures—" The King thinks your Lo^p^· did very well not to encourage any propositions of separate meetings and private negotiations with Sweden. The example of others in that case is too bad to be followed, and it is the interest of Denmark to act openly and in conjunction with their friends." [4]

Before the death of Charles XII Count Holstein-Holsteinborg before mentioned had been selected to go on a mission to England. His instructions had been to promote the treaties and to make proposals for a thorough execution of the stoppage of trade to Sweden, in order to compel her to make peace. Conferences in

[1] A later argument for gaining Prussia was expressed by Stair on 13 June : " The Regent seems at present very desirous that the King of Prussia should agree with the King, and that the troubles of the North should be composed, because it is upon those troubles that the Cardinal Alberoni and the Spanish party in France seem to build their greatest hopes ; and his R.H. judges very rightly, that if the King of Prussia was detached from the Czar, the ill-affected in this country could have nothing to expect from the North, and so might become more wary and backward to engage themselves in Cardinal Alberoni's desperate designs " (R. O. France 164, and similarly in despatches following. Cf. Wiesener, III. 137).

[2] 30 Dec., R. O. Denmark 40.

[3] 6 Jan. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5.

[4] Ibid.

the isle of Hveen in opposition to those at the Åland isles were to be suggested, and further a marriage between the crown prince Christian and the princess Anne. In the matter, however, of the Swedish succession the duke of Holstein-Gottorp was favoured at Copenhagen, for it was thought that if he were successful he might be willing to give up all his German provinces, whereas, if the prince of Hesse were chosen, Sweden might insist upon retaining a footing in the empire. The count arrived in England in February. But he had little success. It appeared, he thought, that George might desire the assistance of Danish as well as of Dutch troops to resist the threatened Spanish invasion. But he found public opinion strong against continuance of the prohibition of trade, so much so that he advised that English ships going to Sweden should not be seized, but only kept away. In fact, one of the first acts of the new Swedish government had been, in accordance with De la Marck's advice, to issue orders against the further fitting out of privateers and for the release of ships of neutral nations captured by them.[1] And the British prohibition was actually taken off on 4 April o.s., Stanhope advising that it was better to do this at once than to wait for the lapse of the proclamation with the session.[2]

Holstein was given drafts of a political and a commercial treaty, the former providing for combined action against Sweden in the Baltic and for Danish succours to king George at home,[3] but this was no more acceptable to the Danish government than the old one, although Stanhope wrote that it would satisfy the Danes that the count had been neither idle nor unsuccessful.[4] When the court repaired to Hanover in June, Holstein returned home.

In March Colonel Adolphus Frederick Bassewitz, appointed to go to Stockholm on the part of Hanover, was at Copenhagen. His instructions were communicated to the Danish ministers at a conference at which Polwarth and General Bothmer assisted. The principal discussion was about a suspension of arms. The Danes advanced against this the arguments that no respite ought to be given to Sweden to recover strength, that expenses would be the same as if the war went on, and that during the cessation the

[1] Copy of the queen of Sweden's proclamation, 22 Jan. o.s., with Dayrolle's of 14 April, R. O. Holland 269.

[2] To Whitworth, 7 April o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 83.

[3] At the Record Office (Treaty Papers 4) are "additional instructions" of 11 May o.s. to the Lords Justices to sign the treaty or convention with Denmark "for strengthening our mutual amity and good correspondence and for facilitating the negociations that are to be set on foot in order to restore the Peace of the North." They are endorsed: "N.B. There was no instructions for the Lords Justices to sign any Treaty after this time." For drafts of the treaty, see Foreign Entry Book 5 and S.P. Dom. Entry Book 414. And on the provisions of the commercial treaty a Board of Trade report of 13 May o.s., Treaty Papers 4.

[4] To Polwarth, 14 April, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5.

prohibition of trade would be inoperative. "But after all that reasoning," says Polwarth, "I do not believe they are in a condition to make the preparations they talk of, nor carry on a vigorous war." [1] In this he was mistaken.

With Bassewitz went to Stockholm Colonel Lövenörn on the part of the king of Denmark, after great difficulty had been experienced in obtaining for him leave. He was a man who had served his diplomatic apprenticeship in the trying school of St. Petersburg and whose amiable character fitted him for conciliatory negotiation. His instructions were communicated to Polwarth: to report on the state of Sweden, to keep in touch with Bassewitz, to discover the commission of councillor Hein [2] and insinuate to him the king of Denmark's regard for the prince of Hesse and pleasure at the queen's accession, to express the hope of a reasonable peace, and to observe the situation generally, but, if asked whether he had instructions to treat for peace, to say only that the king of Denmark would be glad to arrange terms in concert with his allies, particularly with the king of England.[3] The two envoys on reaching Stockholm (10 April) had interviews with Horn and Eric Sparre. Secretary Lagau, at present representing France in Sweden, says that Bassewitz told the latter that the motives which had hitherto united the kings of England and Denmark might now no longer subsist, and that the former would not be too eager for the latter's interests, were he too difficult on the conditions of peace. Sparre disapproved of the plan of February as disadvantageous to the princes of the empire and to France. Only the interests of the kings of England and Prussia, he thought, as allies of France need be considered.[4]

Indeed Lövenörn's mission failed entirely. While he was at Stockholm the Danish admiral Tordenskjold appeared with his squadron before Gothenburg and sent word that it depended upon the answer given to the colonel whether the king of Denmark made peace or war. This high language roused strong resentment; Lövenörn was regarded as playing false; Tordenskjold was requested to abstain for the future from such expressions. But the main point was that both sides made impossible demands. The Swedes asked for the restoration of Stralsund and Rügen, the re-instatement of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and payment of the costs of the war. They said that these demands could be enforced by the cession of Bremen and Verden to the king of England, who would then abandon Denmark, and it was hinted that this would enable a good bargain to be made with Russia. On the other hand the

[1] Polwarth, 4 March.
[2] A Swedish privy councillor who had been sent to Cassel and was now returning.
[3] Polwarth, 28 March.
[4] Lagau, 12 April, M.A.E. Suède 137.

Danes insisted on the cession not only of the Pomeranian territory but of provinces in Sweden itself, on the abolition of the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls, and on a guarantee of Gottorpian Sleswick. It was therefore of little use for the Swedes to represent, as they did, the danger to both countries from the increase of Russian power and to say that they would never make peace with the tsar unless he restored what he had taken. Lövenörn, finding himself looked upon as an "arch-spy," returned home. All that was gained by his mission was much insight into the condition of Sweden and the divisions among the leading Swedes.[1] He was back in Copenhagen on 1 June.

The Dutch also sent an envoy to Sweden, Jacob De Bie, expelled in the previous autumn from St. Petersburg on the charge of having made improper reports upon the trial and death of the tsarevich Alexis. He reached Stockholm on 28 March. His principal commission was to demand release of Dutch ships taken and freedom of trade. He reported in April, among other matters, the desire that the powers mediating for peace should be the emperor, France and Holland; whether king George's mediation was wanted, he could not say. Count Horn told him that it was intended to temporise with the tsar, making in the meantime preparations to resist his attack and rebuff him if he came, that Prussia was closely engaged to him, but perhaps might change, that the admission of a Prussian minister to the Åland conferences would be resisted, and that something might be given up to Hanover in return for king George's support against Russia, but nothing to Denmark. On the third point De Bie and Rumpf answered that the tsar would press it, since only Prussia would guarantee Reval to him. Finally they were asked to say that the Swedes reposed great confidence in Holland.[2]

The firmness of the Swedes strengthened the conviction at Copenhagen that the only way to procure peace was to prosecute hostilities. The arguments of king George's ministers in opposition were of no avail, and it was finally decided to make war independently. Polwarth had already reported (4 March) Admiral Gabel's opinion that it was a mistake to send any one to Sweden and that the proper thing to do would be to land twelve battalions and twenty squadrons to attack Gothenburg in conjunction with the army in Norway. And he warned his government (15 April) that, if the king of Denmark had any cause to think himself slighted or neglected, he might undertake any measures. And this happened,

[1] See fully on the above, Holm, pp. 637 foll., and the despatches of Lagau, *loc. cit.* The latter says (27 May) that Lövenörn had left the previous day "fort mécontent" and threatening war, and that Bassewitz was glad to be rid of him.

[2] 1 and 11 April, *Handlingar*, XXI. 374–80.

for having opposed the resolution at first Frederick now adopted and adhered to it. It was decided to invade Båhus and the neighbouring provinces. At the end of June 34,000 Danes stood ready on the frontier of Norway. Frederick himself arrived at Christiania on the 24th.

The Danish decision should have implied a concert with Russia, but that was not the case; the tsar was too much distrusted. Report after report had come that, to make peace with Sweden, he was prepared to sacrifice Denmark. His ambassador at Copenhagen was avoided, Holm quotes, as though he were a leper. He made proposals indeed for combined action, offering to guarantee the Danish acquisitions in Sleswick as well as in Pomerania, while on the other hand he threatened that, if Denmark concluded a separate peace, he would restore the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and even help him to the throne of Sweden. Count Plato Musin-Pushkin arrived on 7 May to support the ambassador Prince Basil Dolgoruky. But in reply to their proposals for a joint attack Frederick said that, while ready to invade Sweden with all the forces he could muster, for a blockade of Carlskrona he would negotiate with the English admiral, when he came; and he expressed the conviction that the tsar should make such concessions as would enable the king of England to join with them. From this answer the Russians concluded that the Danes were loth to separate themselves from king George and desired to be free to make their own terms. Frederick, however, went so far as to send an officer to St. Petersburg early in June to enquire when operations would begin, in order that his own might coincide.

In regard to commerce, in spite of the removal of the British prohibition, the Danes notified their intention of continuing their blockade nevertheless, a declaration, Dayrolle says, looked upon in Holland almost as one of war.[1] The Swedes replied thereto by commissioning privateers to seize neutral ships carrying contraband of war, and by still forbidding trade to the tsar's ports.[2] Peter on his part notified a corresponding prohibition [3] and declined to release the merchantmen already captured by him. Later he issued a proclamation to the effect that his measures in regard to trade would be reciprocal to those adopted by Sweden.[4] To conciliate

[1] 18 April, R. O. Holland 269.

[2] Whitworth, 18 and 21 April. De Bie complained of this as contrary to the promises given, supposing the measure to be owing to the private interests of Count Mörner and other senators in the privateering and to the utility of the prizes to the admiralty (15 April, *Handlingar*, XXI. 380).

[3] Whitworth, 21 April.

[4] 9 April o.s., Bacmeister, III. Appendix xiii. Kurakin notified this at the Hague on 26 April (Whitworth, 28 April). A copy of a further similar declaration by the tsar, 8 May o.s., R. O. Foreign Ministers 52.

the Dutch, he offered them special privileges, promising, says Jefferyes, to send men-of-war to convoy their ships to and from his ports.[1] And De Bie obtained a Swedish permission for them to trade thither under certain conditions.[2]

[1] 1 May o.s., R. O. Russia 9, cf. Solov'ev, Book XVII. chap. iii.

[2] 24 May, *Handlingar*, XXI. 383. In June, the Danish prohibition continuing, and out of thirty vessels taken by them twenty being Dutch, the merchants petitioned for armed convoys to protect them, but nothing, Dayrolle thought, was likely to result (27 June).

CHAPTER XXIII

THE TREATIES WITH PRUSSIA

Denmark thus refusing to fall in with the plans of George I, it became the more important, nay essential, to win over Prussia; to follow, that is to say, the line of policy advocated by the regent. For, if neither Denmark nor Prussia were with him, it would be impossible for George to take the measures he desired against Peter the Great. The Hanoverian ministers indeed, always jealous of Prussia and sensible of the offence which would be given to the emperor, objected to this policy, but their arguments were overruled. It was decided to send Charles Whitworth back to his old post at Berlin, while, later, the young Lord Carteret was appointed to conduct negotiations at Stockholm. There followed a year and a half of most difficult diplomacy at those courts, at Copenhagen and at Paris, before the pacification, apart from Russia, could be completed. Stanhope, who directed it, achieved success, but was forced to employ discreditable expedients.[1] To use the words of Erdmannsdörffer: out of the almost impenetrable confusion of truth and falsehood, interest and greed, projects and imaginings, unions and differences, necessities and accident, a general pacification of the north at length resulted. For England, Russia was always the enemy unceasingly to be watched and her alarming increase restrained. On this account Sweden must be rescued from complete destruction, although the circumstances obliged her to put up with serious losses. England took over the mediation; it was not to be expected that German interests would be placed by her in the front rank; the principal aim of English policy was to bring Prussia and Denmark to terms with Sweden and thereby to isolate the tsar for ever.[2]

Frederick William of Prussia was willing enough to be reconciled with his father-in-law, provided that this did not entail a breach

[1] Cf. Droysen, p. 283, in reference to the treaties with Sweden: "deren Artikel es mit Drohungen, Bestechungen, Taüschungen, mit allen Mitteln einer mehr dreisten als ehrenhaften Diplomatie einen nach dem andern durchzutreiben verstand."

[2] II. 350; cf. Droysen, p. 282.

with his ally the tsar or advantage to the particular object of his hatred, the king of Poland. Friendly expressions had been exchanged between Bonet and Stanhope at the beginning of the year.[1] But he was distrusted, and some, as Stair and Whitworth, made no secret of their suspicions. The latter went to Berlin full of misgiving in consequence of advices of a most alarmist character received from a German friend [2] and of his former experience of the Prussian ministers.[3] His instructions,[4] of course, related only to a treaty with Great Britain. The principal document stated that " whereas the death of the late King of Sweden seems by the special hand of Providence to furnish a happy opportunity for reconciling the differences, composing the troubles, and establishing a good peace in the North," and particularly for staying the damage inflicted upon British trade in the Baltic, the best means to put an end to " these ruinous and fatal disorders " seemed to be a strict alliance and friendship with " our good brother and son-in-law, the King of Prussia." As the affairs of his Majesty's electorate were " much complicated with those of the North, and not a little interwoven with the interests of the King of Prussia," his resident Heusch had orders to communicate to Whitworth the state of affairs and aid him in his work. He must reciprocate, and further communicate the purport of his mission to the French minister, Count Rottembourg, endeavouring to discover from him what were his instructions and what he had done.

The articles of the proposed treaty, four in number, were then discussed. On the first, a Prussian guarantee of the protestant succession, Whitworth was informed that in return a British guarantee of the king of Prussia's peace with Sweden should be given, when it was made. The succour was named at 6,000 foot, or ships or money in proportion. The second promised a British guarantee of the treaty to be negotiated between Prussia and Hanover, with like succour, should the king of Prussia be molested in his new possessions. The next stipulated that no peace should be made with Sweden unless commerce in the Baltic were restored to its former footing, in whoever's hands the ports might remain ; and this, Whitworth was informed, was the principal aim of the treaty.

[1] Letter and reply, 22 and 27 Jan. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 253.

[2] See R. O. Holland 265. The advices, Whitworth said, " never could have come in a luckier or more necessary juncture. . . . The main point is to secure the concurrence of the Emperor and France in your concert, and then Prussia must come in " (to Tilson, 7 March).

[3] A single quotation from many in his despatches will suffice. " I am still more and more persuaded that the Court of Prussia will trick us, if they can. The present Ministers there are not to be converted by reason but necessity, nor are they at any time or on any occasion to be trusted. I have such proofs of them, that no protestations would ever convince me of their sincerity " (16 Feb.).

[4] Dated 15 April o.s., R. O. King's Letters 52.

Lastly there was an article for liquidation of the arrears due to Prussia from the French war, an article only to be inserted if insisted upon, but the expectation of payment to be held out to facilitate acceptance of the others.[1] The importance of affairs at the Hague, it was said, rendered it desirable that Whitworth should return thither as soon as possible.

Then there were (1) private, (2) very private and additional instructions of the same date. In the former Whitworth was ordered to treat Rottembourg with great confidence, communicating to him "freely but discreetly" all that was done and saying that there was the greater readiness to give Prussia a guarantee of Stettin, since it was understood that France had given such a guarantee. He was civilly to decline to communicate to the Prussian ministers the whole of his commission until he had had an audience of the king, "lest they should give a wrong turn" to his proposals and prejudice his case. He was to offer a British guarantee of the electoral treaty to be proposed by Heusch and explain to the king by word of mouth its substance, leaving particular exposition to the resident. He was to say that the importance of affairs in Holland necessitated his speedy return thither, and that he had been specially selected as in the confidence of and agreeable to the king of Prussia. Should the latter suspect from the king of England's frankness some pressing necessity in his affairs, it was to be insisted that his only motive was his earnest desire for the king of Prussia's friendship. Any new pretensions that the latter might have in the north had better be referred, it should be suggested, for settlement with other points at the congress of Brunswick, rather than be allowed to hinder the present negotiation. In general, Whitworth should avoid discussing the affairs of the empire or any subject foreign to the present treaties, as not proper for the crown of Great Britain to be engaged in; of the Vienna treaty, in particular, he was to disclaim any particular knowledge, but to say that he understood it to be purely defensive and only directed against powers designing to molest the parties to it, so that the king of Prussia could in no way be affected; besides, it was intended to invite him to join it. Similarly he must deny possession of instructions in regard to Mecklenburg or the duke of Holstein-Gottorp or the king of Poland, such matters either belonging wholly to the emperor or empire, or proper to be treated of at Brunswick. Discussion about Courland, the king of Prussia being "not a little fond of that project," must be dexterously avoided, but it might be insinuated that, the republic and king of Poland having very considerable rights in that quarter, the king of England did not

[1] The four articles, R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 414.

see his way to meddle without their consent. If the king of Prussia seemed favourably inclined to listen, Whitworth might bring forward the interests of the kings of Denmark and Poland, citing the king of Prussia's desire to make peace in concert with the tsar and deducing therefrom that he could not be less desirous of making it in concert with the other allies of the north, for then he would have not only their reciprocal guarantees but also that of Great Britain and her best offices to obtain those of the emperor, France and the States-General. If want of confidence in the emperor were expressed, Whitworth should insinuate that distrust in that quarter could only arise from the king's relations with the tsar and would disappear as soon as he accepted joint action with Denmark and Poland, who were in no wise so suspected but rather in strict friendship with the emperor. While the last-named, in his position of mediator, could not declare himself at once about the provinces to be taken from Sweden, he would doubtless confirm the cessions, when they were made. Lastly Whitworth was to say that peace must not be concluded unless freedom of trade were completely restored, in whoever's hands the Baltic ports might remain, particular regard being had to the trade of Dantzig and Elbing, and that for the mutual succour it would be preferred to supply ships rather than men, not as under the treaty of 1690 ; and, to hasten matters, he was to give frequent reminders of the necessity for his speedy return to the Hague, and not to dispute points of ceremonial.

The very private instructions were concerned with the relations between the king of Prussia and the tsar, prescribing how Whitworth must delicately and with every possible precaution feel his way in ascertaining them, in suggesting a change, and in appearing to acquiesce, if he found the two inseparable. There was added a plan of pacification, which, however, Whitworth and Heusch thought better to suppress.[1] It differed principally from that circulated in February in omitting mention of the tsar, though combination against him was implied in its terms. The king of Poland was only to have peaceable possession of his kingdom and the grand duchy of Lithuania; the security of Dantzig and Elbing and freedom of commerce were to be provided for ; restitution to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp was to be settled at Brunswick.[2]

Whitworth arrived at Berlin on 16 May and, to his surprise, found himself well received ; both the king and the negotiating ministers, Ilgen and Knyphausen, he says, evinced anxiety to come to an understanding. In the French envoy, Count Rottembourg, he found an unexpected and most valuable ally, whose frankness

[1] " Afin que cette Cour n'en fît pas un mauvais usage " (Whitworth, 23 May).
[2] R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 414.

and zeal for the king's service he repeatedly emphasizes.[1] But there was a strong opposition headed by the prince of Anhalt and Grumbkow, who, with the Russian ambassador Alexis Golovkin, used every artifice to thwart him. Another adverse influence was that of Bonet in London. Rottembourg had seen an original despatch from him setting forth the growing jealousy in England of the king's German ministers, in view of the secrecy in which they acted, and stating that king George had two natural enemies, France in respect of his kingdom, Brandenburg of his electorate; that if the Baltic trade could not be restored this season by peace with Sweden or otherwise, the government would fall; that Whitworth's principal instructions certainly regarded the tsar, though he might not speak of them at first; and that, if he were sent back, as seemed probable, it would be good to intimate to Stanhope that this was solely the fault of questions concerning the electorate. Bonet himself would insinuate the same to Sunderland.[2] In August, in the despatch previously cited, Bonet advised against the conclusion of the proposed alliance.

Frederick William himself Whitworth found open enough, but vacillating, according to the character which the French writers give him. He lacked confidence in his own conclusions, sound and just as they usually were. He would listen to Whitworth's arguments and promise to sign the treaties, then hear the other side and withdraw. His indecision was, indeed, excusable. He was asked to exchange an alliance which he highly valued for another which he distrusted and disliked. To abandon Peter the Great was to lose a powerful support against Austria and to expose his outlying royal province to a Russian attack. Yet he dared not brave the allies of Vienna with no prospect of support from France. He wanted the impossible, to be on terms with both Peter and George at the same time.

There was little difficulty either with the British treaty or with those clauses of the Hanoverian, to be concluded at the same time,

[1] Rottembourg had been sent back to Berlin at the end of 1718. He was instructed to represent the earnest desire of Louis XV to maintain close alliance with the king of Prussia, the efforts made and to be continued to obtain his admission to the Quadruple Alliance, the danger he would be in if he entered into the plans of the tsar and were not included in a peace made with Sweden by the king of England, and the insignificance of his differences with that king, with whom he ought to be reconciled. (Instructions of 29 Nov. 1718, *Recueil des instructions*, XVI. 320 foll.)

[2] Whitworth, 1 June, secret. He uses strong language, "la relation de ce malheureux, remplie de sottises, est capable de renverser toute nôtre négotiation, et paroit avoir été écrite dans ce dessein, et peutêtre même de concert avec quelqu'un des ministres icy." Cf. extracts from Bonet's despatches of 17 March, 15 and 24 April, o.s., quoted by Droysen, pp. 260–61, notes, and his memorial of 25 May o.s., with Craggs's report of an interview with him, R. O. Regencies 57.

which provided for peace with Sweden on the conditions of the treaty of 1715, the cession, that is, of Bremen and Verden and Stettin. The disputes arose on two other clauses, the one concerning the 5th article of that treaty, before referred to, the other introducing the kings of Poland and Denmark. The transfers of privileges and sovereignty stipulated in that 5th article had never been carried out, and the date from which the guarantees of Bremen and Verden and Stettin should take effect was now postponed till they should have been made and the documents of cession handed over. But Frederick William was extremely loth to give up his hold upon the three Gartow villages. Situated in the extreme eastern angle of Brunswick-Lüneburg which re-entered into Brandenburg, they were of considerable political importance; through them passed the roads from the Altmark to Lenzen and the north.[1] He attached to the transfer of their "superioritas territorialis" conditions, among others, that passage should be free and that no lines nor fortifications should be erected. In the Hanoverian view these limitations rendered the concession valueless, and they were strongly opposed by Bernstorff and his colleagues. The other clause was struck out; Frederick William would have no mention of either king and on the other hand was importunate to bring in his ally the tsar. So difficult was he about the king of Poland that this clause, though greatly modified, was not accepted until the final exchange of ratifications.[2]

Amended drafts of the treaties were sent to Hanover and returned early in June. All the Prussian conditions about the three villages were struck out, but in the Polish clause, now the seventh, considerable concessions were allowed. The parties were to agree not to make peace without the king of Poland, he was to be recognized by Sweden as such, and his kingdom and the grand duchy of Lithuania were to be guaranteed to him for his life only. He in return was to guarantee the acquisitions of Hanover and Prussia and to engage to make peace in concert with them. Other of his pretensions, as also those of the tsar, were to be discussed at the Brunswick congress. It was added that, as the parties were already under equal treaty engagements with the king of Denmark, it did not appear necessary to make stipulations in regard to him. This Stanhope claimed as a positive advantage:—

[1] Droysen, p. 269.

[2] "Den vornehmsten Anstoss gab ein Artikel zu Gunsten Polens, der gegen Russland gedeutet werden konnte" (Ranke, *Preussische Geschichte*, V. 26, cf. Droysen, p. 250). "En toute apparence," Whitworth wrote on 27 May, "les ministres icy rompront ce traitté plutôt que de laisser nommer le Roy de Pologne." And of Ilgen, "il ajouta avec véhémence que les affaires de Pologne et la seureté de son maître de ce côte-là étoient de telle importance, qu'il faudroit abandonner dix Stetins, et n'y jamais penser, plutôt que de les négliger."

" If you finish with Prussia upon the foot now proposed, 'twill have been the greatest happiness imaginable that Prussia by the difficultys idly started about Poland have given us a decent occasion of being either absolutely silent in this treaty touching Denmark, or the mentioning it in a manner which will not bind the Crown of Great Britain to conditions which I believe can never be obtained, and which perhaps it would not be desirable to obtain, if we could, especially considering the views which Prussia hath unawares disclosed to you upon the Danish Pomeren." [1]

In the same despatch Stanhope said that it was not surprising that the Prussians feared the effect which the Vienna treaty might have upon affairs in Poland, but the king would give a formal and positive engagement, as elector, to guarantee to the republic the right of election to the throne after the present king's decease; and he would further give a British guarantee, as king, of the treaty embodying the same, the strongest safeguard to Prussia possible. " Having thus gone the utmost lengths possible to comply with that Court, 'tis to be hoped you will make them sensible how much it is to their interest not to let slip this occasion of securing the guarantee of England and the Electorate of Hanover." How could the emperor be prevailed upon to confirm the Swedish cessions, " when they shall flatly refuse to suffer his new allye to keep his crown " ? The king of Poland's guarantee of Stettin to Prussia was much more valuable than the reciprocal guarantee required. " If the king of Prussia sets any value upon the friendship of our master he must consent to this condition." If the draft now sent to Heusch were not accepted, Whitworth must leave Berlin. The article, however, might be kept a separate one, and secret as long as necessary.[2] In that case Prussia might get from the king of Poland his guarantee of Stettin and his promise not to make a separate peace with Sweden, and the king of England would immediately employ his good offices at Dresden and elsewhere.[3]

To Stair Stanhope wrote that in sending Whitworth to Berlin to engage that court to work conjointly with the king for peace with

[1] Hanover, 25 May o.s., R. O. Prussia 8.

[2] Stanhope rather liked this idea, in view of what Whitworth had said about a guarantee by France. " Our treaty standing thus free of any obligation to other allies, your thought of getting France to become a party to our guarantee, which is a very happy one, might then possibly take place, and you would consider in what manner we could best hook in their express guarantee for Bremen and Verden."

[3] Since writing the above, Stanhope ended, " it hath been adjusted here in what manner both the King of Denmark and the Czar should be mentioned," the whole being thrown into a separate article. " You are at liberty as to the form in which they shall agree to this article, provided they agree to it." If they would not, " you must take your leave and come hither, where I offer you a bed."

Sweden the method suggested by Dubois in his despatch of 5 May had been exactly followed, nor was success despaired of. If Whitworth prevailed, the obligation would be to Rottembourg, who both enlightened and supported him and whose conduct was just the opposite of that of De la Marck.[1] Stair replied that the regent was absolutely convinced of the necessity of making peace in the north, with the special object of preventing a league between Sweden, Russia and Prussia. Even if the drafts, as amended, were not accepted, the regent still hoped that means would be found to surmount difficulties and agree with the king of Prussia, and flattered himself that his desire would be acceded to, when the king was exactly informed of the situation of affairs in France.[2]

At the conferences which ensued, says Whitworth, the former difficulties were renewed and others started. "The most plain and general expressions were caviled at, and their particular inclination for the Czar discover'd itself at every turn. I rose more than once to put an end to the conversation and treaty." The engagements of the new seventh article were declared impossible, for they might oblige Prussia to support the king of Poland against the republic. Invective was used against the Saxon ministers and their behaviour. Ilgen said that he had left the king "plus animé que jamais contre le Roy de Pologne, et que tout étoit rompu." But at an audience immediately afterwards Whitworth found that Frederick William had not been prepared about the article; being informed that the guarantee to the king of Poland was for life only, he said, "bon, je suis content." And the clause relating to the three villages, the third, he expressed himself satisfied to remit to a separate convention, insisting, however, upon his conditions. Speaking of the Quadruple Alliance he said he would not enter it, having no interest in the southern quarrel. Whitworth replied ingenuously that he did not think there was any intention of inviting him to come in.

But the same afternoon Golovkin and others had audience of the king and moved him in an adverse direction. The final conference took place on 17 June, when Whitworth was informed that he would consent to both treaties as now drawn, with the exception of the Polish article. For this it was offered to substitute either a general engagement not to make peace with Sweden without the tsar and the kings of Denmark and Poland, or the insertion of a clause precluding a peace to the prejudice of the members of the northern league; or again, the article would be accepted if a series of

[1] 7 June, R. O. France 164.
[2] 16 June, ibid.

conditions were annexed.[1] This was in the king's own hand and signed by him as an ultimatum, and it was shown to Golovkin.[2] A fresh draft of the convention about the three villages was also presented, full, says Whitworth, of new clauses which made the transfer of no value. He and Heusch being unable to accept the proposals, he prepared to leave. Invited by the king to dine, he was well received and was given other conditions of a similar character to submit at Hanover. He arrived there on 24 June and went on to join the court at Pyrmont.[3]

But the issues at stake were too important to allow of this being the end. A pitched battle ensued at Hanover between Stanhope and Whitworth and the German ministers, and the former, strongly supported by the French ambassador, Count Senneterre, gained the day. It was decided to comply with most of the conditions demanded. Stanhope, acknowledging to Dubois the services of Senneterre, expressed great regret that Whitworth had had to come back from Berlin, in view of the importance attached at Paris to an agreement with Prussia at any cost in order to defeat the schemes of Alberoni, but called to mind the difficulty of getting him sent there at all. The Hanoverians, he said, had argued that, in view of the king of Prussia's positive declaration that he would in no case take action against the tsar, a treaty with him would only bind the king of England, leaving the other free to mock him when he pleased. Against them had been used the arguments suggested by Dubois, for instance, that a treaty signed with the king of

[1] In Frederick William's own words : " Soll mich der König von Polen darum requirieren, dass ich mit ihm allianz mache, zum andern soll mir der König August déclaration und réparation solennelle und révocation des Fraustädter Briefs thun, und hernach soll er mir versprechen, mich zu dem rühigen Possess vom Elbinger Territorium zu lassen, ohne das Geld wiederzugeben, . . . zum letzten Draheim, Tempelburg, Lauenburg, Bütow, Preussen, dass die von nun und ewig von der Krone Polens an das Haus Brandenburg cedirt werden, sonder Anspruch zu machen, . . . und keine Erbhuldigung (in Preussen) prätendiren mit gehuldigt zu werden " (to Ilgen, 16 June, Droysen, p. 262 note). Elbing and Draheim, Whitworth tells us, were mortgaged to the king of Prussia, the former for 400,000 crowns ; Lauenburg and Bütow he held in fief from the republic.

[2] See Solov'ev, Book XVII. chap. iii. Later he gives further particulars about Golovkin's conversations with Ilgen. Frederick William, he says, wanted the tsar to hasten peace with Sweden by giving up Livonia, and refused to enter into hostile action against Sweden.

[3] The above from Whitworth's despatches, 13 to 20 June. Droysen (p. 263) attributes his return to the question of the three villages, and emphasizes this and the part taken by Heusch as evidence of Bernstorff's influence. But greater importance was attached to the Polish question.

Craggs wrote to Stanhope, 17 June o.s., " The treaty being broke off, what I write to your lordship is not very material, but I am extremely glad Mr. Whitworth did go to Berlin, since it not only shews us what we may depend upon from that Court, but shews all the world that the King neglected nothing to be well with them, a point as necessary as any for his Majesty's service at home " (R. O. Regencies 58).

Prussia, even though of no solid foundation, would impose for a time upon the enemies both of king George and of France. It might be expected, Stanhope went on, that a coolness might result between the king of Prussia and the tsar which could be worked upon and might draw the former further than he intended. Now Whitworth was returning to Berlin and could hardly fail of success, unless a treaty with the tsar also were insisted upon. Ilgen had proposed an open treaty including him, and a secret one leaving him out.[1] This could not be thought of, but what the king of Prussia desired to hide from the tsar might be put into secret articles.[2]

Whitworth was back at Berlin on 14 July. Rottembourg and Heusch told him that he had come very opportunely, as reports brought by Count Dohna from Vienna had greatly influenced the court. The king had said that he was ready to sign the treaty, provided only that assurances were given him that he should not be obliged to take action against the tsar. He now told Whitworth that he regarded the treaty as made and would observe it exactly. Sounded by Knyphausen on the subject of the tsar, Whitworth said that he must restore the vessels captured, let the sailors go,[3] cease his intrigues with the emissaries of the Pretender and break off the Åland conferences, before any engagements could be made with him. Rottembourg, he reported, was as zealous as before, was being pressed from Paris to do his best, agreed with the proposal for a French guarantee of the treaties, and had asked for full powers to sign it.[4]

Stanhope advocated a French guarantee of the treaties in his letter to Dubois cited. The king of Prussia, he said, having nothing more at heart than to keep Stettin, such a guarantee would deprive him of this pretext for reliance upon the tsar and would secure the principal aim of the negotiation. "Une pareille garantie donnée par la France formeroit, ce me semble, un noeud entre Elle, l'Angleterre, la Prusse et l'Electorat de Hanover, dont les suites heureuses pourroient s'étendre même au-delà de la Pacification du Nord." But Stair's efforts to obtain the guarantee were met by the argument that it could only be given after the conclusion of the treaties, lest in the event of their failure cause of complaint should be given to Sweden needlessly. He admitted the plea, but asked that the necessary full powers to sign should be sent to Rottembourg, in order that the treaties might not be hung up on this point,

[1] "They honestly offer to cheat him," Whitworth wrote on this, "but the way is too base, nor are they to be trusted on any account."

[2] Stanhope to Dubois, 2 July o.s., R. O. France 164.

[3] Efforts were being made to recall the British sailors in the tsar's service.

[4] Whitworth, 10 to 18 July.

and Dubois undertook that this should be done. In a private despatch (after expressing suspicions of intrigue between the courts of France and Spain) Stair wrote that there appeared to be a belief at Paris, derived from De la Marck's statements, that the king of Prussia only wanted a mortgage of Stettin with a much smaller district than that appointed to him, and that Dubois had complained that the cession proposed made a peace difficult and impracticable for Sweden. He had replied that if the king of Prussia would not accept the treaty for the cession of the larger territory he certainly would not for a mortgage of the smaller. Also that the king of England had assented to the former on account of the engagements in regard to Stettin entered into by the regent. Dubois passionately denying the existence of any such engagements, Stair replied that in that case the treaties might be let fall, whereupon Dubois, he says, flew into as great a passion on the other side, declaiming for half-an-hour in favour of them. A week later (27 July) he wrote that the regent confessed to the utility of the Prussian treaties to break up the dangerous league which might be formed in the north; to encourage their being made, he would engage to furnish to Prussia subsidies for defence equal to those agreed to by the king of England and to guarantee the Prussian acquisitions as soon as the peace ceding them was made with Sweden. Stair answered that in this way the guarantee would be refused instead of given, and the treaties would not be concluded. The regent objected that by giving the guarantee he would lose his status of mediator and become a party against Sweden, besides which, that the king of Prussia might inform the tsar of it and the latter make use of the information for his own advantage. Whereto Stair replied that the guarantee might be kept secret, and the regent then said that, sooner than let the treaty fall, he would give it on that condition.[1]

On 15 July there came to Berlin a special envoy from St. Petersburg in the person of Count Tolstoi. A letter from the tsar had already been received signifying that a treaty made with the king of England without his inclusion would be regarded as a rupture of his own with the king of Prussia, and that the intention of the former was only to separate them and thereafter to sacrifice the

[1] To Robethon Stair wrote: the king of Prussia must be restrained by treaty, yet, supposing that this were accomplished, the demand for the cession of Stettin would make an agreement with Sweden almost impracticable, nor would Denmark be suited, because the king of Prussia, after the fall of Tönning, had guaranteed to the young duke of Holstein-Gottorp Sleswick as well as Holstein. "Voilà bien des dangers à prendre un parti, de n'en point prendre pourroit être et dangereux et déshonorable." On the whole, an understanding with Prussia was the most pressing, and its negotiation would gain time, while it would please France and satisfy her of British good faith (22 July, B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 231, f. 320).

latter for his own advantage.[1] Tolstoi emphasized this, while on the other hand, says Whitworth, he offered "blancs signés" to be filled in with any conditions required. The tsar, he told Ilgen, would engage to have no correspondence with the Jacobites, to hear no proposals from Spain, to do nothing against the Quadruple Alliance nor anything to disturb the emperor or the empire, and to content all British grievances; he would not even insist upon a guarantee of his conquests. Whereas, if he were forced to break off his friendship, he would not want means to make his anger felt. Ilgen argued persistently in his favour, Whitworth rebutted, and at the end put the question, would the king of Prussia go on or not? Ilgen said that he would, even at the cost of the tsar's friendship, but it was very hard on him, and he would be obliged to ask for a guarantee of Prussia proper against the tsar's attack. That, he said, would engage the king of England in fresh negotiations, embarrassment and expense, whereas some complaisance shown would bring the tsar to allow anything that was desired. His help would be required, if Sweden must be reduced by force of arms, and the king of Prussia would even agree to take action against him, if he proved false. The conclusion was that Ilgen must report that nothing could be done for the tsar till after the treaties were signed, when the good offices of the king of Prussia could be employed with better grace and greater efficacy. The guarantee of Prussia proper Whitworth thought reasonable under equal reciprocal conditions, and agreed to propose it. He ended this long despatch by mentioning that Tolstoi had given in a copy of the Vienna treaty, that the Prussian Mardefeld had been admitted to the Åland conferences, and that he would himself press on his business, though foreseeing intrigues designed to gain time, particularly in regard to the convention about the three villages.[2] Stanhope in reply expressed willingness to put forward the reciprocal guarantee, but observed that the greater the fear of the tsar in this direction the more advisable it was to have the friendship of the republic and king of Poland.[3]

At length on 22 July Whitworth received from the king of Prussia the following letter, written in his own hand :—

"Vous pouvez mander au Roy vôtre Maître que je signeray le dit traitté, en donnant la déclaration comme Ilgen vous l'a dit. Je vous félicite que vous avez procuré l'amitié entre le Roy et Moy. Je suis persuadé que les

[1] 31 May o.s., received 30 June n.s. Frederick William noted to this: "Ich werde fest halten und nicht mit England schliessen sonder Zaar. Sollen an König von England schreiben, dass der Zaar die Freundschaft Englands suchet; ich Mediator sein" (Droysen, p. 264).

[2] 18 July.

[3] 23 July.

suites d'amitié deviendront de jour en jour plus stables et solides, et que jamais point d'incidents entre le Roy et Moy viendront. Grâces à Dieu que l'affaire est faite." [1]

The same day at a dinner at Charlottenburg Rottembourg announced that he had orders to give a French guarantee for Bremen and Verden and Stettin. The Russian ministers were present, and everyone somewhat embarrassed. On his return Whitworth sent word that fresh difficulties raised by Ilgen in the morning had been withdrawn, that the instruments were being put into form, that the king was about to send an envoy to St. Petersburg to justify his conduct, and that it was only asked that the treaties should be kept secret for a time. Stanhope replied with congratulations, and said that orders now going to Stockholm would probably result in the success of the negotiations there. If a treaty with Sweden were signed before those with Prussia, it would be difficult to obtain the cession of Stettin.[2]

But suddenly everything was again upset. News from Stockholm, a strong Hanoverian protest against the restoration of Schwerin to the duke of Mecklenburg, as ordered by the emperor, reports of misrepresentation at Vienna by George's German ministers, and interviews of Court-Marshal Loss, who had arrived from Dresden, with Whitworth and Tolstoi roused distrust and disquietude. Frederick William, conscious of having acted against his better judgment, committed to paper and to his archives, as a monition to his descendants to keep the friends they had and to beware of false ones, a violent outburst against England and Austria.[3] Opportunity to recant was afforded by the convention about the three villages. This had been referred to Grumbkow's department, and now there issued thence a report condemning it.[4] Heusch declined to accept a fresh draft handed in, saying that it must be sent to Hanover. "Voicy, my Lord," wrote Whitworth, "le véritable crise de nôtre affaire." [5]

Stanhope replied that he knew nothing of the matter himself, it concerned the electoral ministers. The treaties, he said, must be signed promptly, or it would be too late to do anything for Prussia at Stockholm. The queen of Sweden had agreed to cede Bremen and Verden and to renew the British treaty on the best

[1] 21 July, enclosed in Whitworth's of next day.

[2] 27 July.

[3] For this and other of Frederick William's ebullitions, see Droysen, pp. 266–68. Yet he wrote: "wenn ich nicht schliesse, so bin ich überzeugt, werden sie mir schelmischer Weise auf den Hals fallen."

[4] According to Whitworth, Grumbkow avowed "qu'il l'avoit bien sallée, et que nous trouverions des embarras où nous ne les attendions plus. Il n'a que trop bien tenu sa parole; c'est la première fois qu'on l'en ait pu accuser" (25 July).

[5] Ibid.

terms that could be desired. The despatches had been shown to the Prussian minister Wallenrodt, and his master should judge whether the cession of Stettin and its dependencies would not be greatly advanced by his signing.[1]

But not only the convention stood in the way, a fresh draft of the Polish article was submitted from which, says Whitworth, everything essential was left out. It required a prior agreement with the king of Poland upon northern and Polish affairs and his recognition of the king of Prussia's title, as it had been recognized by the emperor and other crowns. Whitworth flatly refused it. Another demand was that king George should oblige himself, both as king and as elector, to come to the king of Prussia's aid, if he were attacked in any of his dominions, with as many ships and men as should be necessary. Against this Whitworth required, as before, a reciprocal undertaking in case the tsar, in his resentment, should arrest British subjects or their ships or effects. He forwarded the proposals to Hanover on 29 July, expressing the opinion that matters were being purposely delayed to see the results of the Russian attack on Sweden and of the Åland conferences.[2] He advised the conclusion of terms with Sweden in order to break off those conferences; "alors vous aurez cette Cour." Next day he had another long discussion with Ilgen and then an audience of the king. As the result he wrote that the treaty would be signed, but that, while the secret article guaranteeing Prussia was absolutely necessary, a reciprocal guarantee could only be given in general terms. In the convention about the villages express stipulations for freedom of passage and communication and against the construction of lines or fortifications would be insisted upon. The king had been to inspect the place himself and was convinced of the necessity of this. Other points might be accommodated, but this was essential.[3] After the audience Knyphausen came to say that, as soon as the treaties were signed, a little complaisance towards the king would entirely restore his confidence.[4]

The Prussian envoy designated for St. Petersburg was privy

[1] 30 July.

[2] Such delay was actually advised by Ilgen, see Droysen, p. 269.

[3] "Ich signiere nicht eher, als bis diese Punkte abgemacht sind," wrote Frederick William (Droysen, p. 270).

[4] Whitworth, 29 July to 1 Aug. He deplored the difficulties that were being made. "On aura de la peine à s'imaginer que les petites chicanes touchant la Convention ayent pu arrêter un traité de cette conséquence." He believed the king to be sincere, but suspected the ministers. Rottembourg, he said, was pressing him earnestly for concession, if only to remove pretexts for further delay. "On pourra facilement se dédommager ailleurs." Concession would remove the king of Prussia's "prévention" for the tsar. Stanhope wished the Elbe islands, now being fortified by the Hanoverians in haste, at the bottom of the sea (Droysen, p. 269).

councillor von Schlippenbach. His mission, Whitworth wrote (29 July), was an indication that the king of Prussia intended to sign the treaties. He was instructed to give full explanations and assurances and to say that the proposed treaties would serve Russia by taking away the basis of Polish intrigue.[1]

On 5 August Stanhope was able to announce to Whitworth further concessions on the part of Hanover. The king, he said, was so desirous to conclude the treaties, that in spite of his surprise and displeasure at the new demands he consented to them and moreover, in the convention about the three villages, to the two principal conditions asked and to all that was not definitely incompatible with his honour. The Prussians, said Stanhope, could not now refuse to sign the treaties and Whitworth must insist upon their doing so, because the course of the negotiations in Sweden depended thereon. If they were not signed within eight days he must break off and take his leave. But if successful he might then hear what Tolstoi had to say, telling him that the mediation of Great Britain had been offered at Stockholm and asking him whether it would be accepted by the tsar.

So much Stanhope had written, when there arrived from Stockholm the signed convention with Hanover ceding Bremen and Verden in return for British naval succour, which Bassewitz and Carteret, as will be seen in the next chapter, had obtained. Enclosing a copy of it to Whitworth Stanhope said that the king's desire to come to terms with Prussia was not lessened thereby, and that the ratification would be delayed till that king's resolution was known. He must perceive the advantage of having Stettin guaranteed to him by Great Britain, France, Hanover, and later by the emperor. His undertakings were nominal, those of the king of England serious. An immediate answer must be given and only three days from receipt of the present despatch could be allowed for it.

The value of the concessions and the danger of further postponement were appreciated at Berlin. Ilgen confessed that it would be very unfortunate if the present opportunity of getting out of the war and keeping Stettin were lost. But still there was delay, for Frederick William still held by his word given to the tsar not to conclude peace without him.[2] Besides, he was ill of dysentery at Wusterhausen and unable to attend to business for some days. However, after a seven-hours' discussion on 12 August the treaties and separate articles were settled with the ministers, and two days

[1] Droysen, p. 269.

[2] "Leur plus grande difficulté parut être la parole du Roy de Prusse tant de fois donnée au Czar, et renouvellée même en dernier lieu, de ne pas conclure sa Paix sans luy" (Whitworth, 8 Aug.).

later, with certain modifications, they were signed and ratified by the king, excepting the separate article concerning the king of Poland, which was postponed. Frederick William still held " dass des Königs von Polen Maximen und Politik hauptsächlich wider Uns und zum Ruin unseres Hauses eingerichtet sind, daran ist kein Zweifel, und haben wir gar zu klare Proben in Händen." [1]

But the Swedish convention with Hanover said nothing about a cession of Stettin; Carteret had been specially warned not to concern himself with Prussian interests, and the Swedes had no thought of it. In order that it might appear that the cession had been agreed upon with Prussia before the Swedish convention was received, Whitworth asked that the treaties might be ante-dated 4 August, on the plea that they would have been signed then, had not the king been ill. This was extremely repugnant to the Prussian ministers, for it was just at that time, he says, that they were giving the Russians the strongest promises not to conclude peace without them. But considerations of expediency prevailed.[2] It was only asked that secrecy should be maintained for a time, in order that the engagements with the tsar might not be too suddenly repudiated.

Another piece of cleverness, or of chicanery, on Whitworth's part was his avoidance of an engagement to settle the Prussian arrears. Although, as instructed, he had employed the prospect of their payment to further his other work, now he pointed out that such an engagement would give the appearance of the treaties having been bought, and so postponed this difficult matter.

[1] Droysen, p. 279. He gives (pp. 273–74) the following account of what occurred. The king refused to sign the Polish article unless an undertaking were given that George would treat with the tsar. " Ich bleibe bei meiner Resolution so fest wie Stahl und Eisen," he wrote. Whitworth threatened that everything should be broken off and all engagements cancelled, said that in the treaty with Sweden the cession of Stettin was stipulated, and gave in a written declaration that as soon as the treaty was signed his master would enter into negotiation with the tsar. Then the king signed all but the article named, throwing the responsibility on his ministers: " ich bin krank und ich thue es ausser Verantwortung; verliere ich den Zaaren und komme unter Englands Joch und des Kaisers Joch, so werde ich die Herren Minister in grosse Verantwortung ziehen." This reached the ministers just after they had signed. They wrote to the king in consternation that they had done nothing without his orders and that the documents had been handed over; if the king would not have the Hanoverian alliance, for God's sake let him disavow it, and they would gladly take the blame. But no reply came.

If Whitworth really made the above statement about Stettin, it was untrue; nothing about the cession was said in the Hanoverian convention with Sweden, it was reserved for the later British convention.

[2] " La plus grande utilité l'a emporté, et Monsr. de Ilgen travaille déjà dignement à trouver des prétextes pour colorer cette conduite, de sorte, My Lord, qu'il n'est pas à doubter que nous n'ayons le but proposé pour cette négotiation sans trop paroître l'avoir affecté " (Whitworth, 14 Aug.).

The British treaty [1] provided that the two kings should work in concert to secure their respective interests in the treaties to be made with Sweden, and that they would not make peace unless commerce in the Baltic were restored to the same footing as before the rupture, whoever might hold the ports. The king of Prussia guaranteed the protestant succession and promised to send to Great Britain, if required, an auxiliary force of 6,000 infantry or their equivalent in money, as desired, conditions being specified as to their transport, maintenance and pay. The king of England engaged to guarantee the Prusso-Hanoverian treaty of even date and to furnish for the help of Prussia, over and above his engagements under that treaty, 6,000 infantry paid by Great Britain, or their value in money at the rate of 10,000 Dutch florins for 1,000 men per month, or men-of-war up to 320 guns. A separate and secret article provided against the case of the king of Prussia, in consequence of the present treaties, being attacked in Prussia or in Pomerania. If that happened, the king of England would send him such succour, beyond that already specified, as should be sufficient to maintain him and repair his wrongs. And the king of Prussia undertook in return to maintain the present treaties against any who should attack the king of England to their prejudice, and to aid him in Great Britain or Germany in like manner.

The Hanoverian treaty [2] confirmed that of 1715 in regard to the provinces gained from Sweden and mutual succour. It specially guaranteed possession of those provinces, stipulating joint measures at the peace to obtain their cession. The king of Prussia undertook to satisfy the fifth article of 1715 and to hand over the documents of cession and send the necessary orders in regard to the three villages at the latest at the time of ratification of the present treaty. Not till this was done should the guarantees beforementioned take effect. The two kings engaged to influence the queen of Sweden towards peace, to send plenipotentiaries to the congress of Brunswick to treat of it, and to do all they could to conclude preliminaries ; the cessions named to be essential. They would make every effort in common to obtain the emperor's consent, and, to facilitate this, the king of Prussia declared that he had never taken with the tsar engagements contrary or prejudicial to the interests of the emperor or the empire, and never would. To re-establish a general peace in the north, so very necessary, the two kings agreed to concert measures with all their allies and even with neutral powers who could be of help, and to leave nothing undone

[1] Original, with ratification by the king of Prussia, 15 Sept., R. O. Treaties 410 ; copies, Treaty Papers 59.

[2] Copies, translations and drafts, R. O. Treaty Papers 59.

to attain so salutary an end. There were three separate and secret articles. The second was that of the British treaty, the first the Polish. The king of Prussia promised not to trouble the king of Poland in the peaceable possession of his crown or of his estates in Germany nor to do anything against the rights of the republic, provided that the latter undertook to refrain from any attempt against his incontestable right to the sovereignty of Prussia proper. When the king of Poland had given a satisfactory explanation of his Fraustadt letter, which impugned that sovereignty, then the king of Prussia would enter into negotiations with him to re-establish perfect intelligence. The king of England undertook to do all he could with the king and republic of Poland to obtain their recognition of the Prussian kingship, as it was recognized by the emperor and other crowns. The third separate and secret article arranged that the two kings would agree upon a sum of money to be paid to Sweden to facilitate a peace.

Ranke [1] allows that the British treaty was undeniably advantageous to Prussia. The newly won provinces were guaranteed by England, while the protestant succession was a Prussian interest. He notes the saying of Stanhope that the treaty would be popular in England, because the fine fleet of Great Britain and the fine army of Prussia could work together. Sunderland, congratulating on the conclusion of the treaties, wrote to Stanhope: "The King is really now master of affairs in the North, and you will most justly have the honour of being the projector and finisher of the peace both in North and South." [2]

But all was not yet in accord. The Hanoverians were reluctant to destroy their fortifications on the Elbe; to do so would cost more, they said, than their construction. Also they wanted to evade the sixth article of their treaty, which stipulated that neither party should make peace with Sweden unless the cessions were made. Orders were sent to Heusch on 21 August to declare that this article could not be executed "selon le pied de la lettre." Whitworth, to whom in consequence of Heusch's illness [3] it fell to conduct his business, protested to Stanhope in strong terms. These and other matters drew from Frederick William further ebullitions of wrath. Rather than yield about the fortifications he would make war on Hanover, he said; to see a few hundred Hanoverian villages in flames would make him well again. The treaty would kill him; it was that that had made him ill.[4] Whitworth urged

[1] *Preussische Geschichte*, V. 28.

[2] 14 Aug. o.s., Mahon. And in similar language Craggs to Whitworth, congratulating him, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 53.

[3] He died of the prevailing epidemic of dysentery on 2 Sept.

[4] Droysen, pp. 276–77.

strongly that all possible complaisance, even in small matters, should be shown him.[1]

After the treaties were signed Whitworth obeyed his instructions to offer king George's mediation to the Russian ministers. He sought out Tolstoi, who replied to his overtures in general terms, alleging the change of circumstances since previous proposals of the kind had been made and his want of suitable instructions. Whitworth was equally guarded, adroitly parrying the searching questions put to him. But the offer, he says, gave much satisfaction to the Prussians,[2] and indeed it tended to counteract their suspicions of George's good faith.

A clause requiring the cession of Stettin was sent to Carteret for insertion in the British preliminary convention with Sweden, on which he was now at work. He was authorized to name as the price to be paid by Prussia two million crowns, twice as much as George had agreed to pay for Bremen and Verden. Stanhope wrote to Whitworth that, if the Swedes were so unwise as to refuse the cession, and the king in consequence failed to obtain finally that of Bremen and Verden, he looked to the friendship of the king of Prussia to compensate him. So long as they remained closely united, no one would be bold enough to attempt to deprive them.[3]

King George's action was approved at Berlin, except in regard to the price to be paid for Stettin. Ilgen thought it better to sound the king on what should be done, if the Swedes insisted, and that in any case the proposition should come from them. But when Frederick William was informed, he said that he would not pay more than half a million crowns. Whitworth suggested that Carteret might sign the condition *sub spe rati*,[4] although he would, he said, be much embarrassed by the offer, authorized by Mardefeld contrary to orders, to hold Stettin under a mortgage for the sum of four million crowns.[5] If the Swedes accepted that offer, it must, Whitworth supposed, hold good in spite of the new treaties. The

[1] 17 Aug. He says, " Le Czar ne l'a pas gagné par des avantages solides, mais par des caresses et petites complaisences, et on voit combien de peine il coûte de le retirer de ces liaisons." In a private letter he wrote : " This Prince is violent in his temper, and sower'd by long Picques, and will be apt to relapse and repine at every little turn, if he is not used with some gentleness, till he be confirm'd in the good way and return'd to the former confidence he had in his Majesty. He is still suspicious that our friendship is not sincere," etc. The king might do well " to write a short letter in his own hand with a few oblidging fatherly expressions," as though to a " returning prodigal."

[2] 17 Aug.

[3] 19 Aug.

[4] " De cette manière tout le désagrément seroit pour le compte de la Suède, et cependant on en auroit l'effet," for no doubt the king of Prussia would yield, if obliged.

[5] I.e. in Osterman's ultimatum, see p. 345.

great point was to gain time till the Russians, who had invaded Sweden, had withdrawn.[1]

Stanhope replied to Whitworth on 31 August : [2] " Vous pouvez compter que la Suède n'aura de nous ni un vaisseau ni un sol sans qu'elle fasse au Roy de Prusse les cessions qui luy sont promises par nôtre traitté." Carteret had positive orders on this head. If he found it possible to leave the sum blank there would be time to concert it with the king of Prussia, but, if the Swedes refused the cession for less than two million crowns, it was not to be expected that he would therefore bear ill-will, especially as it was known that he had offered the late king of Sweden that sum for a mortgage only. And it appeared from what Wallenrodt said that the amount would not cause difficulty.

Acceptance of the terms prescribed was obtained by Carteret in consequence of what is related in the next chapter. His success was known by 11 September. Stanhope then wrote to Berlin that the action taken must be approved there, the king having done everything possible at the risk of spoiling his own business. Whitworth must obtain a formal acceptance of the conditions signed and of the French guarantee of the Prussian treaties, in which it was to be hoped that Rottembourg would not hesitate to specify the provinces ceded, as desired. That part of Carteret's despatches, Stanhope said, which did not concern the Prussians, must not be communicated, nor the Swedish convention be published until the mention of French and imperial mediation had been inserted in it. In consequence of the difficulties made as to granting a passport for a Prussian minister the king would send him on a frigate to Ystad under his own pass. As to the sums of money required from Prussia, they had been greatly diminished by the free expenditure of Carteret and Bassewitz,[3] which need not have been incurred for the king's business only.

In answer to this Whitworth was able to signify the king of Prussia's consent to pay the money and 110,000 crowns for "presents" too,[4] and that he had signed a copy of the Stettin article.[5]

[1] " Alors leur négotiation languira d'elle même, et la Prusse sera plus entre les mains de Sa Majesté." And again : " Si les Moscovites sont obligés à se retirer sans conclure leur traité, tout le reste n'aura guère d'effet icy." The above from Whitworth's despatches of 22 to 29 Aug.

[2] R. O. Regencies 2.

[3] In bribery of the Swedish senators, see p. 356.

[4] He enclosed letters of exchange for this sum with his despatch of 17 Sept. At the Record Office (Hamburg 99) is a holograph note from Carteret, dated Stockholm, 24 Sept. o.s., to Michael David, the king's agent at Hamburg, desiring him to pay to James Cooke (the court of Sweden's banker) " on this my first bill of exchange . . . 109633⅓ dollars Lüneburg currency in new drittels."

[5] " As a more authentick demonstration " of his gratitude, says Stanhope, the king of Prussia signed this article with his own hand, " which I have now by me "

So the Danes, he said, were too late [1] and the Russians defeated. "La grande affaire étoit d'avoir l'article de la Suède approuvé." Knyphausen had now revealed the conclusion of the Prussian treaties to Tolstoi and Golovkin, and was pleased thereat, as their haughty bearing had mortified him. It was hoped that Tolstoi would go, as he had threatened. In fact the whole court declared their only apprehension to be that Admiral Norris, (whose commission to drive the Russian fleet away from Sweden had procured the signature of the convention), would be too late to catch it.[2]

Ratifications of the Hanoverian treaty with Prussia and of the convention about the three villages had reached Berlin on 20 and 21 August. But the Prussians desired to postpone exchange till those of the British treaty arrived from England. There was delay also about the French guarantee, though Rottembourg had received full powers to sign it. Whitworth had written that the Prussians did not seem keen in the matter, and that both they and Rottembourg desired it to be kept secret, which would hardly be possible for long.[3] But he would press the matter on, he wrote on 2 September, whether with the ministers or without them. Stanhope expressed surprise that difficulties should be raised, and hoped that when Rottembourg returned to Berlin nothing further would be heard about them. In any case Whitworth must sign with him the guarantee for Bremen and Verden; this was too important for the king to run the risk of losing it by delay.[4]

The French guarantee was duly signed by Rottembourg on his return, but post-dated 23 September [5] and not delivered till the 30th, when the ratifications of the treaties, after the return of the acts of cession in respect of the three villages from Hanover approved, were at last exchanged.[6] In its last form of all, of a later date, it guaranteed the duchy of Bremen and principality of Verden to Hanover, and Stettin and the district between the Oder and Peene with the isles of Usedom and Wollin to Prussia, according to the

(to Norris, 22 Sept., B. M. Add. MSS. 28146). The autograph is preserved among the papers at the Record Office. Frederick William wrote (23 Sept.): "Mein Frieden ist gemacht mit Schweden, ich darfs aber nit sagen, denn ich mir schäme. Ich muss Schweden 2 Millionen, an die Herren Reichsräthe 120,000 Thlr, und anno 1722 muss alles bezahlt sein. Die conditions sein stark, aber Stettin bis an die Peene ist auch gut" (Erdmannsdörffer, II. 352, note).

[1] General Meyer arrived from Copenhagen with proposals on 14 Sept. Whitworth reported him very much put out of countenance, when he was told plainly that the king had made his agreement with Sweden, that the king of Denmark had better do the same, and that if he got out of the war, keeping Sleswick, he would be lucky.

[2] 14 to 17 Sept.

[3] 17 and 19 Aug.

[4] 31 Aug.

[5] Whitworth, 17 Sept.

[6] The Polish article was included (Whitworth, 30 Sept.).

stipulations of the treaties, so far as they contained nothing contrary to those of Utrecht and Amsterdam. If either monarch were troubled in the said dominions the king of France undertook to interpose his good offices and to furnish the same succour that they had promised each other reciprocally under the treaties.[1]

The whole honour, said Whitworth (17 Sept.), of "laying the plan" and carrying it through was due to Stanhope. The vacillation and distress of mind of the king of Prussia had been terrible, but Knyphausen was "an admirable doctor for a queasy conscience." Now he was thoroughly pleased, "and the good Queen in the fulness of her joy." Knyphausen was greatly to be commended.[2] Two days later Whitworth saw letters from the king full of gratitude for his father-in-law's good offices, one of them to Stanhope expressing strong approval and inviting him to Berlin.[3]

The last delays were attributed by Whitworth to a secret negotiation between the Prussian and Russian ministers concerning Poland, which came to light by a curious accident. He desired from Stanhope absolute secrecy about it, lest Rottembourg, his informant, should be compromised and so be no longer useful. Ilgen had sent to Berlin from his country-seat two packets, the one for Golovkin, the other for Rottembourg. His servant delivered them by mistake at the wrong addresses. Rottembourg, in bed and half asleep, opening his, found it to contain the draft of a treaty with Russia. He closed the packet again and sent it to Golovkin. Ilgen, on hearing of the accident, came in haste to Berlin and endeavoured to pledge Rottembourg to secrecy. The count replied that the only way was for Ilgen to confide in him entirely and show him the draft; if it contained anything against the king of England he must, by his instructions, inform Whitworth. Ilgen then explained to him the whole, saying that the sole intention was to pacify the king against the insinuations of the prince of Anhalt and others, namely, that the new treaties were only intended to deceive and that he would be ruined if he separated himself from the tsar. The proposed treaty, he said, really signified nothing. He showed Rottembourg the draft, marked all over in the king's hand, and also copies of the four treaties between Russia and Prussia at present existing, three no

[1] Copy in the form dated 23 Sept., R. O. Treaty Papers 27. The treaty of Amsterdam was substituted afterwards for the Triple and Quadruple Alliances, in which, it was objected, Prussia had no part (Whitworth to Craggs, 30 Sept.).

[2] "He has very great credit here, has been particularly usefull in this negotiation, and thô I am far from answering for his principles, yet he is now entirely on our side, and a little openness will fix him more. You will find him very free against the Muscovites," etc. He desired Carteret's assistance in obtaining for his court any papers which might give evidence of bad faith on the tsar's part.

[3] With Whitworth's of 19 Sept., original.

longer of force, one unratified.[1] The new one consisted of eleven articles, all concerned with Poland and designed (in Whitworth's view) to nullify the treaty of Vienna of January.[2]

Whitworth, having gained (in the usual manner) a principal subordinate of Tolstoi, learnt that the treaty was being put into Russian, but that Tolstoi thought it unnecessary and only a shadow. It had come to light, he said, on the same day that the news of the Suedo-British convention arrived, and had probably been the cause of the confusion and recalcitrance latterly exhibited.[3]

And indeed Tolstoi and Golovkin had done their best to prevent the ratification of king George's treaties. Frederick William, indeed, assured them that he had stated in writing that he would do nothing against the tsar, nor would he, while he lived, in spite of great advantages offered by the emperor and the king of England and of threats from Saxony. Ilgen said that they had received from the Russian side nothing but hard words, but from the king of England much indulgence; their ancestors, though weaker, had known how to protect themselves; they had 60,000 soldiers and were not without friends. Tolstoi thereupon asked that he might leave to report to his master the state of affairs, but Ilgen said that he must stay to hear the overtures which Whitworth was authorized to make under Prussian mediation. Tolstoi replied that he could not negotiate with king George separately from the king of Prussia, and as the two had made their alliance without the tsar his orders obliged him to go. Then Ilgen said that his court was ready to conclude a new convention with the tsar, that, namely, for guard against the king of Poland which came to light as above stated.[4]

On 14 October Whitworth had the satisfaction of notifying the departure of Tolstoi. Nor was Schlippenbach at St. Petersburg more successful in maintaining accord between his master and the tsar; it was to a great extent replaced by mutual distrust. On

[1] Namely, that of 1714, superseded; the Havelberg convention of Nov. 1716, only a protocol, and not binding; one respecting Courland, void by the Prussian marriage not having taken place; and one signed by Mardefeld, which the king of Prussia would not ratify on account of a secret article pledging him to place a large force on the frontier of Pomerania in case the emperor threatened Poland by augmenting his forces in Silesia and Bohemia. "Distinctions scholastiques," Whitworth calls these explanations.

[2] Among other articles the republic of Poland was to be prevented from acceding to that treaty, and 100,000 crowns were to be sent thither to hinder the assembly of a diet or to break it up, if assembled (extract enclosed by Whitworth). Droysen (pp. 279–80) gives the substance of the treaty, with the king of Prussia's diatribe against the king of Poland. The former was suspicious, he remarks, of king George's support of the latter.

[3] Whitworth, 17 Sept., secret.

[4] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.* There is much also about Tolstoi's doings in Whitworth's despatches.

2 November Whitworth wrote that Ilgen had returned to Tolstoi the draft treaty respecting Poland with alterations which deprived it of force and danger.

Once made, the alliance with Prussia was genuine. Her peace with Sweden was effected in due course on the lines laid down. Frederick William was separated from Peter the Great, and though he would not take up arms against him as George desired, he employed threats, if his mediation offered were not accepted. The treaties, as the Hanoverian ministers had always foreseen and emphasized, were an important addition to the various causes of complaint which in the year 1719 were alienating the old allies, Great Britain and Austria.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE PRELIMINARY CONVENTIONS WITH SWEDEN

Lord Carteret, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, reached Stockholm on 11 July 1719. His commission was to renew the treaty of 1700 with Great Britain, lately expired, to support Colonel Bassewitz in his negotiation for peace with Hanover, and to promote peace with Denmark and Prussia. Like Whitworth, he was furnished with triple instructions, principal, additional, and private.[1] The first were chiefly concerned with the promotion and protection of trade. The second expressed king George's desire for a restoration of the ancient amity, so necessary for the maintenance of the protestant religion; recalled the help formerly given by Great Britain, particularly in regard to the Neutrality Convention of 1710, "which would have protected the Swedish possessions in Germany, if the late King had not wilfully prevented it"; ascribed what had happened since to the attacks upon commerce; and offered the mediation of Great Britain, as a neutral power, for a general peace. Queen Ulrica was to be assured of personal support and of efforts to obtain the association of her husband with her in the sovereignty. Damages done to trade on either side were to be assessed and balanced. The German provinces of Sweden, it was said, were but a burden to her, and the recovery of losses "towards Finland and Livonia is the only thing every true Swede should have at heart." The friendship of the kings of Denmark, Poland and Prussia was essential to strengthen the queen's hands against the tsar and could only be obtained by their being allowed to retain their acquisitions. That he should keep Finland and Livonia, the granaries and bulwarks of Sweden, and be master in the Baltic, would be fatal. This, Carteret was told, "is a consideration of such importance to the commerce of Our subjects and even to their safety, which could not be so well provided for without the naval stores We draw from those ports, that you are to labour this point with the utmost dexterity and application." The failure on the part of Great Britain to carry

[1] R. O. King's Letters 65, of date 6 May o.s.

out the provisions of the treaty of 1700 he should impute to the exigencies of the French war and the ravages of the privateers, which might in justice be considered to have annulled the treaty. The squadrons sent to the Baltic had only been intended to protect trade; if the molestation thereof were stopped, the Swedes would have no reason to be jealous of their coming, on the contrary, if the alliance were renewed, they would be employed for the interest and security of Sweden.

The private instructions ran as follows:—

"We judge it to be of so great consequence to the trade and security of Our British Dominions as well as to the peace and tranquillity of Christendom that the Czar should not grow too powerfull in the Baltick, that if you find the Queen of Sweden and Prince of Hesse listen to Our proposals of their making peace and entring into a friendship and good correspondence with the Kings of Denmark and Poland, the King of Prussia, and other neighbouring potentates of Germany, you shall make them an offer in Our name that if the Czar refuses to conclude a peace with Sweden upon the foot of making such restitutions to that Crown as are necessary for its security and for preserving the trade in the Baltick upon the same foot as it was before the present troubles began, besides the assistance which shall be agreed upon to be given them by Us towards recovering the same by force of arms, We will employ Our utmost credit and interest with the Powers before mentioned and with Our other Allys to procure supplys from them for enabling the Swedes to bring the Czar to reason."

Carteret found himself opposed by a very strong party, headed by the chancellor, Count Cronhielm, which favoured peace with Russia.[1] On his side were the prince of Hesse and Marshal Dücker, the heads of the army. The first obstacle he encountered was Cronhielm's objection to his credentials, from which the queen's full titles were omitted. But she, moved by Bassewitz, waived the objection, granted an audience, and named commissioners to treat.[2] Carteret found that the cession of Bremen and Verden had been promised to Bassewitz upon the condition, among others, that Great Britain, in renewing the treaty of 1700, should be obliged to render help in money, troops and ships to recover what had

[1] Proposals had been made by Peter the Great at Stockholm through Brigadier Le Fort, before Carteret arrived. He asked for the immediate despatch of the new Swedish plenipotentiary Lillienstedt to the Åland isles; delay would oblige him to take measures as occasion demanded. Le Fort was answered that peace was wanted, but it must be bearable; to risk losing all would be better than to accept a bad one (Solov'ev, Book XVII. chap. iii).

[2] Count Gustavus Cronhielm, president of the chancery, Count and Marshal Charles Gustavus Dücker, Count Gustavus Adam Taube, governor of Stockholm, Count Magnus de la Gardie, president of the royal college of commerce, all four senators, and Baron Daniel Nicholas Höpken, secretary of state. The chancellor and Höpken, a very able man, might be gained over, says Carteret, by presents.

been conquered by the tsar. Upon this he requested instructions.[1] If only the tsar would give up Reval, he said, peace would certainly be made with him. He earnestly desired that the British squadron under Sir John Norris, now at Copenhagen, might be ordered up the Baltic at once, in order that the fears of a Russian invasion might be allayed.

So far Carteret had written, 3 July o.s., when Dücker and Bassewitz came to him with the news that a Russian force was embarked and would land within four miles of Stockholm. If that happened, they said, the tsar's terms must be accepted. Only the king of England could help, and that by sending his fleet on. Carteret said that the conditions offered to Bassewitz were not admissible. Dücker rejoined that, if the fleet were ordered up, they would not be insisted upon. Carteret answered that he would write to request it, if the queen would declare to that effect and finish the Hanoverian treaty. To this at an audience she consented, only insisting that a footing must be preserved by Sweden in Germany. Carteret reflected :—

" if the Muscovites land and beat the Swedish troops, there is an end of Sweden ; if the Muscovites should be beat, which is most likely, Sweden will then be soe elated, that there is an end of the King's business that way ; but if she make a peace, which is the most likely of all, Europe, especially the trading countries, will feel the consequences of the Muscovite power in the Baltick."[2]

If the news about the Russians were true, he said, resolute measures should be taken ; if it were false, for the fleet to come up would be no great matter.

The British squadron, again under the command of Sir John Norris, had arrived in Copenhagen roads on 3 July. Its departure had been delayed pending the return of ships from the Mediterranean,[2] for it had been necessary to keep a strong force on the look-out against the threatened Spanish invasion. Norris himself had cruised in the mouth of the Channel up to 18 May. Even now his command included only eleven of the line and the *Port Mahon* frigate. On the other hand it was known that twenty-two Russian men-of-war and four frigates had been got ready at Cronslot and Reval to protect the force invading Sweden.[3] The Swedes had only a few ill-equipped vessels to resist them. And

[1] " I never doubted but they would part with those Duchys, if the King would give more and engage himself to doe more for them, than they are worth."

[2] " Capt. Hardy is at length arrived with his squadron from Port Mahon, and therefore Sir John Norris is now preparing with an expedition for his voyage to the Baltic " (Craggs to Stanhope, 29 May o.s., R. O. Regencies 57).

[3] Twelve of the line sailed from Cronslot on 20 June to join the remainder at Reval (La Vie, 23 June, *Sbornik*, XL. 33–35).

it was believed that the Danes were acting in concert with the tsar and might send some ships to join him. Consequently Norris was in no condition to do what was asked of him. Stanhope wrote to him on 11 July that the only commands which could be given him at present were to protect the traders and dispose his squadron as most convenient for that purpose. He was informed by Bernstorff that a reinforcement would be sent him. And he was asked, to quote his journal, " whot force of Denmark or Sweden would be suffetiant to see the Russians ? " [1]

Peter the Great's armaments, indeed, caused much alarm. He was suspected of intending not only to invade Sweden, but to land an army at Lübeck to create disturbance in the empire in concert with Spain ; large remittances of money from Holland for his account to Hamburg and Lübeck were taken as evidence of this.[2] The Jacobites were still sanguine that he would act in their behalf.[3] And his hand continued to be heavy upon commerce ; Wich and Polwarth reported later the capture of some twenty-four British, Dutch and Danish merchantmen by a Russian squadron cruising in the latitude of Gothland.[4]

In spite of his cautious commands to Norris, Stanhope was as eager as his colleagues to see the Russian fleet destroyed. In a despatch home,[5] after expressing uncertainty about a Danish reinforcement to Norris, he went on :—

[1] B. M. Add. MSS. 28129, ff. 46, 55. Writing to Stanhope Norris said (7 July o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval) : " From what I have heard of the actions between our Country and the Dutch, or that has past to my knowledge from the happy Revolution to this time, I have not observ'd that when the force has been near equal on both sides that it has been able to make a final determination of success, and thô I would not give too much reputation to the Russians, yet in proportion to their neighbours I may be join'd with on either hand I beleive they may acquit themselves upon near an equality to them, and as the situation of the Czar's affairs is likely to be this year near his own ports, it may be conjectured that with his fleet he may have the use of a great number of gallies which in calms that attend the summer season may give him an opportunity to make an attack upon some port where it will not be in our power to prevent it."

[2] Stanhope, 7 April o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 414, Whitworth, 25 April, Holland 266. For the alarming increase of Peter's naval power, see Jefferyes, 3 April o.s., Russia 9.

[3] Stair wrote on 24 April (B. M. *Stowe MSS.* 247, f. 150): " Le Czar arme par mer et terre. Les Jacobites et leur amis de ce pais icy se flattent que cela nous regarde." Craggs enquired of him (28 April o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 30), what was thought in France of the " prodigious armaments " of the tsar ? Was it his intention to attack Sweden, or to re-instate the duke of Mecklenburg ? Perhaps *ad utrumque paratus*, according to circumstances, " but our Jacobites, who never hear of an armament in any of the four parts of the world but they believe it designed to support the Pretender, flatter themselves that the Muscovites will come here to protect the Church of England and maintain the Constitution."

[4] Wich, 21 June, R. O. Hamburg 36 ; Polwarth, 11 July.

[5] To Delafaye, 1 July o.s., R. O. Regencies 2.

"It were indeed extreamly to be wished, that he had with him a force sufficient to put himself in the way of the Russes. I am persuaded that, if he had six English ships more than he has, he might barely by shewing himself, without striking a stroak, or even declaring himself, entirely defeat all the Czar's designs and save Sweden. By the conversation I have had with Major Finbo I have reason to believe that Sr. Jn. Norris himself is of this opinion. He is extreamly satisfied with the condition and quality of the ships he has, which are very well manned. And thô I believe that even with what he has he would disengage himself without much loss from the Czar's fleet, yet the disproportion of their number is so great, that nobody can advise he should put himself in their way. And it would be a great misfortune if for want of some more ships we should lose the opportunity of awing the Czar, saving Sweden, and by giving Peace to the North, of defeating the greatest hope which is now left to Spain, that of forming a strong Allyance against us in the North. The Lords Justices will therefore consider, whether, being at present intirely free from all apprehensions at home, any reinforcements may be sent to Sr. John Norris." [1]

No Dutch men-of-war seem to have gone to the Baltic this year. Stanhope enquiring what would be done to protect commerce,[2] Whitworth had replied that Amsterdam was in favour of sending a squadron but others opposed, and that the resolution had been so long delayed that now only seven or eight ships at the most could be equipped, for want of sailors. He did not think well to press the matter publicly, but was doing his best in private conversation.[3] Dayrolle wrote: "there being two great obstacles, the advanced season and the want of money, their Admiralty declaring they are exhausted, 'tis very apparent there will be no other force this year in the Baltic than the ordinary convoy of Amsterdam, consisting of 2 or 3 men-of-war." And later that four men-of-war were ready to sail, but would probably wait for the British force.[4]

[1] Whitworth in like strain from Hanover, 11 July, expressed to Norris the hearty wish that he had four or five ships more and were "gone to take the air up the Baltick, affairs being so very ticklish. . . . The sight of an English flag well accompanied would make al your mushroom seamen of the north keep their heads in.

'Where'er thy Navy spreads her canvas wings
Homage to thee and peace to all she brings.'"

His "land-expedition," meaning his return to Berlin, would have success proportionate to that of Norris at sea (B. M. Add. MSS. 28155).

On 14 July o.s. Stanhope sent thanks for the quick despatch of the reinforcements desired: "it was a particular pleasure to his Majty. to find their Excellencys have ordered four men-of-war to join Sr. John Norris's fleet in the Baltick" (R. O. Regencies 2).

[2] 14 April o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 83.

[3] 2 May, R. O. Holland 266. Other reasons which he gave were the quarrels about the appointment of an ambassador to Sweden and the opinion that not enough power would be given to the admiral to vindicate the honour and utility of the republic.

[4] 2 and 30 May, ibid. 269.

Carteret wrote to Norris on 4 July o.s. desiring a copy of his instructions, as his own made it appear that the admiral was to obey his calls. "Nothing," he said, "keeps these people from agreeing with the Czar, but the hopes they have that we shall protect them against any invasion he shall endeavour to make upon them." The queen and prince both thought that, if Norris would come up the Baltic, the Russians would never venture out. It was of the greatest importance that he should come as far as Gothland; if he did so, the king would probably approve.[1] The best thing for the Swedes to do, Stanhope advised in a despatch of 10 July, was to fit out as many ships as possible at Carlskrona in order to try to cut off supplies from coming to the Russian army. A land-battle should be avoided, unless success were certain. Without sustenance from the fleet the force must perish of itself.[2]

When Carteret wrote again, 12 July o.s., the Swedes were in the sorest straits. The refusal of their ministers at Lofö to accept his terms had made Peter show his teeth. The whole of his fleet now lay off the Swedish coast; galleys and transports carrying some 30,000 men had entered the river of Stockholm.[3] Its passages were too well defended to allow them to come up, but the troops landed at various points to burn and pillage. General Lacy's record of destruction included two towns, Osthammar and Oregrund, and 135 villages, and the Cossacks penetrated to within a mile and a half of the capital.[4] In the south, the Danish army had crossed the frontier, Strömstad had been evacuated, Marstrand was being bombarded. Tordenskjold captured it and its fortress Karlssten on the 26th. All the ships in the harbour, seven men-of-war of from 44 to 50 guns, two frigates and a number of smaller vessels, were taken or sunk. Yet the prince of Hesse and Dücker stood out against the large majority of the senators for resistance. To defend the capital they formed a camp of 20,000 men at Tuna a few miles out.[5] The immediate effect, indeed, was the signature not of terms with Russia but of the convention with Hanover, under Carteret's written promise to send for the British fleet. "Our success,"

[1] B. M. Add. MSS. 28146; R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval. Received by Norris 10 July o.s.

[2] To Carteret, R. O. Regencies 2.

[3] De Bie says that the Russian galleys and transports carried 26,000 men, those on the war-ships making up the number to 40,000, and that the fleet was chiefly employed in stopping trade to Stockholm (*Handlingar*, XXI. 384 foll.).

[4] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*; Bacmeister, II. 149. The ravages, Carteret wrote on 8 Dec. o.s., would cost the crown a revenue of 400,000 crowns for some years, while the losses of private persons were reckoned at two million. Twenty thousand families had been burnt out of house and home. Carpenters from the British fleet had helped to set up huts. Campredon calculated the damage done at 2,351,000 rix-dollars, and so Carteret, in German crowns, 26 Jan. o.s. 1720.

[5] De Bie, *loc. cit.*, p. 384, 16 July.

he wrote, " is chiefly owing to the Czar, he at the gates of Stockholm has reasoned the best for us." No people could have behaved better than the Swedes in the present straits. The party that desired peace with the tsar was very strong, and only the courage of the prince and of Dücker prevented acceptance of his terms; " they will both dye before that should happen." Consent to the treaty had only been obtained by expectation of the king's assistance. The commissioners (apart from Dücker) were still strongly opposed to it, but they could be bought. In regard to the British treaty Carteret earnestly desired instructions, particularly as to the words " ut in Germania," which would be insisted upon strenuously, for the Swedes were determined to maintain a footing in Germany.

" Here," Carteret resumes two days later, " I was interrupted." He proceeds with a graphic account of what had happened in the interval. Höpken, bringing the queen's ratification of the treaty, had said that the senate desired a fuller explanation of the terms of Carteret's promissory paper. Then Taube came in, but as Carteret refused to discuss the matter, the two left, threatening that everything should be broken off. At another meeting in the evening a fresh document drawn up by Cronhielm and Höpken was submitted, but Carteret refused to sign it, and, though the discussions continued till five in the morning, a satisfactory form could not be fixed upon. He gave the Swedes till six o'clock to hand over the ratification. As it did not come, he went straight off to the camp, got there about noon, and was back by nine with a letter from the prince and Dücker expressing surprise that, " dans un tems que nous avons nos enemis les Russes comme dans un sac," the treaty should be delayed. Bassewitz, coming in, advised that nothing should be said about this visit to the army, as there had been great disputes and jealousies in the senate. And as Carteret learnt that that very afternoon Osterman had arrived in camp with propositions from the tsar, and as the senate would not yield, he now consented to sign a supplementary promissory paper, " which I allmost quite changed from what they offered at first, having brought it as low and made it as general and obscure as I could." He then sent off his secretary William Finch to acquaint Norris with what had been done, urging him to join the Swedish fleet and advance, and the Swedes repaired to camp to confer with Osterman.

What Carteret had promised was that the treaty of 1700 should be renewed in a form applicable to present circumstances, and that an express should at once be sent to Norris desiring him to advance with his squadron and employ it according to his instructions. The senate desired an explanation of the word " applicable." The new " papier promissoire " declared (1) that it implied nothing to

the disadvantage of Sweden or which could take away from her the advantages she might, on the model of the former treaty, expect from the new one, (2) that the 11th article of the said treaty should retain its full force, being adapted to the present situation, and (3) that the 18th article should be reproduced in such manner that it should not become useless to Sweden.

The preliminary convention with Hanover, signed on 11 July o.s. provided (1) for eternal peace and amnesty and the restoration of old friendship, (2) for the complete cession of the duchies of Bremen and Verden, as ceded to Sweden at the peace of Westphalia, with all rights and privileges appertaining, (3) that Sweden would no longer trouble British commerce, but favour and promote it as much as possible, (4) that in return the old friendship and alliance with Great Britain should be renewed, (5) that the king of England, as elector, should pay a million crowns, the first instalment, if possible, within six weeks of receipt of the queen of Sweden's ratification, (6) that the two contracting powers would send plenipotentiaries to the Brunswick congress as soon as possible to conclude a formal peace on the lines of the present preliminary treaty under the mediation and guarantee of the emperor, and that efforts should be made at the same time to conclude peace with Denmark and Poland, (7) that the king's ratification should be delivered within six weeks from date.

As has been said, there was no mention in this document of Prussia. Carteret had observed his instructions not to bring Prussian interests forward.[1] King George waited to broach the cession of Stettin until the issue of the negotiations at Berlin should be known.

Carteret could never, he says, adequately express his obligations to Dücker. "His way of acting has been noble, and it is to his courage and conduct that Sweden will owe its preservation." The situation had been most critical. "Your Lordship sees how near we were losing all in the very port." The senate had been "outrageous" in opposing the cession of the duchies, insisting that a mortgage would be sufficient. "If it was not already done, it would certainly now not be done, the fear of the Czar being almost over. . . . If our fleet does not come, I don't know what I shall be able to say, for by that promise already at once was the business done." These despatches of Carteret, as has been said, reached Hanover on 5 August.

[1] "Not that I shall speak openly against that Court, but only with coldness and indifference, when I hear it mention'd" (3 July o.s.). The warning was repeated in despatches from Stanhope of 10 and 22 July (o.s.), R. O. Regencies 2 and Sweden 24.

The coming of the British squadron was viewed by the Russians with resentment and apprehension. Veselovsky had protested in London against it, saying that it showed neglect and jealousy of his master, who suspected an intention to attack his fleet. And he renewed his efforts to rouse the merchants to a sense of their danger.[1] Craggs in reply to him accused the tsar of harbouring emissaries of the Pretender and of supporting him by treaties and expectations; the only intention, he averred, was to protect trade, with which the tsar had interfered.[2] A fortnight after Norris reached Copenhagen he had an interview with the Russian ambassador Prince Basil Dolgoruky, who asked whether he had instructions to interrupt the Russian operations against Sweden and said that a British squadron was not expected this year, that his master had given orders for a free trade, and that the object of his attack on Sweden was to force her to make peace.[3] Four days later (20 July) three Russian frigates appeared in Kjöge Bay. Count Golovin, the commander, came with Dolgoruky to Norris and delivered to him a letter from their master.[4] Premising that he was the king of England's ally in the war but that no concert had been made for the present campaign nor notice sent of the coming of the squadron, as heretofore, Peter desired from Norris, before he came near the Russian fleet or territories, a written explanation upon what account he had come and what were his orders, particularly in regard to any act of hostility or friendship. In default of an answer in writing an advance would be taken to have a hostile intention and measures would be taken accordingly. He himself, Peter declared emphatically, had never entertained any design against the king of England's interests, but only against Sweden. Norris was given also copies of Peter's manifesto justifying his invasion of Sweden,[5] couched in terms more honest than was usual in such documents, and of his last declaration of 28 June o.s. in regard to trade.[6] This referred

[1] Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*

[2] Craggs to Stanhope, 17 June o.s., R. O. Regencies 57. He accuses the Holstein minister Petkum, the "universal spy" of all the states that would employ him, of inspiring the Russian alarm. The answer given to Veselovsky on the part of the Lords Justices, 26 May o.s., was couched in threatening language: the king had always sent a squadron to the Baltic to protect his trading subjects from the violence of the Swedes; it was hoped that the tsar would not use the example of his enemies to trouble the commerce of his friends; if he did, the Lords Justices would not fail to represent the case to the king, in order that he might give the orders necessary to protect it (R. O. Foreign Entry Book 254).

[3] Norris, 7 July o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

[4] Dated on board the *Ingria* at Hango Head, 7 June o.s. The Russian original, with an English translation, B. M. Add. MSS. 28155.

[5] Ibid., and Bacmeister, III. Appendix xv. The origin of the war is referred to an affront given by the refusal of Charles XII to believe the accusation that Count Dahlberg, governor of Riga, had laid a plot against Peter's life.

[6] Copies, R. O. Foreign Ministers 52, S.P. Dom. Naval; B. M. Add. MSS. 28155.

to the previous declaration of 17 April o.s. and said that, in spite of the refusal of Sweden to allow free trade by neutrals to the tsar's ports, he, in order to show his moderation and regard for Great Britain and Holland, would grant to the merchant-ships of those nations liberty of commerce to Sweden, if provided with the proper passports and certificates and carrying no contraband of war, to wit, powder, lead, saltpetre, sulphur, hemp and naval stores, grain and salt. It was hoped that the traders would have orders so to conduct themselves that no damage should occur to them by breach of the conditions or by their own negligence.

Veselovsky again on 10 August o.s., enclosing a copy of this document, complained of the reinforcement sent to Norris.[1] In reply Craggs wrote to him on behalf of the Lords Justices :

" Que chaque souverain est en droit d'employer ainsi qu'il trouve à propos ses troupes et ses vaisseaux, et sur ce principe on n'a point été demander au Czar quelles veues il avoit en faisant sortir de ses ports la flotte et l'armée si nombreuses qu'il a maintenant sur la Mer Baltique ; mais qu'on ne peut être surpris de cette demande de sa Majesté Czarienne après la lettre qu'Elle a écrite au Chevalier Norris, luy prescrivant les bornes jusqu'où il pouvoit s'avancer. Les Rois de la Grande Bretagne ne sont point accoutumés a recevoir des pareils complimens, et leurs Amiraux ne reçoivent point d'ordres d'aucun Prince Etranger." [2]

Norris in reply to Peter's letter said that he had himself spoken to Veselovsky about his coming with a squadron to protect trade and cultivate a good understanding with the king's allies, so that it must have been known. With the greatest submission he must express surprise at the apprehension of discord between the king his master and the tsar. He had sent on the letter to Hanover. If the tsar would send to the king, he would be satisfied of the intention to preserve the ancient amity.[3]

Carteret's despatch reached Norris on 1 August. He received also a memorandum from Baron " Claes " Sparre, the Swedish admiral-in-chief, stating that he had the queen's orders to place his ships under Norris's command but had ready only four of the line and two frigates, and that provisions were very scarce. He requested Norris to send a frigate to Hanö and a boat into Carlskrona, upon which the ships would come out, and informed him of the signals which would be used.[4] Another letter was from Craggs of 7 July o.s. intimating that orders had with difficulty been

[1] R. O. Foreign Ministers 52, Foreign Entry Book 254.

[2] 13 Aug. o.s., ibid. Similarly Polwarth, 22 July : " It will be somewhat new if the British fleet must not enter the Baltick without leave from the Czar."

[3] R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

[4] B. M. Add. MSS. 28155, original.

obtained for a reinforcement of four ships to be sent, and that one or two more might be sent later. "I hope to hear," he wrote, "you have joined some other squadron than your own, or that you have not met with the Czar's fleet, for fear their superiority should make them sawcy." [1]

Meanwhile Stanhope was pressing for aid to Sweden from France. The extreme embarrassment of affairs, he wrote to Dubois (31 July), would be seen from Carteret's despatches communicated. The British squadron would be sent forward, if the Swedes could join it in sufficient strength. Would the Danes do so, there would be nothing to fear. But their concurrence had been lost through deference to French insistence upon their restoring Stralsund and Rügen. Their present conduct had the same effect as though they were leagued with the tsar, whether they were so or not. The fear was that the Swedes might be obliged to give in before Norris could come to their assistance. They must be encouraged to hold firm "jusqu'à ce que nous ayons combatu la flotte Russe." But they were in extreme want, not only of money but of food. Assurances of succour might sustain them, and particularly the promise of it from France, if only of good offices and subsidies. "Vous vous êtes cru obligé en honneur à tout faire pour luy conserver un pied dans l'Empire. À plus forte raison ne devez vous pas luy rester inutile lorsqu'il s'agit de sa ruine totale." Stair had written that the regent was willing to furnish subsidies. The squadron, posted at Bornholm, would cover the transport of food, and a French promise of subsidies would raise Sweden's credit. From all these considerations there had been no hesitation in informing Carteret that they were being sought for. Senneterre and himself had thought it necessary to send Campredon [2] back to Paris on this matter; he was thoroughly instructed in their sentiments. The principal thing was for him to carry to Sweden at once a real succour

[1] B. M. Add. MSS. 28146.

[2] Campredon was appointed to return to Sweden in June 1719, going first to Hanover to consult (Stair, 16 and 20 June, Stanhope, 2 July o.s.; cf. Campredon's memoir). He took an important part in the negotiations there. He has an interesting note on Stanhope: "Je luy ay toujours reconnu des principes d'honneur et de bonne foy; il avoit la confiance du roy son maître, mais soit la multiplicité des affaires dont il estoit chargé surtout à Hannover, où il devoit estre continuellement en garde contre les pièges que M. de Brensdorf luy tendoit, soit tempérament, sa distraction étoit si grande, que souvent on luy parloit un quart d'heure de suite sans qu'il eût entendu une parole de ce qu'on luy disoit; la politesse succédoit à cette espèce d'extase, il faisoit des excuses, et l'on sortoit toujours satisfait de sa conversation." (This does not say much for Stanhope's opinion of Campredon's importance.) Bernstorff, "surnommé le père des difficultés," he stigmatizes as equally ill-disposed to France and Sweden, and as traversing the negotiations "sans beaucoup de ménagement."

in proportion to French means and Swedish wants. When the Prussian treaties were signed there would be hope of raising Sweden again, even though she succumbed to the tsar.[1]

Campredon used arguments showing the danger to France if the regent did not send material help to Sweden. He expressed the belief that the English did not want to do the Russians much harm, that they feared for their commerce and regarded the "levée de boucliers" as solely in the interests of Hanover, that this might be the principal cause of the delay in sending the fleet to Stockholm, and that king George's ministers would be glad to have a plausible pretext for throwing the blame on France. If the regent failed to support Sweden Great Britain might ally herself with Russia and become dominant in the north as the great protestant power, shutting out France entirely and depriving her of the supplies necessary to conduct a war.[2] Such considerations, with arguments pressed by Stair, procured the grant of a French subsidy, although at first Dubois, Stair says, maintained that there was no money to spare from the Spanish war,[3] and Campredon was sent back to Hanover on his way to Sweden in charge of gold ingots to the value of 300,000 crowns.[4] Dubois wrote of the pleasure with which this succour was afforded, but added that Sweden could not treat with king George preferably to the tsar without the hope of regaining Stralsund and Rügen.[5]

Campredon was instructed, as his chief object, to forward peace with the king of England, and as his second, with Prussia, for, if that were not effected, the regent would but imperfectly have carried out his intentions towards the king of England, seeing that the king of Prussia, if he remained at war with Sweden, might at any time raise trouble in Lower Germany to the other's injury. Hence the queen should be persuaded to cede Stettin and its district. Campredon was to expend his money as advised by Carteret, and the position of the king of France as mediator obliged this matter to be kept extremely secret; the Swedes should be informed that otherwise it would not be possible to send more.[6]

On 25 July o.s. Carteret was able to report (to England) that full liberty had been granted to English ships to trade to the eastern

[1] R. O. France 164.
[2] *Memoir*, pp. 152–53.
[3] The regent "ne pouvoit aller plus loin sans se noyer."
[4] Law, says Campredon (*Memoir*, p. 155), advised sending the money in ingots for greater secrecy; also, if lost, they could easily be recovered, whereas coin could not. He could insure them at 5 per cent.
[5] R. O. France 164.
[6] Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XL. iii-vi.

ports without the restrictions imposed upon the Dutch. Two days later he sent to Hanover an account of what had happened in the previous fortnight. He had continually and successfully urged the equipping of as many ships as possible at Carlskrona. If orders were sent to Norris to come thither, there might yet be time to prevent the tsar from imposing terms. Osterman's ultimatum was as follows. Firstly, the tsar to keep Reval and Viborg and all Ingria with its dependencies and in Carelia Keksholm and its district; to buy Livonia, or hold it without payment for a term of forty years; and to restore Finland and the remainder of Carelia. Secondly, "his good ally the king of Prussia" to receive Stettin and its district to the Peene in return for a sum of money, or, alternatively, a mortgage of it for a term of years, at the end of which Sweden should repay for its recovery four million crowns to cover the sequestration money and the expenses of the war. Other points and formalities to be settled at the Åland congress. These conditions, said Carteret, had been accepted by the senate, the only persons opposing being Counts Dücker, Taube, and De la Gardie. The prince of Hesse had thereupon threatened to throw up his command and leave the country, recommending Dücker as his successor, who however had "answered like a brave man that people who could ever tamely come to a resolution to give up their country were not worth serving, and he would have nothing to do with them." The queen too had shown "the courage and firmness of her brother." This had shamed the others and a counter-proposal would be made, namely, to cede Ingria, St. Petersburg, Cronslot and Narva, and either Viborg and Keksholm with their districts or Esthonia with Reval; the king of Prussia's claims to be referred to the congress of Brunswick, unless he would deliver up Stettin upon payment of the 400,000 crowns advanced on the sequestration. "This throws everything again at large, and, if a fleet comes, the King may govern their peace as he thinks fit. If not, they cannot hold out long." Then a further dissertation on the danger of the tsar becoming master in the Baltic. The Danes, Carteret said, would soon repent of what they had done. "They have advanced the Czar's interest more than their own, who is not obliged to them for it, and speaks of them with contempt." In union with the king they might have obtained what they could reasonably have pretended to, and "the Czar, for the common good of Europe, had been reduced to reason, and nothing could have then prevented a glorious peace in the North." The prince, dining with Carteret uninvited, had said that he would rather serve in England than consent to the tsar's conditions, and would hold firm

to the last. All depended upon whether the fleet came or not.[1]

This then was the situation in Sweden when Stanhope replied to Carteret's first despatches, the only ones yet to hand, on 2 August. "The doings of the Danes," he said, "puts us under unspeakable difficulties." Stating the impossibility of action on the part of Norris under present circumstances and the efforts being made at Paris in Sweden's favour, he went on, "The directions I am about to give you in His Majesty's name will afford the strongest proof imaginable of the King's sincere affection to the house of Sweden." Carteret must advise in the strongest manner a peace with Denmark by the cession of Stralsund and Rügen. It could be stipulated that Norris should be reinforced by Danish ships. "The minute they shall have secured Denmark Sir John Norris shall act with the utmost vigour for their service." On the other hand, if peace with Russia were preferred, then, "averse as we are to the Czar," the king would "equally contribute his best offices to save them that way." In that case the treaty must "be so managed as to lay a foundation of enmity and jealousy betwixt the Czar and Denmark." An article should oblige him to give assistance against Denmark by sea and land. At the same time the necessity of a good defensive alliance with Great Britain must be insisted upon. No other power in Europe, excepting France, could render equal service, and Sweden was not so useful to France now as formerly. "Against the Czar they will ever be secure in us of an active and vigorous ally," and help could be given in ships or money, as preferred. The issue at Berlin being yet uncertain, mention of Prussia must as far as possible be avoided, yet not so far as to give any just handle for complaint. The British and Hanoverian treaties should be signed, if possible, at the same time. Of course the guarantee of Sleswick and the German provinces of Sweden, given under the treaty of 1700, could not now be renewed, but to subsidies equal to the succour therein stipulated Sweden would be entitled till the general peace.[2]

The receipt of this despatch threw Carteret into consternation. "If your Lordship is under unspeakable difficulties, what must I be in?" he asked. "The moment a courier arrives my house is full of Senators enquiring about the fleet." They swore that their own should go out and fight by itself. When he imputed their

[1] Carteret enclosed a copy of a letter from the prince to the senate, shown him by the former, in which he argued that the tsar's insistence upon Reval furnished sufficient reason against his having it. He would be able to keep his fleet there and be master of Swedish trade. Much better to make alliance "avec les Chrétiens," especially the king of England.

[2] Hanover, 22 July o.s., R. O. Sweden 24.

situation to the war with Denmark, "they said that all was owing to their relyance upon the King of England. If they had not trusted to his fleet they had made peace with the Czar before any one town had been burnt, and by this time they should have had ample revenge of the Danes. With this they left me." Norris might join the Swedish fleet without fear. The Danes had not above five ships in the Baltic, and it was not likely that they would join the Russians. "A good and a wise Dane is jealous of the Russian fleet, notwithstanding they fight at present against a common enemy." To speak to the Swedes about peace with Denmark was to insult them. "To sacrifice Pomerania is directly contrary to all their views both publick and private." The prince, Dücker, and Taube, the two latter Livonians, would rather die than give up Reval. And so on at great length. All would be right if the fleet came; "Our King will be the instrument of Providence to make Sweden happy in its domestick as well as foreign affairs, and the interests of Great Britain will be secured in the North." The situation had been discussed at another conference on Sunday. Carteret had said, as instructed, that whichever way the Swedes might be constrained to make peace they might be sure of the king's friendship, and that though he preferred the one he would not object to the other, being only anxious to draw them out of their difficulties. It was suggested that he should see Osterman, but when he explained the terms in which he would speak to him, the Swedes thought that he had better not, "unless I would speak more particularly and mention very strongly the fleet." Now he could not see him, for he was not allowed to come to town and was leaving the country the next day. Stanhope's letter to Dubois, of which he had shown a copy, had been very gratefully received, especially in its regard to French subsidies, and so had his own silence about Prussia. As to the exclusion of the German provinces from mention in the British treaty, "they do no way admit that those Provinces are out of the question, but insist that they are the chief question." The ships both at Carlskrona and at Stockholm were to go out as soon as possible. The Swedes would hold out to the last, but, if the sea were not opened, they would starve. "But if our fleet has orders to joyn the Swedish fleet, this nation may still be rescued, and our King and Country make as high a figure as ever people did. I hope this great conjuncture will not be lost." The prince and Dücker said that, if the fleet came, they would break off entirely with the tsar; a word from them, and "the army will demolish the senate." [1]

[1] 3 Aug. o.s. In a ciphered letter Carteret wrote: "The machine is skrew'd up to the height and cannot hold long together, one party must get the better of

But Norris stayed on in Copenhagen roads, in spite of further letters from Admiral Sparre intimating that there were now ready at Carlskrona and Stockholm fourteen or fifteen ships of the line with ten frigates and a number of smaller vessels, and urging the opportunity of destroying the Russian fleet.[1] Stanhope wrote to him that until there was greater certainty about "the dispositions of our several northern neighbours" he could not do better than remain perfectly neutral. It was "no ways adviseable or indeed practical" for him to proceed until the expected reinforcements arrived, "especially considering the present temper of the Danes, who might possibly intercept anything that were to follow you."[2] As soon as the four ships came, he should reply to Sparre, he expected to receive instructions agreeable to the queen's wishes, and in the meantime the Swedish preparations had better be pushed on with all vigour. In order to have accurate information upon the strength of the Swedes, it would be well to send an officer to Carlskrona to view and report.[3] Bernstorff wrote that with the four ships expected and eight or ten Swedes Norris should be strong enough to beat the Russians, and thought that there was no real danger from the Danes. He requested his private opinion, of which no one else should know, for submission to the king.[4]

It was indeed natural to believe that the Danes might now join forces with the Russians, for while they were still obstinate against making peace with Sweden, unless their full demands were granted, the miscalculation of their own strength had become apparent. It had not been possible to follow up the success obtained at Marstrand, partly because the devastation of the country forbade an advance. The army retired from Sweden in the first week of August. The only effect of Frederick's enterprise was to impair his relations with king George. It had been undertaken against the advice of his best minister, Count Holstein, who had not been afraid to represent the situation plainly. In despatch after despatch from England he had warned his master of George's

the other soon, our fleet 's coming or not will cast the balance. The Livonians will venture all before a cession shall be made of their country to the Czar. The Prince and Count Dücker are at the head of that party and have the army at command, the Prince thinks he shall succeed in all his views if the fleet comes."

[1] 18, 19 and 21 July, B. M. Add. MSS. 28155 (originals), 28146 (copies); the last also R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

[2] 22 and 31 July o.s., B. M. Add. MSS. 28146. Stanhope warned Norris that the Danes might even attempt to seize his person, "which is the greatest blow that could happen at present to the King's service." Norris himself feared that they might remove the buoys from the Sound, necessitating passage to the Baltic by the Belts, with whose navigation no one on board was acquainted (7 Aug. o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval).

[3] 22 and 31 July o.s., B. M. Add. MSS. 28146, 28155.

[4] 11 Aug., ibid.

displeasure at his action, of his belief that it was undertaken in concert with the tsar, and of his intention to make peace separately if he could not do so jointly. Stanhope, indeed, wrote to Polwarth on 22 June :—

" Having observed an expression in all of your Lordp's letters implying as if the Danes had some jealousy ; your Lordp. may with great truth assure them, that Lord Carteret has the strictest orders to espouse their concerns with vigour in his negotiations in Sweden, and that Court shall not fail to be regularly informed by us of every transaction there which may in the least affect them, and may further be assured that no peace shall be made without their privity." [1]

But the invasion and the supposed concert with Russia gave sufficient pretext for disregarding the treaty engagements of 1715. Assurances, the release of English ships taken,[2] permission to others to leave Gothenburg, weighed but little in the balance against the insistence of France that Stralsund and Rügen must be restored and the absolute refusal of the Swedes to cede them. George informed Lövenörn at Hanover personally that the probable result of the invasion would be to oblige Sweden to accept the tsar's terms, even to giving up Reval, and that in that case it would be difficult either for the king of Denmark or for himself to obtain what they wanted. Polwarth thought it contrary to common sense to suppose that the Danes should institute operations without the concurrence of king George, unless in understanding with the tsar. He told the Danish ministers (untruly of course) that the negotiations with Prussia had been broken off for Denmark's sake. They answered that they knew the tsar too well to trust him, that their operations would probably not have been undertaken had their treaties with king George been brought to a conclusion, and that they must go on, now that the expense of preparation had been incurred.[3] Stanhope, when he informed

[1] R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 269.

[2] Much on this subject in Polwarth's of 27 May foll. ; cf. Stanhope to him, 26 May o.s., R. O. as above. Great ill-feeling was aroused in England by the Danish interference with trade to Sweden.

[3] Polwarth, 20 and 24 June, see further 9 Aug. Craggs wrote to him on 17 June o.s. : " Upon the repeated applications I perceive your Lordp. has lately made to the Danish Court, without obtaining redress, I cannot help making my observation to you, that it hath been the method of late, and that I think a very extraordinary one, with some foreign Princes to make their complaints and give us such usage as the little foundation there has been for it has been far from allowing us any room to expect. This may be in a particular manner said of the Court where you reside, of whom it must be thought very unjust, that because we will not exactly fall in with all their views, and joyn even perhaps in every measure of theirs, all our assistance, all our services to them, thô ever so extraordinary, as they really have been, must be put to no account, and we must therefore be treated as if we had observed a contrary conduct towards them. I think this observation,

Holstein, who had come to Hanover about the middle of July, of the conclusion of the Swedish treaty, expressed a desire to know on what terms Denmark would make peace, intimating that the limit of time for doing so might come sooner than was expected.[1]

Holstein accordingly presented an ultimatum. In spite of the failure of the invasion it demanded the provinces of Båhus, with Marstrand, of Jemtland and Herjedalen, and of Halland, besides Stralsund and Rügen and Sleswick and the abolition of the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls. Wismar was required to be dealt with as stipulated in the treaty of 1715.[2] Sending these demands to Polwarth, Stanhope remarked that Holstein "could not but confess they were altogether impracticable."[3]

But the Swedes were impracticable too. They had sent to Copenhagen Major-General Adlerfeld. All that he finally offered, according to Polwarth,[4] was to waive all claims for damages done by the war and to pay 200,000 crowns, upon condition that the king of Denmark gave up everything that he had taken from Sweden and from the duke of Holstein. Carteret had written: "When once I mentioned making some cession, it raised such a flame as is hardly to be imagined. They said they had rather give to the Czar everything than anything to Denmark," for the former had been a generous enemy in comparison, the Danes having "always attacked them in their distress." To them was ascribed the loss of Riga and Livonia, of Bremen and Verden. If it were thought that they were to be helped to Stralsund and Rügen the Swedes would at once close with the tsar, if only in order to attack Denmark and beat her again.[5]

At a council of war at Copenhagen on 8 August the representatives of king George were informed of orders issued to Admiral Paulsen to join the British squadron with four ships to cruise south of Bornholm and secure from attack Denmark and the empire "contre qui que ce soit." Polwarth was asked, was he not now convinced that there was no concert with Russia, seeing that the king had solemnly so declared through Holstein at Hanover, and now had ordered Paulsen to act against the tsar in the case named?

thô my private one, may furnish your Lordp. with a hint to expostulate very earnestly with that Court." And again on 26 June o.s.: "The ill-success you apprehend will attend their expedition must convince them more and more that their greatest safety lyes in His Majesty's friendship" (R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5).

[1] See on the above, Holm, pp. 659 foll.
[2] R. O. Regencies 2, B. M. Add. MSS. 28155, f. 134.
[3] 21 Aug. o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 269.
[4] 25 and 29 Aug.
[5] 14 July o.s., private.

Polwarth answered that it amounted to the same, whether there were a concert or not, since all evil that could arise from that was arising effectively without it; that he did not believe in the likelihood of a Russian attempt on Denmark or Germany; and that, whether the Danes were contented with the tsar or not, he was certainly contented with them, or he would not have written that his "brother Frederick" might be sure that he would always act as an honest man should.[1] Like distrust was voiced by Robethon from Hanover in reference to the sending of Captain Kruse, of the Danish service, to the tsar. An agreement with the latter, he said, would not prevent him from making his separate peace, if it were to his advantage, and the Danes would have to pay for it, whereas if they would have joined their fleet with the English, the combined force would have been able to give laws to the Baltic and regulate the conditions of the northern peace. What an obligation the king of Denmark would be under to the war-party among his ministers, and how fine would be the result of the conquest of Marstrand![2]

On Frederick's return from Norway Polwarth informed him of the signature of the Swedish-Hanoverian convention, saying that the object was to prevent a peace with Russia. Admiral Gabel told him that the Danish army had been withdrawn from Sweden for the same reason. Polwarth heard that the resolution was taken after the coming of an officer named Creutz from the tsar. He reflects that it was not the king of Denmark's interest to join the latter, however his resentment might impel him, but to act with Great Britain, the country being quite exhausted and needing peace. Not more than seventeen ships could possibly be put to sea, and while the Danes never willingly went beyond Bornholm—indeed their ships could not stand a long voyage—the Russians could not come so far down to meet them, lest their ports should be frozen up before they could get back. Frederick replied that he could not accommodate himself to king George's views, because he did not know on what footing he stood with Great Britain, no treaty having been concluded. Polwarth said the fault of this was not theirs, and that all the king's servants in Sweden and elsewhere were striving to obtain a good peace for Denmark. Frederick went so far as to issue a declaration that he was not included in the

[1] Polwarth, 9 Aug., cf. Norris's journal, B. M. Add. MSS. 28129, and the memorandum, ibid. 28146.

[2] 8 Aug., ibid. 28155, enclosing an extract from a despatch of Weber from Reval. Kruse (or Cruyse) was a son of a Dutch vice-admiral in the Russian service. Pushkin, Weber said, had come away from Copenhagen well contented. Robethon wrote to Schrader at Stockholm (7 Aug., ibid.) that negotiations with Denmark were at a standstill, and that Holstein showed himself but little.

Swedish treaty, and that his fleet would not act with that of Great Britain against the tsar.[1] When Count Holstein was recalled from Hanover in September and reports arrived of Danish intrigues in favour of Russia at Berlin,[2] the belief that Frederick IV was really acting in concert with Peter the Great, the arch-enemy, was confirmed.

As has been said, Stanhope waited to reply to Carteret's despatches enclosing the signed Hanoverian convention until he had news of the conclusion of the Prussian treaties. Then he broke upon the Swedes the demand for the cession of Stettin, descanting on the necessity of alliance with Prussia, if the war with the tsar were to be carried on. The plea he advanced for the cession was that Stettin had been guaranteed to Prussia under the treaty of 1715. Orders, he said, now going to Norris to advance could not have been given, had not the king been sure of Prussia, and the uncertainty which had prevailed in that direction had been the cause of the delay in replying to Carteret's despatches. He must at once solicit a passport for a Prussian minister to come to Sweden to treat, the name to be left blank. France being also a guarantor of Stettin to Prussia, as well as of the treaty with that power just concluded, it would be a pure impossibility for Sweden ever to recover the place; much better for her to accept the two million crowns offered. The orders to Norris, Stanhope went on in a secret despatch, were intended to facilitate Carteret's negotiation and to render to Sweden all service that was humanly possible, although the king might be involved in an immediate war with Russia and Denmark. Either the tsar would be forced to withdraw and Sweden in consequence gain a year for negotiation, or he would give an answer which would justify to the world anything that might be undertaken in defence of Sweden. It was, as Carteret knew, much easier in England to do certain things than to make treaty engagements that they should be done. Having gone further than perhaps was prudent in order to help Sweden the king was persuaded that his treaty, including the cession of Stettin, would be accepted. If it were not, Bassewitz might hand over his ratification of the electoral convention, but Carteret must break off, declaring that the king would do nothing further and that his fleet would be recalled to England. The worst that could happen would be that

[1] To his resident Hagedorn at Hamburg, 22 Aug. (Wich, 24 Aug., R. O. Hamburg 36).

[2] Stanhope wrote on 21 Aug. o.s.: "It was very surprising to us to hear from Mr. Whitworth that the Danish secretary at Berlin is actually labouring to bring the King of Prussia off from our engagements and to persuade him again to come into the Czar's measures" (R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 269; further on the subject, 5 Sept., Regencies 2, where it is said that Stralsund and Rügen were offered as a bribe).

he would save a million crowns and enjoy his acquisitions serenely under the guarantees of France and Prussia, to which those of the tsar and Denmark could be added.[1]

The orders to Norris were to advance to Hanö, the four ships having joined him, as soon as he learnt from Carteret that the British treaty was accepted and signed, and thence to keep in communication with the Swedish admiral, but not to join the Swedish fleet unless the approach of the Russian should oblige him to do so. Having informed himself thoroughly of all the circumstances, including the disposition of the Danes and the probability of their fleet joining the Russian, he must thereafter use his judgment as to whether, with the Swedes, he might venture an action with prospect of success. If he thought so, he was to send a letter to the tsar offering the mediation of Great Britain and requiring a suspension of arms, under threat that, in case of refusal, the British and Swedish forces should be joined to defend Sweden.[2] Having allowed sufficient time to receive an answer, if none were sent, or if it were insolent, Norris should join the Swedish fleet and act with it as he should judge most effectual to destroy that of the tsar, "than which a greater service cannot be done to your country." More positive orders could not be given; the king was happy to have in command of the fleet a man who could be trusted to help out their "lameness or imperfections."

"You know His Maj$^{ty's}$ view, which is to save Sweden, if possible, and to destroy the Czar's fleet. You are the only judge, whether the means you have are sufficient, if you think not, you must not attempt and consequently not send the letter to the Czar. If you think you are likely to succeed, attempt in the name of God, and be sure of all the support the King can give you, even tho' the attempt should not answer your expectation."

What it was best to say to the Danes, Norris must judge. The treaty with Prussia, received that morning, "makes us very easy on that side"; but it must be kept secret for some time. With these orders Stanhope enclosed translations of his despatches

[1] 17 Aug. In a similar spirit Robethon had reported to General Bothmer Stanhope's opinion that it might be a good thing for Sweden to accept the tsar's terms, for the king would be in perfect security, Prussia immediately sign her treaties, and Denmark be obliged to be content with what could be done for her at Brunswick; in a word, peace would be established. Whereas, if the king should make his peace with Sweden alone, he would burden himself with an ally that had no money, ships or troops and would incur the hostility of Russia, Denmark, and perhaps Prussia, placing himself in a very dangerous situation. Peace between Sweden and Russia, Robethon said, was therefore not looked upon as a misfortune, seeing that one with Denmark appeared to be impracticable (7 Aug., B. M. Add. MSS. 28155, translation).

[2] The letter composed by Norris in accordance with the terms prescribed, but not sent, R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

to Carteret and of the draft for the British preliminary convention.[1]

Sending copies of the orders to Carteret and Norris to Paris Stanhope explained that, so long as Prussia was uncertain, it had been necessary to advise Sweden to make terms either with the tsar or with the king of Denmark, but that now the situation was changed, for the king's German dominions being covered by Prussia the fleet could act against the Russians without any previous agreement with Denmark, provided that Sweden would cede Stettin and that there was not any near prospect of the Russian and Danish fleets joining. But this was improbable, for the Danes had only four ships in the Sound and had offered them for the defence of Germany, on this side Bornholm. The king, he said, was extremely sensible of the regent's promptitude in acceding to his wishes; the gold ingots to be carried to Stockholm by Campredon would have very great influence. He ended with an interesting survey of European affairs and a particular laudation of Dubois.[2]

When Carteret received the above despatches (26 August) he repaired at once to the prince and explained as best he could why the pretensions of Prussia had not been brought forward before, and how essential it was for Sweden to make peace with her. The prince was shocked and astounded, but yielded to persuasion. The king of England, he said, " would obtain terms for his son-in-law, at the representations of an English ambassador, which the Czar could not obtain for him with an army of 30,000 men at their gates and a fleet of 24 men-of-war and 300 galleys at their port." It was to be hoped that he would appreciate the value set upon his friendship, if consent were given. The junction of the fleets would be a *causa sine qua non*, and the recovery of Reval and Livonia must be guaranteed. About the cession of Stralsund and Rügen, however, it would be better for Carteret never to speak again.

At his conference with the senators Carteret endeavoured to satisfy them with general expressions about Reval and Livonia; the time was not ripe, he said, for guarantees. But they were firm, saying that the king of Prussia had offered cheaper terms through Osterman, that the isles of Usedom and Wollin had not come under the sequestration and the former could not be separated from Rügen, and so on. " I looked upon the matter as desperate," says Carteret. At last he said, " the short question was, would they detach the king of Prussia from the Czar, or not, and give him their provinces at the interposition of the king of Great Britain or at the interposition of the Czar." The French guarantee was sufficient

[1] The whole, B. M. Add. MSS. 28146, 17 Aug.
[2] To Stair and Dubois, 20 and 22 Aug., R. O. France 165, and further 8 Oct.

evidence that Sweden could never regain them. "I waved the consideration of money, knowing that they might have a larger sum from the Czar, but the Czar's money was the purchase of their liberty and independency, but my master's a real disinterested supply to preserve them." The discussions were resumed two days later and the conference was about to break up, when there came a letter from Norris "so prudently and discreetly writ," says Carteret, "that I could shew it them. . . . This prevailed infinitely more than anything I could say, turned the ballance in my favour." Count Sparre[1] advised acceptance of the treaty with certain alterations, the principal ones additions to the second separate article, making the cession of Stettin conditional upon the king of Prussia's engagement not to give help to the tsar against Sweden directly or indirectly, and to the third, naming the tsar as the enemy against whom the joint forces of Great Britain and Sweden were to act, in case he refused the king of England's mediation and continued hostilities. Carteret was obliged to acquiesce, although he disputed the latter change almost to breaking off. And he was obliged also to sign a declaration to the effect that Norris should write to the tsar offering the king's mediation and should immediately join the Swedish fleet and be prepared to resist with it the Russians, otherwise the treaty to be null and void.[2]

"Sir John Norris's prudent letter," Carteret went on, "has done this business." To him, if what was done were approved, success must be attributed. If it were not approved, Carteret would take the blame himself. "It was as hard in this case for me to follow orders punctually, as it was to your Lordship to give them. I think I have followed His Majesty's intention, and the interest of my Country." The convention was signed on 18 August o.s. and ratified by the queen late the next night, and upon its signature Bassewitz handed over the king's ratification of the Hanoverian convention.

It must be said that Carteret's success was not wholly due to

[1] Eric Sparre, created a count in April.

[2] "En cas que l'Admiral Monsr. le Chevalier Norris, après avoir reçu avis de My lord Carteret de la signature du Traité conclu aujourd'hui, n'écrive pas au Czar pour lui offrir la médiation de Sa Majesté Britannique et n'avance pas immédiatement avec son escadre jusqu'au rendés-vous que l'Admiral Suédois marquera au dit Admiral Anglois, déclarant en même tems, qu'aussitôt que cette lettre sera rendue il avoit ordre de s'opposer conjoinctement avec la flotte Suédoise au progrés des Russes, et que l'Admiral ne le fasse effectivement, en ce cas-là ce présent traité sera nul et point de tout obligatoire." The plenipotentiaries undertook to return this paper to Carteret so soon as Norris had satisfied its obligations. Carteret proceeds in his despatch (19 Aug. o.s.) with apologies and reasons for signing this, pointing out especially the value of the Swedes as allies: "They have as good swords and as good hearts as any in Europe," and so on.

the Russian invasion and to the promise of British help. Several of the Swedish senators, he had early said, could be bought, and he and Bassewitz bought them. He makes no further secret of this than to write of it in cipher. The pressing poverty of the Swedes made this method of persuasion irresistible. Bassewitz, says Carteret (12 July), had promised the commissioners 10,000 crowns apiece, and 5,000 or 6,000 to under-secretary Von Kochen.[1] He himself had been forced to give very broad hints of further payments, when he should come to arrange the British treaty; £5,000 or £6,000, he thought, expended thus would settle that as desired.[2] On 3 August o.s. he wrote,

"If the fleet does not come, the Defensive Treaty can never be setled as you would have it, without money. The like summ, vizt. of 54,000 crowns, that the King hath sent to Mons[r] Bassewitz must be sent to me to be given to the same persons; if it was not for that money he and I should pass our time very ill at present in this country. That keeps them in awe and makes them stand by. Pray represent the necessity of this to the King in the strongest terms."

Stanhope in reply authorized Carteret to make presents to the value of £10,000.[3] The latter answered that he had engaged to the five plenipotentiaries on his word and honour 20,000 crowns apiece of Prussian money, and to another, not named, 6,000, while the secretaries of the chancery would require 4,000. On the king's account he had paid 14,000 crowns "banco" out of his own pocket and had promised 10,000 more, exhausting his funds.[4] Stanhope thereupon sent him a letter of credit for 26,000 crowns with copies of the bills sent from Berlin to Hamburg for 110,000, before referred to. As this sum was payable in new "drittels," a coin lower in value than the Swedish crown "banco" by at least 32 per cent., Carteret must adjust the balance with Knyphausen, when he came. If he refused to pay the higher value, the king would make the difference good, for Carteret's credit, deducting the amount later from the arrears of subsidy owing to Prussia.[5] And here we may note the complaint of the Dutch ambassador, Burmannia, that he

[1] But Bassewitz expected to save king George thereby 100,000 crowns, as the Swedes would now accept ordinary rix-dollars for the payment of the million for Bremen and Verden instead of rix-dollars "de banco."

[2] "I think we may look upon it in a manner as renewed, and with the help of some presents may renew it our own way, if this government subsists two months, and Providence has not decreed the subversion of this nation."

[3] "I don't mean that his Majty stints you so exactly to that summ, but that he will allow some thousands more if you can finish and get the treaty signed as 'tis sent you" (17 Aug.).

[4] 19 Aug. o.s.

[5] 11 Sept.: 26,000 crowns were sent to allow Carteret a margin. He said, however, that he did not want them.

was not provided with funds to be similarly employed. It was very annoying, he expressed it, to have to sail against the money-stream. Influential persons were interested in the privateering, and to stop it they must be compensated. Two, he said, who did not wish to be named, had come to him and intimated this.[1]

The preliminary convention thus obtained provided that the union between Great Britain and Sweden should be renewed and made yet closer for the maintenance of the protestant religion; that damages done to trade by either side should be assessed and balanced; that instead of the succours stipulated under the treaty of 1700 Great Britain should pay an annual subsidy, the first instalment within fifteen days from signature; that British commerce in the Baltic should at once be free and as favourably treated as ever before the troubles began; that the king, having already urgently exhorted Sweden to make peace with one of the two powers attacking her, since their union must destroy her, should exert himself to obtain the best conditions possible and to engage the help of all the other powers his allies; and that, if in consequence of the present treaty he were attacked by any power whether in Great Britain or Hanover, Sweden should not make peace with that power without him. Four separate articles followed. The first guaranteed the preliminary convention with Hanover and in particular its clause, specially recited, ceding Bremen and Verden, which article was to have full and entire effect from this time without any alteration of it in the final treaty, it being understood that king George would satisfy the fifth article of the convention as to payment of the sum stipulated. The second ceded to Prussia Stettin and the district between the Oder and the Peene with the isles of Usedom and Wollin in return for a payment of two million crowns, their British and Swedish Majesties agreeing to guarantee the treaty to be made with Prussia, and it being stated that the cession was only made upon condition that the king of Prussia undertook to give no help to the tsar against Sweden directly or indirectly. The third article promised that, if a treaty could be made with Denmark, king George would not be content with having helped Sweden by his good offices and by the subsidies stipulated, which stipulation was to hold good until peace was made with Denmark and with the tsar, but even if the peace with Denmark could not be made, would nevertheless be ready to join his forces with those of Sweden as auxiliaries to act against the tsar as reasons of war should demand, in case he would not accept the British mediation offered and continued hostilities against Sweden. The

[1] Private despatch of 29 Dec., *Handlingar*, XXI. 396.

fourth engaged king George to use his best offices and most pressing instances with the court of France to furnish the most considerable subsidies possible up to the time of the general peace.

In this form the separate articles were ratified by George on 14 September.[1] But it was not the final form. Before the convention was signed at Stockholm not only had a French subsidy been obtained, as said above, but also the promise of a French guarantee. Campredon arrived at Stockholm bearing this and his gold ingots on 31 August. He also brought despatches from Stanhope saying that it had been arranged that the good offices and mediation of the king of France should be mentioned in the preamble to the final Hanoverian treaty as having advanced and facilitated the peace, and that similar mention ought to be inserted in the first and second separate articles of the British preliminary convention, if it were not already signed, or, if it were, in a separate act.[2] And to Paris Stanhope wrote that, as Sweden was ceding provinces in Germany, it was impossible not to insert also the mediation of the emperor, it having been accepted by all the belligerents. The alternative, reservation of liberty to accede to an act of mediation later, would be offensive to him, nor was there any precedent for accession to a mediation "après coup." The additional mention of a guarantee in the case of France gave that power the proof of greater confidence and credit for greater influence. All that the late king of France had pretended to was to be joined with the emperor in the mediation, and now that all was to be settled at Stockholm without the intervention of an imperial minister the French mediation would be real, and that of the emperor only nominal. Further, by the same attention to France, and in view of the money sent, the article about French subsidies would now be null, but it would serve to convince the Swedes of the close union between France and Great Britain. Accordingly, mention of the French guarantee and mediation and of the mediation of the emperor was inserted in the first and second articles, and the fourth was omitted. This is the form of the articles preserved at the Record Office as ratified by the queen of Sweden,[3] though it bears the old date, 18–29 August.

After the conclusion of the convention orders were sent to Lillienstedt at Lofö to declare that, if the queen's counter-ultimatum were not accepted within three weeks, he and Gyllenborg would be recalled. And as Peter the Great had already sent

[1] R. O. Treaties 529.
[2] To Carteret, 24 Aug., R. O. Sweden 24, and further 30 Sept.
[3] R. O. Treaties 528. The changes are seen in the copies and drafts, Treaty Papers 71. Carteret wrote on 27 Sept. o.s. that they had been made.

similar orders to his own ministers, 21 August o.s., the conferences were broken off.[1]

In England the news of the convention gave great satisfaction. Craggs wrote to Carteret : " I need not tell your Excy. how far the conclusion of our Treatys in the North will facilitate the progress of our affairs in the South." [2] And this was true as regarded Spain, although, as has been said, they had a different effect upon relations with Austria.

[1] Solov'ev.
[2] 8 Sept. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

CHAPTER XXV

THE FINAL TREATIES WITH SWEDEN. THE SWEDISH TREATY WITH PRUSSIA AND CONVENTION WITH POLAND

The letter from Sir John Norris which had so great effect at Stockholm was written on the day [1] that he learnt from Admiral Sparre of his sailing from Carlskrona with twelve good fighting ships and others towards Landsort and the "Swedish Skaw." The lieutenant sent, as desired, to Carlskrona (returning with a poor account of the Swedish fleet and the report that the Russian had already sailed for Reval and that the galleys were out of reach among the islands) brought a second letter from Sparre wishing that Norris was already with him and appointing a rendezvous at Landsort or Elsnabben, where pilots would be ready for him. Victuals, said Sparre, who wrote in English, would not be wanting at Stockholm, "and shall no victuals hinder us from keeping the sea." Two men-of-war and three frigates had gone forward already to stop "the dangerous burnings and doings of the Muscovites." The combined fleet would number thirty sail, sufficient to fight the Russians.[2] Norris, therefore, reinforced by three men-of-war, decided to sail for Hanö, "to give a countenance to Lord Carteret's negotiations at the Court of Sweden," as he expressed it. While making ready, he had word from Rear-Admiral Hosier of his approach with four more men-of-war and a fire-ship. Sending orders for them to follow, he sailed on the 26th.[3] Passing the Grounds he received a despatch from Stanhope ordering him to do just what he was doing. From Hanö he was directed to inform the queen of Sweden that he was instructed to obey her commands as soon as the treaty was signed. On hearing of this from Carteret, and supposing that the Swedes had not made peace with the tsar, "you do in concert with the Swedish Admiral go look for the Russ. fleet and do your best to destroy them." And he was to leave special assurances of friendship with the court of Denmark,

[1] 12 Aug. o.s.
[2] Sparre's letters (originals), B. M. Add. MSS. 28155.
[3] Norris's journal and letter-book, B. M. Add. MSS. 28129, 28146.

and to say, as with truth he could, that every despatch to Carteret had carried orders in its favour.[1]

The fleet, when united, was a powerful one, eighteen of the line. Two 80-gun ships, the *Cumberland* and *Dorsetshire*, flew the flags of Norris and Rear-Admiral Hopson; the *Prince Frederick*, 70, that of Hosier; the rest were three of 70 guns, five of 60, five of 50, and two of 40, besides the *Port Mahon* frigate and two fire-ships. Anchor was cast off Hanö on 28 August. In accordance with Carteret's request Norris sent him the letter to the tsar before-mentioned. Proceeding on his voyage he joined the Swedish fleet, ten of the line with two frigates, a fire-ship and a bomb-vessel, on 5 September. Carteret wrote to him that the news of his sailing had been received "with inexpressible joy and satisfaction"; he had roused the prince from bed to hear it. He went on:—

"It is now in your power by the help of God to do the most signal piece of service to your country that any man hath done this age. The scales of the North are in your hand. You can cast the ballance as you please. The cause of Liberty and of the Protestant Religion will be served by rescuing this brave Nation, and I know by experience how true a friend you are to those interests both at home and abroad. God give you success. The goodness of the cause promises it, and if the Czar refuses the King's Mediation, as he probably will, a mark of which will be his continuing hostilities against Sweden, I hope you will by force of arms bring him to reason, and destroy that fleet, which will disturb the world, whilst it is steered by ambition and revenge. . . . You have now a very glorious scene of action open to you, in which you will show to the whole world what the English nation can do. 'Tis the honestest cause that ever man was engaged in. The greatest business is to intercept the Czar, that he may not get to Revel. Cut off his retreat, and we are sure of him. . . . God bless you, S^r. John Norris. All honest and good men will give you just applause. Many persons will envy you, and nobody will dare say a word against you. Every Englishman will be obliged to you, if you can destroy the Czar's fleet, which I don't doubt but you will, for the Providence of God will never suffer such cruelty to go unpunished, as the Muscovites have exercised this summer in Sweden. . . . I now thank God that I have prevented their making peace with the Czar. It lay heavy upon my conscience whilst I saw their misery and heard of no succours coming." [2]

Stanhope was of like opinion. Norris's conduct was approved, he wrote, and there were no further instructions for him except

[1] 10 Aug. o.s., B. M. Add. MSS. 28146. Stanhope's last statement was not without truth. In a despatch to Carteret of 24 Aug. he again pressed for the purchase of peace with Denmark by a sum of money or the cession of Stralsund and Rügen, possessions, he once more averred, of much less importance than Livonia and Esthonia. And he wrote in the same sense to Dubois, pointing out that, even though the Russian fleet were driven from the Baltic, the Swedes could not venture upon a land-attack unless they had previously made peace with Denmark.

[2] 19 and 21 Aug. o.s., ibid. and R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

that "you should have used your utmost endeavours to do all the mischief you possibly can to the Muscovite fleet, than which a greater service cannot be done to your country, and in which I wish you all possible success." [1]

Carteret, and Stanhope later,[2] advised that, as the Russian galleys were now retiring to the Åland isles and the men-of-war supposed to lie in Le-Sund harbour hard by, Norris and Sparre should not come on to Stockholm but sail directly for Hango Head to cut them off. But Sparre said he must go to Landsort; for provisions, Norris thought. So on 6 September the fleet arrived there, having experienced great difficulties of navigation on account of sunken and other rocks. The weather turning stormy, it went on past Elsnabben and cast anchor at "the Dollars" (Dalarö).[3]

The proposed undertaking would have been futile, for the Russians were already back at Reval. The news of Norris's sailing was brought thither by Count Golovin, who had stayed with one of his ships in Copenhagen roads to the last moment. There was great alarm, the batteries were armed and all precautions taken. Panic reigned, when a fleet was sighted in the fog, but this turned out to be the Russian.[4]

Immediately on Norris's arrival at Dalarö a council of war was held,[5] attended by the prince of Hesse, Dücker, Carteret, and the Swedish and British admirals. It was decided that, as Le-Sund was too well defended to be attacked and there was no place in the neighbourhood or between it and Reval where the fleet at that season of the year could lie in safety, all that could be done was to send out frigates to obtain intelligence and in the meantime to wait at Elsnabben. On the 11th Norris went to Stockholm to wait upon the queen, and attended a full council the next day. News had then arrived that the Russian fleet had sailed for Reval, and an attack upon that place was decided to be impracticable. Norris could not accede to the queen's wishes that he should stay

[1] 21 Aug. o.s., ibid.

[2] 24 Aug. o.s., R. O. Regencies 2.

[3] Account of the voyage, Norris to Stanhope, 29 Aug. o.s.

[4] See Jefferyes from Reval, 27 Aug. o.s., R. O. Russia 9, and the report of John Dunkin, a trader, 2 Sept. o.s., S.P. Dom. Naval and B. M. Add. MSS. 28129. Interesting particulars are given of the works and fortifications at Cronslot and Reval. The printed pamphlet, *Relation véritable du retour de la Flotte Russienne dans les Ports de Revel et de Cronslot, dressée sur des Journaux Authentiques*, Revel 1719 (copy, R. O. Denmark 42), gives a Russian account of what occurred subsequently to the sending of Count Golovin to Copenhagen roads. It is said that orders were sent to the fleet to withdraw to Lamland upon the return of Osterman with pressing entreaties from the queen of Sweden for a suspension of hostilities with a view to peace, and that it had sailed for Reval early on 21 August before anything was heard of Norris's advance, the news of which was first received on its arrival at Reval.

[5] 7 and 8 Sept.

the winter, but said that, if she would concert measures with his master, he could be back by the time the ice broke up. On the 14th the queen visited the fleet and there were entertainments and rejoicing. Carteret in his narration makes much of the general satisfaction.[1]

As nothing could be done against Russia that season Carteret and Norris resolved to offer the king's mediation to the tsar, "hoping by that means to give our merchants time to withdraw their effects out of his country." The queen and prince said that, if he would not accept it, all negotiation should be broken off and offers cancelled. As Campredon desired that the mediation of France should be offered also, it was so agreed. It was clear, Carteret wrote, from the withdrawal of his fleet, that the tsar would take no risk. "His power can never be sufficiently reduced, unless he is attacked by land and sea at once, and unless a great diversion is caused on the side of Poland and Courland." If the Swedes had not been inspired by the hope of driving him out of the Baltic, "they had certainly made peace with him, and it would have been their interest to have done so." It was this consideration that had made them accept the Prussian clause, for that king's neutrality was essential.[2]

The terms of the letters to the tsar were greatly modified from those before dictated. That from Norris ran as follows :—

"The Crown of Great Britain not being a party in the present Northern war, and the King my Master having offer'd to your Czarian Majesty His Mediation, in order to make a Peace between your Majesty and the Crown of Sweden; hath commanded me to come upon this Coast, not only with the trade of His subjects, but to give weight and support to the said Mediation, which if your Majesty will be pleased to accept, I shall think it of the greatest honour to receive your Majesty's commands, and to be anyways instrumental in cultivating a good understanding betwixt your Majesty, the Crown of Sweden and my Royal Master, who hath taken measures with the Most Christian King and his other allies, in which Sweden is compris'd, not only to procure to His Mediation the weight and success His Majesty ought to expect from it, but speedily to put an end to the war, which has so long disturbed the north.

[1] When at an audience he told the queen that "le bon Dieu avoit béni sa glorieuse constance et fermeté," she replied "Ouy, en me donnant le bon Roy d'Angleterre pour amy." The prince said, "Mon Amy, ne me regardez pas comme Prince mais comme gentilhomme et officier Anglois. J'ay eu l'honneur de servir plusieurs années dans vos Troupes, et je crois que le Duc de Marlborough et tous vos officiers diront que je n'ai jamais été déserteur. A présent que je rentre dans le service je me comporterai de même, et le bon Dieu bénira le Roy, ayant si glorieusement soutenu un de ces anciens officiers."

But Campredon (*Memoir*, p. 162) says that the queen and prince and most of the senators were greatly displeased at the conclusions of the council, but dared not show their dissatisfaction openly.

[2] Carteret, 2 Sept. o.s.

And I am humbly to request, that your Czarish Majesty will be pleased to cause all Hostilities to cease in the mean time, to shew your Majesty's favourable disposition to Peace." [1]

The letters were carried to the Åland isles by one Berkeley,[2] but they were neither accepted there nor allowed to be sent on to St. Petersburg.[3] So that it was clear, Carteret wrote,[4] that the mediation would not be accepted, but the war continued. On the other hand Peter desired the mediation of the United Provinces to prevent a joint attack upon him by Great Britain and Sweden. But Kurakin, presenting the proposal, was answered that the States-General were rather inclined to use their influence in promoting a general pacification in the north. In view of the great complaints of the treatment of Dutch ships he recommended his master to release them and their cargoes.[5]

In spite of his declared intention to return at once Norris was detained at Dalarö by the pressing instances of the Swedes till 20 October. The only operation undertaken was the sailing of Sparre with some frigates for Dantzig to drive away some Russian vessels watching that port and Königsberg. It was unsuccessful, because the Russians had notice of Sparre's coming and moved in under the fortifications of Dantzig, where they were safe.[6] Norris's time was taken up with consultations upon the operations to be undertaken in the following year and the preparations for them.[7] As an acknowledgment of the queen's appreciation of his zeal and goodwill he received a bill for 1,000 ship-pounds of iron with the further promise of " a gallanterea," while his son and the two rear-admirals were given gold medals.

Some ill-feeling was caused by an alleged statement of Norris, reported to the senate, that had he not been brought to Dalarö

[1] 31 Aug. o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval. Carteret in like terms, 1 Sept. o.s., Sweden 25 and B. M. Add. MSS. 28156.

[2] Eldest son of Lord Berkeley of Stratton, says Carteret, 7 Sept. o.s. He was back at Stockholm on 30 Sept.

[3] Peter declared to Kurakin that he would never yield to such barbarian threats, but would prolong the war, trusting in God. It was very necessary now, he said, to seek the alliance of Spain, if that court would promise to continue the war with France, or at least with Great Britain, until Louis XV attained his majority. The English would have to maintain at least twenty men-of-war in the Baltic and even more in the Mediterranean. It would be well to send out the intended expedition against England in the spring, after her fleet had been so divided (20 Sept. o.s., *Kurakin Archives*, I. 11).

[4] 27 Sept. o.s. His letter to General Bruce at Lofö and the reply, R. O. Sweden 25.

[5] Despatch of 10 Oct., Uhlenbeck; cf. Bacmeister, III. 209.

[6] See for particulars Joshua Kenworthy from Dantzig, 11 Oct., R. O. Russia 9 (cf. Jefferyes, 5 Dec. o.s., ibid., and Sparre to Norris, 10 Oct. o.s., B. M. Add. MSS. 28156).

[7] See B. M. ibid. and R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

the Russian fleet might have been cut off. Carteret thought sufficiently seriously of the matter to get the protocol recording the statement altered. Admiral Sparre was blamed. Carteret says that he had many enemies, he could not tell why, but anything against him was acceptable.[1]

When at length Norris did sail he only got as far as Elsnabben, where he was detained by south-westerly gales till 7 November, in great difficulties for provisions. Even then he had the greatest trouble in accomplishing his journey southwards; the whole squadron, some of the ships badly damaged, only assembled in Copenhagen roads on the 18th. As it was now too late to obey the orders he received to come to see the king at Hanover he sailed for home, and after encountering further violent storms anchored at the Nore on 9 December. He learnt that his conduct was approved.[2]

Carteret in the meantime was pressing on the final or " solemn " treaties with Hanover and Great Britain and peace with Prussia and Denmark. A first point was to get them concluded at Stockholm instead of at Brunswick, that is to say, without the intervention of the emperor. The chief argument in opposition was that, his mediation having been accepted, not to observe the formalities in regard thereto would be an insult to him and of no advantage to any one; he might, indeed, refuse to co-operate against the tsar. Carteret was supported not only by Campredon, who intimated " that they have better friends in the world than the Court of Vienna," but also by Count Eric Sparre. In a memorial advocating a defensive alliance with Great Britain, France and Prussia with reciprocal guarantees and commercial advantages as against the Dutch—an alliance which might bring about a breach between Prussia and the tsar and force the king of Denmark to make peace—nothing, he said, was to be expected from the emperor but " ambages et longueurs," and to delay the treaties for reference

[1] 10 Oct. o.s., with enclosure, B. M. ibid. Here may be noted a commercial scheme, not well explained, of which Norris wrote to Carteret: " Your Lordp. is perfectly in the right notion to have it in the Prince's name, and such a grant for a term of years is almost an estate even to let out to others without adventure, and if this can be well digested we may all in a few years make good fortunes and leave the Prince in the method of great advantage likewise " (17 Oct. o.s., ibid.). Also a curious point of law. Lieutenant Bagnall of the *Worcester* was murdered on an island near Dalarö by the mate of his ship. Norris found that he had no authority to try offences committed on a foreign shore even by his own seamen, and reflected thereon that the case ought to be provided for by Act of Parliament (journal, 8 Oct. o.s.). And this, it appears, was done; when in 1721 Lord James Hay accidentally killed a Mr. Blondworth when out shooting, Norris wrote that " according to a late law " he was empowered to hold a court-martial (26 May o.s. 1721, R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval).

[2] Journal, and R. O. ibid. and Admiralty, Secretary's Dept., In-Letters 3.

to Brunswick would be alike dishonourable to Sweden and inconsonant to the wishes of France and Great Britain, the two powers who must co-operate in a plan of campaign against the tsar, and who alone could control the court of Berlin, the most difficult to manage.[1] Carteret and Campredon said that the mention of the emperor's mediation only arose from the anxiety of the kings of England and Prussia to show their attachment and respect to him. In the end their arguments prevailed. The queen, Carteret wrote on 27 September o.s., had agreed to finish the treaties at Stockholm and to send to the emperor the necessary letter for the investiture of the duchies and to Hanover an act absolving her subjects there from their allegiance. "These are the great points which will meet with no difficulty as matters now stand, if Mr. Bassewitz has orders sent him to conclude speedily. The Queen, I believe, may be brought to relinquish the titles." What remained, matters relating to the internal affairs of the duchies, Carteret thought should be settled by commissioners after the treaty was concluded.[2]

With his despatch of 30 September Stanhope enclosed drafts of two articles to be inserted in the British treaty, the one guaranteeing the treaties of Westphalia with the exception of places named, the other binding Sweden to listen to no propositions from Spain to the prejudice of the powers engaged in the war with that country. The exceptions in the former were the provinces ceded to Hanover and Prussia and Sleswick and Wismar, whose destiny was to be decided at Brunswick, but they did not include Stralsund and Rügen. In regard to them, while Carteret was ordered to make a further effort, by a memorial to the queen, to obtain their cession to Denmark, privately he was informed that, if he found the proposition invincibly repugnant, he should say in confidence that it was not

[1] Memorial to the queen of Sweden, 12 Sept. o.s., R. O. Sweden 25. Sparre, it seems, was distrusted both by Carteret and by the prince of Hesse. Too French, the former said, yet not of the regent's party; a man, however, of great quality, estate and interest. The prince desired a hint to be given to Stanhope not to talk with the count, who was about to go to Hanover, on his private affairs (Carteret, 5 and 9 Sept. o.s.). Sparre landed at Travemünde early in November, proceeding to Hanover and thence as Swedish ambassador successively to Vienna and Paris.

[2] Carteret had been much hampered, he said, in his work by the illness of the prince and by Dücker's mourning for his wife, whereby he was thrown back on Cronhielm, "who is an eloquent man, which has cost me much labour and time." He had been forced to break in upon Dücker's "retirement and grief, and got him to come out, or else this plain and reasonable matter had not yet been finished." On 29 Oct. o.s. he wrote: "I have got the better of Count Cronhielm in a pitched battle. He has been reprimanded by the Queen and Prince. I now make my court to him, and by this incident shall finish the treaty sooner." In January Cronhielm was dismissed from his office of president of the chancery, being replaced by Lillienstedt. This, Jackson wrote, would much facilitate the conclusion of the British and Prussian treaties, Cronhielm "having used all manner of artifices to obstruct their progress" (2 Jan. o.s. 1720, R. O. Sweden 23).

desired to compel Sweden to make this cession, but to show the Danes, by the presentation of the memorial, the vivacity with which their interests were supported. If the memorial were rejected, Stanhope wrote, Carteret might promise to pass the Westphalia article as drafted upon condition that the treaties with Hanover and Prussia were completed without delay. A verbal promise before witnesses ought to be sufficient. The article would make Great Britain a guarantor of the treaties of Westphalia.[1]

"Au reste, My Lord, ce que j'ay le plus fortement à vous recommander, c'est de finir les Traittez de Messrs. Bassewitz et Knyphausen; et si pour cet effet vous étiez réduit à la nécessité de donner par écrit la promesse que vous passerez l'Article ci-joint tel que Je vous l'envoye, comptez que vous ne serez pas désavoué. Il vaudroit mieux s'en dispenser, si l'on pouvoit, et par un reste de ménagement pour le Danemarc on ne voudroit point signer un tel engagement à son préjudice, tant qu'il y a la moindre lueur d'espérance qu'il pourroit s'accomoder. Mais si vous ne pouviez finir autrement, donnez leur la promesse par écrit. Vous avez risqué de vous commettre pendant le cours de vôtre négotiation pour le service du Public, et le bon Dieu vous a béni. Je me commets peut-être en vous écrivant ceci, mais je feray de mon mieux pour soutenir tout ce que vous ferez en conséquence."

The article, Carteret replied, gave him great consolation, it would enable him to cut short a great deal of chicane.[2]

In a despatch of 8 October Stanhope explained what had been done to Dubois.[3] Campredon, whose excellent agreement with Carteret he noted,[4] having arrived after the preliminary convention was signed, had drawn up a separate act to include the mediation and guarantee of France for everything concluded with Sweden. But, though the substance of this was agreed to, it had not been thought proper to sign it, mention of the mediation and guarantee having been suitably provided for in the double ratification of the separate articles, of which Stair would have given an account. Carteret had orders to insert mention of the mediation and guarantee of France in the final British treaty and to agree with Campredon on the manner in which this should be expressed. And as Dubois had had a just scruple against France appearing to have procured and to guarantee the second article thereof, which had reference to the maintenance of the protestant religion in general and would

[1] "Qui font le Base et, pour ainsi dire, la Magna Carta de la Cause Protestante, aussi bien que des Libertez Germaniques."

[2] 20 Oct. o.s.

[3] R. O. France 165, B. M. Add. MSS. 28156.

[4] "Cela ne pouvoit manquer vu leurs ordres et leurs dispositions." Carteret wrote of Campredon's invaluable aid (20 Oct. o.s.): "I doubt whether any of the Solemn Treaties wou'd have been sign'd at Stockholm, if he had not in the name of France heartily labour'd that point."

have a good effect in parliament, this would be omitted from the formal treaty and inserted in a separate article, to which the mediation of France would not extend. As to the confirmation of the treaties of Westphalia Dubois would see that there was added a British guarantee, which neither Campredon nor the Swedes had asked for. This would serve to stop the mouths of objectors to the French guarantees of Bremen and Verden and Stettin. For while France derogated from the treaties of Westphalia by giving them, she acquired a British guarantee of all the rest, whereas hitherto Great Britain had never contracted any engagement for their maintenance. As this article, Stanhope went on, would be agreeable to France and Sweden, so it would be ill received at Vienna, and knowledge of it should be kept from that court as long as possible. Carteret was ordered to require secrecy about it at Stockholm till the treaty was signed, and Dubois would permit the same to be requested of him. The reason for excepting Wismar from the confirmation of the treaties of Westphalia was that something might be reserved to contribute to an accommodation between Denmark and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, it being absolutely necessary to leave Sleswick, also excepted, to the former, for otherwise all hope must be abandoned of persuading that king to make peace and detach himself from the tsar.[1] Seeing now that everything that the Swedes could desire had been surpassed, it was hoped that they would be persuaded to facilitate on their side a peace with Denmark, for only by making it could they put themselves in a condition to contend successfully against the tsar. To drive him back to his old bounds there were two ways, the one, for Poles and Swedes to unite in driving him out of Livonia and the neighbourhood, the other for Turks and Tartars to attack him on their side. The king of Poland had already made overtures to the above effect; the Turks had good cause for war, in that the treaty of the Pruth had not been observed. Stanhope hoped that Bonac at Constantinople might have orders to conduct himself more in accordance with Dubois' ideas than he had hitherto done, in order that a general peace in the north might be accelerated.

Replying to a similar despatch addressed to himself Stair expressed the regent's satisfaction with everything and his intention to do all he could to win over Denmark and force the tsar to make peace. The orders to Bonac asked for were to be sent at once. Schleinitz having expressed the tsar's willingness to accept the

[1] "Au reste, ce n'est que par une précaution surabondante que nous avons excepté ce Duché spécialement, et il ne nous paroit point qu'en le cédant au Roy de Danemarc l'on dérogeroit aux Traittés de Westphalie, dans lesquels il n'est compris qu'en termes généraux, sans mentionner à qui il doit appartenir."

second alternative of the Swedish counter-ultimatum, Stair had replied that this would not do now; the powers interested in the Baltic could not afford to allow him to keep Reval, though a good part of his conquests he might hold with the goodwill of everyone.[1] There were great compliments too from Dubois, who professed to regard Stanhope's success as miraculous and lauded highly his penetration and activity. He hoped that he would now arrive "à bout de pacifier le Sud et le Nord." Senneterre, he said, was ordered to express the regent's gratitude for the insertion of the French mediation and guarantee, for the restoration of Stralsund and Rügen, and indeed for all that had been done.[2] And the regent wrote to George in corresponding terms.[3]

Enclosing to Carteret an extract from the above despatch to Dubois Luke Schaub, who was now with Stanhope at Hanover, advised him to have orders sent to Count Bielke, who had been talking unsuitably at Ratisbon and Vienna, to moderate his language.[4] He sent also the following extract from a despatch from St. Saphorin, the British minister at Vienna :—

"Assure yourself they are here very jealous of us, and altho' they agree that the treaties we have made with Sweden and Prussia have been necessary, they are nevertheless displeased that the circumstances were such as would fully justify them. And altho' they reap so great an advantage from the ascendant his Majesty has acquired with the Regent, they are also very jealous of it." [5]

The conclusion of the final Hanoverian treaty was still delayed. Stanhope pointed out that the apparent callousness of the Swedes in regard to it would postpone their handling the million crowns and that, if they did not hasten to complete it and the Prussian also, they would not be able to count upon the king's assistance whether in the coming winter or in the spring.[6] Had Carteret had charge of the treaty it might have been settled by the middle of October, for he wrote that he would have signed a draft given by the Swedes to Bassewitz "without losing a moment's time, for

[1] 18 Oct.

[2] Letters dated 20 Oct., R. O. France 165. Stair wrote privately on the same date, noting the good effect on the malcontents at the French court: "One that has seen the many difficulties of different kinds you had to struggle with, must own, that nothing but the skill and vigour with which these negotiations have been carried on could have brought them to perfection."

[3] Same date, ibid.

[4] 11 Oct., B. M. Add. MSS. 28156. This was Count Thure Gabriel Bielke. He had set out from Stockholm for Vienna shortly after Carteret's arrival, reaching Germany under convoy from Norris.

[5] 27 Sept., ibid.

[6] 29 Sept.

reasons too plain to be inserted." [1] He asked that Bassewitz might have orders to sign at once, or, if any considerable alterations were thought necessary, to say that the first third of the million crowns was awaiting at Hamburg to be paid, " which will be a bait to tempt them." He complained bitterly of the delays caused by Hanoverian insistence on points solely of electoral interest.[2]

At length the treaty and documents appertaining were signed on 9–20 November. " Your lordship's letter of 29th October N.S.," Carteret wrote, " has cleared up all difficulties." He had now taken upon himself his character of ambassador, in order to act properly as mediator of the Prussian and Danish treaties.[3]

The complete treaty differed much from the preliminary convention. The preamble recorded the mediation and good offices of Louis XV for the latter through Campredon, an agreeable fiction. The first two clauses provided for friendship and amnesty, the third confirmed the cession of the duchies with all rights and

[1] 2 Oct. o.s.

[2] Thus in a private letter of 26 Sept. o.s., reporting the payment of the 110,000 crowns on Prussian account : " if Mr. Bassewitz wou'd have ventured, I cou'd have concluded, I verily believe, the solemn treaty at the same time. That affair is now dwindled from a negotiation into a squabble, for the reasons I hint in my publick letter." If not concluded speedily, it would be infallibly mixed up with the British treaty. Cronhielm said it would be a shame for the duchies to appear to have been sold for one million crowns, and wanted all the advantages of the British treaty recited in the preamble. " He insists on this maliciously. . . . My L^d., entreat the King to give orders that they do not insist upon trifles, otherwise, with great concern I say it, his business will never be done. . . . If I was to write to y^r L^p. all, it wou'd make you sick as it do's me." And in his ordinary despatch : " These points must be settled by Commissarys, after the solemn treaty is concluded. They can never keep pace with it, and all this proceeds from that 3rd art., which I sent your Lordship in my letter of the 2nd inst., to which Mr. Bassewitz can get the Plenipotentiarys to give no better name than chicane. Count Cronhielm, who in such matters will yield to no man, has in his turn thrust in such things " as only a lawyer could adjust. Then on 2 Oct. o.s. Carteret sent the conditions which the Swedes now insisted upon having inserted in the body of the treaty and those which they were content to leave to be settled by commissioners after it was signed, " neither of which wou'd have been so fill'd, if Mr. Bassewitz had been at liberty to take my advice, and sign the Treaty as he once cou'd have got it. . . . They insist upon the King's renewing the Ancient Alliances, as Elector, because it shall not appear that they gave up these Provinces for a million. What those alliances are I don't know, nor does Mr. Bassewitz. His orders are to answer *dilatorie* upon that head, for which I don't know an English word. What can a minister do under such orders ? These people desire a plain and positive answer. . . . Little points must ever be overlooked in transacting great business in such a ticklish conjuncture as we have here." And again, 29 Oct. o.s. : " Mr. Bernstorff is much dissatisfied with the separate article. He wrote to Schrader to desire me to suspend putting it in execution. I regarded that advice as an honest man should do, with great neglect. Schrader is an honest sensible man, and deserves well of the King for his conduct here, if he had had the Plein-pouvoir the treaty would have been concluded some weeks ago."

[3] 10 Nov. o.s. And so to Schaub on the 8th : " Le moment que je receus la dernière dépêche de M^r. Stanhope toutes les difficultés disparurent. . . . J'éspère de finir le traitté d'Angleterre sans attendre le projet. J'ai tant risqué que c'est trop tard de devenir sage."

privileges appertaining, set out in full particularity, while the next four dealt with their internal affairs, maintenance of ancient liberties, freedom of exercise of the reformed religion, redress of old grievances and preservation of old claims, restitution of confiscations due to the war, payment of debts contracted by the regency before the Danish occupation. Under clause 8 the king of England agreed to renew former alliances and friendship and also the guarantees regarding Holstein-Gottorp, " sur le pied de ce qui a déjà été réglé entre les Alliés du Nord, ou qui sera ci-après réglé pour la paix future et de diriger cette alliance selon la présente conjoncture," and further to pay the remaining two-thirds of the million rix-dollars in a single payment within six weeks of the exchange of ratifications. The ninth clause provided that the treaties of Westphalia, so far as not " dérogés " by the present treaty or by the future pacification of the north, should remain in complete force. The tenth reserved power to seek and admit the guarantees of the emperor and others. The last two stipulated exchange of ratifications at Stockholm within two months from signature, and for duplicate copies. Three separate articles specified affairs of the duchies which were to be settled by commissioners.[1]

The queen's ratification and the formal acts in connexion were not handed over to Bassewitz till 13 December. The delay was the consequence, says Carteret, of Bielke's reports from Vienna, where the mention of French mediation was objected to and that of the emperor at Brunswick insisted upon. There is much in the despatches about this, and St. Saphorin was implicated; he defended himself by accusing the ill-intentioned in Sweden of giving a wrong turn to what Bielke said.[2] Cronhielm and his party did their best to aggravate the uneasiness felt at Stockholm in the matter. But a letter from Prince Eugene, Carteret wrote, approving both the Hanoverian treaty and the Prussian draft, had enabled him to pass off the objections as due to excess of caution on the part of St. Saphorin. He thought that the Swedish chancery, in writing to Bielke, had confused the Hanoverian and the British treaties. After the ratification he wrote: " nothing gives me so much pleasure in this business as to see the goodwill with which this cession is made." The queen's titles to Bremen and Verden were still used, for formal reasons, but she had notified her intention to use in future only " the ancient title of Queen of the Swedes, Goths and Vandals." The British treaty he was keeping back till the Prussian was settled, for till then he could not " adjust the

[1] Copy, R. O. Treaty Papers 71.
[2] To Schaub, 13 Jan. 1720, R. O. Germany (Empire) 40.

guarantees." [1] King George's ratification was delivered in February 1720.

But there were later verbal changes in the treaty. Carteret wrote on 17 February o.s. :—

"I was yesterday at a conference, when Mr. Bassewitz delivered the King's ratification. The Swedes will alter theirs as the King desires, and use the words of the formulary, as it was sent in the King's last rescript. The Swedish ratification must be entirely writ over again . . . till then I don't part with what I have."

To negotiate the peace between Sweden and Prussia Knyphausen arrived at Stockholm at the beginning of November. Orders had been sent to Captain Smith of the *Port Mahon* to convey him to Sweden a month before,[2] but the grant of his passport had been steadily put off, until, as was alleged, king George's ratification of the British preliminary convention should be received.[3] Stanhope had directed Carteret to see that the preliminaries agreed upon were strictly adhered to, but on all other points to act as an impartial mediator conjointly with Campredon and do his best to remove difficulties. Special care, he said, must be taken to provide expressly for the re-establishment of the Baltic commerce on its old footing, in whomsoever's hands the ports might remain, as in the second article of the British treaty with Prussia. Knyphausen would agree to this as regarded Stettin and would undertake that no new tolls should be imposed on the traffic of Oder or Peene.[4] Carteret remarked that Knyphausen would see that neither his own great abilities nor his master's credit, although "sustained by the power and violence" of the tsar, would avail by themselves, all that the king of Prussia had obtained having been due to the influence of the king of England ; and he would meet with insuperable difficulties unless he could show that the former " will enter into the great and necessary design of driving the Czar out of the Baltick, at least out of Revel and Livonia." Prompt payment of the two million crowns for Stettin was wanted, the difficulty being to tide over the next two years ; four million had been demanded, and the reduced amount had only been accepted on the condition of immediate payment in full. The mere expectation of receiving so much money at once had raised Swedish credit 20 per cent.[5]

Knyphausen's first step was to sound Carteret upon a cession

[1] To Stanhope, 4 Dec. o.s. ; to St. Saphorin, 2 Dec. o.s.
[2] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 220.
[3] Really, Carteret wrote in cipher, in order that Knyphausen might have nothing to do with the distribution of the 110,000 crowns among the senators.
[4] 24 Sept.
[5] 27 Sept. and 2 Oct. o.s.

of the whole of Swedish Pomerania to Prussia, an ambition, therefore, still nourished at Berlin in spite of formal disavowal in consequence of French opposition.[1] He believed, he told Carteret,

" that he could persuade the King his master, as a condition for the cession of the rest of Pomerania and Rügen with the dependencies, to joyn to the Swedish troops 20,000 of his own, and over and above give subsidies sufficient to pay the Hessian troops. So that the King of Prussia would help Sweden upon his own bottom and at his own expense with 30,000 men, make himself as it were a principal in the quarrel, and continue in it till all was fairly over, Sweden re-instated in Finland, Eastland and Liefland, and the Czar drove beyond his ancient limits."

This could not be done for Stettin only, which was regarded as bought. And it was absurd to consider or to expect aid from Denmark. Supposing 25,000 Swedes landed in Livonia; if they were not supported, not a man would come back; the tsar would keep Finland in addition to the rest and would perhaps conquer Sweden itself, and England and France could not hinder him. If his wishes in regard to Stralsund and Rügen were not considered the king of Prussia would remain indifferent, knowing that they must come to him sooner or later, from Denmark immediately or from Sweden some time. Carteret replied that he could not enter into any such scheme nor act in any other manner than as mediator upon the terms already stipulated. But he was taken with the idea and proceeded to discuss it, propounding the certainty of success of a general offensive league against Russia.[2] Knyphausen, however, did not abandon the scheme, dropping, says Carteret, a hint to the prince that he could find him 600,000 or 700,000 crowns if he would do something real for the king of Prussia.[3]

There was delay, principally on minor points, chief of them the " Licenten " of Wolgast.[4] Stanhope supported the Prussian

[1] Cf. Stair, 18 Oct., and Stanhope to him, 9 Nov. Whitworth wrote in cipher (21 Oct.): " Monsieur Ilgen a pressé le Comte de Rottembourg d'écrire fortement en France pour ce que sa Cour favorise le Roy de Prusse dans son dessein d'acheter Rügen et Stralsund de la Suède." Stair later took advantage of Knyphausen's proposal to press for a resumption of the payment of subsidies to the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel (who had shared with Sweden the subsidies paid under the treaty of April 1715), in order that he might use them to place his son in a position to hinder the demand, as the latter wished to do. And not only did the regent agree to this, but also sent a sum of money for the prince's private use (Stair, 12, 27 and 30 Dec.).

[2] Carteret, 26 Oct. o.s. He gave his opinion that if 60,000 men could be brought together, of whom 25,000 Swedes, " Reval and Riga will fall in one campaign, and the Muscovite power be crushed."

[3] But " I know the Prince is above any such thing " ; he had solemnly promised never to think of the cession (Carteret, 10 Dec. o.s.).

[4] These were tolls at one time levied at Wolgast but long since transferred to Stettin, and now claimed by Prussia. The other points were (1) the retention of certain reversionary rights under the treaties of Westphalia to Stettin, to Prussia proper, and to the towns of Damm and Gollnow beyond the Oder, matters which

claims, saying that the Swedes would lose more by deferring the conclusion of the treaty on these small points than by consenting to them; it had been hoped that they would have "better considered their own interest, and finished with Mr. Cnyphausen without sticking at trifles."[1] By the end of the year, however, everything was settled, excepting about the "Licenten," and Knyphausen agreed to refer this matter to commissioners.[2] But suddenly he received fresh instructions from which he was forbidden to depart "un seul iota"; the consequence, according to Carteret, who found himself "in as intricate a case as ever," of his sending to Berlin, contrary to his promise, a copy of the first Swedish counter-project, subsequently altered to accord more with his views. If Knyphausen's hands, Carteret went on, were really bound, the treaty was lost. The Swedes would not hear the new project read but had ordered their own to be engrossed, and it had been offered to Knyphausen to sign. If he would not, then himself and Campredon must accept the treaty as mediators and he would complete the British treaty, for, if he did not, new difficulties would be raised in the riksdag about to assemble. "What can I do? 'tis vain to ask. The States assemble in fifteen days, before which time I can have no answer from anybody. . . . I would pay a good sum of money to be out of it." Anyhow he would keep his word with the queen and prince, who would otherwise suffer extremely, especially the prince, "to whom Our Master has great obligations."[3]

Carteret and Campredon desired should be left "to be decided by posterity," (2) intricate matters relating to the rights of private persons. See fully Carteret's despatch of 4 Dec. o.s. As he phrased it later (30 Dec. o.s.): "The King of Prussia won't pay no duties at all at Wolgast, not even the ancient duties properly belonging to the place, and settled long time before the war."

[1] 22 Dec. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155. [2] Carteret, 23 Dec. o.s.

[3] To Whitworth, 30 Dec. o.s., R. O. Sweden 26. To Stanhope Carteret wrote (2 Jan. o.s., ibid.): "Unexpected and undeserved difficulties have arisen in the negotiation with the King of Prussia, who by a little start of passion, and tying up the hands of his ministers too strait, has gone a great way towards obstructing his own business." If Knyphausen "will not sign what by his own approval Monsr. Campredon and I have been able after great difficulties to obtain for him, I must indispensably venture to accept the Swedes' signature of the treaty as we have by our Mediation fixed it," in the hope that the king would be able to persuade the king of Prussia to accept it. Campredon approved, but would only act in this manner in the last extremity. The British treaty must be finished before the meeting of the Estates, "or the best of our friends will have just reason to accuse us, and our own interests will suffer for want of our work being approved in that Assembly, which we can't expect it should be, but the contrary, if the English alliance is not ready to be produced." If the British treaty were signed before the Prussian, the latter would infallibly be sent to Brunswick, which would be worse for the king of Prussia. "I hope Mr. Cnyphausen will venture, otherwise I must." The documents accompany Carteret's despatches. Whitworth wrote to Stanhope (19 Dec.) that the king of Prussia's statement, that the "ultimatum" was his last resolution, was only "the effect of a little vivacity," and would not be carried out literally. He attributed the difficulty (17 Feb. 1720) to the inadequacy of the information sent by Knyphausen.

As the result, Carteret signed the British treaty on 21 January o.s., the night before the riksdag assembled, and at the same time he and Campredon accepted as mediators the Prussian treaty signed by the Swedes only, and gave a promissory paper acknowledging its receipt and acceptance, recording Knyphausen's refusal to sign in spite of all persuasion, and declaring that, if the king of Prussia would not accept and ratify within six weeks, the treaty should be returned to the Swedish plenipotentiaries as "nul et non avenu." [1]

Later, the sum of 100,000 crowns was sent to Knyphausen to be bestowed by him, says Whitworth, "as he should think most proper for procuring the same conditions as had been granted to his Majesty and obliging the Swedes to desist from their pretensions to the Licent." [2] Carteret wrote on 12 February o.s. that Knyphausen had received the money and offered to put it into his hands "to get the Zol and Licent of Wolgast. I desired him to send the bills back, it being impossible to obtain." [3]

The Prussian treaty began in peculiar phraseology by acknowledging the good offices of the king of Great Britain, which under the Divine benefaction had procured in the treaty of 18–29 August 1719 an agreement upon preliminary articles to serve as a basis for peace between Sweden and Prussia by the praiseworthy offices of the king of France, uninterruptedly exercised to pacify all the belligerents under his mediation. The majority of the clauses dealt with the internal affairs of the territories ceded, liberties and rights, freedom of religion according to the Augsburg Confession, redress of grievances, and so on, and with the navigation of the rivers, in which Swedish commerce was to be favoured; the question of the "Licent" being left to be settled by commissioners. There were the usual first clauses respecting friendship and amnesty, liberty of navigation and commerce, release of prisoners, and mutual help. The king of Prussia undertook to observe the treaty of 18–29 August in all its points. He further engaged not to assist the tsar during the present war with Sweden directly or indirectly, and to renew former friendship and alliance, with guarantees regarding the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, on the footing of the treaties concluded with the allies of the north or to be concluded in concert

[1] Carteret, 26 and 27 Jan. o.s. "I believe it is the first time," he wrote, "that in the course of a mediation, when a Treaty was in a manner brought by it to a conclusion, that an ultimatum was ever sent by the Prince, who sought the mediation, and this ultimatum founded upon matters wrong understood." However, a treaty had been obtained for the king of Prussia "in the most advantageous manner that it can ever be framed."

[2] Whitworth, 17 Feb.

[3] Cf. his despatch of 24 Feb. o.s. on Knyphausen obstructing the Danish peace in order to be able to buy the "Licent."

with himself. He engaged to pay to Sweden two million rix-dollars in instalments during the year and to do all he could to persuade the enemies of Sweden to conclude equitable conditions of peace. It was stated that the treaties of Westphalia, so far as not derogated by recent or impending treaties, were to continue in force; in particular the king of Prussia was to work with the king of England to obtain for Sweden restitution of Stralsund and Rügen and to use the most pressing instances with the emperor for that object. He was to withdraw his garrison from Wismar as soon as peace was signed betwen Sweden and Denmark. Lastly, there was to be liberty to seek and admit imperial and other guarantees of the present treaty. The first separate article stated that, it being notorious that the protestant religion was being persecuted within and without the empire and particularly in Poland and Lithuania, the most efficacious means were to be employed jointly in the strongest manner to defend both the Lutheran and Reformed religions as under the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva. Two others had reference to ecclesiastical and other questions within the ceded province, and a fourth to matters affecting the part of Pomerania occupied by the Danes, should it be restored to Sweden.[1]

Carteret wrote to Whitworth[2] at length about the treaty, recounting what had occurred, and explaining and criticizing it clause by clause. It could be allowed to go to Brunswick or not, he said, by refusal or acceptance, as the king of Prussia pleased, but it could never be drawn again so advantageously for him, if the present opportunity were lost. To Stanhope he wrote that Knyphausen really approved of what had been done, adding, "I can say one thing which I thinke will please you, that there is not a scrap of publick paper in the world that can shew that this treaty has been dependent upon that of Bremen and Verhden."[3]

When Whitworth and Rottembourg learnt what had been done they determined to attack the king personally, and were fortunate in finding him in an excellent temper. He approved the whole treaty without change. On 24 February his ratification was despatched to Stockholm, with, however, what Whitworth called "a very long and frivolous representation" about the tolls. This caused little difficulty; the ratifications were exchanged on 5 March o.s. Prussian chicanery, Carteret wrote, had nearly ruined everything, and the treaty would certainly have been remitted to Brunswick had it not been "for our King's honour" to have it settled

[1] Copy, R. O. Sweden 26.
[2] 22 Jan. o.s. 1720, copy enclosed with Carteret's despatch to Stanhope of the 26th, ibid.
[3] 29 Jan. o.s., private.

at Stockholm.[1] On 2 April o.s. full powers issued to Whitworth to confer with the ministers of Sweden and Prussia about settling the "Licent" and other questions which might arise in connexion.[2] Ranke observes that by the cessions of Stettin and of Bremen and Verden the proposals of the Prussian-Hanoverian treaty of 1684 were carried out, France now assenting instead of, as formerly, opposing.[3]

The final treaty with Great Britain was a lengthy and detailed document.[4] The preamble stated the desire to renew former treaties, particularly that of 1700, under the mediation and guarantee of France. The parties undertook to discover to each other all dangers and conspiracies, to join their counsels and forces to avert and annul them, to attempt nothing damaging to each other in any way, and therefore not to harbour rebels, much less to give assistance to them, but to deal with them as traitors. There was to be a special defensive alliance for mutual advantage and safety, for the security of the protestant religion, and for protection of dominion and liberty of navigation in northern waters and in the Channel. The queen of Sweden undertook on no account to listen to any propositions from Spain, nor to give asylum or assistance to the Pretender or his descendants or to the king's rebel subjects, and so on, but to maintain and guarantee the protestant succession. The mutual succour to be furnished, if required, was fixed at 6,000 foot or the equivalent in munitions of war, forage, ships, etc., at the rate of 4,000 imperial thalers per month per 1,000 men; if that succour were not sufficient then more was to be given, as in the present case when Sweden was still engaged in war with more than one power. If, it was said, the present efforts to end the northern war proved ineffectual, the king of England would lose no further time in negotiation but send to the Baltic in the coming spring a strong squadron to be at the disposition of the queen of Sweden and to assist her fleet in repelling the tsar's attack. The ports of either party were to be open to the ships of the other, and those of neutral powers were not to be molested; on the other hand the subjects of neither should be allowed to use the ports to the advantage of the enemy. Conditions for a treaty of navigation and commerce were set out in great particularity. Whereas

[1] 5 March o.s., Whitworth wrote (24 Feb.): "it is no easy matter to keep people from spoiling their own business, but by going on roundly and steadily reasonable things will always be brought to bear."

[2] R. O. King's Letters 65. Carteret wrote on 9 March o.s. that he supposed that the king would give orders for the "Licent" to be adjudged to Prussia.

[3] *Preussische Geschichte*, V. 30.

[4] Original, R. O. Treaties 531. Carteret's comments on its provisions with his of 26 Jan. o.s.

the parties to the treaty of 1700 were exempted from sending the stipulated succour if themselves engaged in war and therefore Great Britain had been so exempted during the war with France, but from the end of that war Sweden claimed her subsidies; and whereas satisfaction for damages to trade was demanded by both sides; now commissioners were to be appointed to assess and balance those claims and damages. The present treaty was in no wise to derogate from the sovereignty of the parties in their respective seas. The succour sent under its conditions might, if desired, be considered as auxiliary, and the party sending not take part in the war; but no peace nor truce might be agreed to by the one at war without inclusion of the other, nor, if both were engaged in the war, might either agree to preliminaries of peace separately. The exemption above-named was renewed, but from it the present war between Great Britain and Spain was specially excepted. The king of England was to send the stipulated ships and subsidies so long as the war with the tsar lasted, and the subsidies during that with Denmark, supposing that, as was not expected, it outlasted the other. As it was of very great importance that the Baltic Sea should not be under the domination of the tsar, if he refused to make peace and restitution, then the king of England would not only help against him as provided but would use his good offices with his allies to obtain their help also to enable Sweden to reduce him. The mutual obligations as to succour, however, were not to extend to cutting off all friendship and commerce with the enemy of the other party, but the subjects of the party not at war were to have liberty to trade with such enemy, excepting in contraband. Other treaties or conventions were not to be brought forward as excusing from the present obligations. The treaty was to last for eighteen years, and to be made perpetual, if at any time thought fit. There followed two separate articles. The first was an engagement to combine counsels and forces in defence of the protestant religion in the empire and everywhere else. The second alleged the advisability of a peace between Sweden and Denmark in the interests of freedom of navigation and commerce in the Baltic and for the common good of protestants, and to restrain the power of certain neighbours increasing every day; for which reasons the king of England had not only offered his mediation to both parties, which had been accepted, but now promised to be security and guarantor of the engagements of all treaties of friendship made by Sweden heretofore with Great Britain and lately with Hanover and Prussia and to be made with Denmark; and he particularly engaged himself to guarantee and maintain the treaties of Westphalia both as regarded the protestant religion and the

cessions made by them to Sweden, so far as not already excepted or to be excepted in the treaty with Denmark or at the congress of Brunswick.

The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged on 30 April. Sending that of king George Stanhope said that, but for Carteret's assurances, more particular statements would have been liked on the benefit to trade under clause 12 and its restriction to certain ports, and that Jackson should forward " an account of the import and reasons for those expressions " in the clause at the first opportunity. His Majesty readily agreed to the disposition of 20,000 crowns " banco " as in Carteret's of 13 February.[1]

Another convention signed by the Swedes (18 January) was with the king of Poland. It is not necessary to say more of the negotiations than that they had been begun in the summer by a mission of General Trautvetter to Dresden [2] and continued by him and by General Poniatowski, now reconciled to Augustus, travelling backwards and forwards and calling on their way at Hanover to receive king George's advice and instructions. One Boscawen, too, was sent by the latter to Dresden in September.[3] George was mainly concerned to reconcile the kings of Poland and Prussia in order to bring them into line against the tsar.[4] Particularly to satisfy his son-in-law, and especially on account of the electoral prince of Saxony's change of religion, he desired that the crown of Poland should remain elective and that there should be strong provision for the security of the Polish protestants.[5] After the exchange of projects and counter-projects preliminaries were signed containing the following provisions: an armistice, mutual renunciation of all pretensions and work for the common advantage, recognition of Augustus as sole and lawful king and after him whomsoever the republic should elect, reservation of efforts for a suitable provision for king Stanislaus at the future peace, amnesty and restitution of estates to all Poles who had taken his side and that of Sweden, all possible joint endeavours to preserve the liberties of the republic of Poland and the grand-duchy of Lithuania, validity of the conditions independently of treaties to be made with Sweden by other of the northern allies, all possible exertion to put an end

[1] 8 March o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155. Jackson's explanation was duly sent on 9 April o.s.

[2] John Renold de Trautvetter, General Prefect of the Queen's Guards, a Livonian says Carteret, and of Dücker's party. He had credentials to king George and a laudatory letter of introduction from Carteret of dates 26 Sept. and 3 Oct. o.s.

[3] A letter to Stanhope from Dresden (6 Sept., R. O., S.P. Dom. Geo. I. Vol. 17) is signed G. C. Boscawen, but the credentials (31 Aug., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 269) are made out in the name of Hugh Boscawen.

[4] Cf. instructions to James Scott, 8 Dec. o.s., p. 403.

[5] Stanhope to Whitworth, 27 Oct., cf. Whitworth, 28 Oct., R. O. Prussia 10.

to the troubles, and the conclusion of a solemn treaty under the mediation of the emperor, Great Britain and France, in which the treaty of Oliva would be confirmed in all its points and articles.[1]

These preliminaries remained for many years an empty form. Augustus continued to disregard the rights of the protestants[2] and the efforts of George and Frederick William in their behalf. On the other hand he was induced to explain his Fraustadt letter of March 1719, and to declare that there was no question of the "supremum dominium" of the king of Prussia in Prussia.[3]

[1] Carteret, 24 Jan. o.s. 1720.

[2] Of whom James Scott wrote that they were in a worse case than when he was in Poland before, the Bishop of Cracow being their chief enemy (R. O. Poland 26, 13 March 1720). See also on the subject Whitworth, 30 May and 10 June 1719, Prussia 8, and 23 Aug. 1720, Holland 274, and Droysen, p. 255.

[3] Scott, as above, enclosing a copy of the explanation. Stanhope had pressed this matter on his attention, on the appeal of the Prussian minister Wallenrodt.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE TREATY BETWEEN SWEDEN AND DENMARK

We have seen how firm an attitude was maintained at Copenhagen even after the failure of the invasion of Sweden. All Polwarth's arguments [1] on the necessity of making peace on the terms dictated were useless. He could only give warning of the danger of delay, which he attributed to the desire to wait and see whether any naval success would be obtained against the tsar. The answers to his representations were, that to the ultimatum delivered at Hanover was only to be added that the cession of Sleswick, Stralsund and Rügen, and Marstrand must be a preliminary condition to the discussion of other terms, in the same manner as the promise to cede Bremen and Verden had been a preliminary to the peace with Hanover. As to mediation and an armistice, the king would declare himself in a manner suitable to his friendship with Great Britain as soon as the above-said preliminaries were agreed to, provided that there was no derogation from the treaty of 1715, whose guarantees must continue.[2] Polwarth attributed this firmness to the king personally.[3] Stanhope answered with an exposition of all that the king of England had done for Denmark—for five years in succession, he professed, British fleets had gone to the Baltic solely to defend that country from Swedish attack, although Great Britain was in no way obliged thereto by treaty—and with arguments on the importance of British and other offices and guarantees for ducal Sleswick, which would not be given unless an immediate suspension of arms were consented to.[4] Carteret considered the Danish demands "to be founded upon nothing but a presumption that Sweden is undone," which was the reverse of

[1] A long string of these in Stanhope's of 16 Aug. o.s., R. O. Regencies 2, see also instructions to Polwarth, 19 Sept. o.s., Foreign Entry Book 220 and Denmark 42.

[2] Polwarth, 16 and 30 Sept.

[3] 3 Oct. "Tout ce qu'il répondit, ce fut fort froidement, 'J'ay déjà ordonné à mes Ministres de Vous donner une réponse là-dessus.'" Holm says that while Frederick had no great confidence in himself, and often gave way to opposition, once he had made up his mind to anything, nothing could turn him from it.

[4] 19 Sept. o.s.

fact; the Danes were really in the worse way. If the queen granted a suspension of arms, peace might be forced upon them by the British fleet. They might be told that the question of their retaining Stralsund and Rügen was not of sufficient weight for the great powers of Europe to allow the northern war to continue. They would get more by seeing the tsar driven out of the Baltic than those places were worth.[1]

The Swedes, on their side, handed in to Carteret and Campredon, as mediators, a formal statement of their terms as follows. In return for the restoration of the Pomeranian territory and of Marstrand without reserve and in the state they were in before the war a sum of money would be paid and Wismar ceded, upon condition of its not being fortified nor ever being mortgaged or sold to any other power. The peculiar tenures of and the treaties concerning Sleswick and Holstein obliged the interests of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to be referred to the emperor, but it was hoped that, as the duke had been neutral in the war, his dominions would be restored to him, or at least compensation granted to his entire satisfaction. And all former treaties and alliances between Sweden and Denmark should be renewed and confirmed in all points not contrary to that now to be made. Commenting on these conditions Carteret stated, as the two principal reasons requiring the restoration of Stralsund and Rügen, the necessity that Sweden should preserve a footing in Germany for the support of the protestant cause and the expectation that Denmark would either sell them to Prussia or be obliged, for their sake, to remain in close alliance with that power.[2] As to Marstrand, "They will have their Marstrand again . . . got from them by treachery, for which the Governour has lost his head, or it shall cost the Danes Norway." He hoped, however, to obtain resignation of the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls; "further than that it was impossible to carry them." They might yet, he said, make peace with the tsar, even though that should entail war elsewhere; "but they say that they shall then sink Denmark for an age, and make that King fear a Duke of Holstein as much as ever that Duke has fear'd him." A minister of Denmark to treat would not be received, because of the mischief which Lövenörn was believed to have made when

[1] 2 Sept. o.s.

[2] A result, said Carteret, very prejudicial to Hanover, seeing that the Danes "upon any reverse of fortune, or whenever they dare, will fall upon that House with as little humanity and justice as they have done upon Sweden in its present distress." If Wismar were re-fortified, "Denmark will be insupportable to Mecklenburg and extreamly dangerous to Saxen-Lawenburg." (The long-standing dispute about Saxe-Lauenburg had been settled in favour of Brunswick-Lüneburg in 1716, see Erdmannsdörffer, II. 51.)

at Stockholm in the spring; everything must be done through those of the mediating powers. "Il faudra aussy en frayer le chemin."[1] Polwarth, on learning the above from Carteret,[2] wrote that so little did the Swedish terms meet the views of the Danes that merely to mention them might spoil everything. In his reflections he gave the opinion that, if a proper frontier could be arranged between Sweden and Norway, and if the exemption from the Sound tolls were given up, then there might be the hope that Denmark might be satisfied.[3]

From Paris Lord Stair wrote that the regent thought it of his honour and the honour of France that Sweden should not be despoiled of all that she held in Germany under French guarantee, that the Danes would be well advised to conclude promptly, in order to be quit of a war which they had not the means to continue, and that it was important for others that they should, for then the tsar, seeing himself isolated, would become more tractable. Stanhope, narrating to Dubois what had occurred at Copenhagen, said that, as the cession of Stralsund and Rügen was absolutely refused, and as the king knew how greatly the regent was interested in their restoration, he was trying to obtain it for a sum of money.[4]

After protracted discussions following upon his presentation of a memorial, as instructed, Polwarth was given on 10 October the following statement. The king of Denmark was as greatly desirous as the king of England for mutual amity. He had shown equal goodwill in giving up to him Bremen and Verden for a small sum. Denmark had of late borne almost alone the brunt of the war and was earnestly desirous of peace. As the ultimatum delivered by Count Holstein had been found excessive, a very moderate one

[1] Carteret, 27 Sept. o.s.

[2] I.e. from Carteret's despatch to him of 29 Sept. o.s. Carteret said that, when he had proposed the payment of a sum of money for Stralsund and Rügen, the answer had been that Denmark was indebted to Sweden and that now no money would be paid, in view of the rejection of Adlerfeld's proposals and the Danish ultimatum. Giving a graphic account of the discussions he warned Polwarth of the danger to Denmark, if the tsar took up the duke of Holstein's cause, a pregnant remark in view of later developments. And about the Russian naval power: "'tis notorious that the Czar can sail half as cheaply again as any other nation," for he paid small wages, common labourers having nothing but their victuals, provisions were very cheap, and he had "all the materials of shipping at home for nothing." Merchants therefore would employ his ships, his subjects be educated to the sea, and the Danish navy become inconsiderable by comparison. The Danes "must come with the Great Alliance at last, why not then at first, with a good grace? . . . If Denmark should succeed in conjunction with the Czar, which is next to an impossibility, that success will be its ruin." Of Stralsund and Rügen Carteret wrote to Stanhope, 17 Oct. o.s., "Denmark, I am confident, will never enjoy these spoils." They would certainly be sold to Prussia, and Stettin would become one of the great cities of the Baltic (R. O. Sweden 25).

[3] To Carteret, 14 Oct., R. O. Denmark 42.

[4] 6 and 8 Oct., R. O. France 165.

was now presented, too easy, in fact, considering Sweden's present circumstances. Only the cession of the Pomeranian territory, Marstrand, the fortress and province of Båhus, and Vigen, and the abolition of the exemption from the Sound tolls would now be insisted upon. For Sleswick was sufficient a promise on the part of Sweden never to interfere therewith. On this footing the king of Denmark would conclude preliminaries at once, and, on receiving the formal guarantee of Great Britain for Sleswick, would sign an armistice and accept British mediation. If in spite of everything Sweden would not cede Stralsund and Rügen, an equivalent must be given in land. Polwarth replied that he could look upon the above only as a refusal of the king's offers, and prayed for a speedy explanation. The proposals, he said, were made to release the king of Denmark from the war. Did he accept them, or not? Let a clear and distinct answer be given, without mingling of other matters, and without loss of time. This he received. Mediation was accepted, freedom of commerce and an armistice were agreed to; only compensation for Stralsund and Rügen in land was still insisted upon. This, said Polwarth, was all that could be obtained, but "cela les engage à la fois dans un traité séparé du Czar, fixe une cessation d'armes sans qu'il y soit compris, et déroge au traité de garantie de 1715." The rest must be managed, as best might be, in the treaty to be made.[1]

In reply to this Stanhope furnished Polwarth with other arguments to use, besides the incompatibility of the rise of Russia with Denmark's safety. The Danes, he said, could not be ignorant that theirs was the court least considered and least in favour at Vienna. The emperor and empire were guarantors of the treaties of Westphalia and of the duchy of Holstein to the duke; the emperor had specially guaranteed the duchy of Sleswick to him by various treaties. France and Prussia were his guarantors also. The imperial ministers insisted that Sweden must have Stralsund and Rügen back; France did the same; themselves must support France in the demand, in view of her straightforward conduct. If in spite of the above it was necessary to fortify Polwarth's arguments "de quelque réalité," he might employ £4,000 or £5,000 among the Danish ministers, nor would the king regret the expense if it produced the prompt conclusion of a convention. This despatch was private;[2] it was accompanied by a principal one[3] entering

[1] Polwarth, 6 to 11 Oct., R. O. Denmark 42.

[2] 7 Oct. o.s., ibid. Polwarth replied about the proposed bribing (24 Oct.): "Vôtre Excellence n'a pas besoin de douter que je ne manie ce que Vous m'avez confié de la manière la plus avantageuse; et je ne m'en servirai point, à moins que la nécessité ne le demande absolument."

[3] Ibid. and Foreign Entry Book 220.

at length into the whole question, and by a draft of a proposed convention consisting of a very long preamble and seven clauses. As soon as this was signed, Polwarth was told, a minister ought to be sent to Stockholm to arrange a preliminary treaty to be confirmed at Brunswick. Carteret would have orders to act as mediator, and the good offices of the French minister would also be sought and efforts made at Paris to obtain the guarantee of France for Sleswick. The king of Denmark ought to accept French mediation, if it were offered. The British guarantee of Sleswick could only be relative to that given by Hanover in 1715. And as there was then expressly reserved to the duke a compensation for his portion of Sleswick, the same compensation would be considered to be reserved for him now; its nature to be settled at Brunswick. If it consisted of the Danish part of Holstein, Denmark would gain at least one-third by the acquisition of the whole of Sleswick.

Count Senneterre had already been persuaded to send instructions to Campredon at Stockholm to offer to the Danish minister, who should come thither, the mediation and guarantee of France. The guarantee, Stanhope wrote to Stair on 20 October,[1] would principally concern Sleswick; French mediation indeed would only be accepted on this condition, as the king's had been. The king of Denmark would never willingly resign the duchy, nor could Hanover or Prussia, who had guaranteed it to him in 1715, require him to give it up. The position of Stralsund and Rügen, cut off from his dominions, was different.

"Le Roy de Danemarc soutient avec fondement que les Garanties cidevant données à la Maison de Gottorp ne sauroient avoir lieu dans le cas présent, puisque cette Maison a esté l'aggresseur en prêtant son païs, ses places et ses troupes au feu Roy de Suède. Néanmoins vous remarquerez que la Garantie que Nous allons donner au Roy de Danemarc pour le Duché de Sleswick est clausée par deux choses essentielles. Elle ne subsistera qu'en cas qu'il fasse la paix. Et cette même Garantie nous autorisera à procurer au Duc de Holstein une satisfaction pour la partie du Sleswick qui luy appartenoit, laquelle satisfaction nous tâcherons de rendre aussy ample que faire se pourra."

It was hoped, therefore, that the regent would confirm the orders sent to Campredon. Comparing the Swedish preliminaries with the terms sent by Polwarth, the peace certainly appeared to be well advanced. Both Sweden and Denmark ought to be tractable, considering their present relations with Russia. Stair replied (28 October) that the regent entirely approved of the steps taken

[1] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 220 and France 165.

to bring about peace between Sweden and Denmark and was ready to give a guarantee to the king of Denmark in the manner desired and as given to the king of Prussia. He also very much approved of some cession of land to Denmark, in order to increase the satisfaction to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and would order Campredon to join in pressing the crown of Sweden to part, as suggested, with the little province of Dal on the Norway frontier. As however we shall see, in what he wrote about the French guarantee Stair was mistaken; the regent sent orders to Campredon not to offer it.

French views on the question of Stralsund and Rügen are shown in a despatch of Dubois to Campredon of 22 September:

"Il est également important à la Suède et à la France qu'elle conserve un pied en Allemagne par la restitution de Stralsund et de Rügen de gré ou de force, sans quoi la France ne pourroit plus prendre de la part à la Suède, parce-qu'elle n'auroit plus d'intérêt, même apparent, de s'intéresser pour elle. . . . En aucun cas vous ne pouvez consentir à aucun accommodement qui n'assure à la Suède la restitution de tout ce que le Roy de Danemarc possède en Allemagne qui a appartenu à la Suède. . . . La restitution de l'Estonie et de la Livonie à la Suède ne peut être d'aucune considération pour les intérêts particuliers de la France, que quand cette Couronne conservera un établissement en Allemagne."[1]

At length, after prolonged discussions,[2] a convention between Denmark and Great Britain[3] was signed on 30 October accepting the king of England's mediation and agreeing to a complete suspension of arms for six months, during which time there should be full freedom of commerce in all waters, ports and countries of Sweden and Denmark. Every effort was to be made during the armistice to conclude a permanent peace, and, as an essential preliminary, the king of England undertook for himself, his heirs and successors to maintain the king of Denmark in peaceable possession of the duchy of Sleswick against all who should attack or trouble him, as under the treaty of 1715, and specially to procure that in the treaty of peace Sweden should agree to this; the guarantee to continue in force always, after peace was made. If the Swedes could not be persuaded to cede Pomerania and Rügen, the king of Denmark, in his desire for peace, would resign them for an equivalent. On this head he referred to previous declarations given to Polwarth and to king George, being persuaded that the latter would obtain for him at the peace conditions just and equitable. Eight days later a similar convention was signed at Stockholm

[1] R. O. Sweden 25 and Foreign Entry Book 53, extract enclosed by Carteret 20 Oct. o.s.; cf. the regent to George I, 20 Oct., quoted by Wiesener, III. 149, 150.
[2] See fully Polwarth's despatch of 30 Oct.
[3] R. O. Treaties 44, copies, Treaty Papers 4 and 71.

stipulating freedom of navigation and trade, of posts and couriers, and maintenance of the status quo during the armistice, and prohibiting Danish ships from carrying, as they were reputed to do, Muscovite colours and commissions.[1] The armistice was shortly proclaimed.

After the ratifications of the Danish convention had been exchanged, and as soon as Polwarth could get the money, he put into execution the instructions he had received about gratifications to the Danish ministers. He sent notes payable to bearer at sight to (among others) Count Holstein and Wibe for 5,000 dollars each, and to Sehestedt and I. G. Holstein for 3,000. To his astonishment these returned them, though the others, he said, made no difficulty. Count Holstein said that the offers were premature, the business being not yet ended and nothing having been done to earn the money.[2]

Two results followed from the armistice, the freeing of trade to Sweden and the definite separation of Denmark from Russia. Efforts had been renewed at St. Petersburg on Peter's return thither to maintain the alliance. He emphasized his constancy, would let Denmark name her own terms, and hinted that George's tyranny might be overturned. But Frederick had declined his advances, saying that it was better that each should prosecute the war independently. There was violent recrimination between Prince Basil Dolgoruky and the Danish ministers at Copenhagen,[3] and though later relations were improved and friendly expressions were used, matters had then gone too far.[4]

After receiving the news of the signature of the convention Stanhope wrote to Polwarth that the minister to be sent to Stockholm to negotiate the preliminary treaty must be authorized to admit French mediation conjointly with that of the king, but care must be taken

[1] 27 Oct. o.s., R. O. Treaties 530. Copies with Carteret's of 10 Nov. o.s. and Polwarth's of 3 Dec.

[2] Polwarth, 12 Dec. "This," he remarked, "is the part of negotiating I like worst."

[3] Polwarth was informed of "a very strong and threatening memorial" presented at Copenhagen on the tsar's behalf. "As pointed and as strong an answer" had been given. He thought this a good opportunity for king George to conclude a defensive treaty with Denmark, if he were so inclined, "to keep them in heart and bring them into His Maj$^{ty's}$ measures in order to bring the Czar to reason" (21 and 25 Nov.).

[4] Holm, pp. 673–76, cf. Solov'ev, *loc. cit.* Stanhope wrote to Polwarth, 19 Feb. o.s. 1720: "The usage they [the Danes] met with from the Czar must have made them very cautious how they trust to any new offers from him, besides that his health is in so uncertain a state, and that government in case of his death seems to be upon so precarious a foot, that they can not in common prudence look upon his friendship as a foundation of any solidity for them to build on" (R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5).

" que les Danois profitent de cette Garantie si importante pour eux de manière qu'il ne paroisse point que nous leur en ayons fait naître la pensée ; ils doivent y insister d'eux mêmes comme sur une chose sans laquelle ils n'auroient jamais accepté la médiation de la France, et ils nous doivent de la reconnoissance de ce que nous les avons prévenus en y disposant le Régent d'avance. . . . La Garantie de la France pour le Duché de Sleswick justifiera le Roy de Danemarc suffisamment d'avoir donné les mains au seul moyen par lequel il pouvoit y parvenir. Quand il s'agira de former le Congrez de Bronswic, l'on verra alors quels autres Médiateurs l'on pourra associer à l'Empereur." [1]

But towards a permanent peace between Denmark and Sweden the armistice effected little. The Danes adhered to their demands,[2] which Carteret stigmatized as " exorbitant and absurd " and declined even to mention ; to do so, he said, might spoil the Prussian treaty ; " they are in a manner relapsed into their old ultimatum." If they were to have much more than Sleswick, the Swedes would not make peace, " nor indeed be able to subsist well " after it. Their revenues would be reduced from eight million crowns to less than three, while those of the Danes, possessed of Sleswick, would be five million, of the tsar, in time of peace, eight. " The Swedes," he went on, " look upon the Czar, considering his ill state of health and the probability of the Muscovites returning to their old manners upon his decease, as a temporary foe, but they regard the power of Denmark as an eternal enemy." The rivalry of Sweden and Denmark had caused all former wars in the north. The latter had always been the stronger at sea, the former in revenue and on land, besides having the support of Holstein. Now the balance would be heavily altered. " The reserving a satisfaction for the Duke of Holstein will please the Swedes ; which for the honour of all parties it is essential to do. The Swedes had rather Wismar should be in any hands, than the King of Denmark's. So it is very possible to make that a free Imperial town." Knyphausen thought that Denmark ought to be satisfied with Sleswick and its revenues. He wanted exemption from the Sound tolls for his master's new Pomeranian subjects, and would support Sweden in this matter. He objected to Denmark having Heligoland, an appanage of Sleswick, and in this he was right ; it was an impregnable island governing the entrance to the Elbe and ought to remain in the hands of the duke, who could do no harm with it. The Dutch ambassador objected also ; indeed, " it

[1] 12 Nov., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 220. Polwarth wrote (16 Dec.) that the king of Denmark was resolved to have a formal guarantee of Sleswick before accepting French mediation.

[2] Proposals delivered to Polwarth on 30 Nov. still demanded Jemtland, Halland and Båhus with Vigen and Marstrand and part of Scania including Helsingborg.

will be a common cause to all traders, who will not be easy, if Denmark is to keep it by a solemn treaty." Knyphausen believed that the Danes could be forced to peace. Although his master had guaranteed to them Sleswick and Rügen and Stralsund, yet, he said, " there were always equivalents reserved, which, being in general, they have ground to extend them as they please, and can come off honourably, considering the conduct of the Danes in this great matter, and their having broke off their treaties by taking several Prussian ships." Knyphausen would support these views at Berlin, if brought forward by the English minister, but thought that the business had better be done at Stockholm. " The Danes will never make peace unless they are forced. It has been their constant lot. The treaties of Fontainebleau, Lund, and Traventhahl are examples." Prussian troops would soon bring the Danes to reason, and the king of Prussia would risk little in doing this, not having reason to fear Denmark as he had the tsar. He had only joined her for his own advantage and was securing that by a wise peace, whereas the Danes were " unwise enough to run the risk of being alone in war." They believed that Bernstorff and the German ministers were supporting them. The Swedes insisted upon keeping Stralsund and Rügen, not on account of their revenues, which amounted at the most to 60,000 crowns, but from weighty political considerations. " I shall send a courier to England in a few days to acquaint the Court that the Danish peace is impracticable, and that some measures ought to be concerted to oblige Denmark to be reasonable." After completing the Prussian and British treaties he would return home, " having leave to do so, if I don't see any probability of concluding soon with the Danes." Further Carteret quoted with approval the views of Count Horn,[1] a man, he says, filled with resentment against the Danes and professing to look upon the king of England rather as the protector of Sweden than her ally and as one who, though he might not be able to coerce the tsar, could certainly coerce Denmark.[2]

Carteret's expressions of his views, says Polwarth, " put me under such difficulty, that I did not well know what hand to turn to." The Danes, in standing firm, were in the right. However, in spite of their refusal to do anything till an answer was received to their demands, he had obtained a resolution to send some one to Sweden. If Marstrand, he wrote to Carteret, and abolition of

[1] " I was perfectly pleased with this discourse from a person who was always thought to be against us, and who is the third person in this country and likely to be Marshall of the Estates, the most important office in the country, while it lasts."

[2] Carteret to Stanhope, 10 Nov. and 4 and 8 Dec. o.s., and to Whitworth and Polwarth, 25 and 28 Nov. o.s.

the exemption from the Sound tolls could be obtained, peace might be made. He was greatly surprised that the Swedes looked upon the armistice and freedom of commerce as things indifferent; the king in procuring them had thought otherwise.[1] Frederick himself wrote to George on 19 December setting forth how moderate his demands were and asking him to order Carteret to lay weight upon them,[2] and it was held at Copenhagen that the king of England both ought to and could force them upon Sweden.

A chief difficulty in the work of pacification was the refusal of the Swedes to receive a Danish envoy, at least during the session of the riksdag. When their reluctance had been overcome, Carteret further postponed his arrival until he should himself have arranged the substance of the preliminaries. The envoy chosen was again Lövenörn, now a major-general, although strong objection was made to him personally.[3] He arrived at Stockholm on 31 March 1720, and the terms agreed upon were at once presented to him. After the usual first clauses it was demanded that the portion of Pomerania occupied by the Danes should be restored without reserve within six weeks from ratification; the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls thereupon to be given up. The expectation was expressed that the emperor would dispose of Holstein, an immediate fief of the empire, in favour of the duke; as to Sleswick, in spite of solemn treaties and guarantees, the queen of Sweden stated her willingness to join with the emperor, Great Britain and France, as mediating powers, in regulating that affair at Brunswick. To provide the money to be paid to Denmark, the amount also to be settled at Brunswick, she transferred to the mediating powers her rights over the town and territory of Wismar,[4] excepting certain rights of private persons, upon condition that the disposition made thereof brought no prejudice or offence to the empire or to any neighbouring prince. Marstrand was to be held by Denmark until the final treaty was made, and then restored in the same state as when taken. It was an absolute condition that the king of Denmark should give no help to the tsar against Sweden directly or indirectly. If these preliminaries were not accepted before the armistice expired, then it was declared that Sweden would not further be bound by them.[5]

[1] Polwarth to Stanhope and Carteret, 16 Dec.

[2] Cf. Holm, pp. 677–80. The king of Denmark's letter, in German, with translation, R. O. Royal Letters 5.

[3] "He is the most disagreeable minister to this Court that could have been chose" (Carteret, 23 Dec. o.s.).

[4] Whose revenues, according to a detailed statement sent by Carteret on 10 Feb. o.s., amounted to 25,200 crowns, less 6,500 mortgaged.

[5] R. O. Treaties 45 and 533 and Sweden 27, dated 4 March o.s. 1720. Carteret's comments in his despatch of 9 March o.s.

Of course Lövenörn resisted the proposals. He still held out for Marstrand and the province of Båhus. The loss of Stralsund and Rügen, he argued, was definite, the questions of Sleswick and of money-compensation of uncertain issue. Carteret offered him 50,000 crowns to use as he thought fit, if he could find a man to work for them, swearing that further cessions could not be obtained and that if the terms were not accepted within the period of the truce Great Britain would hold herself released from her promise of a guarantee of Sleswick.[1] For form's sake, he wrote, he must listen to the Danish pretensions, but the whole negotiation turned upon the sum of money to be paid by Sweden as part of the equivalent for Stralsund and Rügen, and on Wismar. If Lövenörn did not shortly receive orders to conclude, he would go with him to Copenhagen.[2]

But now a new development of affairs made Frederick IV begin to realize that, as had been duly and forcibly impressed upon him, if he persisted in his claims he might even lose Sleswick. This was the result of action on the part of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, who had betaken himself to and found encouragement at the court of Vienna.

What the duke himself principally wanted as compensation was his recognition as successor to the Swedish throne. He had conversed on this subject with Lövenörn at Stockholm in the spring of 1719, and had then betaken himself to Copenhagen. He offered there, in the event of his becoming king, to give up Sleswick for Danish Pomerania. Frederick received his overtures well, deputed Lövenörn to treat with him at Hanover, whither he proposed to go,[3] and wrote to George in his favour. In the conferences there George himself and Bernstorff took part. The duke offered much, for the king of England's money and support were necessary. But neither his offers, nor his threat to throw himself into the arms of the tsar, availed. All that he could obtain was an undertaking that at the general pacification at Brunswick the attempt should be

[1] Holm, pp. 687–88.

[2] 25 March o.s. Carteret's first discussions with Lövenörn in his despatches of 22 and 23 March o.s. to Polwarth, to whom he wrote that the Swedes claimed to be able to use the king of Denmark now as he had used them; "he has played the Czar upon them, made use of that Prince, and encouraged his power to punish Sweden. They now can doe the same, make use of the Czar's power, which the Danes have contributed to raise, to punish Denmark." The objection to giving up Wismar, it was alleged, was the necessity of deferring to the wishes of France. Cf. Carteret, 21 May o.s. to Stanhope and 1 June o.s. to Tilson.

[3] The duke stayed at Hamburg, negotiating with Lövenörn and others, from 15 June to 5 July 1719, departing then for Hanover. He seems to have gained over the British minister, Cyril Wich, who extols his person and accomplishments: "he is certainly a very fine prince" (16 June foll., R. O. Hamburg 36).

made to procure for him the throne of Sweden in reversion.[1] Nor do the efforts of his envoy Dumont at Paris appear to have had better success.[2] In October, to protest against the guarantee of Sleswick to Denmark and to make representations in favour of restitution of his estates, he sent to Stockholm Brigadier Hans Bertram von Rantzau, and later presented a memorial (2 November) through his envoy extraordinary L. von Flohr. But Rantzau was ordered to quit Stockholm at twenty-four hours' notice for speaking too freely.[3] The duke himself went a second time to Hanover early in November.[4] His proposals were now more favourably received; Stanhope wrote to Carteret about settling the succession to the Swedish throne upon him. But Carteret declined to mention the subject until the Hanoverian treaty was completed, on account of the jealousy existing against the duke. His party, he said, was decreasing every day. It was no new scheme, the prince told him, but "the thought of the Hanover ministry," and that to suggest to the riksdag the naming of a successor would at once be unconstitutional and might result in the exclusion of the duke for ever, with which Carteret agreed.[5] Asked by the prince in February 1720, whether he had orders to work underhand and by money to procure the duke's succession, Carteret protested that his only orders were to work in concert with his highness, and the king's only object to render him a personal service and facilitate the peace with Denmark.[6] In April a formal proposal to name the duke successor was brought forward in the riksdag, only to be summarily rejected.[7]

From Hanover the duke went on to Berlin, where, says Whitworth,[8] he did not advance his cause much, and thence to Vienna, where he had better success, finding support both from the party opposed to king George and from the Russian ministers, as is related in the next chapter. He obtained the issue of an imperial mandate to Hanover and Prussia to make an execution in Holstein, if the Danes would not evacuate that duchy.[9] George was accused of instigating this, but strongly repudiated the accusation, declining, indeed, to act upon the imperial letters. Stanhope, advised

[1] The above from Holm, pp. 654–56.
[2] Stair, 10 July.
[3] Stanhope, 2 Oct., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 220; Wich, 30 Sept., 11 Nov., 1 Dec.; Polwarth, 14 and 25 Nov.
[4] Wich, 7 and 17 Nov., 22 Dec.
[5] Carteret, 7 Dec. o.s.
[6] The same, 28 Jan. o.s. 1720.
[7] Carteret and Jackson, 20 and 23 April o.s., R. O. Sweden 27 and 23.
[8] 21 Nov., 2 Dec.
[9] "Le Duc de Holstein, qui a négocié icy sans vouloir rien avoir à faire avec moy, a obtenu de l'Empereur un Decret de restitution par rapport au Holstein Allemand" (St. Saphorin to Bernstorff, 13 Jan. 1720, R. O. Germany, Empire, 40).

by St. Saphorin, ascribed the imputation to a misunderstanding by Baron Huldenberg, the Hanoverian minister at Vienna, of a despatch from Bernstorff.[1] He wrote to St. Saphorin that any understanding given to the imperial ministers, that the decree was agreeable to the king, must be strongly contradicted.[2] But it had effect at Copenhagen.[3] The Danish occupation, Carteret wrote, had lasted seven years, during which time double the ordinary revenue of 200,000 crowns had been drawn by extraordinary taxes and the quartering of troops. "If they wait for an execution, by the laws of the Empire they are lyable to refund." And there would be other consequences; the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin also would ask for damages, and orders would be sent from Sweden to Count Bielke to solicit a like imperial mandate for the restoration of Stralsund and Rügen. Later Carteret communicated a despatch from Bielke to the effect that the emperor would employ every effort to preserve Sleswick for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp.[4] Stanhope instructed Polwarth to "inculcate the ticklishness" of the present situation; the reinstatory letters from Vienna, he said, the disposition of the French court, and the Prussian opposition to abolition of the exemption from the Sound tolls should give the Danes "plainly to understand how few friends they have to support them in their pretensions upon Sweden, and how many enemies," and so on.[5]

But yet worse was in store. The encouragement which the duke received from the Russian ministers at Vienna resulted in his sending his minister Stambke to St. Petersburg. It was rumoured that he was to marry one of Peter's daughters and to have Livonia, and with such propositions, indeed, Stambke was charged. Then came a letter from him to his aunt, the queen of Sweden, saying that the tsar of his own accord had declared his willingness not only to confirm his former guarantees of the duke's possessions in general, but to give him a new and particular guarantee of ducal Sleswick, which he hoped would be combined with those of Sweden and Holland. In sending a minister to the tsar, he assured the queen, he intended nothing inimical to Sweden, but

[1] As fully explained by St. Saphorin, 20 Jan. and 10 Feb., ibid. Stanhope wrote to Polwarth (19 Feb. o.s. 1720, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 221): "It would not be the first time that the German Chancellerie have sent orders diametrically opposed to those His Majesty has given thrô the hands of his English servants, and even without His Majesty's knowledge, which I tell you that you may make your own use of it." (Cf. pp. 409–10.)

[2] 23 Feb. o.s., ibid.

[3] Stanhope wrote to Carteret: the Danes "seem to be alarmed and to become more plyant upon the coming of the imperial letters for reinstating the Duke of Holstein in his territories" (19 Jan. o.s., ibid.).

[4] 10 Feb. and 20 April o.s.

[5] To Polwarth, 19 Jan. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5.

only desired to save himself and his hereditary dominions, whose inalienability and indivisibility had long ago been constituted, and confirmed by Denmark. The right of primogeniture had been recognized by the emperor at Altranstädt. Hence a cession of Sleswick was impossible. He himself had attempted to bring about an armistice between Russia and Sweden, in order that the latter might be encouraged not to surrender anything to Denmark. If his minister could render the queen any service at St. Petersburg, he would be very happy.[1]

Under the pressure from all sides Frederick IV gave way. He let Peter the Great know that he felt himself exonerated from blame in taking measures to avert the evils which threatened. He wrote to George that under dictates of reason he ought summarily to reject the terms offered, "tellement imparfaits et dilatoires à mon égard, et si bien ajustés pour la Suède," but that under the circumstances he would accept not less than a million crowns in cash for the Pomeranian territory, in lieu of compensation in land, with abolition of the Swedish exemption from the Sound tolls, and would restore Marstrand. The question of Sleswick should be relegated to Brunswick. Sweden must renounce all her engagements with and guarantees to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and he would be glad if the duke could receive his compensation in being declared heir to the Swedish crown.[2] Orders were sent in this sense to Lövenörn, the sum named being 1,200,000 crowns "banco"; and it was stated that, if the duke could not be persuaded to give up Sleswick, then Marstrand must remain in Danish hands for ever, unless exchanged for some other compensation.[3]

But the highest offer that Carteret could obtain from the Swedes was 500,000 German crowns, in return for a simultaneous evacuation of Pomerania with Rügen, and Marstrand. Lövenörn offered to accept a million crowns "banco," excluding Marstrand, and later 800,000, or a million current money.[4] King George, in his anxiety to conclude the peace, offered to find in the last resort 400,000 crowns himself, the half as king and half as elector, but upon condition that Denmark should positively accept the preliminaries and the Swedish court engage formally to dispose of Wismar as he should desire, and not otherwise. The armistice

[1] Vienna, 16 March 1720. Translation with Carteret's of 2 April o.s., in which he gives his discussions upon it with the Swedes. "It must certainly now be infatuation," Stanhope commented, if the Danes "do not close immediately with the offers of the Swedes" (to Polwarth, 19 April o.s.).

[2] 17 April, R. O. Royal Letters 5.

[3] Copy with Carteret's of 23 April o.s.

[4] Carteret, 26 April foll. o.s.

(which had expired on 30 April) should be renewed, Stanhope said, and the British guarantee hold during the prolongation.[1]

At last the Swedes were brought to offer 600,000 crowns, and this was final. Carteret took upon himself to accept preliminaries signed by the Swedes alone on 3 June o.s., and at the same time Campredon signed, conditionally, the French guarantee of Sleswick. "At least," Carteret wrote, "I secure to the King of Denmark for some time an opportunity of obtaining these very advantageous terms, which the King our Master has, with great difficulty, drawn from Sweden." In spite of the ravages renewed this year by the Russians the court, he said, had held firm, but if the Danes would not finish soon, other counsels would prevail. The Holstein party had done all it could to obstruct.[2] Ten days later he left for Denmark in company with Lövenörn, going straight to the king at Frederiksborg, where the joint arguments of himself, Polwarth and General Bothmer obtained the signature of the treaty on 3 July.[3]

The preamble cited the reiterated instances of the king of England, who had procured an armistice and offered his mediation, which had been accepted, as also that of the king of France. The first clauses, as usual, established eternal peace and friendship, amnesty and liberty of trade. All treaties, conventions and alliances, so far as they were contrary to the tenour of the present treaty, were renounced, and no future ones to the prejudice of either party were to be made. The king of Denmark undertook specially not to aid the tsar in any way against Sweden while the present war continued, and not to open his ports to Russian privateers or their prizes. Sweden undertook not to oppose directly or indirectly anything that should be stipulated in favour of Denmark by the two mediatory powers in regard to Sleswick, and not to give any assistance to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in respect thereof. Denmark was to restore Stralsund and Rügen and Marstrand with all

[1] Stanhope to Carteret and Polwarth, the former being thought to have gone to Copenhagen, 1 May o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 221.

[2] 8 June o.s.

[3] See Carteret's and other despatches, R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270 and Denmark 43. Stanhope wrote on 8 July that Carteret had done wonders in obtaining the French guarantee, such as it was. The compensation question must not be raised at this time. "The true point of view of Denmark is to fence and secure the possession of Sleswick against the Duke of Holstein, who will not easily be persuaded to make a cession of that Dutchy." Against him the Danes could have no better security than the guarantees of Great Britain and France. He went on: "The Crown of Great Britain is at present under no kind of tye whatsoever to Denmark save the Convention signed by you Lord Polwarth, the conditions of which will expire with the armistice, and will, I promise you, not easily be renewed. But if once the Crown of Denmark shall have rendered our Guaranty perpetual by signing the peace with Sweden, it will then become our interest to concert with Denmark and elsewhere all proper expedients to extinguish the pretensions of the Duke of Holstein."

their appurtenances, and renounced all pretensions over Wismar, acknowledging the incontestable rights of Sweden there. In return, the exemption from the Sound tolls was given up and a payment of 600,000 rix-dollars promised. Particular stipulations were made about the transference of Stralsund and the internal affairs of that part of Pomerania. Disputed boundaries towards Lapland were to be settled in accordance with the ancient treaties. A Swedish post-office commissioner was to be allowed to reside at Elsinore.[1]

Polwarth signed the British guarantee on the 23rd. It referred to the temporary guarantee of ducal Sleswick to Denmark under the convention of 30 October, to the promise that it should be made perpetual if peace were concluded within the term of the armistice, and to the renewal of that six months later with the same condition, and confirmed these undertakings formally. Afterwards the king of Denmark presented Carteret with his own sword, valued at 20,000 crowns, saying that now peace was made by his interposition he had no further use for it.[2] The peace gave general satisfaction in Denmark,[3] but Westphal heard bitter words about it at St. Petersburg.

There was long delay bringing the treaty to completion, in spite of every effort. The regent had all along been most reluctant to give a French guarantee of Sleswick. Stanhope's personal efforts at Paris in January only obtained the promise of it, after the treaty between Sweden and Denmark should have been concluded on the lines laid down. But the Danes refused to accept a conditional guarantee. Lövenörn, says Carteret, had stated that French mediation even would not be accepted, unless Campredon signed a guarantee of Sleswick at once "in the very same words as ours. . . . The Danes don't seem to understand the value of the French guaranty. . . . They really seem to have a different way of thinking from all the people, that I have ever seen." [4] And though Campredon signed, as said above, the regent could not be brought to ratify, and the king of Denmark refused to complete the treaty till that was done. The document was, indeed, perfected on 18 August, but it was not delivered till 20 October, and only then were the ratifications of the treaty exchanged and the

[1] Copies of the treaty, R. O. Sweden 27 and Treaty Papers 71. Exceptions and explanations were embodied by the king of Denmark in a separate document (Royal Letters 5, with correspondence on the subject).

[2] Carteret, 30 July, R. O. Regencies 3.

[3] Holm, *Danmark-Norges Historie*, pp. 4, 5, 18. He quotes from Sehestedt's diary: "I Eftermiddag blev Freden undertegnet, hvorfor Gud vaere evig velsignet." Our frontiers, said Lövenörn, are now secure on all sides and we can hope for a fast and true peace.

[4] 25 March o.s.

evacuation of Marstrand and Danish Pomerania proceeded with.[1] "We should not," Stanhope wrote, "have obtained the signature, unless the present situation of affairs in France had made the Regent sensible that he stands more in need than ever of our Master's friendship."[2] And again, "The procuring of that from France has cost His Majesty a great deal of pains, and he is very glad to have done in it what cannot but be extreamly usefull and agreeable to Denmark."[3] The real reason of the regent's recalcitrance seems to have been the consciousness that by giving his formal consent to the deprivation of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp he would drive that prince into sole dependence on the tsar.

[1] The king of Denmark threatened to increase his garrisons in Marstrand and Stralsund if the French act were not sent speedily (Carteret and Polwarth, 13 Oct.). As it was, the former fortress was not handed over till the end of November, nor Stralsund till the following year.

[2] To Carteret and Polwarth, 27 Aug., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270; the financial crisis is alluded to.

[3] 12 Jan. o.s. 1721, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 5. See on the above Stanhope's despatches from Hanover, R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270, those of Carteret and Polwarth, 13 Aug. foll., Denmark 44, and Holm, p. 700.

CHAPTER XXVII

DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION ELSEWHERE, 1719–20

While a treaty of peace was thus being forced upon Denmark, George I was busy with the second part of his scheme for the settlement of the north, the formation of a general league to drive Peter the Great away from the Baltic. His negotiations were of very great complexity, and ended in failure. Peter found means to control the republic of Poland ; a variety of causes deterred the emperor from taking up arms ; and the king of Prussia, in feud both with him and with the king of Poland, would not move alone or at least without a far greater guerdon than could be allowed him. The Dutch republic was obliged by the state of its finances to refrain from interference in European politics, while Denmark was in like case and, besides, was not free of the war before July. France, lastly, at issue with Great Britain during the first months of 1720 on the terms of peace with Spain and through the controlling influence of John Law, looked upon the tsar not as an enemy but as one with whom advantageous commercial relations might be established and as an ally in the future against the eternal rival, Austria.

There was, indeed, at the end of 1719 some appearance that the tsar might prove reasonable, in George's sense of the word. Reassuring reports came from Schlippenbach at St. Petersburg, and on the strength of them, as transmitted by Whitworth, Stanhope wrote to Stair : " Vôtre Excellence verra que le Czar se ravise quant à nous, et qu'il y a lieu de croire qu'Il accepteroit la médiation du Roy, si sa Majesté la luy offroit en luy écrivant Elle-même."[1] Advices too reached Jefferyes, who with Weber had been transferred in October from St. Petersburg to Dantzig,[2] of the tsar's readiness to be reconciled with George and to submit his interests to him, preferring his friendship to all the conquests he had made and

[1] 9 Nov. 1719, R. O. France 165, S.P. Dom. Entry Book 414.

[2] The reason given was that some person was required to reside at Dantzig for a short time, and Jefferyes' credentials to the tsar were not withdrawn till much later. He and Weber left St. Petersburg on 4 Oct. o.s. His first despatch from Dantzig is dated 4 Nov. o.s. (R. O. Russia 9).

readily accepting his mediation.[1] But Jefferyes himself doubted the truth of this, having personal knowledge of Peter's temper. The latter, no doubt, was greatly affected by the defection of Prussia,[2] and could not yet be sure that a league might not be formed against him or that British naval action in the Baltic would be ineffective, yet, as will be seen below, the attitude he adopted was anything but submissive.

The mediation proposed was that of the emperor, Great Britain and France jointly. As Stanhope wrote further to Stair in the despatch cited: "Il s'agit de l'intimider et de luy faire envisager des Médiateurs capables de la réduire à une Paix raisonnable, s'il rejettoit leur entremise et les conditions qu'Ils luy proposeroient. Outre que par là nous engagerions en quelque manière l'Empereur contre luy." Stair replied[3] that the proposal was approved at Paris, and that he and the Austrian ambassador Pendterriedter would write to Vienna on the subject.

But affairs took a new complexion when the king of Prussia came forward as a mediator, consequently upon a private and informal visit to Hanover in November, which passed off most successfully.[4] Immediately thereafter Frederick William wrote to

[1] Jefferyes, 28 Nov. o.s.

[2] Cf. Jefferyes' account (7 Nov. o.s.) of his audience of leave. "I left his Czarish Majesty and the Court as much pleas'd with their expedition against Sweden, as they were dissatisfied with the measures that kingdom had taken with their Majtys of Great Britain and Prussia; nothing could surprize them more than the sudden change of the latter, for they thought themselves so secure on that side that I verily believe this to be the reason of their having so much neglected the friendship and amity of other Princes. . . . Tho' His Czarish Majty can dissemble his resentment as much as any man living, yet he could not forbear giving to me and the rest of the British nation sensible marks of his displeasure" (i.e. by the arrest of British merchants). Schlippenbach, Jefferyes said, was much caressed, for the tsar would still do all he could to keep Prussia on his side, or at least neutral. On 14 Nov. o.s. he sent an account of his and Weber's leaving conference with Shafirov, whom they assured of the king's goodwill if the tsar "would return to his former maximes."

[3] 14 and 25 Nov., R. O. France 165.

[4] The queen of Prussia (George's daughter) had a long private interview with Whitworth about the visit. She prescribed absence of ceremony, music at table, comedies, and so on; any business to be mentioned only to Gersdorf. She intimated that the king had changed his views with reference to the proposed match between Prince Frederick and the Princess Wilhelmina, and that the subject might be brought up, if the king of England was still of his former opinion (Whitworth, 31 Oct. foll. He calls Gersdorf in one place count, in another general. The better known members of this family were in the service of Saxony). On the visit, see Droysen, p. 280. It was delayed, partly because Frederick William would not meet Count Flemming at Hanover, partly by his illness, brought on, says Whitworth, by the efforts of the prince of Anhalt and Grumbkow to prevent his going, and by the eagerness of Golovkin to be of the party. One result of it was the recall of Bonet, who had made himself so objectionable in England. He was replaced by Baron Hans Christopher Wallenrodt, whom Whitworth describes as "très superficiel et léger," doing well or ill by accident rather than by design (2 Dec.).

Peter the Great explaining the reasons for his visit, and saying that both the king of England and himself were anxious to see the war concluded upon equitable terms and the tsar freed from the embarrassment of carrying it on alone. He asked therefore, would Peter, now that the Åland conferences were broken off and there was no hope of direct negotiation, accept their mediation ? In his covering letter to Mardefeld he desired him to say that the tsar, like Louis XIV, must make peace some time, and that if he desired the mediation of the emperor, that would be quite acceptable. A revival of troubles in Livonia would be dangerous to Prussia. And on 28 November Mardefeld was instructed further to advise that peace was making with Denmark and with the king of Poland, so that the tsar would be left alone. Finland, Livonia, Esthonia and Reval must be restored, the rest could be accommodated. If the tsar would not consent, a dangerous league might be formed against him. Swedish ministers were busy at Vienna, Paris, London, Dresden and Berlin. Some courts were disposed that way, and so on, threateningly, with a series of arguments to be brought forward.[1]

This action of Frederick William gave great satisfaction in London, whither George had now returned. Stanhope wrote to Whitworth congratulating upon the success of the visit to Hanover, the happiest measure, he said, that could be taken for mutual interests and for the benefit of the protestant cause, and upon " the strong and persuasive manner " in which the king of Prussia had written. The instructions to Mardefeld, he said, were " perfectly right, and in the very terms we ourselves could wish and desire." [2]

The Prussian proposals were duly backed up by money. Ilgen avowed, on Whitworth's suggestions to this effect, " qu'ils n'ont jamais rien obtenu de cette Cour que par ce moyen." He said that Mardefeld was authorized to offer up to 100,000 crowns to the most accredited persons at the Russian court, the tsaritsa included, if they could find means to dispose the tsar to give up Reval to restore peace. And further Whitworth reported that Schlippenbach had been told that if the king of England, in making peace with Sweden, had not entered into any direct engagements against the tsar, or if he would give a declaration that he would not act against him, then there would be no further difficulty about accepting his mediation, but that the Swedish counter-ultimatum still held good ; to which Ilgen had sent word in reply that, if the tsar

[1] Copies of the letter and instructions at the Record Office with Carteret's and Whitworth's despatches, and in Prussia 105.

[2] 4 Dec. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 212.

would agree to a suspension of arms for some months, there would be no need for such a declaration.[1]

Peter, however, in fact resented strongly the king of Prussia's action. He wrote to Kurakin that never was there such a letter; it was impossible to accept the mediation of a power which had made alliance with the enemy. The proposals could not be accepted and the war must be prolonged. A memorial should be prepared to show the English nation that he was innocent and that there was no cause for hostility.[2] Veselovsky, accordingly, presented in London his well-known memorial of 12 December o.s.[3] Recapitulating from the Russian point of view the course of events from 1715, it ended with a strongly worded protest against the threatening letters sent by Carteret and Norris, though with the formal assurance that the tsar continued in the disposition to cultivate king George's friendship which he had constantly maintained. Replies[4] on the part of Great Britain and of Hanover answered the memorial point by point, advancing corresponding accusations from king George's side. The obligatory assurances of goodwill were modified by a disclaimer of any fault on his part if, in spite of everything, he should be obliged to adopt further measures.

The king of Prussia was formally thanked by Peter for his assurances of friendship and his overtures, and desired to complete the treaty proposed by Tolstoi as a preliminary.[5] Mardefeld wrote that the mediation both of England and France was objected to, that of the latter power because of the subsidies paid to Sweden contrary to treaty-engagements. He was trying bribery. Many Russians, he said, disapproved of the tsar's naval enthusiasm, which was eating up resources. But Whitworth interpreted him to say that mediation was not rejected, but the outcome at Vienna awaited, and that though many of the ministers were in great agitation and for giving up Livonia in order to obtain peace, yet Esthonia and Reval would only be restored in the last extremity, and nothing would be allowed to the prejudice of the fleet.[6] Later Mardefeld wrote that all the money which England would employ to equip her fleet and pay the subsidies to Sweden would be necessary to induce the tsar to give up Livonia, Reval and Esthonia, for he would not give up Reval except to a superior force, and would

[1] Whitworth, 2 and 9 Dec. Schlippenbach shortly left St. Petersburg.
[2] 16 Nov. o.s., *Kurakin Archives*, I. 13.
[3] Copies, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 254 and elsewhere. Published at the time.
[4] 22 Feb. and 21 Jan. o.s. 1720.
[5] 26 Dec. 1719, reported by Whitworth 23 Jan. 1720.
[6] Whitworth, 6 Jan. 1720, enclosing copies and translations of Mardefeld's despatches of 11 and 18 Dec. The latter wrote: "Solte Gott über S. Czarische Majestät gebieten, so wird diese See-Macht gewesen seyn wie eine Blume aus dem Felde."

rather die than submit to an unjust peace.[1] Nor did the king of Prussia really intend to take offensive action, for he now offered to engage himself to observe an exact neutrality and not to allow the passage of troops through his dominions, in return for a corresponding undertaking on the part of the tsar.[2]

To get together the superior force referred to was, as has been said, George's main purpose. The instructions given to Lord Cadogan, appointed to go to Vienna, included the following passage: "at the same time that you are settling with the Emperor what relates to this mediation to be offered to the Czar, you shall endeavour to induce him to concurr in acting with a good body of Troops against that Prince in case he should refuse to come into a safe and equitable peace." And he must be persuaded to influence the king of Poland to undertake the measures concerted with Count Flemming at Hanover. The king would concur in forming the congress at Brunswick whenever it should appear reasonable, indeed, Cadogan himself and Whitworth were actually named to go there.[3]

Count Flemming's visit had taken place early in November. He came to confer about persuading the republic of Poland to accede to the treaty of Vienna and to declare war against the tsar. He asked as the price the reversion of Courland for a Saxon prince,[4] and Kiev and Smolensk for the republic. This was approved. But in addition, he said, it would be necessary to follow the tsar's example in expending money amongst the Poles. He was promised the sum of 60,000 crowns and the like amount of French money, if it could be obtained. The money would be used in the first place, Stanhope wrote to Stair, to enable the republic to send to St. Petersburg the solemn embassy to demand satisfaction for divers injuries resolved upon at the diet of Grodno (October 1718) but delayed by the tsar's intrigues and by the lukewarmness of the king of Poland. Now the latter would send it, and Flemming gave assurance that measures had been taken with the principal senators to procure their concurrence. As soon as the money was received

[1] Ciphered postscript of 15 Jan. to the king of Prussia enclosed by Whitworth 3 Feb. Whitworth of Mardefeld: "This gentleman is wholly devoted to the Czar, and consequently all his reasonings turn that way" (30 Jan.).

[2] La Vie, 25 Jan. 1720, *Sbornik*, XL. 81; Droysen, p. 295.

[3] Instructions to Cadogan, 24 Nov. o.s., R. O. King's Letters 3.

[4] Of Saxe-Weissenfels, namely. Peter had actually engaged himself to this with the king of Poland two years before (p. 254), but the treaty had been spoilt by the latter's delay and now Peter preferred the Prussian candidate, the Margrave Philip of Brandenburg-Schwedt. See fully in Solov'ev; also La Vie and Campredon, *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 276, XL. 2, 9, 59, 237, 229. It proved impossible for George to press the Saxon candidature, on account of adverse feeling at Berlin (Whitworth 3 Nov., Carteret 8 Dec. o.s.).

the king of Poland would convoke a diet to take the necessary resolutions. Care must be taken, Stanhope concluded, never to name war to the Poles if it were desired to engage them in it; proposals must be disguised under the name of conditions for procuring peace.[1]

Stair used every possible argument, whether of his own or of a series supplied by Stanhope,[2] to persuade the regent to provide the money, and the Saxon minister Le Coq[3] was sent to Paris to support him, but with no effect. The regent stood firm, advancing various objections and particularly the expenses of the Spanish war,[4] but at the bottom declining to trust the Poles. Le Coq was sent back at the end of December with his propositions not accepted.[5] However, when Stanhope was in Paris in January, he brought up the subject again.

"Talking with the Regent about Poland and pressing him to contribute towards animating the Dyet against the Muscovites as the King hath done, which he at last consented to purely in consideration of his Majesty, and then speaking of the Swedes, that unless they were well assisted they might be in danger of parting with Rugen and Stralsund to procure powerfull succours against the Czar, his Royal Highness replyed very seriously, 'J'aimeray mieux alors les Moscovites que les Suédois,' an expression which ought to weigh greatly with the Swedes, not by such a measure to forfeit the friendship of France."[6]

The money was granted; Stanhope was able to send orders to Wich at Hamburg to forward it at once in the safest and speediest manner he could.[7]

To aid in rousing the republic of Poland James Scott was sent thither, instructed to advise the Poles that they could never have a better opportunity of recovering the provinces of Smolensk and Kiev and that, if the tsar were seriously met, he would be disposed to make peace. Scott might, he was told, declare the king of England's aversion from any attempt upon Polish liberties, such as making the crown hereditary in the house of Saxony, and must

[1] Despatch of 9 Nov., cited.

[2] In a long despatch of 16 Dec. from London, R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 414.

[3] Perhaps James Le Coq, p. 252 note. He had fresh credentials as envoy extraordinary to George I, dated 4 Dec. 1719 (R. O. Royal Letters 41). "Mr. Le Coq est homme fort sensé, et nous avons beaucoup à nous louer de luy à tous égards, et il se laissera diriger entièrement par V. Exce." (Stanhope, 9 Nov.).

[4] Wiesener, III. 152. But he gives as the real reason of the regent's refusal his fear of enabling the king of Poland to make the succession to that crown hereditary in his family, to the frustration of French designs upon it.

[5] See Stair's despatches, 13 to 30 Dec.

[6] To Carteret, 19 Jan. o.s. 1720, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 221.

[7] 26 Jan. o.s., ibid., cf. Stair to Craggs, 1 Feb. Flemming's original receipt for the money, dated Leipzig, 26 April, with Wich's despatch of 30 April, R. O. Hamburg 37.

earnestly try to remove all misunderstandings between the kings of Poland and Prussia and to establish a firm accord between them.[1] But, arrived at Warsaw in February, he could only report that, while plain language had been spoken in regard to the restoration of Livonia and evacuation of Courland, the Poles were extremely averse from war, firstly on account of the embarrassment of their affairs and secondly from fear of the consequent entry of Saxon and other foreign troops into their country, to the prejudice of their liberties.[2] Whitworth had already written that Scott would arrive in Poland too late and that the diet would not accede to the treaty of Vienna. When, he said, the Swedes had finished their treaties with Prussia and Denmark and were repossessed of a footing within the empire and in a condition to assemble a good body of troops of their own and their allies in Courland or in the neighbourhood of Dantzig, then would be the proper time to push negotiations in Poland, and money well employed would gain at least a strong confederation.[3] And his prediction proved true. It was found that nothing could be done in the diet unless the demand of the disaffected nobles, that the command of the foreign troops in the country should be transferred from Count Flemming to the Polish generals, were acceded to. On 23 February it broke up on this question.[4] In April Scott wrote that to bring the republic to war was impracticable, and that more might be done by negotiation with the tsar.[5]

The failure was attributed in part to intrigues of the French and Prussian ministers, Besenval[6] and Posadowski, and the king of Poland demanded the latter's recall. He was replaced in April by Major-General von Schwerin, formerly in the service of Mecklenburg.[7] Ilgen protested to Whitworth that he was only instructed to work against the settlement of the crown upon the house of Saxony and against "the best and greatest part of the troops of that country" being employed by Flemming to that end; yet Whitworth would have it that a chief object of his mission was to prevent the republic from acceding to the treaty of Vienna. The prince of Anhalt and Grumbkow, he said, were

[1] Instructions to Scott, 8 Dec. o.s. 1719, R. O. King's Letters 46.
[2] 6 and 14 Feb., R. O. Poland 26.
[3] To Tilson, 6 Feb.
[4] Abstract of the proceedings of the diet day by day, Jefferyes 23 Jan. foll. o.s., R. O. Poland 27.
[5] 10 April, ibid. 26.
[6] "Buzenval en Pologne agit ouvertement pour le Czar et contrecarre tous les desseins du Roy de Pologne dans la diette" (Stair, 29 Feb.).
[7] Whitworth, 13 April.

doing all they could "brouiller les affaires du Nord et jeter leur Maître dans des nouveaux embarras," and further, "these two Courts are more embroiled than ever, and all the affairs of Poland are in no small confusion."[1] But the principal cause of the failure was, no doubt, the power of Peter the Great among the Polish nobles, whether gained by bribes or otherwise.

Of greater importance was the action which the emperor might take, and George did his best to set forth his action in the north in the most favourable light. Cadogan was instructed to explain that the Swedish treaties were absolutely necessary, for not otherwise could Livonia and Esthonia be recovered or Sweden be saved, that due care had been taken to mention in them the emperor's mediation, and that like mention of the mediation and guarantee of France was necessary on account of her rights under the treaties of Westphalia and the "gratitude, friendship and decency" owed to the regent for the powerful help he had given. But at Vienna the affairs of the north were of less consideration than the settlement with Spain and the campaign which was being conducted against protestant liberties in Germany and Poland.[2] The one question brought the imperial government into collision with the policy of Great Britain and France, the other with all the protestant powers and particularly with Great Britain and Prussia. The two united in opposition to George I the Spanish party at Vienna, the ministers of Rome and Turin, and the catholic leaders in Germany; while jealousy of Prussia animated also Prince Eugene and the German ministry, otherwise well affected to George's policy.

Charles VI himself and his German ministers were not disposed to push the religious quarrel to extremities.[3] But "le mauvais Parti," or "la Cabale," as St. Saphorin calls the others, did their best to inflame him. Foremost at Vienna on the catholic side was the vice-chancellor of the empire, Count Frederick Charles Schönborn,[4] nephew of the principal agent of Rome in Germany, the

[1] 12 and 15 March. He advised gaining the king of Prussia's goodwill by sending to him tall recruits, "the most valuable present His Majesty could make, and much more esteemed here than so many first-rate men-of-war." The men, he said, "have large pay in proportion to their bulk." Some Irishmen of sufficient size were before long sent.

[2] Particulars, Erdmannsdörffer, II. 377 foll., Droysen, IV. ii. 285 foll., and other authors, and in the despatches.

[3] St. Saphorin wrote, for instance, "L'Empereur ayant pris les affaires de la religion tout différemment de la manière dont cette Cabale a voulu les luy faire envisager, elle en a été très-déconcertée, et les Ministres bien-intentionnés en ont pris courage" (3 Jan. 1720, R. O. Germany, Empire, 40).

[4] St. Saphorin wrote of him (30 Oct. 1719, ibid. 39): "Celuy-cy, qui est déjà ennemi de Sa M^té, sera ravi d'avoir une occasion si favorable de tout embrouiller.

elector of Mentz. He and his following were for cultivating the friendship of the tsar, seeing in him one who might aid their cause. As St. Saphorin expressed it, "La Cabale commence a menacer les Protestants que l'Empereur fera une alliance avec les Russes contr'eux," the tsar to be used as "un épouvantail pour contenir les Protestants et pour les empêcher de soutenir leur cause avec vigueur."[1] And consequently, when Peter the Great sent General Weisbach to Vienna in January with friendly overtures, he met with encouragement, in spite of the rupture of diplomatic relations a year before,[2] and although the Russians, St. Saphorin tells us, were generally disliked and there was no thought of making alliance with them.[3] And on the same side worked the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and his astute minister Count Henning Frederick von Bassewitz. The duke's success in obtaining the imperial decree of restitution in Holstein has been noticed. St. Saphorin accused him of entirely disregarding the salutary counsels given to him at Hanover, and expressed the conviction that the principal intention of the Russian mission was to negotiate with him.[4] He and Bassewitz were seen to be in perpetual converse with Weisbach, with the Mecklenburg minister Eckholz, and with the vice-chancellor.[5] St. Saphorin thought that they were endeavouring to prevent the peace between Sweden and Denmark in order that Frederick IV might ally himself once more with the tsar, who would then have Sweden at his mercy and oblige acceptance of the duke as king.[6]

Whatever was Weisbach's real measure of success—St. Saphorin says that he received nothing more than formal assurances[7]—he learnt enough to inform his master that the emperor would at least undertake no engagements against him. The attitude, indeed, of the imperial court in regard to the northern war was shown by

C'est un homme hardi, qui donne des instructions à sa mode, et qui, quoyqu'il ne soit nullement aimé de l'Empereur, et qu'il n'ait nulle part dans sa confiance, cependant le sachant prendre par le point d'honneur et par son autorité, il en obtient de tems en tems sur les choses les plus importantes des ordres sans que les affaires ayent été auparavant débattues dans les conférences et même quelque fois contre ce qui a été resolu." He continually inveighs against Schönborn in his despatches as king George's "ennemi déclaré," "ennemi capital," and takes occasion now and again to suggest pretexts for demanding his dismissal.

[1] 10 Feb. and 13 March.

[2] Consequent upon the affair of Pleyer, the imperial resident with the tsar, on which see fully St. Saphorin, 29 Feb. 1720, R. O. Germany (Empire) 40, also *Sbornik*, XXXIV. 310, Solov'ev, and elsewhere. Abram Veselovsky, the Russian resident at Vienna, was ordered thence in February 1719.

[3] E.g. 10 Feb., 13 and 27 March.

[4] 13 and 17 Jan.

[5] St. Saphorin, 3 and 10 Feb. Eckholz "est son guide icy."

[6] To Bernstorff, 10 Feb.

[7] See his despatch of 4 March. Particulars of Weisbach's commission and doings in Solov'ev.

the answer given to Count Bielke at the end of January. It referred to the invitations to the congress of Brunswick issued in November and stated that, before taking action against the tsar, his reply thereto and the outcome in Poland must be awaited, as also enlightenment upon the views of the kings of England and Prussia, as electors, and of France.[1] And St. Saphorin was told that the emperor, having offered his mediation, could not well at the same time use menaces.

Knowing, then, that he need fear trouble neither from the emperor nor from the republic of Poland, Peter the Great hardened his heart and made ready to prosecute the war, strengthening the defences of his ports, calling up regiments from the Ukraine to reinforce his troops in Livonia and Courland, and preparing his galleys for a fresh incursion into Sweden. And further, he sought to renew the treaty of the Pruth. His envoy at Constantinople, Alexis Dashkov, was supported in this work by the French ambassador Bonac, while Abraham Stanyan and Count Virmond on the part of king George and of the emperor did their best to thwart him, or at least to turn the new treaty to the benefit of Sweden.[2] Dashkov had sufficient success to write for full powers and instructions to conclude, and he received them in May.[3] One of the articles of the draft treaty, reciting that the tsar had withdrawn his troops from Poland and would never attempt to obtain any territory of the republic nor interfere in its affairs, and that it was the interest of both powers to prevent the establishment of a hereditary sovereignty, bound them to maintain its liberties and permitted either of them, if Sweden or any other power should send troops into the country, to take such measures as the occasion should demand.[4]

But the worst consequence of the religious war for king George was the breach which it produced between Austria and Prussia. In revenge for the violences done by the present elector Palatine upon his protestant subjects at Heidelberg Frederick William instituted reprisals upon catholic churches and convents in his own dominions, suggesting the same to George in Brunswick-Lüneburg.[5] And he wrote a strongly worded letter of protest to the emperor on the subject. This " fatale réponse," as St. Saphorin termed it, reached Vienna, he says, soon after the arrival of the vice-chancellor there to plead the catholic cause, and enabled him, in conjunction with other

[1] Copy, in German, with St. Saphorin's of 24 Jan. Cf. his despatch of 13 Jan.

[2] For Dashkov's negotiations see Stanyan's despatches, 1719–20, R. O. Turkey 24, and Solov'ev.

[3] Stanyan, 9 May o.s.

[4] German translation of the draft, dated 12 March o.s. 1720, Baemeister, III. Appendix xxi.

[5] 12 Dec. 1719, R. O. Royal Letters 46.

evidence, to persuade the emperor that his authority in Germany was being undermined and that, if he gave way about the protestants, it would be destroyed.[1] There resulted an outbreak of feeling against Prussia of extraordinary bitterness. Prince Eugene said to St. Saphorin, " qu'il n'en donneroit pas le conseil à l'Empereur, mais que si luy étoit Empereur, et que le Roy de Prusse luy eut écrit une semblable lettre, il luy feroit certainement la guerre si on ne luy en donnait pas satisfaction." [2] And Count Sinzendorff in passion : " Nous ne souffrirons jamais les avaries et les insultes que nous fait le Roy de Prusse, et qu'il en arrive ce qu'on voudra, nous sommes déterminez à le réduire dans les termes auquels il doit estre, et à embrasser tous les moyens qui peuvent nous y conduire." [3] Would not the king of Prussia, St. Saphorin asked, moderate his expressions in writing to the emperor ? " J'ay toujours eu pour principe, que plus on dit de choses fortes en elles-mêmes, plus doit-on tâcher de ôter l'aigreur par la manière dont on les dit." [4]

To the king of Prussia's letter a reply was sent in terms as strong. He professed not to understand this, writing to George : " Je laisse juger Vôtre Majesté si cette lettre de l'Empereur n'est pas des plus extraordinaires, et si la mienne, qui a été concertée avec le Corps Evangélique à Ratisbonne et particulièrement avec le Ministre qui y est de la part de Vôtre Majesté, méritoit une telle réplique." Nothing, he said, should induce him to abandon the interests of the protestant religion nor the measures undertaken in defence of it in concert with king George. He would be glad to know the latter's sentiments, and whether he would advise cessation of the reprisals ordered with his approbation. He would gladly regulate his measures in accordance, and was communicating the emperor's letter to the Corpus Evangelicorum.[5]

The other principal champions of the protestants were George himself and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the latter almost as suspect at Vienna as the king of Prussia on account of his close relations with France and the fear that his son's attempts to make the succession in Sweden hereditary in his family would, if successful, bring that country entirely under French influence.[6]

[1] St. Saphorin, recapitulating, 9 May.

[2] St. Saphorin, 29 Feb. He says (16 March) that Eugene was " sans contredit le Ministre de cette Cour qui aime le moins le Roy de Prusse, tant à cause de l'affaire de Clément, que parce qu'il a eu des avis que Knyphausen avoit parlé très-mal sur son sujet à Stockholm." On the " affaire de Clément," see Droysen, pp. 232 foll.

[3] 13 March.

[4] 6 March.

[5] 16 March 1720, R. O. Royal Letters 46, copy.

[6] So Cadogan and St. Saphorin, 29 June and 20 July, R. O. Germany (Empire) 41. " Nous croyons nous appercevoir que cette partialité de la Maison de Hesse en faveur de la France, dont Vôtre Excellence nous parle, est un des plus grands

George showed great zeal in the cause ; a principal part of the work committed to James Scott was the defence of the protestants in Poland and he was using every effort to that end in conjunction with the Prussian envoy,[1] and James Haldane was sent on a special though fruitless mission to the elector Palatine. But George's first object was to remain on good terms with the emperor, without whose aid he could not succeed against the tsar. When, however, it came to choose between Austria and Prussia, his English ministers were all for standing firm by the latter power in the interests of their whole European policy, while the Hanoverians valued her alliance only as against the tsar and would not side with her against the emperor. They were for making concessions in the religious quarrel and allowing him his proper share in the settlement of northern affairs. Thus George sent from his German chancery two letters to Frederick William at the end of 1719, the one recommending the speedy assembly of the Brunswick congress to regulate the compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and to secure the safety and quiet of the circle of Lower Saxony, before the peace between Sweden and Denmark should be made, the other advising that the investiture of Bremen and Verden should be demanded separately from that of Stettin, lest in the endeavour to obtain the two simultaneously both should be lost.[2] For it was known that the former would be granted, but the latter steadily opposed. Whitworth commented on the orders sent him to support the representations of these letters : "I own I cannot comprehend the reasonings in the two orders directed to me . . . except they are designed to create jealousies at this Court and overthrow all we have been doing, but that shall not happen whilst I am here." And he grumbled at being obliged by the absence of a Hanoverian minister from Berlin to receive electoral commissions at all.[3] Indeed, the opposition between king George's English and German ministers, which had shown itself in the negotiations with Prussia and Sweden in the previous year, was now so rampant, that Wallenrodt reported to Berlin that all business intercourse between them had ceased.[4] For Whitworth was not the only representative abroad to receive orders contrary to the views of the British government. Stanhope's expression to Polwarth has been noted. St. Saphorin found himself placed in so great difficulties from this

obstacles que l'on trouvera à engager cette Cour icy dans les mesures contre les Russes," etc. They expressed the hope that king George would endeavour to help in preventing the Swedish succession from being made hereditary.

[1] See, for instance, Scott, 11 Sept. foll., R. O. Poland 26.

[2] 15 and 18 Dec. o.s. 1719, R. O. Prussia 11, copies.

[3] To Tilson, 13 and 20 Jan.

[4] Droysen, p. 294.

cause that he asked to be recalled.[1] A long despatch from Wriesberg, the Hanoverian minister at Ratisbon, set forth instructions from the king opposed to what was communicated to him by the British envoys at Vienna.[2] And so in other instances.[3]

This matter of the investitures troubled the negotiations of the year almost as greatly as that of the protestants. St. Saphorin himself approved the Hanoverian proposal. The arguments which he used, well enough justified by his knowledge of affairs on the spot, were that in case of delay things might happen which would spoil everything and that if the one investiture were granted the other must necessarily follow. The particular possibility, to which he referred, was that Stralsund and Rügen, as well as Stettin, might fall into the hands of Prussia, whereas her acquisition of Stettin alone was already strongly resented at Vienna.[4] But he was informed that to comply with his views was impossible, though that did not deter him from continuing to urge them.[5] The British government attached too great importance to the alliance with Prussia to imperil it in any way. Cadogan had been ordered in his instructions to omit no endeavours to obtain the investitures, but not to sue for that of Bremen and Verden—to which, it was said, there could be no objection, the emperor having guaranteed those provinces to Hanover under the Quadruple Alliance[6]—apart from that of Stettin. Stanhope wrote emphatically to Whitworth,

"We are impatient to have that (the Prussian treaty) concluded, that My Lord Cadogan may be dispatched to Vienna to sollicit the Investitures, which he is directed to do by reiterated orders jointly and not separately, and Mons^r. de St. Saphorin is instructed again, as you will see by the inclosed, not to set on foot in form or by memorial the one without the other; since the Crown of Great Britain is equally engaged by her Guaranty to procure the Investiture of Stettin, as of that of Bremen and Vehrden, and cannot separate them, or

[1] Private despatch, 20 April.
[2] 14 May, R. O. Germany (Empire) 37.
[3] See on the above, Droysen, pp. 290–94.
[4] "Il s'est tenu là-dessus des discours les plus mordans que l'on puisse figurer" (St. Saphorin, 6 Jan.).
[5] "J'ay peu d'espérance ou pour mieux dire je n'en ay aucune d'obtenir les Investitures de Bremen et de Vehrden en même tems que celle de Stettin, et si on ne veut pas les séparer l'un de l'autre, la chose sera vraysemblablement portée à la Diette, et en ce cas on court risque d'avoir un Votum de l'Empire directement contraire. Car, My lord, il ne se peut rien de plus positif que la Négative qu'on me donne à l'égard de l'affaire de Stettin." The king of Prussia was thought already too redoubtable; possessed of Stettin, he would at once embark on new ventures; whereas "en suspendant cette Investiture, la crainte de perdre sa nouvelle conquête le pourra arrêter et empêcher de prendre des engagemens dangereux," with the tsar, for example. "La vivacité avec laquelle on me dit tout cela n'est pas croyable," etc. (21 Feb., and further 4 March, cf. 13 Jan.).
[6] "By which all We were then possessed of is warranted to Us and to which We are likewise a party as Elector" (instructions cited).

preferr the one to the other. These are His Majesty's last commands, and continue to be our fixed resolution, as I had advised you before." [1]

In the fresh instructions given to Cadogan (20 February o.s.), when he was actually about to proceed to Vienna, he was ordered to travel by way of Berlin in order to assure the king of Prussia of "Our unalterable purpose not to admit of any Temperaments that may tend to divide the Investitures"; [2] which instructions he exactly obeyed, obtaining thereby both the king of Prussia's confidence and 50,000 thalers to add to the like sum of British money, which he was authorized to expend at Vienna to expedite his work.[3]

On the bearing of the affairs of southern Europe upon this matter we have the following expressions of Stanhope :—

"It is not to be doubted, but that the Imperial Court will grow more stiff about the Investitures and the other points which are not to their taste in the Peace of the North, the more the negociation in the South seems to promise a good issue." "As Beretti Landi has now signed the Quadruple Allyance, and consequently the Peace in the South must soon be adjusted; it is plain that the Imperial Court will grow more difficult in the point of the Investitures." [4]

It was the more necessary to preserve the alliance with Prussia on account of the unsatisfactory state of present relations with France above referred to. The two principal causes of this were the animosity towards Great Britain which appeared in the doings of the now all-powerful John Law, and the dispute about Gibraltar, which the regent had undertaken to have restored to Spain, and which George and Stanhope were ready to restore, but for the outburst of national feeling which the idea provoked. So critical did the situation become, that Stanhope had to repair to Paris a second time this year in March, and a squadron was prepared for defence against France under pretext of its being required in the Mediterranean. It was believed, besides, as has been said, that

[1] 19 Jan. o.s. 1720, R. O. Foreign Entry Book 53.

[2] R. O. King's Letters 3.

[3] Cadogan and Whitworth from Berlin, 6 April. St. Saphorin advised that it was of no use to offer money to the vice-chancellor; he was too greatly embittered against Prussia and would probably reveal the offer to the emperor (27 March). He says later (30 Oct.) that though the specified object of Cadogan's mission to Vienna was to obtain the investitures, his real work was to be to support Prince Eugene and the German ministry against the Spaniards.

Cadogan's use of his money caused considerable trouble in the following year, when the Prussian government enquired into its disposition. Only 12,000 crowns given to the Countess Althan could be accounted for, and Cadogan was suspected of expending the rest on his private pleasures. Eventually he had to repay 40,000 crowns. (See the private despatches of St. Saphorin, 5 and 15 March, and of Whitworth, 22 March, 1 April, 6 May, 1721).

[4] To Whitworth, 19 Jan. and 16 Feb. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 53.

the work of the tsar in Poland and at Constantinople was being actively supported by the French ministers there. If the Prussian alliance, Stanhope wrote, were forfeited, that power might be driven into the arms of France,

"et ces deux Puissances, étroitement unies ensemble et aidées par le Czar, tailleront après le besoin toujours et à l'Empereur et à nous aussy. . . . La Grande Bretagne en seroit abîmée." "Nous mériterons dans ce cas-là les uns et les autres tous les maux qui nous en arriveront. Comptez que cette Cour ce répent des bons offices qu'elle nous a rendus dans le Nort ; qui ont été très essentiels ; et qu'ils ne manqueront pas de nous réplonger dans de nouveaux embarras de ce côté-là, si nous leur en fournissons une aussi belle occasion que sera l'aliénation du Roy de Prusse." [1]

Count Eric Sparre had arrived at Paris from Vienna in February. Stair reported him to be contented with his reception at the latter court and with the disposition shown there to aid Sweden against the tsar, but to have been made to understand that action could hardly be taken unless France showed readiness to give effective help. He had been well received by the regent and hoped for a renewal of the subsidy treaty. Wismar and Sleswick, he said, could only be given up in exchange for Stralsund and Rügen, and he spoke much of the compensation to be made to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp.[2]

Sparre's own report home of his doings at Paris was as follows.

[1] To St. Saphorin, 2 Feb. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 221 and Germany (Empire) 37, and to Craggs, 1 April, France 167. Further to St. Saphorin on the latter date : "J'espère que . . . la Cour de Vienne reconnoîtra enfin combien il est capital pour elle de ne point réduire le Roy de Prusse à la nécessité de se précipiter dans des mesures qui entraîneroient infailliblement la ruine de toute l'Europe." It was mistaken if it thought "pouvoir mieux se passer de nous que cy-devant. Au contraire je suis très persuadé, et Mr. de Penterridter l'est aussi, que depuis quelques semaines nous avons esté à deux doigts de nôtre perte. Cette Cour icy s'est cru assurée de pouvoir disposer l'Espagne comme elle voudroit." Certain people had not scrupled to propose to the regent to declare war upon the emperor. Dubois "s'en est cru perdu, a crié au secours, et m'a fait venir icy. Heureusement pour nous la Cour d'Espagne ne s'est point trouvé si docile que l'on avoit espéré. Nous ne sçavons point le détail du manège qu'il y a eu, mais nous en sçavons assés pour sentir qu'il y a présentement de l'aigreur entre eux. Cet incident m'a donné beau jeu." St. Saphorin had written (20 March) : "Comme Mr. de Penterrider est dans l'opinion que Mr. Law est entièrement dans les intérêts du Prétendant, et qu'il travaille à renverser le nouveau Archévêque de Cambray [Dubois], l'idée qu'ils se forment icy là-dessus, que Sa Mté. aura besoin de rechercher l'Empereur, ne laisse pas de fortifier beaucoup leur hauteur naturelle ; et comme ils croyent que si Law n'entraîne pas le Régent dans des mesures contre le Roy, ce ne sera qu'au cas que toutes les violences faites en France dans les Finances feront à la fin remuer la Nation, l'espérance qu'ils ont qu'en cet autre cas le Régent sera obligé d'avoir recours à eux ; tout ce les rend très fiers, sans qu'ils fassent attention au dérangement extrême de leurs Finances."

[2] Stair to Craggs, 13 Feb. Later (29 Feb.) he wrote that Sparre's success was small, and expressed the belief that Torcy, Law and Le Blanc were conspiring to blow the flame in the north.

He had consulted the regent about a renewal of the defensive alliance expired in 1718 and about subsidies and a treaty of commerce, and had suggested that he should promise not to trouble the emperor while negotiations in the Swedish interest were going on. The idea, that he would do so, the regent warmly repudiated. Going on to discuss the prospects of a concert against the tsar, Sparre said that even if, in accordance with the plan he had submitted at Vienna, the emperor furnished 16,000 men and France paid for them and other German troops, yet nothing could be done since the failure in Poland, that country being the only gate to Russia. The king of Prussia certainly would not assist. He himself did not find he could do any good at Paris, and wished to return home. He hinted further that king George might change, and advised fresh methods of proceeding. A person of great influence had told him that, had Osterman been allowed to return to Sweden, he might have brought with him acceptable propositions.[1]

Sparre further reported conferences with the Russian minister Baron Schleinitz on the possibilities of peace, whose substance was as follows. He declaring that Sweden must have back Esthonia and Livonia, Schleinitz replied that if the tsar gave up Reval he might pretend to keep Viborg, as in the alternative proposals of the queen of Sweden. But Sparre said that those proposals no longer held good; Viborg could no more be given up than Esthonia. Schleinitz then enquiring about the division of Carelia, he proposed a line which would retain for Sweden Keksholm. This Schleinitz pronounced to be impossible. Nor would Sparre agree that Narva and other neighbouring ports could be ceded, saying that it was required to drive the tsar away from the Baltic. In the end Schleinitz insisted upon the cession of part of Esthonia and Carelia, including Viborg.[2]

These doings of Sparre followed upon overtures made at Paris on behalf of the tsar. To him the regent's policy of the previous year had been eminently distasteful. He had been fully informed by Alexis Golovkin of the part taken by Rottembourg and Senneterre in promoting the Prussian treaties. The regent at first denied, so Schleinitz reported, sending them instructions so to act, but later admitted the help given, saying that a continuance of enmity between Prussia and Hanover was harmful to France; nothing was intended inimical to the tsar. Dubois declared that consent to the Swedish cessions, contrary to the true interest of France, had

[1] 30 April, translation enclosed by Carteret 25 May o.s., R. O. Sweden 27.

[2] Sparre's report, above, and "Précis des propositions faites dans les conférences entre le Baron (sic) de Spaar et le Baron de Slenitz sur les moyens de parvenir à la paix entre leurs maîtres," *Recueil des instructions*, VIII. 204.

been compelled by the pressure of southern affairs. Schleinitz replied that, seeing what had occurred, the tsar must take measures for his own defence; he had made his conquests alone and would keep them alone. Then in October Dubois formally proposed to Schleinitz French mediation, to which the latter, after reference to his court, replied agreeably, saying that it was hoped that the king of France would observe the same impartiality as the tsar had observed in regard to Spain. Dubois countered with the statement that the tsar's intrigues with Spain—the visit of Lawless to Reval, his conferences with Shafirov and the rest—were fully known on irrefragable authority, and that such conduct was not calculated to dispose the regent to give him help. The interview ended, however, with friendly assurances for the future; wait, said Dubois, till the Spanish war is ended, and then see.[1]

At the end of the year Schleinitz received instructions from the tsar of 16 November o.s., and thereupon delivered a declaration to the following effect. The tsar willingly accepted French mediation, conditionally upon the regent declaring formally that he had no engagement direct or indirect with Sweden or with any of her allies or any other power contrary in letter or spirit to the third separate and secret article of the treaty of Amsterdam. This was required, it was stated, on account of the known doings of French ministers at various courts, and especially at Berlin, of the subsidies paid to Sweden and Hesse-Cassel, and especially of the letters sent by Carteret and Norris in the previous year, couched in a style unfit for use in communications between great princes and mentioning the co-operation of France and of other powers. The tsar could not suppose that this was done without a concert with the king of England.[2] The regent replied that he had faithfully observed the treaty of Amsterdam, but could not give the declaration asked, because it would impugn his honour. If the tsar would believe him and accept French mediation, he would see that proper impartiality would be observed; if not, then it would be agreeable that he should obtain peace with Sweden by the mediation of some other power.[3]

After Stanhope's second visit to Paris the regent made secret overtures to Schleinitz through De la Marck.[4] Foreseeing that the peace now made with Spain and a general peace in the north might "fixer le système" of the powers concerned as to their interests and views for the future, he was disposed to enter into

[1] Solov'ev.
[2] Dated 15 Jan. 1720, *Sbornik*, XL. 74–77, also in Solov'ev.
[3] Solov'ev.
[4] Early in April; Schleinitz' report, *Sbornik*, XL. 131–32.

the closest relations with the tsar on the basis of the said pacifications, in which might join hereafter other powers and some princes of the empire. As the foundation of this would be peace and union between Russia and Sweden, the regent would work for this with all the impartiality of a mediator, if the tsar would accept such mediation without limitation, would explain confidentially his conditions and views upon an armistice and place of congress, and would send full powers to his ministers in France to enter into the necessary negotiations. The regent was informed, De la Marck said, of the relations between the tsar and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, both as to his marriage and the restoration of his estates and as to his nomination as successor to the crown of Sweden, and the manner in which these two delicate points were treated would either advance the peace or render it more difficult. If the tsar would open himself confidentially on this subject, the regent would act in concert with him and endeavour to procure an issue satisfactory to him.

Solov'ev's account of what De la Marck said runs as follows. Now that the Spanish war was ended the regent was willing to consider a league with Russia, Spain and Sweden and with Prussia and other protestant powers of the empire. As such could not be formed till peace was made with Sweden, he would exert himself to obtain it. He had ordered Dubois to state that he had no engagements with Sweden or with any other power contrary to the treaty of Amsterdam or which could hinder his impartiality; though strongly pressed by the allies of Vienna to enter into such, he had refused. He hoped that the statement would satisfy the tsar, without a formal declaration. The king of England threatened, indeed, to withdraw his help from Sweden if she entered into negotiation with the tsar without him, but his use of the regent's name in southern as in northern affairs, for example in connexion with the letters sent by Carteret and Norris, was quite unauthorized. Campredon had been obliged by his ministers at Stockholm to enter into a secret agreement between Great Britain, France and Sweden, but his conduct was not approved and he had not full powers; the treaty would not be ratified. De la Marck went on about the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, as above. Schleinitz, Solov'ev continues, thought the regent sincere and tired of his alliance with the emperor and the king of England, perceiving how he had strengthened the former by his Spanish policy and wanting the support of the tsar. At a later interview De la Marck spoke of the religious disputes in Germany and how fear of the protestant powers induced a desire at Vienna for the prolongation of the northern war. He communicated a project of the two landgraves and the dukes of

Saxe-Gotha and Wolfenbüttel for raising, with the aid of French money, a force of 30,000 to 40,000 men to secure the empire against foreign powers and to preserve the conditions of Westphalia, but the regent, he said, had refused to help, on the grounds that the scheme was directed against Russia and the empire was in no danger.

Peter the Great now, with the view of conciliating British sentiment, declared to the merchants of that nation at St. Petersburg that he imputed the king of England's hostility towards himself entirely to his Hanoverian interests; he did not blame Great Britain, and would continue his favour to them as heretofore, so that they need fear nothing on account of Hanoverian intrigues but might pursue their trade freely, provided that they did not concern themselves in those intrigues. If, however, any should be found to be implicated in them, they would be treated as spies.[1]

To return to Vienna, St. Saphorin continued his efforts both to bring the emperor into line against the tsar and to obtain the investitures. A Russian alliance, he wrote, was contrary to the sentiments of the emperor and of all the ministers, excepting the vice-chancellor. He quoted assurances by Eugene and Sinzendorff that the tsar, established on the Baltic, would be a danger to the empire, and that the emperor was disposed to enter into the arrangements proposed against him, as soon as he could do so with safety, in spite of anything that the Russians might bruit abroad to the contrary. Yet, he reported Sinzendorff to say, their hands were free to make alliance with the tsar, were they reduced thereto.

"Il me paroit, que l'on a envie d'avoir le Cxar dans le Congrès de Brunswick, dans l'espérance qu'il y influera pour leurs deux principales vues, dont l'une est, d'inquietter le Roy de Prusse par rapport à Stettin, et l'autre de procurer la restitution de Schleswick. Il y a dans tout cela un travers de politique bien grand, car en voulant amuser le Cxar, ils l'enorgueillissent, et luy donnent les moyens de se faire rechercher par le Roy de Prusse, et d'intimider les Polonois. Et ils ne sçauroyent se servir de luy pour leurs vues dans les affaires de l'Empire, sans luy donner occasion de s'y ingérer beaucoup plus avant qu'il ne seroit convenable."[2]

A long and stormy discussion with Sinzendorff[2] had shown that three things were certain; (1) the vice-chancellor would do all that he could to bring about an alliance with the tsar, (2) pending the settlement of the religious quarrel the court "flottera sur

[1] Declaration by Count Tolstoi as president of the college of commerce, 8 April o.s., *Sbornik*, XL. 86. The gist sent by Wich from Hamburg 10 May, R. O. Hamburg 37.

[2] "Je n'obmis rien pour le bien échauffer, parce ce que c'est par ce moyen que l'on peut d'ordinaire le mieux découvrir le vray état des choses."

plusieurs projets différens et contradictoires," and (3) that no dictates of prudence would prevail, were there any appearance of detraction from the emperor's dignity and authority. Were the vice-chancellor the master, there would probably be an alliance with the tsar at once, but the other ministers desired nothing better than that the Russians should be driven back to their " Palus-méotides," although in the present circumstances " ils ont pris le principe de les ménager extrêmement, tandis qu'ils ne verront point de moyens suffisans pour leur ôter ce qu'ils ont pris de la Suède." Besides which, there was no reason for hostility, and there was a common enemy in the Turk. If the tsar were won over to grant certain concessions to his subjects of the Roman faith, an alliance might result. It was certainly the interest of Prussia, by working in concert with the emperor, to prevent the tsar from establishing himself upon her borders. As to the corresponding interest of the emperor to keep on good terms with the king of Prussia, lest he should ally himself with Russia and France, Sinzendorff was of opinion that to hold out about the investiture of Stettin would not alienate him, but on the contrary render him more amenable.[1]

In the second quarter of the year the negotiations at Vienna increased in activity and importance. The Prussian resident Canngiesser, who had come in March to replace Burchardi, deceased, received at the beginning of April the queen of Sweden's formal renunciation of her sovereignty over Stettin and its district.[2] Cadogan arrived at length on 23 April, and on 10 May, to reinforce Weisbach, came Paul Yaguzhinsky, the tsar's especial confidant.[3] Cadogan had been authorized at Berlin to deny that the king of Prussia either had entered or would enter into measures prejudicial to the emperor or empire and to express his readiness to comply with anything which should be done at Vienna on his behalf.[4] He found, as had St. Saphorin, that there was willingness to grant the investiture of Bremen and Verden, but the reverse in the case of Stettin.[5] It was objected to Canngiesser that the renunciation must come from the kingdom of Sweden, not only from the queen,

[1] St. Saphorin's despatches, February and March.

[2] St. Saphorin, 3 April.

[3] Shafirov was at this time out of favour and ill of an hypochondriacal ailment. Whitworth called Yaguzhinsky " at present the Czar's favourite and chief minister " (23 March). La Vie in his account of the tsar and his ministers (*Sbornik*, XXXIV. 324–26, March 1718) wrote of him : " Le Czar se sert de Monsieur Jagosinsky, son chambellan ordinaire, pour toutes ses parties de plaisir et dans de certaines expéditions secrètes, dont S.M. se dérobe la connoissance à ses ministres. On obtient beaucoup de choses par lui, et l'on peut aussi par lui insinuer au Czar tout ce que l'on veut." Cf. Bain, *The First Romanovs*, p. 380, and *The Pupils of Peter the Great*.

[4] Cadogan and Whitworth from Berlin, 10 April.

[5] Cadogan and St. Saphorin, 27 April.

and the vice-chancellor said openly that the matter must be referred to the diet.[1]

On the religious question Cadogan and St. Saphorin used firm language. The latter had already been bold enough to say that the protestant princes had as much right to disobey the emperor as had the elector Palatine (who had found pretexts to evade orders already sent him), and that the essence of the matter was to oblige the "aggressors" to desist from their innovations. At a stormy interview with Sinzendorff they said:

"Comme la considération des Investitures n'obligeroit jamais Sa M^té^ à abandonner en aucune manière la Cause des Protestants, ni à admettre dans ce qui la regarde aucun tempérament qui pûsse leur estre dangereux, du moment que l'on voudroit attacher à l'ottroy des Investitures le moindre relâchement préjudiciable aux intérêts Protestants, on cesseroit de les demander à l'Empereur, et que les deux Roys ne manqueroient pas d'autres moyens pour conserver, indépendamment de ces Investitures, les Pais que la Suède leur avoit cédé."

As the result they were able to lead the count, they said, to enter into expedients in regard to the affairs of religion which, without shocking the emperor's delicacy, might appease them advantageously and honourably for the protestants, and in such a manner that they should owe all the obligation to his Majesty. And they obtained the admission that it was proposed to send fresh explanatory orders to the elector Palatine, and a minister to dispose him to render his protestant subjects justice. If, said Sinzendorff, the reprisals were stopped, the emperor would be placed under the obligation of using severity with the innovators and his prejudices would be calmed. Having knowledge of a conciliatory letter from the king of Prussia received by Canngiesser, the envoys were able to reply that that should be done as soon as restitution was made in the Palatinate. After that, Cadogan had an audience of the emperor, when he represented energetically the part which the court of Rome had taken in the disturbances, desiring, he said, to divert the emperor's attention from affairs in Italy and to disunite him from the king of England. Charles replied favourably, and promised to send to the elector Palatine the further orders named. "Il nous paroit," the envoys wrote, "que cette Cour-cy a véritablement l'intention de tâcher de déraciner une bonne fois pour toutes cette sémence de division dans l'Empire."[2]

[1] St. Saphorin, 20 April.

[2] Cadogan and St. Saphorin, 9 May, and therewith translations of the king of Prussia's letters to the emperor and to Canngiesser. St. Saphorin had pressed upon the latter the necessity of conciliatory conduct and the danger of the Russians establishing themselves on the Prussian frontier, assuring him that, if his master

The duke of Holstein-Gottorp, in the meanwhile, entered a protest against the transfer of imperial fiefs, to which he was the next heir, without his consent and in violation of the treaties of Westphalia and of the constitutions of the empire.[1] When the British envoys called his ministers to task, they were answered that he could leave nothing undone to relieve his present extremity. The Austrian ministers disclaimed any interest in his doings, only Sinzendorff expressed his regret that the king of England was aiding the king of Denmark to obtain Sleswick. The envoys replied that, if the duke had followed the salutary advice given him at Hanover, he would have come out very advantageously, but now it must be seen what the issue would be. Sinzendorff then reduced himself to saying that he hoped that some consolation would be found for him.[2] St. Saphorin was ordered to let the duke know that it would cost but little to get him finally excluded from the succession to the Swedish throne by law, and that, if he conducted himself as he was doing, he could have no support for the future. Denmark, it was said, must be expelled from Germany and must have compensation in Sleswick, outside the borders of the empire. It was agreed that the satisfaction to the duke was to be arranged at Brunswick. "Nous donnons à peser à la Cour Impériale et à tous ceux qui écoutent la raison, si nous devons ou bien si nous pouvons même pour l'amour du Schleswick nous dégager de ce que dessus, et faire une guerre au Dannemarc qui obligeroit cette Couronne à s'unir avec le Czar." [3]

It was about this time that the duke sent Stambke to St. Petersburg. According to Mardefeld's report, his request for the hand of Peter's daughter for his master was absolutely rejected, Peter declaring that he had undertaken no engagements on his behalf and that the encouragement given him had been due to the likelihood of his being declared successor to the Swedish throne. Now that that was no longer in prospect, he held himself relieved of any promises he might have made.[4]

would take part against the tsar, the emperor would forget their differences with pleasure. One reason given for the necessity of the said conciliation was that "nous voyions aussi que plusieurs autres Princes Protestants qui ont besoin de l'Empereur commençoyent à vaciller dans les affaires de la Religion, et qu'ainsi il étoit têms de tâcher à les ajuster le plutôt qu'il se pourroit, et avant que la foiblesse de quelques uns se manifestât publiquement."

[1] Copy, undated, with Cadogan and St. Saphorin's despatch of 19 June.

[2] The same, 9 May.

[3] Rescript to St. Saphorin, 24 May, R. O. Germany (Empire) 37.

[4] George Harris, left in charge of affairs at Berlin while Whitworth went to Aix-la-Chapelle for his health and to Holland to get married, 25 June. But Stambke had a long private interview with the tsar on the subject of the marriage, so Jefferyes reported, on 18 June o.s.

In further despatches of May and June Cadogan and St. Saphorin bore witness to the conciliatory attitude of the emperor and his ministers,[1] the satisfaction of the representatives of the protestant princes thereat, and the necessity of putting an end to the Prussian reprisals. The reports of an understanding with the tsar they attributed to the ministers of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and held to be without foundation. Cadogan found opportunity to represent to the vice-chancellor the advantages which would accrue to him personally by securing the king of England's favour and the reverse, and obtained from him in confidence the statement that it was resolved that the Hanoverian investiture ought to be granted, and that the Prussian would be accorded out of consideration for the king of England upon conditions, which might be that the king of Prussia should undertake to demand nothing further and to enter into no relations which might be prejudicial to the emperor or the empire. But, he said, in view of the duke's protest, an act of the estates of Sweden must be obtained giving the sovereign authority to make the cessions. Letters accordingly were sent to Finch, and Bielke also wrote, to obtain such an act; and the riksdag passed it in a form.[2]

The conditions to be imposed upon the king of Prussia, the envoys said, had evident reference to his known desire to obtain Stralsund and Rügen as well as Stettin, to prevent which their master was interested equally with the emperor. They argued that, since that was his present price for giving military help against the tsar, if he were definitely debarred therefrom he might be persuaded to give it without that condition. Other demands would be security for the cities of Hamburg and Bremen and the debarring of female succession, to prevent the possibility of the duchies ceded to Hanover passing into the hands of Prussia. Although the question *an* in regard to granting of the investitures was conceded, the question *quomodo* it was intended to refer to the Aulic Council; nor would they be granted " dans le même sens et étendue " as to Sweden. Acknowledging Stanhope's instructions to keep the religious question separate from that of the investitures the envoys said that they had always endeavoured to do so, but the position was that the investiture of Stettin would not be granted before the Prussian reprisals were revoked. Canngiesser, they said, was

[1] Who blamed, the envoys said, the violence of the catholic princes, and held " que l'Empereur a rendu impartiellement justice aux Protestants et agi en Père commun de l'Empire, qu'il a témoigné une considération infinie pour Sa Majesté pendant tout le cours de cette affaire, et qu'ainsi il espère qu'Elle disposera le Roy de Prusse et les autres Princes Protestants de l'Empire à discontinuer les Represailles."

[2] " More we could not venture to ask or hope to obtain " (Finch, 15 June o.s.).

laying the blame for their continuance upon his Majesty, saying that restitution would be made as soon as he thought proper.[1]

In reply Stanhope said that, if different conditions were attached to the two investitures, the king of Prussia would be irritated instead of gained, and the grants, which must be simultaneous, be long put off.[2] But he had admitted in his previous despatch the advisability of considering a condition binding Prussia not to make a further demand for Stralsund and Rügen, although, he said, the imperial court appeared only to seek pretexts for delay.[3] The king of Prussia, on his part, gave repeated assurances that he would act in the matter of the reprisals entirely in accordance with king George's advice.[4]

As for Yaguzhinsky, one of his first interviews was with the emperor's confessor, who told him that the friendship of no prince in Europe was more desired than that of the tsar and set forth to him the various differences which were alienating the emperor from the king of England.[5] And he was able, according to Mardefeld's advices,[6] to report to his master assurances of friendship on the part of the emperor and amicable interviews with the vice-chancellor, who said that all the tsar had to do was to send his ministers to Brunswick. This Yaguzhinsky promised, subject to a written declaration that nothing should be transacted there to his master's prejudice. But the vice-chancellor held that only verbal assurances on this point could be given, since the emperor would act as mediator and a formal declaration would only give umbrage to the Swedes. But nothing was arranged, and James Scott judged from the utterances of Prince Gregory Dolgoruky and others to him "that this new friendship between their imperial and czarish Majestys is not yet very firmly cemented, nor ought methinks either of these two Princes to think it much his interest to contribute to the aggrandizing of the other." He was informed that the tsar's overtures to the emperor were only intended to break up the concert which seemed to be formed against him by the treaty of Vienna, and that the friendship of Great Britain would be preferred to any other.[7] And the envoys at Vienna reported that Yaguzhinsky had been

[1] "Et les Emissaires de Rome qui sont à cette Cour icy ayant déjà attribué depuis long têms à Sa Mté. de vouloir se former, par le moyen des affaires de Religion, un parti dans l'Empire propre à y faire la loy à l'Empereur, il est aisé de juger combien ce manège de la Cour de Prusse donne de poids à leurs inspirations. . . . Cette Cabale Papiste tâche, à quel prix que ce soit, de causer de trouble dans l'Empire."

[2] 31 May o.s., R. O. Germany (Empire) 37.

[3] 7 June, ibid. Further despatches from Cadogan and St. Saphorin on the subject, 15 and 19 June.

[4] Harris, 7 and 28 May; cf. Solov'ev.

[5] Solov'ev.

[6] As cited by Harris, 21 June.

[7] 5 June, and further 6 July.

met at his audience with mere generalities, and that the suspicion of engagements with Russia was warmly repudiated. But, they wrote, " tandis que les choses resteront dans l'estat qu'elles sont, cette Cour icy continuera à ménager le Cxar." It was because there was no reason for a quarrel with him, and because no practicable plan of action against him had been submitted, that his ministers were received with politeness. " Nous avons de plus en plus lieu d'estre persuadés, que si les Russes ne cherchent qu'à tromper cette Cour, Elle, de son côté, non seulement le connoît, mais encore, bien loin d'estre disposée à entrer en liaisons avec Eux, Elle les haït de tout son cœur." The Russian intrigues reported from Constantinople were calculated to increase the aversion. But before anything could be concerted against the tsar the peace between Sweden and Denmark must be signed, and a more practicable plan than that of Sparre submitted.[1]

[1] 25 and 29 May and 29 June.

CHAPTER XXVIII

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN 1720

By this time a British fleet had appeared once more in the Baltic and was acting openly against the Russians. It consisted of no fewer than twenty-one of the line with ten frigates and smaller vessels. Sir John Norris flew his flag on the *Sandwich*, 90, and Hopson and Hosier theirs on the *Dorsetshire*, 80, and *Prince Frederick*, 70. There were besides six of 70 guns, five of 60, six of 50 and one of 40. Sail had been made from the Nore on 16 April o.s. direct for Stockholm, and anchor was cast at Elsnabben on 12 May o.s. With the men-of-war came more than sixty merchantmen with supplies which were sorely needed.

Whereas, Norris was instructed, "We have not yet found any effects of Our endeavours to promote an accommodation between the Crown of Sweden and the Czar of Muscovy, and have declared by treaty that if such amicable applications should prove fruitless, We would not suffer any longer time to be lost to no purpose," he was to concert operations with the Swedes for repelling a Russian invasion and for obtaining from the tsar as soon as possible a just and reasonable peace. Protection of trade was to be "without prejudice to the service you are principally sent upon, and to the due performance of which We are specially engaged by treaty." He must notify to the Russian ambassador at Copenhagen, and, when advanced into the Baltic, to other the tsar's ministers, admirals and generals, that the king renewed his offers of mediation and best offices. But he was not, by waiting for their answers, to delay his junction with the Swedish fleet. To give effect to the king's offer he and Finch would be empowered to act as plenipotentiaries, jointly or separately as the occasion might require.[1] Information of the above was given by Stanhope to Vesclovsky at the same time.[2]

At Copenhagen, accordingly, Norris apprised Prince Basil Dolgoruky of the tenour of his instructions, but the ambassador's

[1] Instructions, 6 and 7 April o.s., R. O. King's Letters 65, B. M. Add. MSS. 28146.
[2] Ibid. and R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

reply was cold and only referred him to St. Petersburg. On leaving, therefore, he issued to his rear-admirals and captains the following private orders (8 May o.s.) : being commanded to act with the Swedes in defence of Sweden against the Russians, and the Swedes having notified that the tsar would not hearken to any reasonable terms of peace and desiring that Russian ships acting against them should be attacked and destroyed, therefore the several ships were to be kept in readiness for attack as auxiliaries to the crown of Sweden, " and at all times when you shall come up with any Russian ships you do your utmost to take, sink, burn or otherwise destroy them," treating their crews, however, with all civility and taking no plunder.[1] This was quite in accordance with views at home, for Stanhope wrote to Norris on 31 May o.s. that if the tsar would not accept the king's mediation, " there is nothing more to be wisht than that his ships and gallys may fall in your way, there being no doubt of your giving a very good account of them." [2]

The prince of Hesse was now king of Sweden, with the title of Frederick I. His election had long been in negotiation [3] and depended a good deal upon money being supplied to him. Thus Carteret wrote on 20 October o.s. 1719 that he wanted a loan of 200,000 crowns, without security, " to make his views of the Crown sure and infallible," and that Dubois had promised to furnish money to this end independently of the subsidies, but desired the matter to be kept extremely secret. Asked by the prince in February 1720 whether the money could not be advanced on his undertaking to repay it soon, Carteret replied in the negative, but promised on no account to speak of the matter and to assist the prince as much as possible by good offices and representations. He reported that Campredon had bills of exchange for 200,000 crowns of French money to support the prince's views, and that more would be forthcoming, if necessary.[4]

When the riksdag met the queen proposed first a joint sovereignty of the prince with herself, and then, the suggestion proving unacceptable, that he should be king when in the kingdom, herself regent in his absence and queen in case of his death ; all acts to pass in both names, but one signature to be sufficient. But in the end all form of a joint sovereignty had to be abandoned. The

[1] Norris's journal, B. M. Add. MSS. 28129.

[2] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

[3] Carteret, for instance, 5 Sept. o.s. 1719, in cipher (R. O. Sweden 25): " I think the Prince stands fair for the crown. The Queen is extremely for it. In what manner will the King assist him ? If the King would give him the garter he would receive it with pleasure, and I believe such a mark of friendship in this juncture will be of use to him. I never met with anybody that loves our country better. It would do well to put an English mark upon his person."

[4] 28 Jan. o.s. 1720, ibid. 26.

queen consented to resign to her husband all royal power during his life, and he was elected king on 24 March o.s.[1] The coronation took place on 3 May o.s.[2] After taking their oath of allegiance the estates took another to defend their liberties against despotic power. It was also proposed by a party, as has been said, to name the duke of Holstein-Gottorp successor, in order to prevent him from throwing himself into the arms of the tsar, but this also was rejected. A protest by the duke against his uncle's election increased his unpopularity, it being "universally disliked," says Jackson, even by the Holstein party.[3]

Arrived at Stockholm, Norris was requested by the new king to join his fleet at once and go in search of the enemy, cruising towards the Åland isles and Hango Head to prevent the passage of the Russian galleys into the Gulf of Bothnia and the fleet from coming to their support. Sailing on 20 May o.s. he took up station with the Swedish fleet, twenty of the line with ten frigates, at Gottska Sandö, an island north of Gothland, and cruised thence as ordered. But the Russian fleet kept out of his way at Cronslot and the galleys had gone north into the Gulf of Bothnia, where they could not be followed, three weeks before.[4] A force of 8,000 foot with horse and Cossacks landed at Umeå in Västerbotten and burnt the town and ravaged the country round.[5] The attempt to approach the Åland isles failed through contrary winds, fog, and want of pilots; the Swedish fleet, says Norris, never having navigated those waters. On the 27th the main fleet sailed for Reval and anchored off that place, some vessels being detached to make a close inspection of the port. As the result thereof it was decided that an attack was impracticable without the aid of a land-force.[6] Norris sent in his letters offering the king's mediation, but the governor of Reval, William van Delden, returned the packet unopened, having instructions not to transmit to the tsar any communication from Norris, because he was assisting and protecting his enemy.[7] The restriction, however, did not apply to the tsar's

[1] "To the great satisfaction of the Queen and all the good people of Sweden," says Carteret.

[2] When celebrating the occasion, an English merchant ship of 16 guns was blown up and thirty-five persons were killed, including Carteret's chaplain.

[3] Jackson, 20 and 23 April, 11 June o.s., R. O. Sweden 23. He had lately resumed his post of minister resident. See on these affairs Campredon in Malmström, pp. 61 foll.

[4] Says Norris: "The Coast of Finland and towards the Bothnick Gulf is so environ'd with rocks, where our ships cannot navigate, that it is impossible for us to hinder the motions of the gallies and their excursions where the Swedes are unguarded" (to Stanhope, 9 June o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval).

[5] Particulars, Bacmeister, pp. 171–72.

[6] Norris's journal and letter-book, B. M. Add. MSS. 28129, 28146, and despatches to Stanhope, 26 May to 2 June o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

[7] Norris, and Bacmeister, II. 169.

servants. Count Apraksin, the Russian admiral-in-chief, enquired as to Norris's intentions and desired him to keep at a reasonable distance from the coast, seeing that his coming, in consequence of the reports of Veselovsky and Dolgoruky, was regarded as a mark of hostility. Norris, having replied to this, was informed by Apraksin in return that the tsar desired that he or some other British minister should be sent to St. Petersburg, furnished with credentials and full powers, and that he would be well received. He asked also whether Russian ships bound on private affairs would be allowed to pass, and Tolstoi wrote about goods, in particular about some wine intended for the tsar's stores at St. Petersburg confiscated from Dutch ships.

Returned to Käppelswik Bay in Gothland, Norris was informed by the king of Sweden of the burning of Umeå and was asked whether he could not cut the galleys off on their return to Helsingfors. At a council of war on 8 June o.s. it was decided to cruise for ten days for that purpose off Hango Head, but a week later resolved to return to Elsnabben and Dalarö; and this was done, the fleet remaining there for five weeks.[1] Norris set forth to the king how he had acted in accordance with his instructions and with what result, and how it was impossible to attack the Russian galleys amongst the rocks, especially when there was no single person able to act as pilot.[2]

Discussions at Stockholm now, as the result of the cruise, turned upon the possibility of making peace. As Norris expressed it: "There seems to be an uneasiness in Sweden that they are not able to gain an advantage of their Enemies, and it is to be fear'd they are not at present in condition to do it."[3] Even before Norris's return king Frederick had confessed to Finch the impotence of the fleet against the Russians unsupported by a land-force, and had intimated that, in spite of his inclination to persevere with the war and of the loyal support given by the king of England at so great expense, if the latter with his knowledge of the intentions of the European courts was of opinion that it could not be carried on with success, then he was willing to enter into negotiation for peace under his direction.[4] And he used to Norris like expressions, assuring him that he would take no step without the king of England's advice.[5] He set out the situation to George I as follows. A combined land-force must be assembled speedily, he himself being at great expense for ships and soldiers while the tsar

[1] Journal and letter-book.
[2] Copy of his letter, 15 June o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.
[3] To Stanhope, same date, ibid.
[4] Finch, same date, R. O. Sweden 28.
[5] Norris to Stanhope, 25 June o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

saved them and his money by keeping on the defence. It was intended to despatch a force to Finland, but it could not be more than 20,000 men and without help on the side of Poland and Livonia would be crushed. If nothing were done this year, the exhaustion of his finances would allow but little to be attempted in the next. Hessian and other German troops, and Poles and Cossacks, could be obtained, were a foundation laid. King George would know whether the coldness of the imperial court could be overcome and the goodwill of France be made more lively; if that were not possible, negotiations must be opened with the tsar very soon. His mediation, principally, and any other would be accepted, and it would be more efficacious if the emperor and France would join. Sweden would be content to recover what was absolutely necessary for her security, Finland up to the Systerbäck, with Viborg, Esthonia with Narva, and Livonia.[1] George replied :—

"Je souhaitte pouvoir disposer les Cours de Vienne, de France et de Prusse à former un bon concert pour mettre sur pied une armée capable de faire entendre raison au Czar: pourveu que J'y trouve de la disposition, Je vous promets d'aller pour mon particulier même au delà des engagements portez par nos Traittez. Et selon les avis que Je vous donneray de tems en tems des progrez que Je feray, ou que Je ne pourray pas faire, Vôtre Majesté se consultera Elle même sur le plus ou le moins qu'Elle devra sacrifier au Czar, et pourra toujours compter sur la continuation de tout ce que portent nos Traittez, pour ne pas dire davantage, tant qu'Elle jugera à propos, ou qu'Elle sera contrainte par l'opiniâtreté du Czar à continuer la Guerre." [2]

The English court had removed to Hanover at the end of June, and Stanhope was at once sent on to Berlin to arrange a meeting between the two kings and to press Frederick William to renew his representations to the tsar. He agreed, and wrote in terms which Stanhope dictated. Referring to Apraksin's letter to Norris the king of Prussia expressed king George's willingness to send a minister to St. Petersburg, did he not fear the loss of time which would result from the necessity of sending to Sweden first to ascertain final views there. It would be better, he said, if the tsar would either empower one of his ministers abroad to make known to the king of England his ultimate demands and to hear those of Sweden, or send some authorized person to treat with Sir John Norris, who was provided with the necessary full powers and in touch with Stockholm. In either case an armistice should be proclaimed, to last till May. The king of England would be much pleased if the tsar would join with him some other mediator

[1] 26 June o.s., R. O. Royal Letters 56; copies, S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270 and Regencies 3.

[2] 6 Aug., copies, as above.

or mediators, in particular, himself the king of Prussia. And the treaty of peace, which should be made, he was ready to guarantee.[1]

In conversation with Golovkin Stanhope said that the tsar could not be allowed to keep Reval, but that St. Petersburg and a considerable tract of coast could be guaranteed to him, if Sweden could be prevailed upon to cede them, and he pointed out how dangerous to Russia would be a cession of Livonia to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. The reality of that project, however, and also that of the duke's marriage, he found to be disbelieved, and he reported signs of the tsar desiring an accommodation and of the king of Denmark being willing to offer his mediation and inclined to concert measures against him.[2]

On his return to Hanover Stanhope sent to the British envoys at Vienna a full exposition of what had been done at Berlin and elsewhere in furtherance of the northern peace and of the measures contemplated for war.[3] The object of persuading the king of Prussia to write as he had done was, he said, that he should be the more offended if his proposals were declined. For the price of Stralsund and Rügen the Prussians " s'embarqueroient tout de bon," and would put into the field at their own expense an army of 30,000 men, with artillery, while the Swedish, Hessian and other troops would muster 40,000. But as the cession of Stralsund and Rügen, " que je pose pour une condition sine qua non," would be extremely repugnant both to Sweden and to other powers, he (Stanhope) had carefully guarded himself against giving any hope of it. If it could not be allowed and the help of Prussia so secured, there remained three alternatives: firstly, that the tsar should retain his conquests and be master in the Baltic; secondly, a plan presented at Stockholm by the landgrave's minister General von Diemar providing for the assembly of a miscellaneous German force of 30,000 men, to be paid for by France and Great Britain, a plan drawn up by Campredon and strongly approved in France;[4] or, thirdly, an armed league of the emperor, Great Britain, Sweden, the king of Poland, and the landgrave. The first plan would satisfy nobody, unless perhaps France, who would not fail to cultivate the tsar's friendship with the view of raising a disturbance in the empire whenever desired. As to the second, it was known that France

[1] Abstracts, R. O. Regencies 3, B. M. Add. MSS. 28146.

[2] 11 and 13 July o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270, and similarly to Norris. On the mediation by Denmark, see Stanhope to Carteret and Polwarth, 28 July, George to Frederick IV, same date, and Frederick I to George, 2 Aug. o.s.; ibid. and Royal Letters 56.

[3] 26 July, R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270, Germany (Empire) 41.

[4] Copies with Finch's despatch of 25 June o.s.; see also Carteret's of 25 May o.s. Campredon, said Stanhope, " offre monts et merveilles pour le faire goûter, et d'y contribuer en subsides autant qu'on voudra."

was laying a bait for Sweden and Hesse by hopes of subsidies capable of supporting a force of 40,000 men, and " recherche avec empressement de se rendre maîtresse de la négociation de paix entre le Czar et la Suède même à nôtre exclusion," but the scheme was worse than useless and would only raise the credit of the tsar's arms. If the league could not be formed, the first solution, however shameful, must be accepted. It must, therefore, be discovered whether the emperor would take up arms, and if so, what force he could furnish,

" et en troisième lieu quelle convenance il rechercheroit outre celles qui le touchent pour le moins autant qu'aucun autre Prince, à sçavoir, d'empêcher qu'un Barbare aussi puissant que le Czar ne s'établisse point assez près de luy pour être à portée de le troubler toutes les fois que la France s'en voudra servir, et d'empêcher aussi que la Suède, le landgrave de Hesse, le Danemarc même, et d'autres réduits a ne point espérer d'appuy de l'Empereur contre le Czar, se jettent, quoyque peut être peu sagement, entre les bras de la France. Il nous semble que la conduite de l'Empereur jusqu'à présent, dans tous ces affairs du Nort, n'a déjà donné que trop d'avantages à la France, qui a seu se faire un mérite d'avoir sauvé la Suède, d'avoir procuré la Paix et donné la Garantie du Duché de Sleswick au Dannemarc, d'avoir procuré Stettin et la paix au Roy de Prusse, et faut il que je dise enfin que toute la Terre voit avec surprise que le Roy nôtre Maître doibt en grande partie sa paix avec la Suède, la cession de Breme et Verde, et la figure qu'il fait aujourd'huy dans le Nort aux ménagements que la France, par bonne ou mauvaise politique, a eu pour Sa Majesté."

The emperor had been earnestly courted, yet, though he had not actually injured the king's interests, no one could say that he had helped them. Excuses on the score of the Turkish or Spanish wars were no longer valid, for they were ended. By serving his friends now the emperor could prevent the establishment of a power in the north far more formidable by sea and by land than Sweden had ever been, and just as well disposed to France. He ought to seize the opportunity for his own interests, without being urged on by others. It should be remarked that an imperial force, however large, would cost but little, as it would find subsistence in Poland.

But it soon appeared that neither Austria nor Prussia nor France were to be stirred to action. In the first case to all that Cadogan and St. Saphorin could say it was only answered that no concert could be entered into until the religious dispute was composed, and on that question all their pains, they confessed, had not been able to obtain a resolution in accordance with his Majesty's views.[1]

[1] 3 Aug. "Les Protestants et les Catholiques diffèrent depuis long tems si absolument de Principes sur ces affaires, que l'on peut hardiment dire qu'il n'y a aucunne négociation plus difficile vers cette Cour que celle qui regarde cette matière."

They had done all they could, they said, to set forth the tsar's "obliquité" and his intrigues in Turkey[1] and Poland, and had stated that, so long as the grant of the investitures was delayed, the king of England must act with extreme circumspection in the religious question lest he should be accused of buying them by a betrayal of the protestants.[2] They attributed the recalcitrance of the imperial court in some measure to the belief that the king of England was anxious to be rid of the northern imbroglio, and "ils veulent se prévaloir du besoin qu'ils croyent que l'on a d'eux pour faire les difficiles et pour arranger toutes choses selon leurs désirs." Of all that they themselves had said, what seemed most to impress was the statement that, if the emperor would not co-operate as desired, the king would endeavour to bring about a peace between Sweden and Russia or would enter into the projects of Prussia in reference to Stralsund and Rügen, or even support the plan of Diemar and Campredon. They blamed the Spanish party.[3] Although it was the vice-chancellor who led the attack upon the protestants, "il n'en seroit pas venu à bout si la Cabale Espagnole n'y avoit aussi contribué . . . Elle représente la France comme estant présentement dans un tel dérangement, que l'on peut luy donner quelles loix l'on veut, et selon Elle il n'est pas besoin d'avoir de ménagement pour cette Puissance." And it would have it believed that the king of England was endeavouring to undermine the emperor's authority in the empire.[4]

Secondly, though the court of Berlin was steady on the religious question—the emperor's attitude, Harris wrote, was viewed with reserve, and judgment was suspended until the king of England's opinion should be known [5]—to join in action against the tsar was a different matter; indeed Frederick William had lately renewed to him his assurance of neutrality.[6] As the result of one conversation

[1] The envoys had procured by bribery the abstraction from Yaguzhinsky's papers of a draft for an alliance between Russia and Turkey, presumably the draft of March above-mentioned. Stanyan forwarded from Constantinople a translation, similarly obtained, on 19 Aug. o.s.

[2] 10 Aug., and fully on the religious difficulty, St. Saphorin to Bernstorff and Stanhope, 14 Aug. There was no sincerity, he said, on the part of the imperial court in the whole affair.

[3] "Cette Cabale n'a jamais totalement abandonné ses vues chimériques et dangereuses, et a toujours espéré d'y entraîner dans un tems ou dans l'autre l'Empereur."

[4] 24 Aug.

[5] "These ministers are resolved to conform themselves entirely to his Majesty's sentiments in the affairs of Religion, and are extreamly satisfied with the prospect there is of composing the differences in this respect in an amicable manner. They are absolutely against transferring the discussion of the Griefs, complained off by the Protestants, from Ratisbon to Ulm or Franckforth, as the Empr. seems to insinuate" (10 and 27 Aug.).

[6] Stavenow, p. 41.

with Ilgen Harris could report, indeed, some disposition thereto upon conditions—co-operation by other powers, a guarantee for the security of Prussia proper, and compensation in land, for instance by the bishopric of Ermeland[1]—and, said he, if action were taken in common with France, "you may at present have this Court, and on your own terms, should the Czar still refuse to listen to reasonable accommodation." But at another interview he found the minister in quite a different temper, saying that they would know what answer to make when the king of England had submitted a plan and specified his conditions. The best thing to move the court of Berlin, he advised, would be "a good body of troops whether Danes or Hessians formed in Poland" and at hand to cover the frontier of Prussia.[2]

That France, lastly, would join in the proposed concert there was now little hope. Stanhope wrote to Carteret and Polwarth at Copenhagen: "Your Lordships must have observed by what has fallen in your way, and we have stronger proofs of it from other places, that France has not of late acted a frank and sincere part towards His Majesty in relation to Northern affairs."[3] And Sir Robert Sutton, now at Paris in Lord Stair's place, wrote of the "manège" of the French court:—

"Elle écoute favorablement le Baron Sparr,[4] le S^r^ Du Mont, Envoyé de Hollstein, et le Sieur Schleinitz, Envoyé du Czar. Ces gens, qui sont tous François, et les deux derniers pensionnaires, ont voulu entamer une négociation entre la Suède et le Czar par l'entremise de la France, et on espère icy de s'attirer par leur moyen le maniement et la direction de cette affaire. L'on a fait compter cent mille écus au Duc de Holstein, et l'on favorise sous main les intérêts de ce Prince, que le Czar comence à protéger ouvertement, ayant mandé, à ce qu'on m'assure, à M^r^ Schleinitz par un courier, qui vient d'arriver, de déclarer qu'il ne peut pas l'abandonner. En même tems on recule le payement des subsides dus au Roy de Suède, et on luy recommande fortement la paix avec le Czar. On a de grands ménagemens pour ce dernier Prince, non seulement dans la vue d'ouvrir un commerce avantageux avec ses états, mais aussy dans le dessein d'en tirer les mêmes avantages, qu'on tiroit autrefois de la Suède. D'un autre côté M^r^ l'Archévêque de Cambray n'a pu cacher son chagrin contre le Dannemarc et le peu de satisfaction qu'on a de la Paix conclue entre cette Couronne et la Suède. Tout cela bien considéré,

[1] But, says he, "I easily comprehended his drift, and that the mention of that place was only to conceal his views on Stralsund and Rügen."

[2] 30 July and 3 Aug.

[3] 28 July, R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270.

[4] Count Sparre, that is. When he was about to return to Stockholm Sutton wrote (29 Aug.): "On va être quitte d'un homme, qui a toujours tenu une conduite de travers, et qui a certainement suivi des Maximes, qui ne conviennent nullement aux intéresses du Roy de Suède aujourdhuy regnant. Je m'en vais concerter avec le Comte Bielke pour me mettre mieux en devoir d'appuyer les prétentions de la Suède." (This was Count Charles Gustavus Bielke, the Swedish envoy at Paris).

il me paroit fort douteux, si la France souhaite tout de bon la Pacification du Nord, à moins que ce ne soit d'une manière, qui réponde aux vues qu'Elle a pour l'avenir." [1]

These suspicions rested partly on information which came to hand that sole mediation by France had been proposed at Stockholm. Frederick I had written to the regent excusing himself from accepting the proposition. It originated, Finch and Norris wrote, with the party at Paris desiring to promote commercial relations with Russia.[2] Campredon was implicated,[3] and Stanhope complained bitterly to Sutton of orders being sent to him apparently without Dubois' knowledge and contrary to his assurances. The regent, he wrote, should be seriously requested not to allow the king's efforts towards peace to be thus traversed. Campredon had hitherto acted extremely well, and must have had precise orders so to have changed "son blanc en noir." Was the work done, Stanhope asked, for which the northern powers were so grateful, to be nullified by intrigues with the tsar ? [4]

On 27 July arrived in Paris Count Plato Musin-Pushkin,[5] bearing a letter to the regent of date 29 May o.s. and instructions to Schleinitz. The tsar thanked the regent for his willingness to employ the good offices of France for the pacification of the north and thereafter to form a league of Russia, France and Spain with Sweden, Prussia, Hesse-Cassel and other protestant powers whom it might be judged proper to admit. He himself, he said, was of the same disposition, and would accept the good offices of France on condition that Sweden should cede to him all his conquests excepting Finland and a part of Carelia not including Viborg and Keksholm ; and he would follow the regent's advice, as far as possible, in regard to compensation or assistance to be given to Sweden in return. Unless the provinces named were ceded he could not be an useful ally to France in the future, as he would always have to be on armed guard against Sweden. He would

[1] 5 Aug., R. O. France 168.

[2] " Upon our asking the secretary [Höpken] the reason why France had desired to be sole mediator, he told us it was upon some views a Party in France had in relation to commerce with Russia, which Mr. Laws and many others were very much for " (Norris to Stanhope, 25 June o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval).

[3] " Mr. Campredon has of late taken great pains to undervalue the assistance the King our Master gives this country, and has been trying to persuade this Court to put the sole mediation of the peace with the Czar into the Duke Regent's hands " (Finch, same date). Later, however, Stanhope wrote to Finch (5 Nov., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 221) that the suspicion of Campredon did not appear to have been well founded, and that in view of his necessitous condition he might be given £500 as a present ; for which money Campredon sent a grateful letter of thanks (27 Nov., Sweden 28, original).

[4] 26 July, R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270.

[5] Credentials, 29 May o.s., *Recueil des instructions*, VIII. 200.

be glad to know the regent's mind in regard to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, having taken no engagements with him as yet and not intending to take any without the regent's participation, provided that the latter entered into his views as above stated.[1] The instructions to Schleinitz were to the same effect, and he was told that on receiving the regent's reply the tsar would send further instructions and full powers to his ministers. Schleinitz should thank the regent in the warmest terms for not having listened to the propositions of certain other powers against the tsar's interests, and, if he would point out in what ways the tsar could be useful to him, everything possible in that direction should be done. The statement about the duke of Holstein-Gottorp was repeated.[2] Informing Prince Kurakin of this, Schleinitz said that their master's terms of peace being quite incompatible with the Swedish the regent was much embarrassed, and indeed the internal affairs of France were in such confusion that little attention could be given to foreign politics.[3]

Solov'ev says that Musin-Pushkin was ordered to declare in Russia that he was only going on private business to Holland, but really to get to Paris with the greatest expedition possible. There, before delivering to Schleinitz the tsar's letter and his instructions, he was to enquire privately whether that minister, as a German, was acceptable as a negotiator in matters of such serious importance. If not, he was to say that the business would be transferred to Kurakin and Schleinitz be recalled : and in any case the latter would be ordered to act only in concert with Kurakin. Musin-Pushkin, on enquiry, found that Schleinitz was distrusted, it being found that everything said to him became known at Hanover, Stockholm and Vienna, nothing being communicated to anyone else. But the coming of Kurakin to Paris was objected to, he said, as it could not be kept secret. Schleinitz therefore was shortly recalled and was replaced by Prince Basil Dolgoruky.

Dubois, in a memorandum to the regent, set forth the dangers of the policy the tsar proposed.[4] And Sutton wrote to Craggs on 15 August :—

"Whatever the secret inclinations of this Court may be, and notwithstanding the ear they have lately given to the Baron Sparr, M. de Mont and Mo^r. Schleinitz, the Regent has gone so far along with His Majesty in pacifying the north that there is no reason to believe He will [not] be disposed to concurr to the finishing of that work."

[1] Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XL. xli–ii.
[2] Schleinitz' report, ibid. pp. 133–35.
[3] Copy, dated 9 Aug., sent by Whitworth from the Hague, R. O. Holland 274.
[4] *Recueil des instructions*, VIII. 202–03.

The report of money paid to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp was not confirmed.[1] Later he wrote that, after learning all he could from Bielke, he had represented the great necessity of powerfully supporting Sweden against the tsar. In reply the regent and Dubois had alleged the impossibility of furnishing subsidies, at present at all events. He then asked that the alliance with Sweden might be renewed, to which it was objected that to do so would prejudice the position of France as mediator. It was also observed that the tsar's places were safe from attack. Dubois, said Sutton, was much disturbed by the prospect of conferences at Brunswick under mediation of the emperor and by the support given by the emperor and the tsar to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. " Il me semble que l'union de Sa Majesté avec le Roy de Prusse produit un merveilleux effet icy," and that France, after the guarantee given for Sleswick, " devient jalouse que quelque autre Puissance n'épouse les intérêts du Duc de Hollstein." [2]

After receiving the king of Prussia's letter Peter the Great instructed Schleinitz as follows.[3] He was impatiently awaiting the regent's answer and the confidential communication expected on affairs at Stockholm. To the insinuation that, if he would accept the king of England's mediation, there would be no difficulty in associating with it that of France, or if not, that it would still be very necessary and useful to take such measures as should induce the king of England not to oppose or traverse a negotiation for peace through French mediation only, Schleinitz should reply that the situation of the tsar's affairs did not permit him to accept the king of England's mediation and that he pretended to make peace with Sweden solely by that of France, the acceptance of which he repeated upon the conditions stated in his letter to the regent. Schleinitz must also ask for confidential information as to how the things insinuated could be carried out, inform the regent exactly of the propositions made by Stanhope through the king of Prussia, and remark upon the tsar's moderation in his conduct towards the king of England in spite of his knowledge of the latter's secret machinations for uniting most of the powers of Europe against him. He must also inform the regent of conversations held by Carteret with Prince Dolgoruky at Copenhagen to the effect that Sweden would never cede Viborg, the capital of Carelia, and that, if the Swedes must lose Livonia, they had much rather cede it to the tsar than to the king or republic of Poland.

About the middle of August the king of Prussia paid a visit

[1] R. O. France 168.
[2] To Stanhope, 6 Sept., ibid.
2 Sept. o.s., *Sbornik*, XL. 106–09.

to Hanover, whence he returned extremely satisfied.[1] Soon afterwards Cadogan and St. Saphorin reported a promise that the investitures should be granted as soon as the reprisals were cancelled, though nothing, they were told, could be done, whether in regard to the former or to a plan of action against the tsar, until an answer on that subject was received.[2] This information Stanhope communicated to Berlin, saying that, while the imperial court had made divers attempts to dissolve the alliance between the kings of England and Prussia and to persuade the former to receive his investiture separately, "présentement Elle nous fait témoigner qu'Elle seroit même disposée à bien vivre avec vous, pourvu que vous vouliez y apporter les facilités convenables de vôtre côté." Further enlightenment on the views of the imperial court was hoped for soon, whereby a plan of conduct might be determined, and meanwhile endeavours were being made to promote a better understanding; as soon as a specific declaration of the emperor's grounds of complaint was received it should be communicated. The king was delighted at the king of Prussia's contentment with his visit to Hanover.[3] To which Ilgen replied that but for the king of England's efforts the emperor would never have consented to grant the investiture of Stettin, prayed that the endeavours to promote a reconciliation might be continued, and promised explanation of the grievances as soon as they were specified, Wallenrodt at the same time being charged with certain articles of complaint on their side.[4]

Yet the success of the envoys at Vienna continued to be limited to obtaining assurances and promises. It was stated to be impossible for the emperor to enter into any fresh engagements until quiet was restored in the empire by mutual restitution, and that it was absolutely necessary to engage the king of Prussia in any concert against the tsar, since a sufficient force could not otherwise be obtained, nor could so distant an expedition be ventured upon if he, so powerfully armed and with intentions so uncertain, were left at liberty in the rear. An ambassador would be sent to Poland, but, unless the command of the foreign troops there were transferred from Count Flemming, it was feared that the coming diet would break up as fruitlessly as the last, and without the concurrence of

[1] He extolled, says Harris, his Majesty "and the openness and unreserv'd way of acting of the English Ministry," and expressed to his own ministers his good opinion of them "and his value and esteem for the English nation in general" (31 Aug. and 7 Sept.).

[2] 31 Aug. and 4 Sept. "C'est aussi cette même affaire de la religion et des représailles qui empêche que l'on ne donne aucune résolution sur le *Pro Memoria* donné pour engager cette Cour à entrer dans les mesures contre le Tsar."

[3] 12 Sept., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270.

[4] 21 Sept., ibid.

Poland nothing could be done. There was, moreover, the possibility of an attack by Turkey. It was replied that the king of Prussia could readily be engaged by the reward of Stralsund and Rügen, and that then an army of 60,000 men would easily be raised, and it would be supported at sea by the British and Swedish fleets. But really, the envoys said, any plan of action against Russia was considered impracticable and only calculated to raise in the tsar a powerful enemy, without obtaining for Sweden the recovery of her provinces. The affairs of religion they were no longer discussing, according to orders, but the imperial ministers could not be prevented from bringing them forward upon all occasions.[1]

Stanhope, setting forth the proud attitude of the tsar resulting from his consciousness of security through the impassiveness of France and Austria, and announcing the withdrawal of the king's offer to guarantee his peace with Sweden,[2] said that if the emperor would not come into accord with the king's views the latter must either have recourse to measures less favourable to him or counsel the king of Sweden to make peace on what terms he could. " J'ose dire que l'Empereur seroit le premier à le regretter s'il négligeoit de resserrer le Czar lorsqu'on n'a à faire qu'à luy seul." Prussia was still being moved to action; money ought to be employed with the Polish diet to counteract the tsar's intrigues; and efforts were being made to raise a force of Danes and Hessians to act with imperial troops against him. It must be discovered what force and subsidies the emperor could supply. As to the investitures: " ni sur la question *an* ni sur la question *quomodo* nous n'entendrons jamais à aucune chose qui ne découle pas de la nature même de ces Investitures." Cadogan must come to Hanover to explain fully the position of affairs, and then return to his post at the Hague.[3]

When at length a formal reply was delivered to Cadogan and St. Saphorin it ran as follows:—[4]

" Les Ministres de sa Majesté Britannique en cette Cour, My Lord Cadogan et Monsr. de St. Saphorin, ayant fait connoître que les représailles mises au sujet des derniers différents de Religion étoient levées, qu'on avoit regardées jusqu'à présent comme un obstacle qui empêchoit à se pouvoir expliquer sur plusieurs propositions qu'on avoit faites de la part de sa Majesté Britannique

[1] Cadogan and St. Saphorin, 11 and 18 Sept.

[2] In a paper delivered to Wallenrodt for the benefit of the Russian ministers at Berlin it was stated that British mediation and guarantees had not been undervalued by other powers, but, as the tsar appeared not to care for them, the offer of the guarantee was now withdrawn (15 Sept., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270 and Regencies 3; cf. Droysen, p. 301).

[3] To Cadogan and St. Saphorin, 16 and 29 Sept., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270.

[4] Dated 23 Oct., R. O. Germany (Empire) 41.

au sujet du Nord ; sa Majesté Impériale et Catholique aiant été hors d'état de pouvoir former aucune idée sur les affaires du dehors, n'étant pas seure du repos intérieur de l'Empire, a ordonné présentement de faire connoître à Mess^rs^ les dits Ministres, que le Czar avoit recherché de rétablir l'ancienne amitié qui avoit été entre Leurs Majestés, et même de former des liaisons plus étroittes, promettant des secours considérables, tant en cas de guerre contre le Turc que d'autres Puissances opposées aux intérêts de l'Empereur, se déclarant de plus prêt d'envoier ses Ministres au Congrès de Brunswyck, dans l'espérance que sa Majesté Impériale et Catholique S'y comporteroit en Médiateur impartial, et qu'Elle n'entreprendroit rien contre luy. L'Empereur a fait répondre à sa Majesté Czarienne que son amitié luy seroit toujours agréable ; Qu'elle apprenoit avec plaisir, qu'Elle voulut envoyer ses Ministres au Congrès de Brunswyck ; Que l'Empereur y agiroit en Médiateur impartial, et pour agir comme tel, il ne pouvoit pas s'expliquer ultérieurement avant l'ouverture et le progrès du dit Congrès ; Que cependant selon le désir de sa Majesté Czarienne il enverroit un Ministre à sa Cour, qui était déjà nommé, pour tâcher par ce moyen de conduire toute chose à ce qu'il pourra conserver la bonne intelligence entre les deux Cours, et à ce qui pourroit être utile au bien général de la Paix.

" Par cette réponse, et par la communication qu'on en fait, Mess^rs^ les Ministres susdits pourront faire connoître à sa Majesté Britannique avec quelle sincérité sa Majesté Impériale et Catholique continue à cultiver l'amitié du Roy leur Maître, et de là ils comprendront que l'Empereur ne se peut déterminer positivement à aucun engagement jusques à ce qu'on voye le succès du dit Congrès de Brunswick.

" Ce fondement posé de la manière qu'on vient de dire, l'Empereur, considérant le mémoire qu'on luy a présenté sur les affaires du Nord, trouve qu'il n'est pas possible de former un Plan seur sur le projet à luy communiqué, avant que la République de Pologne accède à l'alliance défensive faite à Vienne le 2^e^ (*sic*) de Janvier 1719, et ne se détermine dans la suite d'entrer dans le Concert projetté.

" Qu'en second lieu Sa Majesté Impériale devoit avoir une seureté réelle contre tout ce qu'on pourroit entreprendre vers le Royaume de Hongrie, soit de la part des Turcs ou de qui que ce puisse estre, car l'éloignement et les engagemens des forces de Sa Majesté Impériale à deux cent lieues de ses Etats pourroit facilement faire naître l'envie aux voisins de ce Royaume de l'attaquer ou d'y susciter des troubles dont les exemples sont trop connus.

" Qu'en troisième lieu il ne paroit pas qu'un corps de seize mille hommes dont on parle dans le mémoire seroit suffisant, mais qu'il faudroit nécessairement le renforcer jusqu'à 25 ou 30 mille hommes, lesquels ne pourroyent estre nullement à charge à sa Majesté Impériale et Catholique.

" Que de plus il seroit nécessaire de convenir sur plusieurs autres points qui seroyent encor à déterminer."[2]

On receipt of this,—so little satisfactory, the envoys said,—they had an interview with Sinzendorff. He allowed that in case of a civil war in Poland the emperor would be ready to throw his weight on the king's side, but said that he could not support at

his own expense the large force demanded of him against the tsar. Nor, replied Cadogan and St. Saphorin, could the king of England, who was already doing more than could be expected of him. It was agreed that it would be convenient to know the terms of peace demanded by the king of Sweden, and that war could only be declared upon the tsar if he refused reasonable conditions. As to the investitures, the envoys enclosed a copy of the emperor's letter on this head given to them by Sinzendorff, promising that they should be granted after the conditions for that of Stettin had been adjusted with the Prussian ministers.[1]

Cadogan left Vienna on 28 October, and shortly St. Saphorin was informed that the unsatisfactory attitude of the imperial court in regard to northern affairs prevented his Majesty from speaking further upon them. " La Suède se tirera d'affaires comme Elle pourra, et Elle aura nôtre flotte et nos subsides jusqu'à ce que sa paix avec le Czar sera faite. Si Elle en fait une mauvaise, du moins ce ne sera ni nôtre faute ni la vôtre." As to the congress of Brunswick, the emperor could not expect Sweden " concourir à former ce Congrez sans plan et sans concert préalable. Même l'Empereur n'auroit jamais dû le souhaitter. Car quelle figure feroit-il en ce cas entre Suède et le Czar ? Il n'y auroit pour luy ni honneur à plaider contre la Suède, ni seureté à plaider contre le Czar." And to Finch Stanhope wrote : " La Cour Impériale se découvre d'avantage et la Cour de Pologne, loin d'animer la République contre les Russes, se conduit de manière à faire paroître d'accord avec l'Empereur et le Czar." Cadogan had been recalled " pour donner un coup d'éperon à la Cour Impériale " ; the categoric answer about the affairs of the north, which he had been ordered to insist upon before leaving, was obviously deceptive ; and clearly the emperor was leaguing himself with the tsar.[2]

Nor could the king of Prussia be persuaded to go beyond offering mediation. The bait of Ermeland or other Polish territory was not enough to tempt him further : to Ilgen's report of this proposal he noted that in return for taking up arms against the tsar he must have all Pomerania and Ermeland and Elbing, the emperor must march with him, and the Juliers-Berg succession and all his present possessions must be guaranteed to him.[3] Cadogan could do little in passing through Berlin, as he only stayed a day there and did not see the king, nor could Whitworth, returning with an Irish peerage conferred on him at Hanover in reward for his long

[1] 26 Oct., enclosing copy of the emperor's letter of 23 Oct., in Italian.
[2] Stanhope to St. Saphorin, 3 Nov., and to Finch, 4 Nov., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 221 and S.P. Dom. Entry Book 271 ; cf. Droysen, p. 303.
[3] Droysen, p. 305.

and able service, do much more. Orders, however, were sent to Halberstadt and other places to discontinue the reprisals and to reinstate the catholics in the privileges they had formerly enjoyed.[1] And at an audience on 24 November Frederick William confirmed to Whitworth "his resolution to maintain inviolably his friendship with his Majesty, and to go in concert with him in whatever related to the affairs of the Empire and the security of the protestant Religion."[2] But of George's main aim Whitworth wrote: "they certainly wish the Czar further off very heartily, but they don't care to venture the giving him a push themselves."[3]

In Poland the course of events had run briefly as follows. An ambassador, Stanislaus Chomestowski, Palatine of Masovia,[4] had been sent to St. Petersburg in February, as arranged, but his mission had proved a failure. At the end of June Jefferyes sent accounts of his conferences with the Russian ministers, "by which your L^dp. will see how strenuously the Poles insist upon having Liefland and the City of Riga restor'd to them," while the Russians, though giving great assurances, said that the tsar was precluded from coming to a resolution on the subject until his war with Sweden was at an end.[5] Later (16 July o.s.) Jefferyes reported that at a further conference Chomestowski had rejected proposals for a new treaty, seeing that the old one was so little regarded, nor would he send to his court the answer given him on the last four points of his commission, since its obscurity persuaded him that he was being played with. He had his audience of leave shortly, and returned to Poland little contented.[6] Soon after his departure the Saxon secretary Frensdorf was roughly dismissed, the tsar saying that the king of Poland must be represented at his court by a Pole, and by one of distinction. According to Scott he believed, as also did many Poles, that a Saxon minister only sowed disaffection between himself and the republic. There was little doubt, Scott went on, that he was arranging to break up the diet about to assemble, like the last, and was stirring up a confederation against the king, even with the view of putting Stanislaus on the throne again.[7]

The diet opened on 30 September. The party opposed to the

[1] Harris, 2 Nov., Whitworth, 9 Nov.
[2] Whitworth, 26 Nov.
[3] To Tilson, 30 Nov.
[4] Credentials (copy), R. O. Russia 9.
[5] 15 and 18 June o.s. Full particulars of the conferences with Jefferyes' despatches.
[6] Bacmeister, II. 174. He reached Warsaw 12 Sept. (Scott, 18 Sept.).
[7] The causes of quarrel between the tsar and the king of Poland are set forth fully by Solov'ev.

king was again strong, in spite of his efforts to pack the assembly,[1] and the question of the command of the foreign forces was once more forced to the front.[2] Scott bore witness to Flemming's activity and address and the support given by the imperial ambassador the bishop of Neutra[3]; but all was of no use; the diet broke up on 5 November without having even been able to choose a marshal. The king began now to evince a desire to reconcile himself with the tsar. Flemming propounded a plan which would carry out, he said, the objects of the treaty of Vienna. The tsar was to engage himself not to send troops into Poland or the empire upon any pretext, nor to meddle with the civil or ecclesiastical affairs of the empire in any way. Such an undertaking, Flemming thought, might pave the way to the resumption of good relations with the king of England and to peace with Sweden. But it was important to make the tsar still believe that he would be attacked, and for that purpose it would be good to expend £50,000, part at St. Petersburg and part in Poland.[4] On the tsar's part Dolgoruky was ordered to give the strongest assurances that in the coming peace he would not neglect the interests of Poland, but would make them a principal feature of the treaty.[5]

Indeed, that an alliance between the tsar, the emperor and the king of Poland was in the making was the general belief at this time. The court of Vienna was obviously alarmed at the Russian doings at Constantinople, and the reports thereof and the state of affairs in Poland, St. Saphorin wrote, must oblige the emperor to declare himself one way or the other, "et de sortir de ces fatales généralités."[6] The bishop of Neutra, however, says Scott, ridiculed the belief, and he sums up: "il semble que les gens icy soient d'oppinion que le Czar a tellement besoin de leur amitié que pour se l'assurer il leur accordera tout ce qu'ils pourront luy demander, il y a cependant beaucoup d'apparence qu'ils se tromperont à cet égard." Besenval told him that the best way to prevent the alliance was for his master to re-enter into negotiation with the tsar, even if it cost Sweden Reval.[7]

[1] See Scott's despatches, and Joshua Kenworthy from Dantzig, 29 June and 20 July, R. O. Poland 27. The latter remarked: "As the King hath no money I do not suppose he will gain more than he did the last session, for that mob assembly of the diet is unanimous in nothing but receiving of bribes."

[2] Harris, 5 Oct.: "The General of the Crown, spirited up by the Emissaries of the Czar, and supported by the disaffected Nobility of the Republick, is resolved to renew his pretensions to the command of the foreign forces."

[3] Count Ladislaus Adam Erdödy, lately sent to Poland.

[4] From Scott's despatches, 2 Oct. to 6 Nov.; see also those of Jefferyes from Dantzig 1 Oct. to 12 Nov. o.s., and Whitworth from Berlin, 16 Nov.

[5] Bacmeister, II. 187.

[6] 30 Oct.

[7] Scott, 13 to 30 Nov.

Peter the Great's treaty with the sultan was actually signed on 16 November. It renewed and made perpetual the previous treaties with certain alterations, the principal of them an exception to the second article in the sense of article 12 of the draft of March concerning the entry of troops into Poland.[1] Stanyan had been unable to procure the addition of a clause empowering the Porte to mediate between Russia and Sweden. The tsar's ratification was received at Constantinople in March 1721.[2]

Denmark was of but secondary account in these affairs. After he had received the French guarantee of Sleswick Frederick IV wrote to George thanking him for all he had done and offering to join in mediation with him and with the king of Prussia,[3] and to Frederick of Sweden that he was doing and would do everything possible at St. Petersburg to procure a peace.[4] But this meant little, for his envoy Westphal had lately been recalled. For war against the tsar Denmark could be of little service, if Prussia would not move, and of this both George and his adversary were well aware.

Baron Charles Gustavus Sparre, the Swedish envoy to Great Britain, being at Hanover in August, George sent him to Stockholm to explain the situation by word of mouth. Thereafter Frederick wrote that it seemed advisable to set on foot a general joint mediation by powers who could make their views respected, namely, besides Great Britain, Austria, France, Denmark and Prussia. This was not so good as war, but better than nothing. It might be well to begin with an armistice, and that the mediating powers should guarantee the treaty to be made.[5] Finch was instructed to say in reply that in spite of the value of the king of England's mediation, if a more advantageous peace could be made without it he would stand aside, and thereby be absolved from giving his guarantee. "The only thing which we absolutely insist upon is that his Swedish Majesty do not conclude a peace with the Czar

[1] Bacmeister, II. 189. Italian copies, R. O. Turkey 24 and Prussia 13. Stanyan wrote: "The articles of their former treaty are many times [i.e. mostly] recited and the several alterations made in them subjoined. That about the liberty given to the Muscovite troops to enter into Poland is settled according to the method proposed in my memorial, which with the converting the truce into a perpetual Peace and granting leave to a Muscovite minister to reside here are the chief alterations made in the treaty."

[2] Stanyan, 18 Jan. o.s. and 24 March 1721.

[3] 4 Nov., R. O. Royal Letters 5.

[4] 5 Nov., copy enclosed by Polwarth on 30 Nov. with the king of Sweden's reply of 2 Nov. o.s.

[5] 15 Aug. o.s., R. O. Royal Letters 56; a letter of great length entering fully into the situation.

exclusive of us." Finch must explain everything ingenuously and repeat assurances of succour in any event.[1]

Sparre was back at Hanover about the middle of September with the above letter from the king of Sweden and assurances of his perfect confidence. It was known now that the tsar had accepted the emperor's mediation [2] and that invitations had been sent to him and to the king of Sweden to send their ministers to Brunswick at the end of November.[3] Mardefeld reported that Prince Basil Dolgoruky was named to go.[4] Commenting on the fact that the invitations had not been notified at Hanover, Stanhope advised the king of Sweden, through Finch, to be circumspect in the matter, as nothing good was likely to result, and to obtain " éclaircissements " first. If, moreover, only Sweden and Russia sent to Brunswick, other powers, who could be of use to Sweden in case of ill-success, would be offended. And as Count Vellingk, who was there, had used language to Counts Freytag and Metsch diametrically opposed to the interest and engagements of the king of Sweden and likely to incite the emperor to refuse assent to the treaties made—distinguishing, like the Holsteiners, between the king and the kingdom of Sweden and not apprehending that the treaties had been confirmed by the riksdag—he ought to be recalled.[5]

Norris and Finch, accordingly, to use their words,

" endeavour'd to insinuate that it could never be agreeable that the Emperor should be the sole Mediator, but that our Master was desirous Sweden should have as good terms as were possible to be gain'd from the Czar, and if Sweden could come at those ends without the sole mediation of the Emperor, and communicate their proceedings to our Master, nobody could have room to take it amiss."

And they obtained the promise from Frederick not to send ministers to Brunswick till the kings of England and France should do so, and to recall Vellingk.[6] Stanhope thereafter wrote to Scott :

" Comme il ne convient nullement de former le Congrez de Brunswick avant que par un concert préalable l'Empereur ait mis la main à rendre le Czar traittable, ni Sa Majesté, ni le Roy de Prusse, ni le Roy de Suède, ni le Roy de Danemarc ne se presseront d'envoyer au dit Brunswick." [7]

[1] Stanhope to Finch, 4 Sept. o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270 and Regencies 3.
[2] Cadogan and St. Saphorin, 27 July.
[3] Copies, dated 20 Aug., with theirs of 11 Sept. and 26 Oct.
[4] Harris, 24 Aug.
[5] Stanhope to Finch, 23 Sept. and 2 Oct., *loc. cit.*
[6] Norris and Finch, 28 Sept. o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval and Sweden 28.
[7] 13 Oct. o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 271. See further p. 457.

At the beginning of August the British and Swedish fleets had sailed again for Gottska Sandö. Detachments were sent to cruise towards Dager Ort and Dantzig, Hosier entering that port for supplies on 22 August.[1] Butnothing could be seen of the Russians, and on 1 August o.s. it was decided, the Swedish ships being in great need of stores, to return to Stockholm, seven British men-of-war and one Swede being left on the look-out. Two days later came the news that four Swedish frigates, which had attempted to attack some eighty Russian galleys among the rocks by Le-Sund without pilots, had run aground and had been captured.[2] On the 5th anchor was once more cast at Elsnabben. The remainder of Norris's time was largely occupied in discussions as to the fleet, or at least a part of it, remaining in Stockholm waters during the winter. This was not allowed, but on 1 October o.s. Stanhope sent Norris orders to leave behind him five or six frigates to stay as long as the sea should remain open.[3] A few ships were again sent out to cruise late in September, and on 22 October o.s. Norris sailed for home, taking six weeks, in consequence of storms, to reach the Thames. King Frederick gave him, on leaving, his gold-hilted sword. The frigates left at Stockholm only stayed there a few days.

[1] Jefferyes from Dantzig, 13 Aug. o.s.

[2] 27 July o.s., full account, Bacmeister, II. 174–83; reports by Capt. Eaton of the *Dartmouth* with Norris's despatches.

[3] B. M. Add. MSS. 28146.

CHAPTER XXIX

PETER THE GREAT WINS

THE plans, then, of George I to destroy the work of Peter the Great were unsuccessful. None of the powers would act with him, and now even Great Britain failed him, for this was the time of the financial crash which followed upon the collapse of the South Sea Company. Subsidies and ships to enable Sweden to carry on the war could no longer be spared indefinitely. It became the object of the British government to end it as speedily as possible, in order to be relieved of the obligations of the treaty of Stockholm.

Stanhope instructed Finch to this effect early in October 1720. It was believed, he said, that the tsar would give up to three million roubles to retain his conquests for twenty years, restoring Finland. "Nous ne sçavons ni si l'Empereur a pris un parti, ni s'il en prendra un, ni quel il sera." Meanwhile Sweden was exhausting herself against an enemy she could not attack. The terms of peace would be worse the longer it was delayed. The king would help Sweden in war beyond his obligations, were there any prospect of success, but in view of the attitude of the powers that prospect was small. If the king of Sweden established himself on his throne now by making peace, occasion to renew the war later would not be wanting. The king would provide a sum of money to make the advice now sent acceptable to the senate; Finch might draw at once upon the treasury for £20,000 and promise a yet larger sum. Indeed, if by making peace the expense of sending another squadron to the Baltic could be saved, £100,000 more might be found.[1] To Frederick George wrote :—

"Ne pouvant pas vous aider à faire une Paix aussy avantageuse et glorieuse que Je désire, du moins crois-Je devoir vous conseiller de tâcher d'en ménager une qui vous mette en état de donner une vraye consistence à l'interne de vôtre gouvernement." [2]

[1] 2 and 12 Oct., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270; 1 Oct. o.s., and further on the subject 5 Nov., Foreign Entry Book 221. Finch, being informed that the king of Sweden's necessities were urgent, handed over bills of exchange for £20,000 on 21 Oct. o.s. (Finch, 22 Oct. o.s., R. O. Sweden 28).

[2] 11 Oct., R. O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 270.

And again :—

"Je conjure Vôtre Majesté en sincère amy et allié de ne point perdre de tems de conclure Vostre Paix avec le Czar." [1]

The reference to Frederick's establishment on the throne had regard to the opposing claims of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, which the emperor and the tsar were believed to favour. George I and the regent were prepared to support his endeavours to make the succession hereditary in his own family, conditionally upon peace being speedily concluded. To prepare the way Frederick had brought his brother, Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, to Sweden in the summer, and the attempt had been made to place him in command of the army, but the project was rejected by the riksdag.[2] The position was set forth by Carteret as follows :—[3]

"Upon considering your Lordship's letters and the despatches sent by Mr. Schaub by your order I can find no better way of acting nor attended with less hazard than to break the whole matter in confidence to Prince William, offering solid assistance to raise the House of Hesse-Cassel to the throne if the King of Sweden will make peace, and for that end Wyburgh and Reval should be offered immediately to the Czar. If the King of Sweden will enter into this proposal, it is highly probable that the Czar will restore Livonia. We may begin this negotiation with the Czar, if we are agreed in private with the King of Sweden, and no one else in Sweden but those who absolutely depend upon the King may be informed of this matter till the affair is concluded, and the King of Sweden need not appear in offering Reval and Wyburg to the Czar till we have tryed whether upon these conditions the Czar will immediately give back Livonia. This is a hard case and must be managed with the utmost secrecy. If Prince William enters into it, which it is very possible he may, it is not unlikely but that he may bring his brother into it likewise. We must try to get out of this business with a good grace. We can gett out of it with an ill one at any time; to avoid that we should do the King of Sweden some service. The raising of his family is what he has much at heart, and he can never get that end without it, and our Court may not be disposed to that in any other conjoncture. If any of these things should come out in Sweden till all is prepared to be put in execution and to be sustained, His Swedish Ma[ty] may run great hazard. I could say other things that I cannot write. Prince William may be safely trusted in this particular, his interest is so strong in it. Wee must support by realities, and then leave it to them to manage the affair of their succession their own way, while we negotiate with the Czar in private, whether we shall succeed on the above-mentioned foundation."

[1] 5 Nov., ibid. 271.

[2] Finch, 2 July o.s. Prince William left Copenhagen for Stockholm on 4 June and was back at Hamburg on 29 Sept., going on to Hanover.

[3] To Stanhope from Copenhagen, 10 Oct., very private and in cipher, R. O. Denmark 44.

King George, then, designed to escape from his now untenable position by flattering the king of Sweden's personal ambitions. Stanhope, in his despatch of 5 November cited, argued that if the latter persisted in the war he would forfeit his aims. The news sent that day ought to convince him that it was useless to expect a concert against the tsar and that by continuing the war he would expose himself to a combined attack, which he could hardly expect to resist with all the assistance of his friends. " L'Empereur s'étant une fois déclaré contre la succession de Hesse en Suède, il n'y a qu'une paix précipitée qui puisse prévenir qu'il n'entre là-dessus en des engagemens formels avec le Czar et la Pologne," in which others, namely, Denmark and Prussia, would join in order to increase their gains. If by making peace the king of Sweden were able to secure the succession for his family he should have a British guarantee thereof, and attempts would be made to obtain others. Finch replied to this " great despatch " that the king and Count Horn agreed with most of its contents, and allowed that peace must be made before the succession could be settled.[1]

Peter the Great in the meantime had opened direct negotiations with Frederick I. He was for making peace without mediation by other powers, and in the end had his way, as by steady persistence he usually did. Prince Kurakin had intimated to Preis at the Hague some time before that his master did not see why he and the king of Sweden should not settle their differences between themselves, and that, if Preis would enter heartily into negotiation with him, a more satisfactory conclusion might be arrived at than in any other way. Preis had replied that he could give no answer until he had acquainted his court, and Frederick, on receiving his report, repeated to Finch his assurances that he would do nothing except in concert with king George.[2]

On 14 September o.s. Adjutant-General Alexander Rumyantsev, he who had helped Count Tolstoi to bring back the tsarevich Alexis from Italy,[3] arrived at Stockholm from the tsar. It was given out that his mission was purely complimentary,[4] but nevertheless he was charged with propositions for an exchange of prisoners and an armistice, and one thing, which he made known, was his master's disinclination to accept the mediation of the king of

[1] 16 Nov. o.s. " I have not seen the King of Sweden better pleas'd than he is at present. . . . People here must be manag'd with great niceness; but I don't doubt that, when the Peace is made, everything will go according to the King's wishes. I have always taken great care to hide from Mr. de Bassewitz, that the King our Master had any views in favour of the Family of Hesse-Cassel."

[2] Finch, 30 July o.s., private.

[3] See Bain, *The First Romanovs*, pp. 354–55.

[4] Thus the tsar to the regent: " Je ne l'ai chargé d'aucune autre commission " (*Sbornik*, XL. 109).

England.[1] He was told that, if the tsar were inclined to treat for peace, an armistice could be arranged at the same time and the king of Sweden would prefer to delay the one for the other; while Norris was once more assured that no step would be taken without the king of England's cognisance.[2] Rumyantsev was detained, Frederick wrote to George, in order that he might not report to the tsar things prejudicial to Sweden, he having made no serious overtures but being evidently sent to amuse and to spy out the condition of affairs; "à quoy J'ay pourtant mis bon ordre." [3]

After Rumyantsev's departure (17 October o.s.) Frederick wrote that his propositions showed that an accommodation with the tsar was impracticable; it was better to persevere in the war than to accept them, in spite of the indifference shown at Vienna. He requested renewed instances to be made at Paris, especially for subsidies, having been led to hope for 600,000 crowns a year. There was no other way out of the situation brought about by the emperor's coldness and the extravagant pretensions of the tsar.[4] Finch wrote that the Swedes were very desirous of peace but considered none tolerable without the restoration of Livonia, that country being Sweden's chief source of subsistence; its loss had made all sorts of provisions very dear. If the tsar would restore Livonia as well as Finland all Swedes would be satisfied. The inclination for peace was becoming more general every day, and most people preferred direct negotiation with the tsar without any mediation.[5]

To Campredon Frederick pointed out the contradiction between the pressure now put upon him to make peace and the former counsels of king George. Those, he said, had prevented the conclusion of peace in the previous year and robbed of their fruit the negotiations of Count Sparre with Schleinitz, from which a successful result had been hoped through the good offices of the regent. Now out of further complaisance to the king of England Vellingk had been recalled from Brunswick and Rumyantsev had been sent away. The cession of St. Petersburg, Narva, Keksholm and a port between St. Petersburg and Reval had been offered, but it was known that Carteret had suggested greater sacrifices, including Reval, and Rumyantsev had said that it was not worth the tsar's while after a war of twenty years to accept anything less than all

[1] Finch, 28 Sept. o.s.

[2] Norris to Stanhope, 6 Oct. o.s., with an account of Rumyantsev's propositions and the replies, R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval.

[3] 14 Oct. o.s., R. O. Royal Letters 56.

[4] 20 Oct. o.s., ibid.

[5] 22 Oct. and 5 Nov. o.s.

his conquests excepting Finland. The counsels of the regent in so sad and embarrassing a case were earnestly desired.[1]

Sir Robert Sutton drew from Dubois the confession that the regent was attempting to negotiate a peace with the tsar and thought that some result might be expected, he having accepted the invitation to send ministers to Brunswick. Sutton, in reply, attempted to show that the tsar was deceiving the French court by general expressions which meant nothing, and was coming to an understanding with the emperor about the affairs of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp opposed to the French guarantee of Sleswick. He pressed Dubois to declare to the Russian ministers that Reval must be restored and to succour Sweden promptly, it being the interest of France to sustain that power. But, it was answered, there was no money in hand to send, though it should be sent as soon as the present measures taken to rehabilitate the finances had borne fruit, and that the alliance with Sweden could not be renewed until peace was made, since that would violate the treaty of Amsterdam. As to a concert against the tsar, he could not be attacked; the republic of Poland would not help and the king of Prussia would continue to temporize. Certainly, said Sutton, the Jesuits and the old ministry were working to traverse the king's policy, and "à présent on fait la Cour au Pape."[2] Stanhope in reply desired Sutton to press for orders to be sent to Campredon at once to enable him to act with authority, "et par des moyens réels avancer soit en Suède, soit vers le Czar, le but que nous nous proposons. Il s'agit d'encourager le Roy de Suède à prendre le parti que nous croyons le seul qui puisse le sauver," etc. The alliance ought to be renewed, subsidies be sent, and Campredon be authorized not only to work for peace but also to procure the settlement of the succession on the house of Hesse-Cassel.[3] Sutton, accordingly, obtained Dubois' promise to write immediately to Campredon to pursue the king's intentions in everything. The regent, he said, promised frankly to second all his views both in regard to peace and to the succession.[4] Campredon would be accorded permission to go to St. Petersburg when the king of Sweden judged proper. Sutton saying that the latter must have money both for gaining support in the riksdag and for prosecuting the war, he was assured

[1] Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XL. xxxii–v.

[2] Sutton, 19 Oct., and similarly 9 Nov., emphasizing the repugnance to the guarantee of Sleswick and the desire to keep on good terms with the tsar for reasons of commerce (R. O. France 169).

[3] 5 Nov., ibid.

[4] "Elle me dit, qu'Elle est bien aise par plusieurs raisons de favoriser cette Maison, et au sujet de la négociation de Paix, qu'il y a du temps qu'Elle s'étoit apperçu, que la Cour de Vienne souhaittoit la continuation de la Guerre dans le Nord."

that subsidies should be sent out of the first moneys available, and Dubois further told him that there had never been any thought of separating the mediation of France from that of the king of England and that the tsar should be so informed. But the question of the succession ought to be postponed till peace was made, rather than that two so difficult matters should be taken in hand at the same time. However, said Sutton, great complaisance would be observed towards the tsar, both in the interest of commerce and for other eventual advantages.[1]

Being informed [2] that George I was continuing his efforts to assemble a force and offered to maintain 20,000 men at his own expense, if France would bear her share, Frederick I let Campredon know that he could easily raise a sum of 600,000 crowns on a French guarantee and that the giving it would be of greater value if the old alliance with France could be renewed, a thing which would alike add force to the king of England's endeavours and impress upon the tsar the necessity of moderation.[3] Thereupon Campredon was ordered to give all assurances to the king of Sweden, but to intimate that the king of France could not declare war upon the tsar, having no pretext for it and being unable either to carry it on directly or to furnish a sufficient amount in subsidies; besides which any such step would deprive Sweden of the benefit of French mediation, with other disadvantages.[4]

Peter the Great in the meantime, still in want of any definite reply from the regent to his letter of 29 May o.s., instructed Schleinitz to explain his acceptance of the emperor's mediation and to deny the report that he would cede Livonia to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. With him, he said, he had no engagements whatever. The emperor's mediation he had accepted in 1714 and had sent Schleinitz to Brunswick as minister plenipotentiary. But whereas after three years the king of Sweden had shown no disposition to follow his example, that minister had been recalled and sent to Paris, giving, however, before he left, a declaration that the tsar did not intend to break up the congress but would send a minister to it as soon as the king of Sweden did so. Now, the present king having accepted the emperor's mediation at Brunswick, himself had done the same, but the regent should be informed in confidence that

[1] 20. Nov., and further 28 Nov., when he wrote: "Dans ces circonstances vous jugerez, My Lord, s'il est convenable de laisser à la France seule la conduite de la négociation du Nord auprès du Czar, dont on peut compter seurement, qu'Elle cherchera à tirer ses avantages particuliers."

[2] Presumably by General Bothmer, see next page.

[3] Campredon, 30 Oct. o.s., as cited by Le Dran, *loc. cit.* p. xxxv.

[4] Dubois to Campredon, 22 Nov., ibid. pp. xxxvi–vii.

he was convinced that peace could not be made there, but only through the mediation of France.[1] As to that of the king of England, he had refused it because that king was the ally of Sweden; yet, if the regent considered his mediation to be inseparable from that of France, he would consent to it, provided that direct negotiation was conducted through the king of France only and promising himself that the regent would admit of nothing contrary to his glory and interests.[2]

George was now back in England, whither he had been recalled by the necessity of calling parliament together to devise measures to restore the national credit. The little likelihood there was that he would try to improve his relations with Peter the Great was shown by his action in regard to Michael Bestuzhev, who had replaced Veselovsky as Russian resident in June. That minister presented on 17 October o.s. a long, able and outspoken memorial [3] in rejoinder to the replies given to Veselovsky early in the year, and as a consequence was peremptorily ordered to leave the kingdom within eight days.[4] Besides this, information reached St. Petersburg that General Bothmer, who had been sent by George to Stockholm at the end of August, had been doing his best to urge the king of Sweden to continue the war by promising maintenance of the Swedish fleet and 2,000 sailors for it and holding out the prospect of a force of 65,000 men to be supplied by Denmark, Prussia, Hesse-Cassel and Hanover; the tsar to be amused during the winter by negotiations for peace and the king of Poland to be brought in by the expectation of settling the succession to the crown upon his son.[5] A like document reached Berlin from Poland, stating that the king of Prussia would place 30,000 men in the field upon condition that peace should not be made until the Swedes were in possession of Livonia and Courland and himself of Ermeland.[6]

[1] In confirmation of this we may quote Sutton (6 Jan. 1721): "Le Chancelier Golofkin travaille à lier le Czar d'amitié avec la Cour de Vienne. Mais quoyque ce Prince la ménage depuis quelque temps, il ne peut oublier les sujets de mécontement qu'il a cru avoir contre Elle, et ne scauroit prendre confiance en l'Empereur."

[2] 18 Oct. o.s., as in Schleinitz's report, *Sbornik*, XL. 136–38, and Campredon's instructions, ibid. pp. xliii–v.

[3] R. O. Foreign Ministers 52, Foreign Entry Book 254, published at the time.

[4] Stanhope to him, 14 Nov. o.s., ibid.

[5] La Vie, 22 Nov., *Sbornik*, XL. 124–25. He was shown letters containing the news from Sweden and from Prince Basil Dolgoruky at Copenhagen.

[6] Whitworth, 10 Dec. He endeavoured to pass this off as a "suppositious piece" concocted by Flemming in order to keep his command of the foreign troops and to reconcile the Poles to his present views of accommodation with the tsar (see p. 440). Orders, he said, had been sent to General Schwerin to disabuse the Poles of the idea. Later, writing of Cadogan's memorial (below), Whitworth recalled "que les Ministres Polonois ne s'étoient fait aucun scruple de forger plusieurs points d'une négociation pretendue de Monsr. Bothmer à Stockholm et les avoient débités à Varsovie pour véritables" (14 Jan. 1721, R. O. Prussia 13).

Such proceedings and reports strengthened Peter's resolution not to accept king George's mediation.

The emperor took the tsar's acceptance of his invitation to the congress of Brunswick in earnest. If other powers would not send their plenipotentiaries, he notified at Berlin and Hanover, he would proceed by the strong, or the direct, way and give his decision in regard to Pomerania and Bremen and Verden in favour of Sweden.[1] At Stockholm he promised through Count Freytag, who arrived there on 18 November o.s., that if the king of Sweden would send his ministers to Brunswick and the tsar could not be brought there to assent to a reasonable peace, then he would be ready to enter into all such concerts as should be found proper to oblige the latter by force of arms to submit to conditions safe and honourable for Sweden.[2] But he was deceived in the tsar's views, as we have seen, nor could his assurances at Stockholm prevail against the counsels of king George and the regent. Vellingk had not yet actually left Brunswick, but Freytag was informed in February, in answer to his enquiries, that though he was provided with full powers he was not to use them until other princes, who had offered their mediation, should send their ministers thither as well as the tsar.[3] It was to be hoped, Campredon had written, that even if the king of Sweden agreed to send his ministers to Brunswick, the necessary orders to Count Freytag would arrive too late to be of use. Excuse could always be made to the emperor that the pressing situation of affairs obliged the king to procure peace in the speediest and least embarrassing way.[4] In March Freytag was removed to Copenhagen for a time.[5]

At the end of December the court of Stockholm was surprised by the sudden arrival from Vienna of its resident Höpken, brother of the secretary, bearing a plan for peace contingent upon the adoption of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp as successor. This was the result of fresh proposals by Count Bassewitz to Yaguzhinsky that the duke should marry a daughter of the tsar and have Livonia. But while the Russian was told that the duke, on becoming

[1] Droysen, p. 304.

[2] Finch, 30 Nov. o.s., Jackson, 14 Dec. o.s., R. O. Sweden 28, 23.

[3] Finch, 25 Jan. o.s. 1721, ibid. 29, cf. Polwarth, 19 Nov. 1720, who says that Vellingk stayed on at Brunswick under pretence of illness (Denmark 44). Copy of the formal answer given to Freytag with Finch's despatch of 1 March o.s.

[4] Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XL. l–lii.

[5] His removal was attributed by Finch (8 March o.s.) to the fear of its being demanded in consequence of insults offered to Bielke's servants at Vienna, which had brought about that envoy's recall. (St. Saphorin regretted this, writing of Bielke as "un honnête homme et droit dans toutes ses démarches.") Jackson did not expect Freytag to return, his conduct throughout, he said, having been so disagreeable.

king of Sweden, would give up Livonia to the tsar, to Höpken was held out the prospect of its recovery by Sweden. He claimed to have the emperor's approval of the plan, but could show no authority; and his propositions gave so much offence that he was put under arrest and only saved from severer punishment by his brother's influence.[1] The fear was expressed that "this unfortunate undertaking of Mr. Höpken might spoil their making a Peace with the Czar and a good Peace."[2] Efforts made by Count Freytag in Höpken's favour seemed to show that the court of Vienna was privy to his adventure, and there was no doubt, Finch wrote, that Yaguzhinsky had aided in inspiring it.[3] The affair gave colour to statements on the part of the last-named that an agreement between the emperor and the tsar had been arrived at, and that Count Kinsky would follow him to St. Petersburg as imperial ambassador empowered to conclude a treaty.[4] And there was also bad news from Poland. Scott wrote that the king of Poland was anxious to be reconciled with the tsar at any price, that Prince Dolgoruky's son had been sent to St. Petersburg with overtures, and that the prince himself had been summoned thither to receive instructions. He reported discussions on the subject with Count Flemming, who was earnest, he said, for his own safety that his project of reconciliation should succeed.[5] But on the other hand La Vie reported the sending of an express by the tsar to the king of Poland to complain forcibly of his opposition to him, in spite of the great services rendered, and to urge him to better courses.[6] And reliable advices reached Whitworth from Vienna that Yaguzhinsky's negotiation had proved abortive and that Stambke had failed in regard to the Holstein marriage-project; with which information Mardefeld's reports were consonant.[7]

Of the impression which these matters made upon the court of Prussia Whitworth wrote:—

"It is certain these Ministers were some months ago very desirous to have the war in the North continued in hopes that Sweden might be obliged by some distress to sacrifice Rügen and Stralsund to them for their assistance and that England and France would give way to yield when they saw no other means of saving that Kingdom, but they have been of late so alarmed at the conduct of the Imperial Court, the proposals made by the Count

[1] Finch and Jackson, 28 Dec. and 4 Jan. o.s. 1721.
[2] Finch, 8 Feb. o.s., private, citing Count Sparre.
[3] Jackson, 11 Jan. o.s.; Finch, 25 Jan. o.s.
[4] Droysen, p. 311. Kinsky was indeed designated for the mission, but did not come to St. Petersburg till the autumn.
[5] Scott, 1 to 22 Jan. Much on the subject in Solov'ev.
[6] 9 Feb., *Sbornik*, XL. 154.
[7] Whitworth, 14 to 28 Dec. 1720 and 25 Jan. 1721; Mardefeld, 31 Jan., 2 Feb., 3 March, *Sbornik*, XV. 175 foll.

Freytagh, and the overtures carried from Vienna to Stockholm by M^r. Höpkens, and they are so convinced that all Count Flemming's designs to reconcile his master to the Czar and form a new alliance between these Princes and the Emperor must end in projects contrary to their interest and the security of the Protestant religion and of all these parts in Germany, that I am persuaded they now heartily wish for a peace and will promote it all they can." [1]

He continued to write in this sense, reporting, for instance, on 8 March serious language used to Golovkin, who, he said, had been much impressed and had written in favour of peace to the tsar and to his father the chancellor.

Meanwhile the direct negotiations between St. Petersburg and Stockholm had taken form. Rumyantsev on his return reported Frederick's willingness to negotiate a cartel and an armistice and to open conferences at some place on the Finland coast, and thereupon Peter sent letters by Prince Meshchersky, a young officer of his life-guards, expressing his pleasure thereat and naming Raumo or Nystad.[2] On receipt of them Frederick wrote to George : " Me voilà donc de nouveau engagé dans une négotiation sans y penser." Time would show whether the tsar's overtures were genuine or only intended to amuse, but it was for the king of England and the regent to give weight to his own instances by renewed efforts in his favour.[3] And though Count Horn expressed the opinion that the letters were sent only to amuse and to create dissension between the Swedes and their friends, and asserted that the former would never give up the substance for the shadow, it was decided that, as the tsar seemed inclined to treat about a cartel, Auditor-General Dahlmann should go with Meshchersky to St. Petersburg to receive proposals.[4] Frederick sent by him a letter agreeing to Nystad as the place of congress and naming John Lillienstedt, just created a count, and Baron Otto Strömfelt as his plenipotentiaries. Dahlmann returned early in February with obliging answers and with passports, and the congress was agreed upon.[5] Care was taken to keep the negotiation secret from Bassewitz and Freytag.[6]

To further the negotiation both George and Frederick desired that Campredon should go to St. Petersburg at once to treat for

[1] To Stanhope, 11 Feb., secret and in cipher.

[2] Bacmeister, II. 184–87 and III. Appendix xix ; Finch and Jackson, 14 and 21 Dec. o.s. Bacmeister prints Peter's letter and another from Rumyantsev to Höpken, both in German and of date 15 Nov. o.s.

[3] 18 Dec. o.s., R. O. Royal Letters 56.

[4] Jackson, 21 Dec. o.s. He wrote that the general private opinion was that " we shall certainly have Monsr. Osterman here again in a little time."

[5] Jackson and Finch, 7 and 8 Feb. o.s. ; Bacmeister, II. 190–91, 195.

[6] Finch, 14 Dec. o.s. 1720, 4 Jan. o.s. 1721.

an armistice and preliminary articles of peace.[1] The expectations of the former from the mission are shown by Sutton's expression of surprise and disgust, when he supposed that it would not take place.[2] Campredon, reporting king George's desire that he should go and his assurance that he would view the success of the negotiation with pleasure, even though he did not act as mediator himself, said that the king of Sweden, after due deliberation, had decided to concur and even to authorize him (Campredon) to treat in his name in order to avoid the difficulty which might arise, if the tsar would not accept French mediation separately from that of the emperor. He did this, however, Campredon went on, only in the hope that Great Britain and France would continue their subsidies after peace was made, in order that the Swedes might always be in a condition to make head against the tsar in the future, and that the king of England would engage to send a fleet and succours, as under the treaty of Stockholm, at any time that he should transgress the terms concluded.[3] In consequence of this full powers were issued to Campredon to negotiate and conclude such treaties, articles, or conventions as he should deem good for the end the king of France had in view.[4] The accompanying instructions from Dubois ordered him to say at Stockholm that, so long as there had been any hope of recovering for Sweden by force the provinces which the tsar had conquered, the regent had abstained from any steps which might prejudice that hope, but now that it had been found impossible to form a concert against the tsar the latter's minister had been informed that he (Campredon) was ordered to go as minister plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg to further the negotiation for peace initiated by Rumyantsev. Arrived there, he should express the regent's desire to form a close and solid union with the tsar, of which the northern peace would be the foundation, since the concurrence of Sweden would be its principal bond; success being the more assured in that the king of England would be willing to join therein. He might begin by intimating that the regent had pressed the king of Sweden to consent to Rumyantsev's overtures and now desired to take up the thread of that negotiation, and might hold out the prospect that after peace was made the regent would be able to work for the further alliances desired on both sides. But before making proposals on the part of Sweden he must discover the tsar's intentions. He would no doubt be empowered by the king of Sweden to act for him, and

[1] A letter from George to Frederick on the subject, 26 Nov. o.s., R. O. Royal Letters 56.

[2] 7 Feb. 1721, R. O. France 170.

[3] Campredon, 20 Nov., as cited by Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XL. xxxviii–xl.

[4] 6 Jan. 1721, *Sbornik*, XL. 147.

must only use his French full powers to the extent that that king thought conformable to his interests. In spite of Sparre's exaggerated account of the financial paralysis of France the regent expected to be able soon to resume the payment of subsidies, and they would be continued to Sweden after peace was made. It was hoped that English subsidies would be forthcoming also, although it was unusual for parliament to grant them in time of peace. Campredon's conduct in regard to the proposition which might be made to join imperial mediation with that of France was remitted to his prudence. The regent would furnish 60,000 to 80,000 crowns for use among the Russian ministers, and it was hoped that the king of England would contribute a like sum.[1]

These instructions were accompanied by a letter to Peter the Great stating that nothing was more desired than to form a close alliance with him; "c'est le motif qui nous fait souhaiter depuis longtemps que le rétablissement de la tranquillité du Nord lève le seul obstacle qui s'oppose encore à la perfection d'un concert aussi désirable pour le bien et pour l'avantage des deux monarchies dont les intérêts conviennent si parfaitement." Although the tsar's conditions had not placed the regent in a position to advance the peace as much as he could have wished, yet it had been possible to give assurance that the tsar was ready to make it. It was unfortunate that Rumyantsev had left Stockholm before the orders to Campredon to support his mission arrived, but the latter was now being sent to St. Petersburg to learn what means would be most agreeable to the tsar for ending the northern troubles. The regent was persuaded of the tsar's moderation and would omit no endeavour to ensure success.[2]

Soon after this was written news was received from Campredon of Prince Meshchersky's visit and its consequences. He was then informed that the opening of direct negotiations between the tsar and the king of Sweden seemed to remove all the difficulties which were the principal reason for his journey to St. Petersburg, so that he need not go, unless further developments should render it advisable. The emperor's joint mediation must be admitted, if desired by the tsar, though it was better to dispense with it. The king of Sweden might expect subsidies and the coming of a British

[1] Dubois to Campredon, same date, *Recueil des instructions*, VIII. 208–19. As to the money, Campredon, when at St. Petersburg, advised that Tolstoi, Chancellor Golovkin and Shafirov might be influenced thereby, but not General Bruce; to him he suggested a present of certain valuable engravings of the royal palaces published by command of Louis XIV (*Sbornik*, XL. 188–90. On Mardefeld's attempts to bribe Tolstoi, see his despatch of 3 March, ibid. XV 181–82).

[2] Same date, *Sbornik*, XL. 145

squadron as before. He ought to persuade the tsar to admit the king of England to the mediation, or at least to a guarantee of the treaty. The latter's close alliance with France admitted of no other principle, and Campredon must not lose sight of what he had a right to expect from a faithful ally.[1]

On receipt of his instructions Campredon communicated their contents to Frederick and his principal ministers. The news was received, he says, as a gracious "coup venu du ciel." Principally in consequence of Höpken's report of a courier sent by Yaguzhinsky to St. Petersburg, it was thought necessary that he himself should go thither at once. But the difficulty was to preserve secrecy, and it had been agreed that he should frame a memorial for presentation to the senate in terms which should not excite suspicion. This he had done, and the resolution for his going had been adopted unanimously. But, unfortunately, the secret had come out through a despatch from Baron Sparre in England which was not in cipher. It would be given out that he was merely going to compliment the tsar on the part of the king of France. He was instructed by the king of Sweden to negotiate an armistice or a preliminary treaty, and to offer Keksholm, St. Petersburg, Narva and all Ingria. The king desired greatly that the money intended for bribery should be supplied.[2] As a result of this Campredon was ordered to stay or go accordingly as desired by the king of Sweden, whether as commissioned by him or as a minister of France, in accordance with his previous instructions.[3] Yet, says Finch, much confidence in his success did not appear, and it was rather desired to conclude directly at Nystad. Although Freytag had been assured that only preliminaries, at the most, would be arranged there, and that the final settlement would be at Brunswick, this was not the real intention.[4]

On the question of continuing French and British subsidies after peace was made, Sutton wrote that a fortnight before the former had been allowed, but now that it was known that the king of England preferred to pay larger sums now rather than so to engage himself for the future, the French court seemed to waver on the point. Dubois, however, had promised to regulate the matter in a manner satisfactory to Sweden.[5]

At an interview with the regent on 24 January Sutton and Count Charles Bielke urged that the king of Sweden would be more likely to bring the war to an end by presenting a bold front to the

[1] Dubois to Campredon, 13 Jan., *Recueil des instructions*, VIII. 219–22.
[2] Campredon, 25 Jan., with the memorial, ibid. pp. 223–30.
[3] Dubois to Campredon, 7 Feb., ibid. pp. 222–23.
[4] 8 Feb. o.s., private, and further 1 March o.s.
[5] 6 Jan., R. O. France 170.

tsar than by confiding in his good dispositions. He was assured, they said, of 20,000 men from the empire, if he could find money to pay for them. This, no doubt, referred to proposals brought to Paris in December by General Leutrum on the part of the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, exhibiting a German levy to be raised for a sum of two million crowns. The force named, said Sutton and Bielke, even with the addition of troops to be transported from Sweden, would not, indeed, be enough, but the tsar might be disposed thereby to make peace. The king of Sweden could only have recourse to his friends, and the king of England was willing to help in finding the money. But Sutton had already written of Leutrum's project : " Vous concevrez bien que ses peines seront inutiles." And the regent said that what was asked was quite impossible, at present at all events ; in a year, perhaps, he might be able to act as he would like in the matter, now he could only pay the arrears of subsidies due. Dubois tried to show that the proposed auxiliary force, even if raised and paid for, would only make Sweden's position worse. Sutton wrote : " Il me semble qu'on ne se fait pas fête icy du nouveau tour, que la négociation du Nord vient de prendre. On se flattoit de conduire seul les affaires de la médiation, et de s'en faire un mérite auprès des deux Parties." Finch learnt at Stockholm that Leutrum and Bielke themselves confessed that there was not the least hope of obtaining from France what was wanted.[1]

The relations of George I with the imperial court were now almost openly hostile. In December Stanhope wrote to St. Saphorin :—

" La Cour où vous estes est si éclairée sur ses propres intérêts, et a si peu besoin de ses anciens amis, que nous ne devons plus prétendre de luy donner des conseils, et ce que Je vous en touche, n'est que pour vôtre propre information."

And again, in reply to St. Saphorin's despatches of 27 and 30 November :—

" Vous direz franchement aux Ministres Impériaux que non seulement Sa Majesté déconseille jusqu'à présent au Roy de Suède d'envoyer au Congrez de Brunswick, mais que Sa Majesté tâchera de l'en détourner jusqu'à ce que les Investitures de Bremen, Vehrden et Stettin soient actuellement données et que l'Empereur se soit déclaré, que dans ce Congrez il ne sera donné aucune atteinte aux traittez déjà faits avec la Couronne de Suède. Le Roy y apposeroit pour troisième condition, que préalablement à ce Congrez l'Empereur s'expliquât sur quel pied il prétend ménager la Paix entre la Suède et le Czar, si Sa Majesté ne s'étoit fait une loy de ne plus parler de ces affaires à la Cour Impériale, mais c'est là sans doute une condition sans laquelle l'Empereur ne doit pas s'attendre que la Suède aille traitter à Brunswick." [2]

[1] Sutton, 21 Dec. 1720 and 26–27 Jan. 1721 ; Finch, 8 Feb. o.s.

[2] 2 and 17 Dec. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 221 and Germany (Empire) 37.

And now a great sensation was caused by the publication in Poland of a memorial delivered by Cadogan at Vienna containing the statement, among others, that in return for Stralsund and Rügen the king of Prussia would place in the field against the tsar an army of 30,000 men. General Schwerin reported that it had been communicated by the imperial ministers to Count Flemming, and it was said that the bishop of Neutra had confirmed its authenticity to Dolgoruky.[1] Stanhope, thereon, apprehensive of the offence which might be taken at Berlin, and denying for himself all cognisance of the memorial,[2] sent a full explanation to Whitworth for the information of the Prussian court. In spite, he said, of his orders to Cadogan and St. Saphorin to observe the utmost secrecy in regard to his despatch of 26 July and not to let it go out of their hands or give a copy of it on any account, " now I find that out of my letters my Lord Cadogan had formed the memorial but with great additions of his own reasonings and very material omissions of what I said, particularly with regard to the interest of the King of Prussia," and had given it in strict confidence to Sinzendorff, but without signing it. No copy had ever been sent to himself. He inveighed strongly against the conduct of the court of Vienna in communicating the memorial and enclosed a copy of a despatch to St. Saphorin ordering him to protest to the emperor in the strongest terms. He imputed to the imperial ministers the deliberate design " to put us in the worst terms they can with our friends and more especially with the King of Prussia." He had always insinuated that Prussia might be given the bishopric of Ermeland ; " and as to Poland, thô 'tis said as an inducement to the Emperor that his troops might subsist in that country, yet it was always intended to procure great advantages to that Kingdom from the Muscovites on the side of Smolensko etc." The particulars guarding the interests of Prussia and Poland seemed to have been suppressed in deference to the feeling of the imperial court. How the tsar took the memorial they were not concerned. If he would still be the enemy of Great Britain, a squadron of twelve or fifteen men-of-war would " soon let him see what a stop we can put to all his projects of grandeur both in strength and commerce by sea " ; he would find his ports blockaded and the Sound closed to him.[3]

St. Saphorin, however, reported particular assurances by Sinzendorff that Cadogan's memorial had been communicated to

[1] Whitworth, 14 Jan., R. O. Prussia 13. Copy of the memorial therewith.

[2] " It was as surprizing to me as it could be to your Lop. to see such a Memorial, which I had never heard of nor laid my eyes on till Mr. Wallenrodt shewed me the copy of it which was sent him."

[3] Stanhope to Whitworth, 27 Jan. o.s. 1721, and to St. Saphorin, 7 Feb., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 221; cf. Droysen, pp. 308–09.

no one whomsoever. The bishop of Neutra had no relations with the vice-chancellor, he said, nor had Yaguzhinsky any knowledge of it. He himself and Canngiesser had fears about formally protesting, and he would first consult Sinzendorff.[1] And inasmuch as it appeared that the Prussian court had been persuaded that the affair was an attempt to create dissension with the British, and that the tsar held the paper to be a " pièce supposée " and had better not be undeceived, St. Saphorin received orders not to make his protest, and the matter was allowed to drop.[2]

Stanhope's despatches on this matter were almost his last. On 4 February o.s. he was struck down with sudden illness in the house of lords, and the next evening he died. Townshend, who had rejoined the ministry in the previous year, resumed now the office of secretary of state for the northern province. His first step was to send assurances to the various courts in alliance with Great Britain that the policy directed by Stanhope would still be steadily pursued. In particular may be cited a letter from George I to the king of Prussia of 11 March o.s. :—

" Je prie Vôtre Majesté d'estre bien persuadée, que rien au monde ne sera jamais capable de Me détacher d'Elle, on de ses intérêts, et qu'au contraire Je désire passionnément de continuer, jusqu'à la fin de mes jours, dans la plus estroite union avec Vostre Majesté, y etant porté par une inclination également juste et naturelle, et la considérant, outre cela, comme le plus convenable à Moy, à Ma Maison, et au bien public." [3]

Of affairs at Vienna St. Saphorin wrote on 29 January :—

" On n'est presque occupé icy que des affaires de la Religion, à l'égard desquelles on tient quasi toutes les semaines des conférences. . . . Le Roy de Pologne sera assez embarrassé, car s'il biaise, il s'agit pour luy de perdre dès à présent le Directoire des Protestants et toute la confiance de ses sujets. . . . Rien ne chagrine plus nos ennemis que l'union qui se forme entre les Puissances Protestantes. . . . Ils craignent sur tout extrèmement que la Paix entre la Suède et le Cxar ne se fasse sans eux, et le Comte de Freytag les allarme là dessus. En ce cas ils ne pourroyent plus se servir du Cxar pour intimider les Protestants. . . . J'ose dire que je les fay frémir toutes les fois

[1] 27 Feb., R. O. Germany (Empire) 43. At a later time (17 Sept.) St. Saphorin wrote that he now knew that Sinzendorff had communicated the memorial to Count Althan, the emperor's favourite.

[2] Townshend, 10 March o.s., ibid. 42, draft ; Whitworth, 18 and 22 Feb. and 8 March. Whitworth wrote on 1 April : " Count Flemming told Trautvetter by way of excuse, the Imperial resident at Warsau Marsilli gave Lord Cadogan's Memorial to Prince Dolgoruki, and the Bishop of Neutra own'd it to be genuine. 'Tis plain by Cannegiesser's letters that Jaguzinsky knows of it, thô he won't speak out ; 'tis best however that the matter has been hushed up, and the intended audience laid aside."

[3] R. O. Royal Letters 46.

que je leur fay considérer ce qu'ils ont à craindre pour l'avenir ; mais cela ne les détermine à rien." [1]

Scott wrote similarly that the court of Vienna " prévoit que les puissances protestantes ayant une fois les bras libres du côté du Czar seront plus en état de soutenir les intérêts de la religion en Alemagne." [2] Townshend replied to St. Saphorin that the king was satisfied with his behaviour and desired him to continue to speak " dans le même style et avec la même franchise." He went on to express astonishment that his old and intimate friend, Sinzendorff, should have departed from his former principles, and to compare the present action of the imperial court with that of the last ministry of queen Anne.[3] St. Saphorin gave the despatch to Sinzendorff to read and impressed upon him the extremity to which the emperor was now reduced ; how, with the Russians masters of Livonia by the mediation of France, he could never again engage in a considerable war for fear of a Russian diversion, and how the tsar would rule both Sweden and Poland ; drawing the moral that the best remedy would be to re-establish a perfect understanding with the king of England.[4]

But George I had now given up the hope of forming a league against Peter the Great. Townshend wrote to James Scott on 10 March o.s. : " It will be to very little purpose to renew the talk of a Concert till the Emperor and his Ministers have changed their sentiments with regard to the affairs of the North." [5] And his words to Whitworth show that reconciliation with Peter rather was looked forward to. He wrote :—

" His Ma[ty] approved very much the prudent and proper answer you gave to what Mons[r] Ilgen told you from Count Golofkin of the Czar's desire to renew a good correspondence with His Majesty. As soon as the Peace shall

[1] To Stanhope, 29 Jan., and further in February, R. O. Germany (Empire) 43.

[2] 19 March. He was confirmed in this opinion, he said, by hearing of an interview between the Bishop of Neutra and Besenval, at which the former said that northern affairs would not be allowed to be settled until the religious disputes were ended.

[3] " La conduite de l'Empereur à l'égard des protestants, et par rapport aux affaires du Nord, me paroit être une véritable copie de ce que les Ministres de la feue Reine ont fait à ses Alliés qui l'avoient soutenue avec beaucoup de succés et de gloire pendant une longue et onéreuse guerre. Le Congrès de Brunswic ressemble parfaitement à celuy d'Utrecht, et les invitations honnêtes qu'on fait pour nous y faire venir sont de la même trempe avec les complimens et les exhortations obligeantes que le Comte de Sinzendorff luy même a receu alors pour se rendre à Utrecht. C'est alors nôtre péché, . . . nous en avons souffert depuis, et je souhaitte . . . que la Maison d'Autriche n'éprouve pas que les mêmes causes produisent les mêmes effets. Je suis bien seur, que leur conduite dans cette conjoncture est plus inexcusable, que la nôtre ne le fût dans ce tems là." And so on at length (28 Feb. o.s., R. O. Germany, Empire, 42, draft, and further 10 March o.s.).

[4] St. Saphorin, 2 April.

[5] R. O. Foreign Entry Book 123.

be made between Sweden and his Czarish Majesty, there will not remain any difficulty on our part why We should not be well with Muscovy; it is the interest of both nations to entertain a mutual good intelligence, and we shall readily hearken to any offers from the Czar of that kind, when our engagements with Sweden cease to interfere with them." [1]

The chief preoccupation, indeed, was still that Sweden should make peace. Thus Townshend replied to Finch's despatches of 8 February o.s. :—

" His Maj^ty was very glad to find by them that the Swedes were so earnest and intent on making peace with the Czar. Provided it be done to the satisfaction of Sweden, the King is very little concerned whether it is carry'd on with or without Mons^r. Campredon's interposition. I make no question but you know enough of the situation of his Maj^ty's affairs in particular, as well as of those in the North, in the Empire and elsewhere in general to judge nothing can be more welcome to the King than to hear that the Swedes carry on their negotiations at Neustadt with success, and that they are likely to bring them soon to a happy conclusion."

If they found that France did not support them properly, it was certainly not through any want of endeavour on the king's part. His engagements would be punctually performed, his fleet should infallibly be sent to the Baltic in good time, the subsidies due should be paid that very week; in fact " everything his Maj^ty has promised by his Treatys to the Crown of Sweden shall be done in the fullest extent." [2]

The money was indeed paid over to the Swedish envoy, although raised, Townshend wrote, with considerable difficulty, owing to its scarcity and the disasters of credit and trade.[3] It was welcome indeed: Finch wrote that not 10,000 crowns could be raised in Sweden, poverty was so extreme.[4] But in addition to the subsidies the king of Sweden asked for 200,000 crowns towards building fifty galleys and for four battalions of infantry to reinforce the garrison of Stralsund, besides 100,000 crowns to erect magazines there and to put the fortifications in repair. To find further sums,

[1] 14 Feb. o.s., ibid. 53.

[2] 1 March o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155. To Whitworth Townshend wrote (10 March o.s., ibid. 53): " Your Lordship will easily imagine from the situation of affairs here, as well as from the general state of matters in Europe, that everything that tends to the procuring peace in the North is extremely acceptable to us." And to Finch again, 21 March o.s. : " His Maj^ty is of opinion that the more the Swedes keep the negociations of that Treaty under their own direction and management the better will their affairs succeed and the more advantageous terms will they obtain from the Court of Petersburg."

[3] 21 March o.s., ibid.

[4] 1 and 8 March o.s. In June Finch learnt from General Diemar that he had been obliged to hand over all the money he had, 12,000 crowns (1 June o.s., private).

Finch was informed, was absolutely impossible, but the troops would be sent on condition that two of the battalions were furnished by the king of Prussia. The object of this, Townshend said, was partly to engage him and partly to make the tsar believe that he was setting a force on foot against him; and also to prevent the tsar from attacking Stralsund without entailing a breach with Prussia. A further sum of £30,000 on account of the subsidies would be ready for payment when due at the end of May, but after that date the cost of the four battalions would be deducted.[1] Nor was this all; in April Finch asked for the payment of the £100,000 promised, as he stated, to help in procuring peace this year and the assent of the riksdag to settling the succession upon the house of Hesse.[2] He was informed in answer that he knew very well that the condition of the offer had been the saving of the expense of a squadron by the conclusion of peace in the winter; yet, if it were now concluded and the squadron could be recalled, the king would fulfil this as all other his engagements to the king of Sweden.[3]

Campredon left Sweden on 30 January but took a month to reach St. Petersburg, being stopped at Reval. During March he had frequent audiences of the tsar and conferences with his ministers and with Mardefeld. Their result was to convince him that Sweden must make peace on any terms. When he made his propositions on behalf of that country the Russians laughed in his face, pointing out how different was the tsar's position now from what it had been even in the previous year; how then he had to fear the formation of a powerful league against him, but now had concluded treaties of perpetual peace with the Porte and of defence with the king of Poland, the latter preventing troops from marching through Poland to attack him, and had assurance of neutrality both from the emperor and the king of Prussia. Campredon dilated in his despatches on the mightiness of the state which Peter had created, on his powerful fleet, his huge army, and the ever-increasing riches of his vast empire. All princes sought his friendship "avec un espèce d'abaissement." He scouted the idea of the possibility of compelling him by force.

"J'ai l'honneur, Monseigneur, de vous répéter que le projet d'un concert pour agir contre le czar, est absolument impracticable, et que l'argent qu'on voudroit employer à cet usage serait jeté dans l'eau. Le grand point est d'avoir la paix et de rompre les mesures que le Czar veut prendre avec le Duc de Holstein, pour forcer la Suède à des extrémités honteuses et accablantes."

[1] Townshend to Finch, 31 March o.s., ibid. The king of Sweden's letters, 1 and 10 March o.s., R. O. Royal Letters 56.

[2] Finch, 5 April o.s.

[3] Townshend to Finch, 28 April o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

He strongly urged the necessity of a good understanding between Russia and France, and begged to have full instructions on the regent's intentions on this head as soon as possible,

"si elles sont portées à prendre quelques liaisons avec le Czar, que tout le monde recherche avec empressement, qu'on n'a guère vu manquer à ses engagements, et qui y sera plus exact encore dans la suite, pour détruire entièrement l'opinion qu'on a eue de lui jusqu'à présent, et mériter la réputation d'être fidèle allié. . . . La France peut tirer de grands avantages de l'alliance du Czar autant qu'il vivra."

Tolstoi, he said, had let out in his discourse the necessity of the above, if the propositions of Austria to the tsar were to be defeated.[1]

The Russians were not at all pleased that the secret of the negotiations had been confided to Campredon. They complained at Stockholm, and desired to know whether French mediation was approved of; and they were answered that neither was there solicitude therefor nor any change of intention as to making peace at Nystad.[2]

Leaving St. Petersburg at the end of March Campredon made his way by land to Pillau and embarked there for Sweden to report his experiences and to disabuse minds at Stockholm of the possibility of continuing the war. His despatches were only received at Paris at the end of April. But accounts of his doings had come to Berlin from Mardefeld, who had been ordered to support him, and were transmitted to London and Stockholm. They aroused something like consternation. When peace was advised, it was never contemplated that it could be made without the restoration of Livonia. Ilgen, according to Whitworth, went so far as to intimate to the Swedish envoy that if the tsar refused it, and Sweden remained firm, Prussia might not impossibly be drawn to interfere.[3] It appeared that Campredon, after his first rebuff, had confided to Mardefeld that if some concession were made in regard to Livonia, so that the king of Sweden might get out of the war with however little honour, he could conclude peace within 24 hours. Mardefeld had not failed to inform the Russian ministers of this, and had then suggested to Campredon that perhaps the tsar would pay a

[1] Campredon's despatches, dated 14 (22) March, 22 March, 9 and 14 April, *Sbornik*, XL. 166–233, cf. Le Dran's narrative, ibid. pp. liii–lxiv. The last was from Pillau, where Campredon embarked for Sweden. The dates both of and within the despatches are confused, some being in the old and some in the new style. The second despatch should come first.

[2] Finch, 22 March o.s.

[3] Whitworth, 18 March. On 27 May he wrote that it was true that Stanhope in the previous year had contemplated a cession of Reval and Esthonia, but "I never understood that Livonia came into the question, nor heard the least mention of it, before Mr. Campredon's unhappy journey to St. Petersburg." To the Prussians the idea of Livonia being ceded had quite altered the aspect of affairs.

sum of money to keep Livonia on mortgage for a term of years, and Campredon had answered that, if a million crowns were offered, he would go at once to Sweden to persuade the senate to accept it. Mardefeld offered to speak of this, and advised Campredon to employ his 60,000 crowns to carry the matter through.[1] Campredon, on his return to Stockholm, denied having spoken of the matter; one of the Russians, he said, had only told him in confidence that a sum of money might be paid.[2] But Mardefeld's report was, of course, believed, and he set forth clearly that the tsar would not give up Livonia.[3] The Prussian ministers, " both vexed and frightened," told Whitworth that he had gone beyond his instructions and professed not to understand Campredon's behaviour; he could not, they said, have adopted a course more prejudicial to peace or to the prospects of Sweden. At Stockholm, Finch wrote, Campredon was said to have " very much exceeded his commission " ; his offers were to be made " without speaking of Reval, or giving the Russ the least hopes of Sweden being brought by any consideration whatever to make a cession of Livonia." Immediate orders were going to the plenipotentiaries at Nystad to disclaim his propositions positively.[4]

We need not, however, suppose with Whitworth either that Mardefeld was a knave or Campredon a fool.[5] They grasped what was not yet understood by those at a distance; how strong was Peter the Great and how secure his position, how he was resolved to keep the coast-provinces from Finland to Courland and could not be deprived of them. Mardefeld reported that his resolution was founded on the persuasion that Great Britain was so crippled in her finances that king George could not send a fleet to the Baltic this year nor do anything further in the north.[6] But, apart from that, Peter knew from the experience of the previous years how little harm an unsupported naval force could do him. Mardefeld, however, wrote in his despatch cited that the disposition of the Russians for peace was very great and that if Livonia were ceded

[1] Whitworth, from Mardefeld's reports, 22 March.

[2] Finch from Stockholm, 19 April o.s.

[3] As in his report printed in the *Sbornik*, XV. 177.

[4] Finch, 25 and 29 March o.s.

[5] " I don't know whether there has been more knavery on the side of Marderfeldt, or more weakness on that of Campredon, but 'tis sure that one way or the other they have spoiled the Treaty of Peace, and that you will either have none, or else on such terms as will be equally dishonourable for the Swedes and dangerous for their neighbours " (Whitworth to Tilson, 22 March).

[6] For instance, " Tout ce système est fondé sur la nouvelle, que J'ay appris moy même de Sa Majesté Tzarienne, que la flotte Angloise ne viendra pas cette année dans la Baltique " (31 March, forwarded by Whitworth). And Campredon reported the expectation that Stanhope's death and the financial crash would deprive Great Britain of the power of aiding Sweden further (*Sbornik*, XL. 183).

not only would a large sum of money be paid for it but other advantages result; in particular, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp would be thrown over.

Whitworth noted that the very fear of the tsar as so near a neighbour entailed reluctance to do anything which might offend him. "Ils appréhendent le voisinage du Czar, mais un peu trop pour hazarder de le chagriner." He had been on the point, he said, of obtaining a declaration on northern affairs "in more strong and express terms," when the "imprudent management" at St. Petersburg "alter'd or at least suspended measures." Yet "I can venture to assure your Lord^{p}. that the ministers here act sincerely and heartily in the work of the Peace. They came in a little of the latest, but see now that they have as much or more interest than anyone else, as is really true, in removing the Czar farther from the frontiers of the Empire." Orders had been sent to Mardefeld to press for the restoration of Livonia in the strongest terms possible without giving offence. But, if his reports were to be relied on, "these affairs have taken so unhappy a turn in the beginning, that either no Peace is to be expected, or such a one, as will leave a very restless and dangerous neighbour to those parts of the Empire." [1]

On receipt of the news in England Sir Robert Sutton was ordered to do his best to discover, without giving umbrage or exhibiting suspicion, the true motive which had impelled Campredon to engage himself to terms so prejudicial; he could not have acted without orders, and was thought to have the interests of Sweden more at heart and to know that the Russians must be treated with firmness and not by concession.[2] But it was soon recognized that the situation must be accepted. It was certain, Townshend wrote to Finch on 7 April o.s.,[3] that the tsar "in his present situation" would never give up Livonia. While the king would not advise on "so tender and important a point" as accepting the sacrifice, yet there was little hope of the Swedes obtaining better terms by continuing the war. The king comforted himself on having performed all his engagements and made all possible endeavours.

"The situation of his Maj$^{ty's}$ affairs here is such as will by no means allow of the constant annual expence which this squadron and the subsidys oblige him to; especially since there is no probability of reaping the fruit which the King of Sweden proposed to himself from his Maj$^{ty's}$ support; and seeing

[1] 22 March to 1 April.

[2] Carteret to Sutton, 23 March o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 32. Craggs having died in February, Carteret had succeeded him in the charge of the southern province.

[3] Ibid. 155.

that nobody else will engage in the quarrel we ought as good Englishmen and good Swedes to wish for the peace even on the terms proposed."

Further arguments were added when Campredon's actual reports were known.[1]

Dubois wrote to Campredon on 25 April—having then heard nothing from him beyond his arrival at St. Petersburg—that his reported conduct " a fait juger en Angleterre que vous vous étiez confessé au renard, et que M. de Mardefeldt avait abusé de vôtre confiance pour favoriser les vues du Czar, auquel il est livré ; " an idea of which he had tried to disabuse the English court. The outcry at Berlin against the cession of Livonia, and the expression of opinion that it was better for Sweden to lose Stralsund and Rügen, suggested, he said, Prussian hopes of gaining that province, if the war went on. Campredon might advise the king of Sweden that the Prussians would be likely to do everything to traverse the peace with that end in view. He added : " Je ne puis pas m'empêcher de regarder la vie du Czar comme fort casuelle et [sa mort] comme peu éloignée ; ce qui mettrait le Roi de Suède en état de rentrer dans toutes les conquêtes du Czar sans coup férir." [2]

A last hope of forming a league against Peter the Great was raised when advices came from St. Saphorin and Canngiesser that the emperor might yet take up arms against him. Fired by this information, Whitworth sent urgent appeals to Finch to prevent the Swedes " from clapping up things too hastily," to Bernstorff at Hanover to instruct Bassewitz to support him, and to Lord Glenorchy, who had replaced Polwarth at Copenhagen, to rouse the Danes to a sense of their danger. He was given, he wrote,

" positive assurances that, if ever a concert can be formed, the King of Prussia will certainly enter into it with a body of ten or twenty thousand men, . . . if advantages were offer'd him proportionable to the services he should do. He thinks the plan of reducing the Czar to reason ought to be formed of one hundred battalions and two hundred squadrons, which if the Emperor and Denmark would concert on their parts, he believes might be very easily found among the Princes concerned."[1]

And to Finch :

" I can only confirm to you, from what I have heard since from several parts, that the dispositions seem to be more favourable than ever for extricating Sweden out of the present difficulties and helping them to a Peace on more reasonable and safe conditions, than what the Czar hitherto pretends, if they do not contribute to their own ruin by their weakness or too hasty resolutions."

[1] Townshend to Finch, 28 April and 2 May o.s., ibid.
[2] *Sbornik*, XL. 239–40.

A British fleet was coming to the Baltic and the tsar, if he attempted an invasion of Sweden, would find himself caught. The king of Poland must be extremely nettled at the manner in which his last overtures to St. Petersburg had been rebuffed, the tsar's language having been "very dry, and even harsh." To Townshend Whitworth set forth at great length and in emphatic language the ill effect which the Russian possession of Livonia must have upon British trade, how the tsar would control practically the whole supply of naval stores, establish a direct commerce with Germany, and, worst of all, have the trade carried in his own ships in order to train his people to the sea. Riga in peace-time, he said, had as much shipping as all the other Baltic ports together. If the tsar lived, his navy was likely to be trebled in eight or ten years. His power would be tremendous; Prussia would be terrorized and unable to be useful to her friends.[1] Every attempt ought still to be made to form a concert, even if Prussia must be allowed Stralsund and Rügen.[2]

But all this was out of date; the advices from Vienna were soon found to be fallacious; and it was already decided at Paris and Stockholm, as well as in London, that Sweden must make peace on any terms obtainable.[3] The "specious offers," Townshend wrote, reported on the part of Prussia to buy Stralsund and Rügen for nine or ten million thalers, or for the price of an army of 40,000 men and three million thalers to set a Swedish force on foot to join it, were vain. "Thô these proposals look very glaring, and the hope of recovering Livonia seems very tempting," yet the king of Prussia would never dare to engage in war with the tsar or move 40,000 men out of his dominions without the emperor's concurrence, "which we are persuaded will not be had." To enter into such proposals would only leave Sweden worse off than ever and involve the loss of Stralsund and Rügen as well as of Livonia. Really, to judge from Campredon's relations, "what is most certain is, that the Czar and the King of Prussia are more united than ever and that Mardefeld is the favourite Minister." [4]

Meanwhile the duke of Holstein-Gottorp had found asylum in Russia. He had left Vienna early in September, had spent the winter at Breslau, and on 4 March, on receipt of an affectionate

[1] Ilgen "plainly told me, they would in this case [if the peace were made] be no further usefull to their friends than the Czar would give them leave" (29 April).

[2] Whitworth, 8 April to 3 May, with copies of St. Saphorin's letter and his answer, and of his despatches to Bernstorff, Finch and Glenorchy. A further long discussion, 10 May.

[3] "Since the child is dead," Whitworth wrote (6 May), "I shall wash my hands, change raiment, and eat and drink as David did of old."

[4] Townshend to Finch, 2 May o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

invitation from the tsar, had left that city for the north.[1] His affairs were now in a more promising condition; an appeal to Stockholm, on the ground that his misfortunes had come upon him through adherence to the cause of Sweden, had procured him an annuity of 25,000 rix-dollars,[2] and he had regained the duchy of Holstein. It was reported that his marriage with one of the tsar's daughters was decided upon, that his journey had the emperor's approval, and that he had received from him 50,000 crowns for its expenses. Le Fort (of whom below) wrote that he had been given 1,000 ducats at Riga and was promised 500 more;[3] and Campredon that if the king of Sweden would not accept the tsar's conditions of peace the latter would use the duke to ruin him, keeping him as "un instrument toujours prêt à fomenter les divisions et les désordres de la Suède."[4] He stayed at Riga till the end of May and then followed the tsar to St. Petersburg, where he was splendidly received and entertained.[5]

This public reception of the duke was a master-stroke on Peter's part. The implied threat finally persuaded Frederick I to accept the peace of Nystad. And it had its effect upon George I, who saw the tables turned upon him. Instead of forming a league to drive Peter back from the Baltic, he found himself threatened by an union of the emperor and the tsar in support of the duke and of the catholics, and had even to fear an attack upon himself in Germany. And so we find him now devising a league with Prussia, Denmark and Hesse-Cassel to safeguard their interests in Germany, and with the secondary view of influencing the coming congress of Cambray. To Glenorchy at Copenhagen was sent a draft of a convention to be negotiated by him in concert with General Bothmer under observation of the utmost caution and secrecy. A part of it, relating to the hire of Danish troops, he was recommended to leave to Bothmer, as experienced on that head. The preamble of the draft referred to the neutrality convention of 1710

[1] St. Saphorin, 11 Sept. 1720, Whitworth, 15 March 1721, Wich, 21 March, Campredon, *Sbornik*, XL. 228, Bacmeister, II. 197. Peter the Great's letter was dated 16 Jan. o.s. (Solov'ev).

[2] Jackson, 15 Feb. o.s. He says that the money had been ordered to be paid some time before through the Swedish agents at Hamburg but had been refused by the duke's ministers, it being said that he knew no king of Sweden at present.

[3] 14 May, *Sbornik*, III. 328. He says, however, that the duke's marriage was far off, and that, if it took place at all, it would be with the tsar's niece, not with his daughter.

[4] *Sbornik*, XL. 229.

[5] Bacmeister, pp. 206, 218. In July reports reached Berlin that the tsar had given the duke an allowance of 3,000 roubles a month and that he was using this and other moneys to gain over the Russian ministers, with success already in the cases of Osterman and Shafirov as well as of Tolstoi, Yaguzhinsky "and generally all those who depend on the Czarine" (Harris to Whitworth, 29 July).

and expressed the desirability of preventing any spark from the northern war from lighting a flame within the empire. Townshend wrote about the scheme both to Wibe, the Danish secretary of state, and to the landgrave's minister, Baron Dalwigk. All princes concerned, he said, should take heed of the danger which would threaten from the redoubtable power of the tsar, possessed of the Baltic provinces, and should enter into measures of defence against him as well for their own safety as for that of the protestant religion. To Dalwigk he expatiated on the great services already rendered to Sweden, on the payment of subsidies in spite of the financial stress, and on the equipment of a squadron again this year, although the sailors' dislike of the Baltic service was so great that the same unpopular measures had to be taken to impress them as in the time of the war with France. "The ill success that has attended the King's former endeavours of a concert against the Czar has obliged His Majesty to narrow his views," but the defensive league proposed might yet oblige that monarch to modify his designs materially.[1]

The project met with acceptance in idea but was ruined upon consideration. The landgrave wanted to bring in the emperor and the Dutch republic, as in the neutrality convention. The Danes were found to be jealous of Prussia, and their conditions for providing troops to be extravagant.[2] When Whitworth first mooted the project to the Prussian ministers they favoured it, though apprehensive that it might exasperate the tsar without in any way helping to save Livonia. But shortly there came reports from Wallenrodt intimating that king George's design was really to intimidate the tsar and to influence the congress of Cambray, in which Prussia had no interest.[3] Townshend appears to have been in fault; he was not, indeed, a great diplomatist; and we can hardly suppose that Stanhope would have let out to Wallenrodt the king's ulterior intentions. Nor did he understand the methods of treating the Prussian court, with which Whitworth was so familiar.[4] It was now said there that to be allied with Hesse was the

[1] 7 April o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 75; Wibe's reply to Townshend, Denmark 45, original. Droysen (p. 311) observes that the scheme was in substance a renewal of the "Religionstractat" of the previous year.

[2] See Glenorchy, 6 to 24 May, R. O. Denmark 45. About the troops: "there appears to be more difficulty in that article than in the Convention."

[3] Whitworth on this (11 April): "I urged the advantages your LordP. mentioned of such an allyance and the weight it would give them not only in the affairs of the Empire but of all Europe, thô I only hinted this last consideration in general terms, for their cares being hitherto only confined to Germany and the neighbouring parts of the North, their politicks are not yet strong enough to digest such extensive views."

[4] "The K. of Prussia judges generally at first sight and without consideration or consulting any one of his Ministers, and when a resolution is once taken it is not easy to be rectified; my method has therefore constantly been first to prepare

same thing as to be allied with Sweden; that neither Hesse nor Denmark had any money, and there was no need to take up their interests; and that the kings of England and Prussia were perfectly able to defend themselves by themselves. "Mons[r]. Wallenrodt's imprudent representations here," Whitworth wrote, "have certainly made one part of the business more difficult." Frederick William wrote himself to George to the above effect. Ilgen said that, if Sweden made peace, there would be no necessity for the projected league; it would be regarded by the tsar as directed against himself and make him dangerous. Finally Whitworth was informed explicitly that the king of Prussia "was ready to enter into any engagements with his Majesty which should be thought necessary, but not with the others proposed by the said alliance."[1] And thus the project was dropped. Townshend informed Glenorchy that the aversion from it shown by the king of Prussia had made his Majesty less eager to carry it through; without hinting the desire to abandon it, he must find pretexts for putting discussion of it off and not speak of it more than he could help.[2] And Whitworth was instructed similarly.[3]

Negotiations, however, for a secret treaty with Denmark for troops were continued, though with little success. On 27 May General Bothmer wrote:

"Il me semble qu'il y a quelque chose à l'égard du Czar pour quoi ils veulent encore gagner du tems. On paroit aucunement être en peine sur son sujet; ce n'étoit pas du même avant l'arrivée de la flotte de Vôtre Majesté. On fait même entendre que le Czar offre encore la garantie pour le Slesvic et la cession du Duc de Holstein-Gottorp, le Czar aiant besoin de la garantie de Danemarc pour la Livonie et ses autres conquêtes, et qu'il ne pourroit jamais

matters with the Ministers, to explain carefully whatever I found was disliked, and to return several times to the charge, rather than draw a denyal on myself by urging it too home at first. By this means the King was fully instructed by degrees in every particular and there was an opportunity of removing any prejudices he might have before it came directly under his own consideration." He had been foiled in the present matter through Wallenrodt's reports going directly to the king (to Tilson, 3 May).

[1] Whitworth, 11 April to 3 May. Copy (or translation) of the king of Prussia's instructions to Wallenrodt in this sense with the despatch of 10 May. Whitworth gave as the real reason for the refusal of Prussia to co-operate with Denmark the recent confirmation of the private treaty made with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in 1713 (cf. p. 36) to favour the recovery of his dominions and also his succession in Sweden, upon condition that when king of Sweden he should give up to Prussia Stralsund and Rügen (6 and 31 May).

[2] 26 May o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 7.

[3] He wrote to Tilson (3 June): "You will have seen by my Lord Glenorchy, how wretchedly the wise ministry of Denmark would have mangled your poor Project; the Landgrave's answer was likewise odd enough, but they will now have no further occasion to make themselves courted, for what was so evidently for their own good."

entrer avec la Suède pour lui faire avoir la Norvège, parcequ'il mettroit par là la Suède en état de reprendre tous ses conquêtes." [1]

Yaguzhinsky had left Vienna at the end of March. St. Saphorin has it that on the one hand he declaimed openly against the non-acceptance of his propositions and said that he had been duped by the ministers of Holstein-Gottorp, when they assured him that the duke had a great following in Sweden and could enforce the proposals carried by Höpken, while on the other the imperial court, observing the progress of the Finland conferences, was of opinion that he had only come to Vienna to amuse, and the ministers who had favoured him were put much out of countenance; but that he persisted in saying that those conferences were only intended to establish, at the most, preliminaries of peace, that the final treaty would be made at Brunswick under the mediation of the emperor, and that Campredon's mission to St. Petersburg was quite informal.[2] Arrived at Warsaw in the middle of April he boasted in his cups of the strong cards held by the tsar in the encouragement given him by the emperor and in the timidity of Prussia. That court, he said, was the slave of England and of Bernstorff, and he threatened that, if the tsar had to give up Livonia, he would unite with Sweden to recover for her her cessions to Prussia and Hanover.[3] La Vie reported him returned to St. Petersburg very well satisfied with this mission.[4]

As for an understanding between the tsar and the king of Poland, Whitworth's remark on the subject has been cited. Yet Augustus still saw his best hope in reconciliation. When neither Prince Dolgoruky nor his son returned, he sent to St. Petersburg his new councillor of embassies, John Le Fort, commissioned to obtain his inclusion in the treaty to be made at Nystad and to advise an alliance with the emperor as best for the interest of the two crowns.[5] Meanwhile Scott pressed upon Count Flemming the necessity of a reconciliation between Poland and Prussia,

[1] See on this subject R. O. Treaty Papers 4, where are original despatches from Bothmer of 24, 27 and 31 May 1721 and further papers to Aug. 1722, one of them a report of 28 April o.s. 1722 to Townshend endorsed "Comparison between, and observations on the Project and Counter-project of a Treaty between Great Britain and Denmark, 1719 to 1722."

[2] St. Saphorin, 27 Feb. to 2 April.

[3] Scott, 23 April; Schwerin to the king of Prussia, 16 April, copy with Whitworth's despatches. Cf. Droysen, p. 315.

[4] 2 May, *Sbornik*, XL. 243.

[5] See Le Fort's despatches, 27 April to 18 May, and "Journal de mon voyage," *Sbornik*, III. 326 foll. His credentials, 16 April, p. 321. He is stated therein to have been a "Commercien-Rath" in the tsar's service. La Vie (*Sbornik*, XL. 246) says that he had been an assessor of the Russian college of commerce, and also agent of the tsar at Paris. Le Fort himself says that he had been for six years

and was assured both by him and by General Schwerin of their desire for it.[1] Townshend answered his report:

"I am glad to hear that the Court of Poland shews a disposition to be on goods terms with that of Prussia. My Lord Whitworth has lately informed me that Major Gen[l.] Schwerin was ordered to declare on the part of his Prussian Maj[ty] upon the overtures made to him by Count Flemming that his said Maj[ty] was ready to enter into a sincere friendship with the King of Poland for their mutual interest and security in case the dispositions were the same and real on his side, so that there seem to be hopes that your good offices in this particular will meet with success."[2]

St. Saphorin expressed the conviction that if only the kings of Poland and Prussia could be reconciled something might yet be done at Vienna. He thought Ilgen to blame; Whitworth's despatches showed "que la Cour de Pologne ne fait aucun pas qui ne soit empoisonné aux yeux du Roy de Prusse." The "Cabal," he said, had little influence at Warsaw; Flemming and his party, opposed to their projects, had always the upper hand. He had learnt from Whitworth that the king of Prussia was disposed to enter into measures with the king of Poland, if he could have Courland. It was to be feared that the indifference of the imperial court would spoil so salutary a project, but it might be brought to join in a defensive alliance, and even that would greatly influence the tsar.[3]

But here again Townshend replied that it was too late, Sweden could no longer hold out, and peace would be made at Nystad unless the tsar brought in the pretensions of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Attention must indeed be given to means for preventing him from further extension and from troubling the empire, and this was very worthy of the consideration of the imperial court, but "Sa Majesté ne veut point courir le risque de les offenser une seconde fois, pas cet endroit là, et continuera dans la résolution qu'Elle a prise de ne plus rien proposer à l'Empereur sur les affaires du Nord"; although he would always be ready to listen to any proposal from him.[4]

As to the congress of Brunswick, Count Golovkin was actually sent thither from Berlin in June, but only for form, not taking with him his family or equipages and only staying a fortnight.[5]

a chamberlain of the king of Prussia, was a Swiss by birth, and a cousin of General Le Fort. In September he went to St. Petersburg as the king of Poland's minister resident, remaining there till 1734.

[1] Scott, 30 April.
[2] 12 May o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 123.
[3] 10 and 14 May, R. O. Germany (Empire) 43.
[4] 23 May o.s., ibid.
[5] Whitworth, 7 and 21 June.

CHAPTER XXX

THE TREATY OF NYSTAD

The Swedish plenipotentiaries were delayed by stress of weather from sailing till 22 April.[1] They were instructed that their nominal charge was to negotiate a cartel and an armistice, but their real duty to do all they could to conclude peace, or at least preliminaries, endeavouring to discover whether the tsar was sincere or only wanted to gain time, as in 1719. They might offer Narva, Ingria to the Systerbäck, and Keksholm with the part of Carelia depending, but all the rest must be restored. Their offers were to be made gradually; if they were found insufficient, certain bailiwicks might be added. Anything in favour of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp they must absolutely reject. In any treaty to be concluded must be expressly stipulated preservation of the Evangelical religion and of liberties in the provinces ceded, free commerce as before the war, and security to the empire, while all engagements with the duke to the prejudice of the king or government of Sweden must be renounced, and nothing must be admitted which could tie the king of Sweden's hands in regard to Poland, on the contrary, support must be given to the interests of king Stanislaus. The rest was remitted to the plenipotentiaries' capacity and wisdom.[2]

The clause regarding the security of the empire was the offspring of the same fear of retaliation by Peter the Great which inspired king George's scheme of a defensive league, a fear increased by reports of negotiations at Berlin for the passage of 40,000 Russian troops into Mecklenburg.[3] Finch had insisted, as ordered, that the insertion of such a clause was absolutely necessary.[4] That the tsar would resist any such stipulation was known. In Townshend's words, he "would be very unwilling to throw off

[1] Jackson, 19 April o.s.

[2] Abstract, with full translation of the clause embodying the stipulations, with Finch's despatch of 5 April o.s.

[3] Wich, 1 April and 2 May, R. O. Hamburg 38. As he wrote on 13 May: "On est tellement prévenu de la grande puissance du Czar, qu'on l'appréhend par tout, et en effet on n'a pas tout le tort."

[4] Finch, 1 and 8 March o.s.

the veil and make a discovery of his aims on this side." But the term "the empire" was not intended to include the emperor or interests opposed to those of Hanover. Townshend went on :—

"As to the Emperor and the Duke of Holstein such an inclusion seems to be of no particular service to them, because they are already on such good terms with the Czar, that they have no need of a further provision in their favour, since there can be no intention in the Czar to attack or infest them. But all the protestant powers have reason to fear that there is a design to make use of the Czar to their prejudice, and therefore it might be very proper to try him on this head. . . . In short the King thinks upon the whole matter that the article in question would prove of the greatest use to the Empire in this juncture, because it would disappoint the Imperial Court of the main assistance they have in expectation against the protestants, and would leave the Duke of Holstein without the means of giving disturbance, having no one in the Empire able to stir in his quarrels and support him in his pretensions." [1]

Later, when it was seen that an article relating to "the whole body of the Empire" would never be accepted, a more limited one was sent, referring only to the security of the circle of Lower Saxony and confirmation of the treaties made with Sweden. Finch was authorized to draw upon the treasury for the 80,000 crowns wanted for use in Russia upon condition that the article was inserted. It was approved, Townshend said, at Paris, but was not to be pressed, if likely to delay the preliminary treaty; in that case it must be "hooked in" somehow afterwards, if possible.[2]

Campredon was back at Stockholm on 27 April. It took him but a short time to convince the king of Sweden and the senate that the longer they stood out against the tsar the worse they would fare, while Finch stated definitely that the king of England could not furnish money beyond the subsidies to which he was engaged. Within a week it was resolved to send orders to the plenipotentiaries at Nystad to offer Livonia for a sum of money or in return for Viborg, but not to delay in disputing this, but conclude.[3] Campredon informed the tsar that the king of Sweden was ready to negotiate preliminaries without mediation, and he wrote home that several senators thought that all mediation and guarantees had better be dispensed with for a treaty which neither party intended to observe longer than was necessary. The king, he said, thought that measures might be concerted for mediation and guarantees as also for an alliance between France, Sweden and Russia, in which Great Britain might join, after conclusion

[1] Townshend to Finch, 21 March o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.
[2] The same, 2 and 12 May o.s., ibid.
[3] Finch, 22 April o.s.

of the preliminaries, and that in any case the time had come for a renewal of alliance between France and Sweden, while he counted always on the promise to accord him subsidies after the peace.[1] Campredon was instructed in reply to do all that he could to procure the inclusion of the king of England in the league projected.[2]

The decision arrived at was welcomed in England. It must be justified, Finch was informed, by everybody. To continue the war would only further aggrandise the tsar and complete the ruin of Sweden. Finch was warmly to be congratulated on the success of his negotiations. The king was ready, if thought proper, to join the alliance projected after peace was made.[3]

A British squadron now appeared once more in the Baltic. Urgent appeals had been made by Baron Sparre in London and by Frederick himself that it should sail as early as possible. Townshend pressed upon Sir John Norris, who again had the command, the necessity of haste in equipping it: "three or four days sooner or later may be of the last consequence at this critical juncture with regard to the obtaining a Peace in the North."[4] When its coming was announced at Stockholm, there was inexpressible satisfaction.[5] The ships, Townshend wrote, were as many as last year and larger, but great difficulties had attended the fitting them out, as should be duly represented to the king of Sweden; not only through want of money but through the trouble with the seamen, the measures to impress whom had given "no small offence to our merchants and occasioned new clamours."[6]

The fleet, twenty-one of the line with other vessels, sailed from the Nore on 13 April o.s. and arrived at Copenhagen, after a bad passage, on the 27th. Norris's instructions were the same as in the previous year, with the addition that he was to return home at the first opportunity of wind and weather in September, unless otherwise ordered. The full powers given to him and Finch, they were informed, still held good. At Elsinore Norris received a letter from the king of Sweden desiring him to join the Swedish fleet at Hanö and cruise thence to search of the enemy. At Copenhagen he found two Russian men-of-war "within the boom," which had found refuge there during the winter and which, after his departure, stopped and plundered British merchantmen in the

[1] Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XL. lxv., cf. Finch, 26 April o.s. Copies of Campredon's letters to the tsar and of the latter's reply (11 May o.s.) with Finch's despatches, R. O. Sweden 29.
[2] Finch, 28 June o.s.
[3] Townshend to Finch, 12 May o.s., *loc. cit.*
[4] To Norris, 9 April o.s., B. M. Add. MSS. 28146.
[5] Finch, 29 April o.s.
[6] To Finch, 7 April o.s., *loc. cit.*

Cattegat.[1] Having joined the Swedes, Norris cruised with them off Oeland and Gothland on the look-out for Russians, but none were seen or heard of, and so sail was made for Elsnabben, where anchor was cast on 18 May o.s. At a council held at Stockholm three days later Norris was urged to take up station in the roads of Söder-arm, opposite the Åland isles, a position, it was insisted, "equally safe and commodious to observe and keep in awe the Enemy's gallys, and from whence there is an easy going out and coming in to the open sea, in case the Enemy should come out with his grand fleet." He himself urged the impossibility of following the galleys among the rocks and islands, and that it was better to guard the coasts south of Stockholm. Moreover, he wrote, as there had been no actual hostilities with the Russians hitherto, it seemed best for the king's service to avoid them now that peace was so near. However, says he, the king of Sweden insisting with great warmth, and "upon considering that they should have no pretence against the sending instructions for inserting in their Treaty the article relating to the quiet of Germany, which His Majesty very readily promised to do, upon M^r. Finch's proposing it to him," he had consented to sail in three or four days if the answer expected from Nystad did not come within that time. Although the king, he said, "has always exprest himself with the greatest civility towards our Master and Country, yet there are many people who wish as much to see us engaged in action with the Czar, as they do for Sweden to have a Peace with him."

Detained by contrary winds, Norris could not sail as desired for ten days. In the meantime a Russian force of 5,000 regular troops and 370 Cossacks under the command of Lieut.-General Lacy ravaged the coast of Sweden from Gefle to beyond Umeå, the tale of burnings including four towns, 509 villages, and over 4,000 houses.[2] This led to an appeal from Campredon to Osterman that the ravagings should be stopped,[3] but nothing else could be done to prevent them, even the Swedish pilots, Norris wrote, being unacquainted with the navigation of those waters. The fleet stayed at Käppelsskär, doing nothing, till the end of August, Norris himself spending most of the time in diplomatic work at Stockholm.[4]

The conferences at Nystad did not really open till Osterman had joined General Bruce there at the end of May. Then Lillienstedt sent word that he had given in on the question of Esthonia

[1] Glenorchy, 14 June; Jackson, 14 June o.s.

[2] Accounts, translated from the Russian, with Jefferyes' despatches, R. O. Poland 27. Bacmeister, II. 210–18.

[3] Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XL. lxvii.

[4] Norris's journal and letter-book, as before, and his despatches, R.O., S.P. Dom. Naval and Admiralty, In-Letters 3; also Jackson's despatches.

and Livonia and confined his arguments to the restoration of Viborg, though without success; and further, that Rumyantsev had come to Nystad and declared on the tsar's part that if his conditions were accepted he would abandon the interests of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Finch wrote:—

"Notwithstanding the many obstacles to peace, especially of its being made at Neustad, that Count Fridach has rais'd; and notwithstanding the great offers the King of Prussia makes now of a present assistance both in money and men; together with the assurances which the Court of Denmark has given, that if the Swedes will continue the war a year longer, there is the greatest probability that they shall be able to assist them the next year, the peace between Sweden and the Czar will be concluded immediately at Neustad. And what makes me almost sure that it will be finish'd at Neustad, is, that the King and Senate of Sweden are convinced, that that is the method the most agreeable to the King our Master's desires."

Lillienstedt, Finch went on, was ordered to obtain as much money for Livonia as he could, but on no account to delay the conclusion of preliminaries any longer.[1]

Pressing the article for the security of Lower Saxony Townshend wrote:—

"all other means must be used, as well as instances with Sweden, to obtain this most material point. . . . You cannot render the King a more acceptable service. . . . We are not, it is true, in open warr with the Czar, yet the sending our squadrons every year into the Baltick to protect Sweden, may be construed to amount to little less; and consequently afford the Czar a specious pretence to give his Maj^ty disturbance after the peace with Sweden is finished, unless timely precaution is taken to prevent it by some article in that very Treaty."

It would be "pretty extraordinary," he went on, for the king to guarantee the treaty, as desired, and then to be exposed to the tsar's resentment for what he had done in defence of Sweden. If that were the case he would be "under great if not unsurmountable difficulties" in finding the £100,000 to be paid after the peace. If too late for the preliminary treaty, the article should be inserted in the final one. Campredon would be the man to overcome the tsar's objections, and Finch must let him know how much the king "depends on his friendly and vigorous offices with the Russian ministers on this occasion," and that they should be suitably acknowledged. What the king desired was no more than the Swedes were "already obliged to perform by the late Defensive Allyance, by virtue of which they receive all their succours from hence." As to the endeavour reported by Finch on the part of some senators (Cronhielm and his party, to wit), to have the final

[1] Finch, 8 and 14 June o.s.

treaty concluded at Brunswick, this " would certainly have been of a very pernicious consequence, if it had succeeded, and would in all probability have put matters in such a condition as only to have set us very soon adrift again." [1]

At this time the idea of reconciliation with the tsar was taken up again, and Whitworth was instructed to approach Golovkin. He strongly approved, but thought that Kurakin, with whom, as he was going to Spa, he would have the opportunity of conversing at the Hague, would be a better medium, he having long been intimate with him and in his confidence. Best of all, however, he thought, to work through the court of Prussia, whose good offices the tsar had requested. Having spoken informally to Golovkin, he reported that what he said was well received.[2]

Leaving Berlin on 17 July he duly saw Kurakin, and having set forth to him the reasons for friendship between their masters reported his disposition to be all that could be wished. Kurakin advised that a person of distinction ought to be sent by the king of England to St. Petersburg, and Whitworth suggested that Kurakin himself should go to England, especially as " there is not the very shadow of business left at the Hague." The overtures, however, had no result, for when Whitworth returned from his course of waters in October he found that Kurakin had received no reply to the report which he had sent.[3]

Advices came from Nystad in July that the tsar insisted on three points : to include the king and republic of Poland in the preliminary treaty ; to be permitted to use his best endeavours with the riksdag, after the decease of the present king and queen, to procure the election of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp ; and to have the district ceded with Viborg extended to the river Petis. As regards the first, Prince Sergius Dolgoruky had been sent back to Dresden with the answer that the tsar would conclude no peace without inclusion of the king and the republic and would always have a special care for their interests.[4] This condition, says Finch, was admitted by the Swedes, but the attempt was to be pressed to the last to include the king of England, as elector, also, or at least to exclude anything which might prevent his inclusion in the final treaty. But the second point was absolutely refused, and on the third the distance of a mile only from Viborg was conceded ; to give up the Petis, it was said, would be to place under the tsar's control all the supplies of provisions and of pitch and tar coming from those

[1] Townshend to Finch, 13 and 17 June o.s., *loc. cit.*
[2] Whitworth, 14 to 24 June, R. O. Prussia 14.
[3] From the Hague, 29 July and 10 Oct., secret, ibid. 15.
[4] Scott, to whom Flemming showed the tsar's answer, 19 July.

regions. No request, Finch went on, was yet made for the king of England's guarantee, but Campredon had asked for credentials to go to St. Petersburg again, and no one could support the king of England's interests better than he, having "all the abilitys and inclination to serve the King our Master which can be desir'd." He had drawn, he said, for the sum of £10,000 as instructed by Townshend, and the king of Sweden was very sensible of the obligation.[1] Before this, 300,000 crowns had been received from Paris.[2]

Townshend in reply expressed surprise that it was proposed to include the king only as elector, "it being unreasonable that his Maj^ty^ and this Kingdom, who have chiefly assisted the Swedes, should be excluded out of the peace." Sweden was definitely engaged to the inclusion of Great Britain by article 16 of their treaty. If the king and republic of Poland and the emperor were to be admitted, then the king of England must be also, as king, and if this were not stipulated in the treaty Finch must do his best to get the omission rectified.[3] Soon after this Townshend learnt that it was agreed that the king of England should be included in the treaty both as king and as elector, that the article regarding Lower Saxony should be inserted, and that the final treaty should be concluded at Nystad. No difficulty, Norris and Finch reported on Lillienstedt's authority, was made by the Russians in regard to the article, and positive orders had been sent for its insertion.[4] Expressing the king's pleasure thereat Townshend wrote: "the resolution the Czar has taken of having no preliminary treaty but to finish all at once is as much relished here as in Sweden." Every effort must be made to induce the Swedes "to submit to any terms rather than to pursue the war, which can end in nothing but the King and Kingdome of Sweden's entire destruction." [5]

Townshend also reported a conversation with the Swedish envoy, Baron Sparre, on a guarantee and on the suggested quadruple alliance between France, Sweden, Russia and Great Britain. Sparre, he said, appeared to be of opinion that only the most pressing necessity ought to induce the king of Sweden to have so bad a peace guaranteed, and on the other hand that the leading motive of France was "their particular favour towards the Czar now," as likely, possessed of Livonia, to be a more useful ally than ever Sweden had been. The king would follow, as to the guarantee, the king of Sweden's inclination, but,

[1] Finch, 10 July o.s. Copy of the orders to the plenipotentiaries respecting the king of England enclosed. Cf. Le Dran, *Sbornik*, XL. lxviii.
[2] Le Dran, p. lxvi. He says that they cost 2,250,000 French livres.
[3] Townshend to Finch, 25 and 27 July o.s.
[4] Norris and Finch, 24 and 25 July o.s.
[5] To Finch and Norris, 9 and 10 Aug. o.s.

"if ever Sweden should be in a condition to recover Livonia, that engagement might be a barr to hinder great Britain from assisting them by virtue of our present Defensive Allyance. . . . Nothing but the Czar's insisting peremptorily to have it guarantyed could be a reason for their submitting to have it done."

The advisability of the new alliance would also be left to the king of Sweden's consideration, but it was doubted whether it would be of advantage to any of the parties but France.

"The King as to his own thoughts is not desirous of seeing either the Guaranty or the Defensive Allyance entered into, as proposed, but would by no means give publickly his opinion against either, because if that should be known his Maj$^{ty.}$ might disoblige both France and the Czar, and by that means perhaps be excluded from these engagements at the same time that the King of Sweden enters into them ; which is no wise the King's intention, his Maj$^{ty.}$ being always desirous, if they are made, to have his share in them."

Finch must be cautious in speaking of these matters and must neither mention Sparre's name nor let out anything about the opinions he held to Campredon and the French party.[1] Finch replied that he could not account for Sparre's utterances nor tell upon what grounds they were founded.[2]

On 2 August o.s. Finch had sent word that the article regarding the circle of Lower Saxony was actually inserted in the draft of the treaty. Sparre on the other hand said that the tsar, having already refused to admit mention of the empire in general, as not engaged in the quarrel, objected also on the same ground to the inclusion of the circle, though he had readily acquiesced in admitting the king of England both as king and as elector. Only insistence upon the article, he thought, could defeat the treaty. Surprised at the contradiction, of how little use, wrote Townshend, would peace be between Sweden and Russia if the war were only to be transferred "to that part of Germany, which may be consider'd as the principal seat and the support of the protestant religion in the Empire!" The king could not but be concerned, especially in view of the attitude of the court of Vienna, at "the prospect of an army of Russes among so many protestant powers. . . . And thô his own interest is not so immediately affected, yet his Maj$^{ty.}$ having a general view to the safety of our religion, the publick good and the peace of Europe cannot help concerning himself in this affair." Yet the article must not be insisted upon, if there were really a risk of breaking the treaty by it.[3]

Soon after this was written, further advices came from Norris

[1] Townshend to Finch, 9 Aug. o.s.
[2] 6 Sept. o.s.
[3] To Finch, 15 Aug. o.s.

and Finch of fresh assurances given them that the article concerning Lower Saxony was inserted word for word as sent. Both themselves and Campredon were putting pressure on the Swedes to conclude the treaty, holding them responsible for the delay, partly on the strength of a letter received by Campredon from Osterman. They on their part had intimated that it was time for the fleet to return home, while Campredon declined to pay the 200,000 crowns which he had still in hand, until the treaty was adjusted, the purpose of the subsidy having been, he asserted, to procure peace and enable troops thereafter to be transported to Finland. Campredon in his reply to Osterman would insist on the necessity of the article.[1] Townshend thereupon again expressed the king's satisfaction, and remarked that the desire of the Holstein party to refer the final treaty to Brunswick was a chief reason for the king of Sweden getting it finished at Nystad with the utmost expedition, in order " that the Imperialists, the Danes, and the Prussians joyn'd with the Holstein Faction may have less time and opportunity to work their ends and embarrass the conclusion of the Peace." Finch must " spare no pains " but make " the most vigorous instances to procure its conclusion. If the King of Sweden does not take upon him to go through with this Congress, and to finish all he has to do at Neustadt, I look upon his affairs in Sweden as ruined and lost." [2]

This reference to Prussia is curious, considering king George's present relations with that court. It was occasioned by Finch's advice, " the Emperor's, the King of Prussia's, and the King of Denmark's Ministers . . . are all against the speedy conclusion of the Peace of Neustad, and are labouring to transfer that affair to Brunswick. But, I think, they will not succeed." [3] To the emperor, of course, it was of the utmost importance that his authority should be recognized by a final pacification of the north at Brunswick under his supervision. Why Denmark should desire this, and that the war should be continued, is not so clear, seeing that imperial intervention would endanger her possession of Sleswick. The position of Prussia continued to be that, if Peter the Great was to keep Livonia, then he must be conciliated; they must, Ilgen repeated, have him for a friend, if they were not in a condition to oppose him as an enemy.[4] But it would have been

[1] Norris and Finch, 6 Aug. o.s., enclosing copies of Osterman's letter and of Campredon's reply. The latter, said Finch, " has done all that is possible to promote the speedy conclusion of Peace. . . . The Party for the Congress of Brunswick make use of all methods to defeat the conclusion."

[2] Townshend to Finch, 22 Aug. o.s.

[3] 6 Aug. o.s.

[4] Harris, 5 and 9 Aug.; cf. Droysen, p. 321.

preferred that Livonia should be recovered from the tsar[1] and prolongation of the war was favoured in that hope; if there were prospect of success and of sufficient reward to Prussia, then she was prepared, it was at least believed, to take part in it herself. The movement of Prussian troops to Königsberg for exercise, the king himself going to inspect them, was taken as evidence of that intention. And overtures were made at St. Petersburg, as formerly at Stockholm, for the purchase of Stralsund and Rügen.[2]

The treaty of Nystad was signed in the night of 30–31 August o.s.[3] Sweden ceded Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria and part of Carelia; the towns and fortresses of Riga, Dunamünde, Pernau, Reval, Dorpat, Narva, Viborg and Keksholm with the other towns and fortresses and the districts appertaining; and the islands of Oesel, Dagö, Moen and all others from the frontier of Courland to Viborg; with all appurtenances without exception. The tsar restored Finland and undertook to pay two million crowns in four equal instalments from February 1722 to September 1724. He promised solemnly not to interfere in the internal affairs of Sweden and not only not to support any attempt to upset the form of government established but to oppose such, if it came to his knowledge. Sweden was accorded permission to purchase corn free of export duty at Riga, Reval and Arensburg (in Oesel) to the value of 50,000 roubles annually, excepting in years in which famine or other cause should oblige the tsar to prohibit the export of corn. Maintenance of privileges and of the Evangelical religion and restitution of estates to qualified claimants in the ceded provinces were provided for. From the amnesty clause were specially excepted the Cossacks who had sided with Sweden in the war. The king and republic of Poland were included in the treaty as allies of the tsar, and liberty was given to them to accede, as though their treaty to be made with Sweden under the tsar's mediation were inserted word for word; all hostilities between Poland and Sweden were to cease and a Swedish ambassador was to be sent to Warsaw to treat. A treaty of commerce was to be concluded; in the meantime the same freedom of trade to be enjoyed by the subjects of either power as by others. The twenty-first article ran (in the French version):

"De la part de Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède on comprend aussi dans ce Traité de Paix Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne, à la reserve des Griefs qu'il y a entre Sa Majesté Czarienne et le dit Roi, dont on traitera directement, et l'on tâchera de les terminer amiablement. Il sera permis

[1] Thus Frederick William: "Mein interesse ist mächtige Freunde aber nicht mächtige Nachbarn zu haben" (Droysen, p. 314).

[2] Droysen, pp. 314–15.

[3] Norris, Finch and Jackson (2 Sept. o.s.) give the actual time as 3.0 a.m. on the 31st.

aussi à d'autres Puissances, qui seront nommées par les deux Parties pacifiantes dans l'espace de trois mois, d'accéder à ce Traité de Paix." [1]

In spite, then, of all the assurances given and expectations entertained George I was only included indirectly and even ignominiously, nor was there any stipulation whatever for the security of the empire or the circle of Lower Saxony. His astonishment and disgust were great, and the Swedes professed themselves equally surprised. Count Horn asked Norris and Finch to be assured that the Swedes had not been " masters of this Treaty," as they would see when they knew what terrible sacrifices had been necessitated; so many provinces given up, " the brave General Ulrich and the Cossacks " not included, and acceptance of the tsar's terms in regard to Poland enforced; they were " tied down to send an ambassadour thither for the concluding a war, which they did not own was begun, and what was still more, the Czar to be Mediator." He trusted that the result would not be taken ill. " If," he said, " they had had a better Peace, and the King our Master not contented with any condition of it, they should be willing to break it upon his desire, and much more so to break such a one as this was." As soon as the protocol of the debate on the clauses in question was received it should be shown to Norris and Finch to convince them of the good faith of the plenipotentiaries and at the same time of their impotence. Horn advocated as the most proper measure to be taken now an alliance between Great Britain, France, Sweden and Russia. Campredon, he said, was favourably instructed as to this, but France would not enter into such an alliance without Sweden, nor Sweden without Great Britain. All that was wanting in the treaty might thereby be repaired.[2] Later Finch reported an unanimous vote of the senate in favour of the proposed league.[3]

George had to put up with the slight put upon him with the best grace he could. Thus Cadogan in Holland was ordered to be very careful what he said about the matter, especially to Prince Kurakin, to avoid bringing it into conversation and " treat it with

[1] Dumont, VIII. ii. 36. " Fait à Neustad le 30 Août 1721 V.S." Copy of the German text with Finch's of 22 Sept. o.s., R. O. Sweden 29.

[2] Finch, 6 Sept. o.s. With this despatch (and further 22 Sept. o.s.) he enclosed extracts (translations) from the king of Sweden's instructions to the plenipotentiaries and their replies and from the protocols, showing the efforts made to carry out king George's wishes and how the Russians had insisted upon the inclusion of the king and republic of Poland as absolutely indispensable; also how in his instructions of 12 Aug. o.s. Frederick I had insisted upon the inclusion of the king of England, as king, and of Great Britain in plain and express terms. Intimating that it was proposed to send Campredon back to St. Petersburg Finch wrote: " I take the liberty to tell your Lordship that it will be absolutely necessary Mr. Bassewitz should have positive orders not to oppose it."

[3] 22 Sept. o.s.

indifference, as a thing His Majesty cannot be pleased with, but that gives him no uneasiness." [1] To Finch was sent a despatch in French, in order that it might be shown to the king of Sweden and his ministers. After congratulating heartily on the peace Townshend went on to say that the king, after the assurances given, had counted upon being included in it " de la manière la plus forte et la plus ample." The article regarding him was couched in such extraordinary terms that it would have been better for his honour and interests had he not been mentioned at all. And it was the more astonishing, in that the Russians did not appear to have insisted upon anything which gave reason for it. They had said, it seemed, that they were in perfect friendship with the king of England and saw no reason for admitting him to the treaty. Why then was he included with a reservation so contradictory to all that had been said ? In any case he ought to have been consulted before being brought in " d'une manière si malséante et désagréable." He was not incensed against the king or senate, but could only say that what had been done would deprive him of the power of being further useful to Sweden, as he would like to be. He certainly could not guarantee the treaty, nor did he think that the French government, so closely allied with himself, would do so. He must wait before taking further measures with Sweden and Russia until he saw the issue of this extraordinary reservation and what means would be found to redress the error. In the accompanying English despatch to Finch it was stated plainly that the king would not advance any more money to Sweden and that the Swedish merchants had been notified to accept no more bills. And orders were sent to Norris to bring the fleet back immediately. As an expedient Townshend suggested, as from himself,

" that the King of Sweden and the Czar should joyn in a declaration that his Maj^{ty} shall notwithstanding the reservation be deemed to be included in the Treaty without any condition and as fully and effectually as if that reservation had never been inserted ; if this could be brought about so soon that we

[1] Townshend to Cadogan, 26 Sept. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 7. " His Majesty is mentioned in such a manner as he has reason to resent ; but He has thought fit, however, to treat this matter with great mildness, least using the King and Senate of Sweden in a rougher stile might make them desperate. . . . There is another reason why His Majesty would not have it thought that he lays this matter much to heart, which is the value the Russes might on that account putt upon an incident which they found so disagreeable to His Majesty, and the encouragement it might give them." Whitworth thought that Great Britain could only " se tenir en répos et voit venir. Toute avance ultérieure ne feroit qu'augmenter la fierté du Czar, pendant qu'il se voit caressé d'une manière si extraordinaire par l'Empereur, la France et la Prusse : mais comme il faudra bien que les Uns ou les Autres soient en peu de tems détrompés de leurs espérances, cela poura donner lieu à d'autres conseilles " (10 Oct., secret, R. O. Prussia 15).

might receive such a declaration soon after the opening of the Session, it might possibly be the means of having this affair set right." [1]

Views on the matter were immediately exchanged with the government of France. Sir Luke Schaub, at this time in charge of affairs at Paris, obtained from Dubois the promise that orders should be sent to Campredon, who was being sent back to St. Petersburg, to act in concert with Finch " redresser nôtre insertion si irregulière " in the treaty of Nystad. Carteret replied expressing the king's satisfaction and explaining fully his reasons for having desired the inclusion of an article stipulating the security of the empire. Later he wrote about an alliance with Russia, saying that the king would not make overtures himself but act only through the regent.

" Si Son Altesse Royale peut porter le Czar, préalablement à toute négociation ultérieure, à signer un acte per lequel touts les Traittez faits avec la Couronne de Suède depuis la mort de Charles 12, desquels la France est garante, soient confirmez, et dans lequel Sa Maj[té] soit comprise comme Roy et comme Electeur, et le Czar s'engage de ne point troubler le repos de la Basse-Saxe, alors Elle promet au Régent de donner au Czar de concert avec la France une Garantie réciproque de tous les avantages que le Czar a obtenus par le Traitté de Neustadt."

After the signature of such an act the king would make no difficulty about sending a minister to St. Petersburg to negotiate the projected league between Great Britain, France, Russia and Sweden, with the object of preserving the peace of the north. If the tsar refused an offer so salutary for him, then there could be no further doubt that his views tended " à toute autre chose que la paix." [2] Finch proposed at Stockholm that the declaration desired should be embodied in a separate article to be added to the treaty, and the senate resolved to send a minister to St. Petersburg to negotiate this.[3] And Frederick I recommended the matter strongly to the attention of Campredon, who had now arrived there.[4]

Norris, having received the king of Sweden's leave with strong commendation of his services,[5] sailed from Elsnabben on 24 September o.s. He stayed a week at Copenhagen and anchored in the Thames on 19 October o.s. He brought with him John Law, who

[1] To Finch and to Norris, 26 Sept. o.s., R. O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

[2] Extracts from Schaub to Carteret of 18 Oct. and the reply, and copy of Carteret's of 31 Oct. o.s., sent to Finch for his private information 13 Oct. and 10 Nov. o.s., ibid. Townshend informed him in the latter despatch that a sum of £14,000, for which Baron Sparre was pressing, would by no means be paid.

[3] Finch, 18 and 25 Oct. o.s.

[4] Extract, 8 Nov. o.s., with Finch's despatch of that date.

[5] Copy of the king of Sweden's letter with Finch's of 22 Sept. o.s.

had lately arrived at Copenhagen from Hanover, excusing himself for doing so on the ground that, if he refused, Law might enter the service of some northern power to the prejudice of that of his Majesty.[1]

Thus matters were left for negotiation during the coming winter, conducted principally by Campredon. He had not much success in promoting king George's interests, perhaps he was not very eager to promote them, in spite of the devotion thereto with which he was credited. Great Britain remained estranged from Russia for nearly twenty years, though not suffering the injuries to her commerce which had been apprehended. And indeed that Baltic commerce was of less importance, now that naval stores were coming year by year in increasing quantities from the American plantations.

The grant of the investitures of Bremen and Verden and Stettin was still delayed. The matter had been referred to the Aulic Council, months were occupied in its consideration, and when a conclusion was come to the vice-chancellor, whose duty it was to report it to the emperor, put off doing so as long as possible. In vain St. Saphorin and Huldenberg and Canngiesser had interview after interview with the other German ministers; they could do nothing. One objection made was the king of Prussia's refusal to complete his restitution of the reprisals until the elector Palatine did so; a sum of 10,000 crowns remained in question. Not till the second week in August was the resolution delivered, and then the grants were found to be burdened with impossible conditions, such as payment of arrears from the Turkish war and other dues, limitation of river and coast tolls, changes in the directorate of Lower Saxony, privileges for the inhabitants of the ceded provinces, an undertaking to send ministers to Brunswick, and, in the case of Prussia, full restitution of the reprisals. St. Saphorin inveighed bitterly against these "conditions odieuses et qui n'ont nul rapport à la chose," and advised that the strongest language should be used with Hofmann in London. To give in to the demands, he said, would only cause others to be made.[2] Nor was less anger aroused in England. Townshend expressed astonishment and disgust at the conduct of the imperial court, in spite of the great services rendered to the emperor and his predecessors. "On tâche par ce moyen de rendre le Roy méprisable aux yeux de toute l'Europe. C'est ainsi que Sa Majesté conçoit toute cette transaction des Investitures, et Elle ne se soumettra jamais à quoy

[1] Norris, 3 Oct. o.s., R. O., S.P. Dom. Naval, with an original letter from Law to Townshend.

[2] St. Saphorin's despatches, to 16 August.

qu'on lui puisse demander au delà de ce qu'on exigea à pareille occasion au Roy de Suède." The king's English subjects were as much aggrieved as his Hanoverian; all who wished well to him, to the Protestant religion and to the liberties of their country saw no other means of preserving their security than by supporting him in his dominions across the sea as strongly as in Great Britain. A proof of this was the readiness with which parliament had granted the subsidy to Sweden. Townshend went on to declaim at length on the folly and self-deception of the court of Vienna. It was useless, he said, for it to build hopes upon disunion in England; there had been some small discontents among the ministers, but now they were assuaged and a perfect harmony established.[1]

However, attempts to restore the old good understanding with the emperor were not abandoned, and it was sought to purchase the favour of Count Althan.[2] But suddenly progress was arrested by a diplomatic rupture between the courts of Vienna and Berlin. Canngiesser, after presenting a strongly-worded letter from the king of Prussia, was forbidden the court. St. Saphorin says that the expressions objected to had not really the insulting character ascribed to them, but were purposely so misinterpreted by the vice-chancellor.[3] In return, the same step was taken in regard to Voss, the imperial resident at Berlin. A month later Canngiesser was ordered to quit the emperor's dominions. The king of Prussia wrote to the emperor expressing his concern at the incident and pointing out that the sense given to his words was forced, and at the same time sought king George's good offices.[4] But there was no prospect of reconciliation for the present.

Reviewing the policy of George I in the north, we see in the years 1709 to 1721 three successive phases of it; indecision, war with Sweden, and approximation to war with Russia. In the second phase George was successful, gaining for Hanover the valuable acquisition of Bremen and Verden, though the gain was discounted by the concomitant aggrandisement of Prussia and the transference of ducal Sleswick to Denmark. In the third he suffered dire defeat. How far his policy, as elector, was damaging to British interests is a question which has been referred to; it has been debated for nearly two centuries and will probably never be agreed upon. The chief consideration is, how far it caused the hostility with Russia. If

[1] Townshend to St. Saphorin, 22 and 25 Aug. o.s., R. O. Germany (Empire) 42; drafts.

[2] See the correspondence, ibid. and 44.

[3] 17 Sept. But, "quoy que le Vice-Chancelier agisse le plus malicieusement, cependant il n'y a aucun Ministre sans exception, qui ne voye avec le plus grand chagrin l'union des Puissances Protestantes d'Allemagne, et surtout celle qui est entre Sa Mtè et le Roy de Prusse."

[4] Harris, 4 Oct.

George had sided with Charles XII instead of with his enemies, Charles might, perhaps, have recovered his dominions in the east, and then there would have been no Russian mastery of the Baltic to fear. But to do so, as we have seen, was not possible, principally in consequence of the perversity of Charles himself. After his accession George's policy was not all inspired from Hanover, his British governments supported it as in the interests of Great Britain. Townshend, Stanhope, Stair, Carteret, Whitworth were not inspired by affection for Hanover; in the last years they were strong in opposition to the policy of Bernstorff. Jealousy of the rise of Russia was natural on the part of Great Britain and inevitable.

King George's methods in diplomacy are sufficiently indicated in the foregoing pages. Selfish and tortuous they were, but if not straightforward he was strong, and he restored to Great Britain the foremost place in Europe. More interesting in character are his two great contemporaries, Charles XII and Peter the Great, and remarkable is the contrast; the one a man of heroic valour, truthful, honourable and temperate, the other brutal in his methods, savage in his temper, and habituated to vice. But Charles's virtues are figured on the obverse of the medal, Peter's vices on the reverse. In contemplating the former we are apt to forget the inscription on the other side, which tells of the misery so nobly endured by his subjects and of the ruin of a great state. Charles made of honour an absurdity, and sacrificed all to its imaginary dictates. Peter recked little of honour, where it interfered with his aims; yet he was no hypocrite, as is seen in his straightforward declarations; he went on steadily through good and ill fortune towards his end and had his reward in seeing the accomplishment of his work. And that work was of surpassing grandeur; the transformation of barbarous Muscovy into the mighty empire of Russia.

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